Bombay High Court
The State Of Maharashtra vs Jagan Gagansingh Nepali on 5 August, 2011
Author: B.R.Gavai
Bench: B.R. Gavai, R. S. Dalvi
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 20 OF 2011
WITH
CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 798 OF 2011
The State of Maharashtra. ... Appellant.
V/s.
Jagan Gagansingh Nepali
@ Jagya and another. ... Respondents.
And
Smt.Sandhya Prafulla Patil. ... Intervener.
Mrs.A.S.Pai, Addl.P.P. for the appellant- State.
A.M.Saraogi with Priyatosh R. Tiwari
for respondent No.2.
Amit Desai, Senior Advocate with Gaurish Kadam
and Ravi Kamat i/b. V.V.Purwant for the
applicant (in APPA No.798/2010)
Shrikant Shivade with Ashish S. Sawant
for the intervener.
AND
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 407 OF 2011
The State of Maharashtra. ... Appellant.
V/s.
Devendra Baburao Jagtap
alias J.D. And others. ... Respondents.
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Mrs.A.S.Pai, Addl.P.P. for the appellant-State.
S.R.Chitnis, Senior Advocate with Ms.Pooja P.
Bhosale for respondent No.1.
A.M.Saraogi for respondent No.2.
AND
CRIMINAL BAIL APPLICATION NO. 600 OF 2011
Shri Sanjay Bhairu Waskar. ... Applicant.
V/s.
The State of Maharashtra. ... Respondent.
Aabad H.H.Ponda with Daljeet Singh Bhatia
for the applicant.
Mrs.A.S.Pai, Addl.P.P. for the respondent- State.
CORAM: MOHIT SHAH, C.J., B.R.GAVAI, J.
AND Mrs.ROSHAN DALVI, J.
DATED : 5th August 2011.
JUDGMENT :(Per B.R.Gavai, J.) Since the Division Bench of this Court vide its order dated 26th April 2011 passed in Criminal Appeal No.20/2011 has disagreed with the view taken ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:21 ::: 3 cr.apeal-20.11--
earlier by two Division Benches of this Court in Sherbahadur Akram Khan v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 ALL MR (Cri) 1 and Madan Ramkisan Gangwani v.
State of Maharashtra, 2009 ALL MR (Cri) 1447 that the term "other advantage" used in section 2(e) of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 ("MCOCA" for short) has to be read ejusdem generis with the words "for pecuniary benefits and undue economic", the matter is placed before us.
2. The question, therefore, that we are called upon to answer is "as to whether the term "other advantage" has to be read as ejusdem generis with the words "gaining pecuniary benefits, or gaining undue economic advantage" or whether the said term "other advantage" is required to be given a wider meaning".
3. We have heard Mrs.A.S.Pai, learned Addl.P.P. and Mr.Amit Desai, learned senior counsel in support of the proposition that the term "other advantage" is required to be given wider meaning and Mr.S.R.Chitnis, learned senior counsel, Mr.A.H.H.Ponda and Mr.Shrikant Shivade, learned counsel in support of the proposition that the term "other advantage" is required to be read as ejusdem generis with the words "gaining pecuniary benefits, or gaining undue economic advantage".
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4. It is the bone of contention of Mr.Desai and Mrs.Pai that if the wide meaning is not given to the term "other advantage", it would frustrate the legislative purpose of enacting the MOCCA which has been enacted for curbing the activities of the organised crime syndicate. It is submitted that the preamble of the enactment would give key to find out indication of the purpose for which the Act is enacted. It is submitted that from the perusal of the preamble, it would reveal that the Act has been enacted for making special provisions for prevention and control and coping with criminal activities of the organised crime syndicate or gang. It is submitted that from the preamble it cannot be said that the Act has been enacted for the purpose of preventing or controlling the criminal activities which are carried only with the objective of gaining pecuniary or economic advantage. It is, therefore, submitted that if a narrow meaning is given to the term "other advantage", that would not be in consonance with the legislative intent. Learned counsel submits that there are various other advantages for which the organised crime syndicate operate, like political advantage, religious advantage, pressuring the witnesses with an objective of assuring acquittal in the criminal trial. Learned counsel have relied upon various judgments of the Apex Court in support of the proposition that rule of ejusdem generis is not a universal rule of interpretation and as to whether ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:21 ::: 5 cr.apeal-20.11--
the said rule has to be applied will depend upon various factors including purpose for which the Act is enacted.
5. Learned Addl.P.P. as well as Mr.Desai, learned Senior Counsel submit that the two Division Benches of this Court in Anil Sadashiv Nanduskar v. State of Maharashtra, 2008 (3) Mh.L.J.(Cri) 650 and in the case of Ganesh Nivrutti Marne v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 (2) BCR(Cri) 586 have taken a view that the term "other advantage" cannot be read as ejusdem generis with pecuniary benefits and undue economic advantage. It is submitted that the said view is a correct view taking into consideration legislative intent and, as such, the same needs to be upheld.
6. On the other hand, it is submitted by Mr. Chitnis, Mr.Ponda, Mr.Shivade and Mr.Saraogi that the words used in section 2(e) of the MOCCA are unambiguous and plain. It is submitted that the words "other advantage" are preceded by the words "gaining pecuniary benefits, or gaining undue undue economic or". It is, therefore, submitted that these two species which form basis for common genus precede the words "other advantage" and, therefore, the words "other advantage" will have to be read as ejusdem generis. It is submitted that the view taken by the Division Benches of this Court in the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:21 ::: 6 cr.apeal-20.11--
cases of Sherbahadur Akram Khan v. State of Maharashtra and Madan Ramkisan Gangwani v. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) is a correct view and requires no reconsideration.
7. It is further submitted by Shri Ponda that the legislative intent is clear. It is submitted that the definition of "abet" in section 2(a) is inclusive whereas definitions of "continuing unlawful activity" and "organised crime" are not inclusive. It is, therefore, submitted that though a wider meaning can be given to the definition which is inclusive, the same is not permissible to the definition which is not inclusive. Learned counsel further submitted that in section 2(e) it is provided that the organised crime also includes any activity which is carried with an objective of promoting insurgency. It is submitted that this is a wider category which does not require economic or pecuniary advantage. It is, therefore, submitted that the legislative intent is clear in so far as advantages are concerned. The legislative intent is that they should be either pecuniary or economic.
It is further submitted that in so far as organised crime committed for promoting insurgency is concerned, no advantage is required. It is submitted that had the legislative intent been different, the legislature would have inserted the words "promoting insurgency" prior to the words ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:21 ::: 7 cr.apeal-20.11--
"pecuniary gains and undue economic advantage". The learned counsel submit that the term "other advantage" means and include financial, material, monetary profit, corruption, controlling market, parallel market and enrichment of participation. It is submitted that the object of MCOCA is to deal with not a routine crime but a crime which has a lethal combination of money and violence.
8. It is further submitted that the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Lalit Somdatta Nagpal, (2007) 4 SCC 171 has held that since the provisions of MCOCA are stringent in nature, they will have to be interpreted strictly. The learned counsel relying upon various judgments of the Apex Court also submit that when two view are possible, the view which favours the subject will have to be preferred. Learned counsel further, relying on various provisions of MCOCA, submit that a conjoint reading of these provisions reveals that the MCOCA is concerned with an offence only for monetary and economic benefit and, therefore, interpretation of section 2(e) by the Division Benches in the case of Sherbahadur Akram Khan v. State of Maharashtra and Madan Ramkisan Gangwani v. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) requires no interference.
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9. The learned counsel also relying on paragraphs- 23 and 24 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 ALL MR (Cri) 1538 (SC) submitted that the Apex Court has clearly held that the expression "any unlawful means" must refer to any such act which has a direct nexus with the commission of a crime which MCOCA seeks to prevent or control. It is submitted that since the MCOCA has been enacted for the purpose of combating crime committed for the purpose of economic and pecuniary advantages, the legislative intent permits only narrower expression to be placed for the said term "other advantage".
10. For appreciating the controversy, it would be necessary to refer to certain provisions of MCOCA, namely, section 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), section 3 and section 23 which read as under:
"2. Definitions (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) - (c) ..... .....
(d) "continuing unlawful
activity" means an activity
prohibited by law for the time being in force, which is a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment of three years or more, undertaken either singly or jointly, as a ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 9 cr.apeal-20.11--
member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate in respect of which more than one charge-sheets have been filed before a competent Court within the preceding period of ten years and that Court have taken cognizance of such offence;
(e) "organised crime" means any continuing unlawful activity by an individual, singly or jointly, either as member of an organized crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate, by use of violence or threat of violence or intimidation or coercion, or other unlawful means, with objective of gaining pecuniary benefits, or gaining undue economic or other advantage for himself or any other person or promoting insurgency;
(f) "organised crime syndicate"
means a group of two or more persons who, acting either singly or collectively, as a syndicate or gang indulge in activities of organised crime;....."
3. Punishment for organised crime (1) Whoever commits an offence of organised crime shall,-
(i) if such offence has resulted in the death of any person, be punishable with death or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to a fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees one lac;
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(ii) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to a fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(2) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit or advocates, abets or knowingly facilitates the commission of an organized crime or any act preparatory to organized crime, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to a fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(3) Whoever harbours or conceals or attempts to harbour or conceal, any member of an organised crime syndicate shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to a fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(4) Any person who is a member of an organized crime syndicate shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to a fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(5) Whoever holds any property derived or obtained from commission of an organised crime or which has been ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 11 cr.apeal-20.11--
acquired through the organized crime syndicate funds shall be punishable with a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees two lacs.
11. Power to transfer cases to regular Courts Where, after taking cognizance of an offence, a Special Court is of the opinion that the offence is not triable by it, it shall notwithstanding that it has no jurisdiction to try such offence, transfer the case for trial of such offence to any Court having jurisdiction under the Code and the Court to which the case is transferred may proceed with the trial of the offence as if it had taken cognizance of the offence.
23. Cognizance of, and investigation into, an offence (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code,-
(a) no information about the commission of an offence of organized crime under this Act, shall be recorded by a police office without the prior approval of the police officer not below the rank of the Deputy Inspector General of Police;
(b) no investigation of an offence under the provisions of this Act shall be carried out by ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 12 cr.apeal-20.11--
a police officer below the rank of the Deputy Superintendent of Police.
(2) No Special Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act without the previous sanction of the police officer not below the rank of additional director General of Police.
It will also be relevant to refer to the Preamble of the Act and Statement of Objects and Reasons. The preamble reads thus:
"An Act to make special provisions for prevention and control of, and for coping with, criminal activity by organized crime syndicate or gang, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."
Statement of Objects and Reasons reads thus :
"Organised crime has been for quite some years now come up as a very serious threat to our society. It knows no national boundaries and is fueled by illegal wealth generated by contract, killing, extortion, smuggling in contrabands, illegal trade in narcotics kidnappings for ransom, collection of protection money and money laundering, etc. The illegal wealth and black money generated by the organized crime being very huge, it has had serious adverse effect on our economy. It was seen that the organized criminal ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 :::
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syndicates made a common cause with terrorist gangs and foster terrorism which extend beyond the national boundaries. There was reason to believe that organized criminal gangs have been operating in the State and, thus, there was immediate need to curb their activities.
It was also noticed that the organized criminals have been making extensive use of wire and oral communications in their criminal activities. The interception of such communications to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes or to prevent their commission would be an indispensable aid to law enforcement and the administration of justice.
2. The existing legal frame work i.e. the penal and procedural laws and the adjudicatory system were found to be rather inadequate to curb or control the menace of organized crime. Government, therefore, decided to enact a special law with stringent and deterrent provisions including in certain circumstances power to intercept wire, electronic or oral communication to control the menace of the organized crime.
It is the purpose of this act to achieve these objects."
Mr.Ponda, learned counsel has also placed on record preface of MCOCA. It will also be relevant to produce the same. It reads thus:
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As explained in the statement of object and reasons, the menace of organised crime, was on the increase and there was no effective law in the Maharashtra State to effectively control the organised crimes.
Mumbai being the economic capital of India, it is a targeted centre of criminals who hoard money through illegal means. In recent years criminal activities like murders of tycoons related to film industry as well by builders, extortion of money from businessmen, abduction etc. show that criminal gangs are active in the state. To cope with them- legislation in the lines of the present law was essential. Effective measures against the misuse of law have been provided in the Act itself. It is hoped that with the passing of this law, unlawful elements spreading terrorism in the society can be controlled to great extent and it will go a long way in minimizing the feeling of fear spread in the society.
11. From the perusal of section 2(e), it can be seen that the following ingredients will be necessary to make out the case of an organised crime: (i) that there has to be a continuing unlawful activities; (ii) that such an activity will have to be by an individual, singly or jointly;
(iii) that such an activity is either by a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate; (iv) that there has to be use of violence or threat of violence or intimidation or coercion or ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 15 cr.apeal-20.11--
other unlawful means; (v) that such an activity has to be with an objective of gaining pecuniary benefits or gaining undue economic or other advantage for the person who undertakes such an activity or any other person or promoting insurgency. The ingredients of continuing unlawful activities would be: (i) that such an activity should be prohibited by law for the time being in force; (ii) that such an activity is a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment of three years or more (iii) that such an activity is undertaken either singly or jointly, as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate; (iv) that in respect of such an activity more than one charge-sheet must have been filed before a competent Court; and (v) that the charge-
sheets must have been filed within a preceding period of ten years; and (vi) that the Courts have taken cognizance of such offences.
12. In the present case we are only required to interpret the words of section 2(e), viz., "with objective of gaining pecuniary benefits, and undue economic or other advantage" and, therefore, it is not necessary for us to deal with other aspects of the matter. For that it will be relevant to refer to the dictionary meaning of the words "economic";
"pecuniary"; and "other". As per Law Lexicon, "economic" means pertaining to wealth. "Pecuniary"
means monetary; relating to money, consisting of ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 16 cr.apeal-20.11--
money, belonging to, or having relation to money.
"Other" means different from that which has been specified.
13. We will first deal with the contention as to whether the term "other advantage" is required to be construed as ejusdem generis with the terms "pecuniary benefits" or "economic advantage". The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Kochuni v. State of Madras & Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080 was considering the word "otherwise". The Apex Court observed thus:
"(50) ..... The word "otherwise" in the context, it is contended, must be construed by applying the rule of ejusdem generis. The rule is that when general words follow particular and specific words of the same nature, the general words must be confined to the things of the same kind as those specified. But it is clearly laid down by decided cases that the specific words must from a distinct genus or category. It is not an inviolable rule of law, but is only permissible inference in the absence of an indication to the contrary."
(emphasis supplied) It can, thus, be seen that the Apex Court has clearly held that the rule of ejusdem generis is not an inviolable rule of law but it is only permissible ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 17 cr.apeal-20.11--
inference in the absence of an indication to the contrary.
14. The Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of four Hon'ble Judges in the case of Jagdish Chandra Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., AIR 1964 SC 1882 was considering the contention that the words "other proceeding" in section 69(3) of the Partnership Act should be construed as ejusdem generis to the expression "a claim of set-off" in the said section. Rejecting the said contention, the Apex Court observed thus:
(6) It remains, however, to consider whether by reason of the fact that the words "other proceeding" stand opposed to the words "a claim of set-
off" any limitation in their meaning was contemplated. It is on this aspect of the case that the learned Judges have seriously differed. When in a statute particular classes are mentioned by name and then are followed by general words, the general words are sometimes construed ejusdem generis, i.e., limited to the same category or genus comprehended by the particular words. But it is not necessary that this rule must always apply. The nature of the special words and the general words must be considered before the rule is applied. In Allen v. Emerson, Asquith J. gave interesting examples of particular words followed by general words where the principle of ejusdem generis might or might not apply. We think that the following illustration will clear any ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 18 cr.apeal-20.11--
difficulty. In the expression "books, pamphlets, newspapers and other documents" private letters may not be held included if 'other documents' be interpreted ejusdem generis with what goes before. But in a provision which reads "newspapers or other document likely to convey secrets to the enemy", the words 'other documents' would include document of any kind and would not take their color from 'newspapers'. It follows, therefore, that interpretation ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociis need not always be made when words showing particular classes are followed by general words. Before the general words can be so interpreted there must be a genus constituted or a category disclosed with reference to which the general words can and are intended to be restricted. Here the expression "claim of set-off" does not disclose a category or a genus. Set-offs are of two kinds - legal and equitable -
and both are already comprehended and it is difficult to think of any right "arising from a contract" which is of the same nature as a claim of set-off and can be raised by a defendant in a suit. Mr.B.C.Misra, whom we invited to give us examples, admitted frankly that it was impossible for him to think of any proceeding of the nature of a claim of set off other than a claim of set-off which could be raised in a suit such as is described in the second sub-section. In respect of the first sub-section he could give only two examples. They are (i) a claim by a pledger of goods with an unregistered firm whose goods are attached and who has to make an objection under O. 21 r. 58 of the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 19 cr.apeal-20.11--
Code of Civil Procedure and (ii) proving a debt before a liquidator.
The latter is not raised as a defence and cannot belong to the same genus as a "claim of set-off". The former can be made of fit but by a stretch of some considerable imagination. It is difficult for us to accept that the Legislature was thinking of such far-fetched things when it spoke of "other proceeding" ejusdem generis with a claim of set-off.
(emphasis supplied) It can, thus, be seen that the Apex Court has clearly held that it was difficult to accept that the legislature was thinking of such far-fetched things when it spoke of "other proceeding" ejusdem generis with a claim of set-off.
15. Again the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, AIR 1965 SC 1167 had an occasion to consider clause 2(d)
(v) of Food Products Order (1955). Clause 2(d)(v) takes in squashes, crushes, cordials, barley water, barreled juice and ready-to-serve beverages or any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp. It was, thus contended that the product of the appellants which was a Sharbat would not be included in the said definition in as much as "any other" will have to be read as ejusdem generis with ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 20 cr.apeal-20.11--
the previous categories of the beverages. Rejecting the said contention, the Apex Court observed thus:
(15) Mr. Pathak wanted to suggest that the Sharbat in question is not a fruit product and as such, is outside the purview of the Fruit Order. We are not impressed by this argument.
We have already referred to clause 2(d)(v) of the Fruit Order which refers to several beverages, and the residuary part of this clause takes in any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp. The suggestion that this clause should be read ejusdem generis with the previous categories of beverages cannot obviously be accepted because an examination of the said beverages will disclose the fact that there is no genus by reference to which the rule of ejusdem generis can be properly invoked. Besides, the context of the clause clearly suggests that it is intended to take in all beverages other than those earlier specified, provided they contain fruit juices or fruit pulp. Therefore, we feel no difficulty in holding that the Sharbat in question falls within the purview of clause 2(d)(v) of the Fruit Order and as such, its production can be controlled by its relevant provisions.
(emphasis supplied) It can, thus, be seen that the Apex Court though found that there is no genus by reference to which ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 21 cr.apeal-20.11--
the rule of ejusdem generis can be properly invoked, the context of the clause clearly suggested that it was intended to take in all beverages other than those earlier specified, provided they contain fruit juices or fruit pulp.
16. In Tribhuban Parkash v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 540, it was contended before the Apex Court that the expression "other sufficient cause"
occurring in clause (iv) of rule 18 of Displaced Persons (Verification of Claims) Supplementary Rules, 1954 has to be read as ejusdem generis with the categories mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) of the said rule. Negating the said contention, the Apex Court observed thus:
13. ..... When in a statute there are general words following particular and specific words, the general words are sometimes construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified. This rule of interpretation generally known as ejusdem generis rule has been pressed into service on behalf of the appellant. This rule reflects an attempt to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words, in view of the other rules of interpretation, that all words in a statute are given effect if possible, that a statute is to be construed as a whole and that no words in a statute are presumed to be superfluous. Ejusdem generis rule being one of the rules of ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 22 cr.apeal-20.11--
interpretation, only serves, like all such rules, as an aid to discover the legislative intent; it is neither final nor conclusive and is attracted only when the specific words enumerated, constitute a class, which is not exhausted" and are followed by general terms and when there is no manifestation of intent to give broader meaning to the general words.
(emphasis supplied) It can, thus, be seen that the Apex Court observed that ejusdem generis rule being one of the rules of interpretation, only serves, like all such rules, as an aid to discover the legislative intent. It can further be seen that it has been held that the rule of ejusdem generis would be attracted only when the specific words enumerated, constitute a class, which is not exhausted.
17. In the case of Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. Collector of Excise, Tripura, AIR 1972 SC 1863 it was contended before the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court that the words "any other cause other than those specified in section 42" should be read as ejusdem generis with the causes specified in clauses (a) to (g) of section 42(1). Negating the said contention, the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court observed thus:
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9. Before dealing with the contention relating to Article 19 we consider it proper to dispose of the argument founded on the ejusdem generis rule and Article 14 of the Constitution. It was contended by Shri Sen that the only way in which Section 43 can be saved from the challenge of arbitrariness is to construe the expression "any cause other than" in Section 43(1) ejusdem generis with the causes specified in all. (a) to (g) of Section 42(1). We do not agree with this submission.
The ejusdem generis rule strives to reconcile the incompatibility between specific and general words. This doctrine applies when (i) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words; (ii) the subjects of the enumeration constitute a class or category; (iii) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) the general term follows the enumeration and (v) there is no indication of a different legislative intent. In the present case it is not easy to construe the various clauses of Section 42 as constituting one category or class. But that apart, the very language of the two sections and the objects intended respectively to be achieved by them also negative any intention of the legislature to attract the rule of ejusdem generis.
(emphasis supplied)
18. The Apex Court recently in the case of Maharashtra University of Health Sciences v.
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Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal, (2010) 3 SCC 786 was considering the definition of "teachers" defined in section 2(35) of the Maharashtra University of Health Sciences Act, 1998 reading as under:
"2(35). `teachers' means full time approved demonstrators, tutors, assistant lecturers, lecturers, readers, associate professors, professors and other persons teaching or giving instructions on full-time basis to affiliated colleges or approved institutions in the University."
This Court had applied principle of ejusdem generis holding that some of the respondents being unapproved teachers did not come under the definition of `teacher' under section 2(35) of the said Act. The Apex Court, after considering some of its earlier judgments on the issue, observed thus:
33. As noted above, in the instant case, there is a statutory indication to the contrary. Therefore, where there is statutory indication to the contrary the definition of teacher under Section 2(35) cannot be read on the basis of ejusdem generis nor can the definition be confined to only approved teachers. If that is done, then a substantial part of the definition under Section 2(35) would become redundant. That is against the very essence of the doctrine of ejusdem generis. The purpose of this ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 :::
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doctrine is to reconcile any incompatibility between specific and general words so that all words in a Statute can be given effect and no word becomes superfluous (See Sutherland: Statutory Construction, 5th Edition, page 189, Volume 2A).
34. It is also one of the cardinal canons of construction that no Statute can be interpreted in such a way as to render a part of it otiose. It is, therefore, clear where there is a different legislative intent, as in this case, the principle of ejusdem generis cannot be applied to make a part of the definition completely redundant.
35. By giving such a narrow and truncated interpretation of `teachers' under Section 2(35), High court has not only ignored a part of Section 2(35) but it has also unfortunately given an interpretation which is incompatible with the avowed purpose of Section 53 of the Act.
(emphasis supplied)
19. Thus, from the survey of the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court, it can be gathered that for applying the principle of ejusdem generis the following five conditions will have to be fulfilled"
(i) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words;::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 :::
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(ii) the subjects of the enumeration constitute a class or category;
(iii) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration;
(iv) the general term follows the enumeration; and
(v) there is no indication of a different legislative intent.
20. The perusal of section 2(e) would reveal that after the words "gaining pecuniary benefits"
there is a "comma" followed by the words "or gaining undue economic or other advantage". We have already reproduced hereinabove the dictionary meaning of "pecuniary" and "economic". To a pertinent query as to what the words "other advantage" could mean, if the principle of ejusdem generis was to be applied, Mr.Ponda, learned counsel stated that other advantage would mean and include financial, material, monetary profit, corruption, controlling market, parallel market and enrichment of participation. It can, thus, clearly be seen that all these would encompass within the term either "pecuniary" or "economic". It would, thus, be clear that the class or category of "pecuniary benefit" and "economic advantage" will stand exhausted. As such one of the essential conditions for applying the principle of ejusdem ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 27 cr.apeal-20.11--
generis, would not be available. Since the preceding words do not constitute mere specification of the genus but constitute description of complete genus, the rule of ejusdem generis will have no application as held by the Apex Court in Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. Collector of Excise, Tripura and Tribhuban Parkash v. Union of India (cited supra). It is a settled principle of law that the rule has to be applied with care and caution. It is not inviolable rule of law but it has only permissible inference in the absence of any indication to the contrary. For the reasons to be discussed hereinafter we also find that even the legislative intent would not permit such a narrow construction. If the construction as put forth by the respondents has to be accepted, then the term "other advantage" would become otiose. The Apex Court in the case of Grassim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297 has observed thus :
10. No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 28 cr.apeal-20.11--
of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sentential legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner "we cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there". In case of an ordinary word there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle is too well settled and reference to few decisions of this Court would suffice. [See: Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests, 1990 Supp SCC 785:AIR 1990 SC 1747, Union of India v.
Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323, Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse, (1997) 6 SCC 312 and ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 29 cr.apeal-20.11--
Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India, (2002) 4 SCC 275] (emphasis supplied) It can, thus, clearly be seen that the Apex Court has held that no word or expression used in the statute can be construed to be redundant or superfluous. It has been also held that one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. It has been held that every provision and word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used.
It has been held that the elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the intention of the legislation.
21. The next thrust on behalf of the respondents is that penal statutes are required to be construed in a strict manner and when two interpretations are permissible, the interpretation which favour the subject has to be accepted. To consider this submission, we will refer to some of the judgments of the Apex Court; wherein Their Lordships have interpreted the penal provisions.
22. In the case of State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese, 1986 2 SCC 746, the Apex Court was dealing with case of counterfeiting of currency notes. The Kerala High Court had held that counterfeiting of or ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 30 cr.apeal-20.11--
possessing of counterfeit dollar bills or dollar notes was not an offence under the Indian Law. The Apex Court observed thus :
Outcome: This analysis reveals that the legislative embargo against counterfeiting envelops and takes within its sweep 'currency notes' of all countries. The embargo is not restricted to 'Indian' currency notes. The legislature could have, but has not, employed the expression 'Indian currency note'. If the legislative intent was to restrict the parameters of prohibition to 'Indian currency' only, the legislature could have said so unhesitatingly. The expression 'currency note' is large enough in its amplitude to cover the currency notes of 'any' country. When the legislature does not speak of currency notes of India the Court interpreting the relevant provision of law cannot substitute the expression 'Indian currency note' in place of the expression 'currency note' as has been done by the High Court. The High Court cannot do so for, the Court can merely interpret the section; it cannot re- write, recast or redesign the section. In interpreting the provision the exercise undertaken by the Court is to make explicit the intention of the legislature which enacted the legislation. In is not for the Court to reframe the legislation for the very good reason that the powers to 'legislate' have not been conferred on the Court. When the expression 'currency note' is interpreted to mean 'Indian currency note', the width of the expression is being narrowed down or cut down. Apart from the fact that ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 :::
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the Court does not possess any such power, what is the purpose to be achieved by doing so? A Court can make a purposeful interpretation so as to 'effectuate' the intention of the legislature and not a purposeless one in order to 'defeat' the intention of the legislators wholly or in part. When the Court (apparently in the course of an exercise in interpretation) shrinks the content of the expression 'currency note', to make it referable to only 'Indian currency note', it is defeating the intention of the legislature partly inasmuch as the Court makes it lawful to counterfeit notes other than Indian currency notes. The manifest purpose of the provision is that the citizens should be protected from being deceived or cheated. The citizens deal with and transact business with each other through the medium of currency, (which expression includes coins as also paper currency that is to say currency notes). It is inconceivable why the legislature should be anxious to protect citizens from being deceived or cheated only in respect of Indian currency notes and not in respect of currency notes issued by other sovereign powers. The purpose of the legislation appears to be to ensure that a person accepting a currency note is given a genuine currency which can be exchanged for goods or services and not a worthless piece of paper which will bring him nothing in return, it being a counterfeit or a forged currency note. Would the legislature in its wisdom and anxiety to protect the unwary citizens extend immunity from being cheated in relation to Indian currency ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 32 cr.apeal-20.11--
notes but show total unconcern in regard to their being cheated in respect of currency notes issued by any foreign State or sovereign power? In the modern age a tourist from a foreign country may bring from his own country into India currency to the extent permissible under the law in India. So also he may obtain foreign currency in exchange of Indian currency whilst in India provided he does so to the extent permissible by the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 and operates through an authorised person known as money changer. Would it be reasonable to assume that the legislature was totally oblivious of the need to protect them from being deceived and defrauded? It would be unwise to do so in the face of the internal evidence which provides a clue to the legislative anxiety on this score. In fact the framers of the Code were so anxious to protect the general public from fraudulent acts of counterfeiters that not only have they defined the word "counterfeit" in very wide terms in the Indian Penal Code, but they have also prescribed a rule of evidence in Explanation 2 so as to draw an adverse presumption against the maker of the counterfeit article, as is evident from the definition of the term "Counterfeit" read with the Explanations in Section 28 of the Indian Penal Code.
(emphasis supplied) It can be seen that the Apex Court has clearly held that the Court can make a purposeful interpretation ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 33 cr.apeal-20.11--
so as to effectuate the intention of the legislature and not a purposeless one in order to defeat the intention of the legislators wholly or in part.
23. In case of Baldev v. Shipping Corporation of India, (1987) 4 SCC 361 section 630 of the Companies Act was under consideration of the Apex Court. Sub-section (1) of section 630 reads thus:
630. Penalty for wrongful withholding of property-
(1) If any officer or employee of a company-
(a) wrongfully obtains possession of any property of a company; or
(b) having any such property in his possession wrongfully withholds it or knowingly applies it to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles and authorised by this Act;
he shall, on the complaint of the company or any creditor or contributory thereof, be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees.
It was argued before the Apex Court that the term `officer' or the `employee' used in the said provision applied only to existing officer or employee and not past officer or employee. Negating the said contention, the Apex Court observed thus:
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7. The beneficent provision contained in Section 630 no doubt penal, has been purposely enacted by the legislature with the object of providing a summary procedure for retrieving the property of the company (a) where an officer or employee of a company wrongfully obtains possession of property of the company, or (b) where having been placed in possession of any such property during the course of his employment, wrongfully withholds possession of it after the termination of his employment. It is the duty of the Court to place a broad and liberal construction on the provision in furtherance of the object and purpose of the legislation which would suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.
8. Section 630 of the Act which makes the wrongful withholding of any property of a company by an officer or employee of the company a penal offence, is typical of the economy of language which is characteristic of the draughtsman of the Act. The section is in two parts. Sub-section (1) by clauses (a) and (b) creates two distinct and separate offences.
First of these is the one contemplated by clause (a), namely, where an officer or employee of a company wrongfully obtains possession of any property of the company during the course of his employment, to which he is not entitled. Normally, it is only the present officers and employees who can secure possession of any property of a company. It is ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 35 cr.apeal-20.11--
also possible for such an officer or employee after termination of his employment to wrongfully take away possession of any such property. This is the function of clause (a) and although it primarily refers to the existing officers and employees, it may also take in past officers and employees. In contrast, clause (b) contemplates a case where an officer or employee of a company having any property of a company in his possession wrongfully withholds it or knowingly applies it to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles and authorised by the Act. It may well be that an officer or employee may have lawfully obtained possession of any such property during the course of his employment but wrongfully withholds it after the termination of his employment. That appears to be one of the functions of clause (b). It would be noticed that Clause (b) also makes it an offence if any officer or employee of a company having any property of the company in his possession knowingly applies it to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles and authorised by the Act. That would primarily apply to the present officers and employees and may also include past officers and employees.
There is therefore no warrant to give a restrictive meaning to the term 'officer or employee' appearing in sub-section (1) of Section 630 of the Act. It is quite evident that clauses
(a) and (b) are separated by the word 'or' and therefore are clearly disjunctive.
(emphasis supplied) ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 36 cr.apeal-20.11--
It can, thus, be seen that the Apex Court held that it is the duty of the Court to place a broad and liberal construction on the provision in furtherance of the object and purpose of the legislation which would suppress the mischief and advance the remedy even in case of penal statute.
24. The Apex Court in the case of Balram Kumawat v. Union of India, (2003) 7 SCC 628 had an occasion to consider the meaning of the word "Ivory" used in Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. It was, thus, observed thus:
23. Furthermore, even in relation to a penal statute any narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical construction may not always be given effect to. The law would have to be interpreted having regard to the subject matter of the offence and the object of the law it seeks to achieve. The purpose of the law is not to allow the offender to sneak out of the meshes of law.
Criminal Jurisprudence does not say so.
26. The Courts will therefore reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the Legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. [See Salmon v. Duncombe . Reducing the legislation to futility shall be avoided and in a case where the intention of the Legislature cannot be given effect to, the Courts would ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 37 cr.apeal-20.11--
accept the bolder construction for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. The Courts, when rule of purposive construction is gaining momentum, should be very reluctant to hold that the Parliament has achieved nothing by the language it used when it is tolerably plain what it seeks to achieve. [See BBC Enterprises v. Hi-
Tech Xtravision Ltd., (1990) 2 ALL ER 118 (All ER at pp.122-23)] (emphasis supplied) It can, thus, be seen that the Apex Court has held that even in relation to a penal statute any narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical construction may not always be given direct effect to and the interpretation that has to be given should be with regard to the subject matter of the offence and the object of the law it seeks to achieve. The interpretation that defeats the plain intention of the legislature, even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used, will have to be rejected. It has been further held that the bolder construction for the purpose of bringing about an effective result will have to be accepted.
25. In Standard Chartered Bank v. Director of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530, it was contended before the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court that no criminal proceeding can be initiated against the Company for the offence under section 56(i) of the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 38 cr.apeal-20.11--
FERA since under the FERA minimum punishment prescribed is imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months and fine. Considering the contention on behalf of the appellant that penal provisions of the statues are required to be construed strictly, majority view observed thus :
"23. The Counsel for the appellant contended that the penal provision in the statute is to be strictly construed. Reference was made to Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay, (1955) 1 SCR 158, SCR at p.164 and Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H.Mehta, (1971) 3 SCC 189. It is true that all penal statutes are to be strictly construed in the sense that the Court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain meaning of the words used and must not strain the words on any notion that there has been a slip that the thing is so clearly within the mischief that it must have been intended to be included and would have included if thought of. All penal provisions like all other statutes are to be fairly construed according to the legislative intent as expressed in the enactment. Here, the legislative intent to prosecute corporate bodies for the offence committed by them is clear and explicit and the statute never intended to exonerate them from being prosecuted. It is sheer violence to commonsense that the legislature intended to punish the corporate bodies for minor and silly offences and extended immunity of prosecution to major and grave economic crimes.::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 :::
39 cr.apeal-20.11--
24. The distinction between a strict construction and a more free one has disappeared in modern times and now mostly the question is "what is true construction of the statute?" A passage in Craies on Statue Law 7th Edn. reads to the following effect :
"The distinction between a strict and a liberal construction has almost disappeared with regard to all classes of statutes, so that all statutes, whether penal or not, are now construed by substantially the same rules.
'All modern Acts are framed with regard to equitable as well as legal principles.' "A hundred years ago", said the court in Lyons' case, "statutes were required to be perfectly precise and resort was not had to a reasonable construction of the Act, and thereby criminals were often allowed to escape. This is not the present mode of construing Acts of Parliament. They are construed now with reference to the true meaning and real intention of the legislature."
At p. 532 of the same book, observations of Sedgwick are quoted as under:
"The more correct version of the doctrine appears to be that statutes of this class are to be fairly construed and faithfully applied according to the intent of the legislature without unwarrantable severity on the one hand or unjustifiable lenity on ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 40 cr.apeal-20.11--
the other, in cases of doubt the courts inclining to mercy."
25. The question, therefore, is what is the intention of the legislature.
It is an undisputed fact that for all the statutory offences, company also could be prosecuted as the "person" defined in these Acts includes "company, or corporation or other incorporated body."
(emphasis supplied) It can, thus, be see that the Constitution Bench held that all penal provisions like all other provisions of other statutes are to be fairly construed according to the legislative intent as expressed in the enactment.
26. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Prakash Kumar alias Prakash Bhutto v. State of Gujarat, (2005) 2 SCC 409 was considering the issue concerning the admissibility of confessional statement of the accused in terms of section 15 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1987 ("TADA" for short). The Apex Court observed thus:
"14. The more stringent the Law, the less is the discretion of the Court. Stringent laws are made for the purpose to achieve its objectives. This being the intendment of the legislature the duty of the court is ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 41 cr.apeal-20.11--
to see that the intention of the legislature is not frustrated. If there is any doubt or ambiguity in the statutes, the rule of purposive construction should be taken recourse to, to achieve the objectives. (See Swedish Match AB v. Securities & Exchange Board of India, (2004) 11 SCC 641 : (2004) 7 Scale 158, Scale para 84 at p.176)
20. Before we proceed to consider the rigours of Sections 15 and 12 we may at this stage point out that it is a trite law that the jurisdiction of the Court to interpret a statute can be invoked only in case of ambiguity. The Court cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Narrow and pedantic construction may not always be given effect to. Courts should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility. It is also well settled that every statute is to be interpreted without any violence to its language. It is also trite that when an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the court would attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose of the provision, having regard to the consequences of the alternative constructions. In this connection, we may notice few decisions of this Court."
(emphasis supplied) After considering its earlier decisions, the Apex Court observed thus :
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"30. By now it is well settled Principle of Law that no part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. It is also trite that the statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved.
ig (emphasis supplied) It can, thus, be seen that the Constitution Bench has held that it is the duty of the Court to see that intention of the legislation is not frustrated.
If there is any doubt or ambiguity in the statutes, the rule of purposive construction should be taken recourse to, to achieve the objectives. It has been further held that no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. It has been held that the statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. It has been held by the Apex Court that the statute should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. It has been further held that narrow and pedantic construction may not always be given effect to. That the Courts should avoid a ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 43 cr.apeal-20.11--
construction which would reduce the legislation to futility. It has been further held that every statue is to be interpreted without any violence to its language.
27. Even in the case of Sanjay Dutt v. State, (1994) 5 SCC 410, on which the learned counsel for the respondents have heavily relied upon, the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has observed thus:
"13. ig The TADA Act was enacted to make special provisions for the prevention of, and for coping with, terrorist and disruptive activities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto in the background of escalation of the terrorist and disruptive activities in the country.
There is also material available for a reasonable belief that such activities are encouraged even by hostile foreign agencies which are assisting influx of lethal and hazardous weapons and substances into the country to promote escalation of these activities. The felt need of the times is, therefore, proper balancing of the interest of the nation vis-a-vis the rights of a person accused of an offence under this Act. The rights of a person found in unauthorised possession of such a weapon or substance in this context, to prove his innocence of involvement in a terrorist or disruptive activity, is to be determined.
14. The construction made of any provision of this Act must, therefore, ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 44 cr.apeal-20.11--
be to promote the object of its enactment to enable the machinery to deal effectively with persons involved in, and associated with, terrorist and disruptive activities while ensuring that any person not in that category should not be subjected to the rigours of the stringent provisions of the TADA Act. It must, therefore, be borne in mind that any person who is being dealt with and prosecuted in accordance with the provisions of the TADA Act must ordinarily have the opportunity to show that he does not belong to the category of persons governed by the TADA Act. Such a course would permit exclusion from its ambit of the persons not intended to be covered by it while ensuring that any person meant to be governed by its provisions, will not escape the provisions of the TADA Act, which is the true object of the enactment. Such a course while promoting the object of the enactment would also prevent its misuse or abuse.
Such a danger is not hypothetical but real in view of serious allegations supported by statistics of the misuse of provisions of the TADA Act and the concern to this effect voiced even by the National Human Rights Commission.
16. It is the duty of courts to accept a construction which promotes the object of the legislation and also prevents its possible abuse even though the mere possibility of abuse of a provision does not affect its constitutionality or construction. Abuse has to be checked by constant vigilance and monitoring of individual cases and this can be done by screening of the cases by a suitable machinery at ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 45 cr.apeal-20.11--
a high level. It is reported that in some States, after the decision of this Court in Kartar Singh, high powered committees have been constituted for screening all such cases. It is hoped that this action will be taken in all the States throughout the country. Persons aware of instances of abuse, including the National Human Rights Commission, can assist by reporting such instances with particulars to that machinery for prompt and effective cure. However, that is no reason, in law, to doubt its constitutionality or to alter the proper construction when there is a felt need by the Parliament for enacting such a law to cope with, and prevent terrorist and disruptive activities threatening the unity and integrity of the country.
(emphasis supplied) It can, thus, be seen that the Apex Court has clearly held that the construction made of any provision of the said Act must be to promote the object of its enactment to enable the machinery to deal effectively with persons involved in, and associated with, terrorist and disruptive activities while ensuring that any person not in that category should not be subjected to the rigours of the stringent provisions of the said Act. It has been further held that mere possibility of abuse of a provision does not affect its constitutionality or construction. It has been held that abuse has to be checked by constant vigilance and monitoring of individual cases and this can be done by screening ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:22 ::: 46 cr.apeal-20.11--
of the cases by a suitable machinery at a high level. No doubt, that the Apex Court held that if two possible and reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the Court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty.
Applying the said principle of interpretation, the Apex Court interpreted section 5 of the TADA. It was held that the word "possession" used in section 5 is required to be construed as conscious possession. It was further held that in the prosecution for an offence punishable under section 5 of TADA Act, the prosecution was required to prove that the accused was in conscious possession, unauthorisedly, in a notified area of any arms and ammunition. Further it was held that the accused in his defence is entitled to prove non-existence of the fact constituting any of these ingredients.
28. No doubt that the Apex Court has held that when two constructions of the statutes are permissible, the construction which favours the subject has to be preferred. However, the Apex Court in the said case itself has held that it is the duty of the Courts to accept a construction which promotes the object of the legislation. For the reasons to follow we find that the interpretation of section 3(e) as sought to be placed by the respondents is not at all permissible if the purpose, for which the legislation is enacted ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:23 ::: 47 cr.apeal-20.11--
is to be achieved, and the legislative intent is to be given effect to.
29. In so far as reliance placed on the judgment of th Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Lalit Somdatta Nagpal (supra) is concerned, no doubt, that the learned counsel for the respondents are right in relying on the said judgment in support of the proposition that since the provisions of the MCOCA are stringent, the provisions are to be strictly interpreted. However, at the same time, it cannot be ignored that in a catena of decisions, the Apex Court has held that the interpretation even in penal statutes has to be purposive taking into consideration the legislative intent. No doubt, as held by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case the authorities concerned would have to be bound down to the strict observance of the said provisions.
30. We find that it will also be appropriate to refer the golden rule of interpretation which is also known as Heydon Rule of Interpretation or Mischief Rule which has been applied by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar and others, (1955) 2 SCR 603. The Apex Court observed thus:
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" It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydon's case was decided that-
"......... for the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered :-
1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act., ig 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide., 3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Common wealth., and 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico".
In In re Mayfair Property Company Lindley, M.R. in 1898 found the rule "as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported Heydon's case". In Eastman Photographic Material Company v. Comptroller General of Patents, ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:23 ::: 49 cr.apeal-20.11--
Designs and Trade Marks Earl of Halsbury re-affirmed the rule as follows :
"My Lords, it appears to me that to construe the Statute in question, it is not only legitimate but highly convenient to refer both to the former Act and to the ascertained evils to which the former Act had given rise, and to the later Act which provided the remedy. These three being compared I cannot doubt the conclusion".
It appears to us that this rule is equally applicable to the construction of article 286 of our Constitution. In order to properly interpret the provisions of that article it is, therefore, necessary to consider how the matter stood immediately before the Constitution came into force, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide and the remedy which has been provided by the Constitution to cure that mischief."
31. Applying these principles, it can be seen that the existing legal framework i.e. the penal and procedural laws and the adjudicatory system were found to be inadequate to curb or control the menace of organised crime. It was found that the organised crime had become a serious threat to the society beyond national boundaries and is fueled by the illegal wealth achieved by contract, killing, ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:23 ::: 50 cr.apeal-20.11--
extortion, smuggling in contrabands, illegal trade in narcotics, kidnapping for ransom, collection of protection money and money laundering etc. It was found that the illegal wealth and black money generated by the organised crime being very huge, it had serious adverse effect on the economy. It was further seen that the organised criminal syndicates made a common cause with terrorist gangs and foster narco terrorism which extend beyond the national boundaries. It was further found that the organised criminals have been making extensive use of wire and oral communications in their criminal activities. In this background, it was found necessary to enact a special law with stringent and deterrent provisions including in certain circumstances power to intercept wire, electronic or oral communication to control the menace of the organised crime.
32. The Preface would show that it was also found that the criminal activities like murders of tycoons related to film industry as well by builders, extortion of money from businessmen, abduction etc. showed that criminal gangs are active in the State. It can, thus, be seen that it was hoped that with the passing of this law, unlawful elements spreading terrorism in the society can be controlled to a great extent and it will go a long way in minimizing the feeling of fear spread in the society.
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33. It is pertinent to note that in both Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Preface, though certain activities have been mentioned the same are followed by the term "etc". It is, thus, clear that the activities mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Preface are only illustrative in nature and not exhaustive. It is, thus, clear that the legislative intent is not only to curb only the activities mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons or Preface but to curb various other activities of the organised crime syndicate so that unlawful elements spreading terrorism in the society can be controlled to a great extent, with an intention that the feeling of fear spread in the society is minimised.
34. It can, thus, clearly be seen that the purpose behind enacting the MCOCA was to curb the activities of the organised crime syndicates or gangs. The perusal of the Preamble and the Statement of Objects and Reasons and Preface, in our considered view, does not lead to any narrower meaning that MCOCA has been enacted only for the purpose of curbing activities which involve pecuniary gains or undue economic advantages. The mischief which is sought to be cured by enactment of MCOCA is to curb and control menace of organised crime. The law has been enacted with the hope that the elements spread by the organised crime in the Society can be controlled to a great extent and for ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:23 ::: 52 cr.apeal-20.11--
minimizing the fear spread in the society. If a narrower meaning as sought to be placed is accepted, it will frustrate the object rather than curing the mischief for which the Act has been enacted.
35. For appreciating this issue, it would also be relevant to refer to subsection (4) of section 3 of MCOCA. It can be seen that the said provision also provides for punishment only by virtue of a person being a member of the organised crime syndicate. If the contention advanced by the respondents is to be accepted, subsection (4) of section 3 will be rendered redundant. We are also of the considered view that there could be various "unlawful continuing activities" by a member of "organised crime syndicate" or by any person on behalf of such a syndicate which can be for the advantages other than economic or pecuniary. We will consider some illustrations.
(i) A politician is murdered by a member of organised crime syndicate or gang on its behalf at the behest of rival political leader. In the facts of a given case, this was without any pecuniary or economic consideration, it was to gain an advantage in the nature of political patronage to the said organised crime syndicate by the political leader at whose behest the murder has taken place.
(ii) If a member of an organised crime syndicate or any person on its behalf murders or kills the leader of another syndicate or rival gang ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:23 ::: 53 cr.apeal-20.11--
in order to get supremacy in the area, there may be no direct economic or pecuniary advantage by that particular unlawful activity. However, in the long term by the very fact of having supremacy in the area, the organised crime syndicate would be in a position to get economic or pecuniary advantage.
(iii) A witness in the trial against the member of an organised crime syndicate may be killed. There may not be any pecuniary advantage in such an activity, however, advantage of assuring acquittal of member of the syndicate could be there.
(iv) A member of an organised crime syndicate murders another member of such syndicate. There may be no pecuniary or economic benefit by such an activity, however, there may be advantage to a person committing murder of getting a stronghold or supremacy in the `organised crime syndicate' of which he is a member.
These could be some of the few illustrations which may come in the term "other advantage". There can be many more.
36. Such a interpretation is being opposed on the ground that if such an interpretation is permitted, the police authorities for every minor activity may invoke the provisions of the MCOCA. It is submitted that the provisions of the said Act are draconian. If such a wider meaning is given, it ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:23 ::: 54 cr.apeal-20.11--
will lead to misuse of the said provision. It is further submitted that in view of the provisions of the MCOCA being draconian in nature, once the MCOCA is applied, it is difficult or impossible to get the bail and if the wider interpretation is placed to the term "other advantage" it will give a tool in the hands of the police machinery to misuse the said powers to invoke MCOCA for even petty offences.
37. The answer to this question lies in the observations of the Apex Court, in the case of Sanjay Dutt (cited supra), that merely because the statute is likely to be abused cannot be a ground for upsetting its constitutionality or construction. In this respect, it will also be necessary to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma (supra); wherein the Apex Court has observed thus:
"23. Interpretation clauses contained in Sections 2(d), 2(e) and 2(f) are inter-related. An 'organised crime syndicate' refers to an 'organised crime' which in turn refers to 'continuing unlawful activity'. As at present advised, it may not be necessary for us to consider as to whether the words "or other lawful means" contained in Section 2(e) should be read "ejusdem generis"/ "noscitur-a-sociis" with the words (i) violence, (ii) threat of violence, (iii) intimidation or
(iv) coercion. We may, however, ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:23 ::: 55 cr.apeal-20.11--
notice that the word 'violence' has been used only in Section 146 and 153A of the Indian Penal Code. The word 'intimidation' alone has not been used therein but only Section 506 occurring in Chapter XXII thereof refers to 'criminal intimidation'. The word 'coercion' finds place only in the Contract Act. If the words 'unlawful means' is to be widely construed as including any or other unlawful means, having regard to the provisions contained in Sections 400, 401 and 413 of the IPC relating to commission of offences of cheating or criminal breach of trust, the provisions of the said Act can be applied, which prima facie, does not appear to have been intended by the Parliament.
24. The Statement of Objects and Reasons clearly state as to why the said Act had to be enacted.
Thus, it will be safe to presume that the expression 'any unlawful means' must refer to any such act which has a direct nexus with the commission of a crime which MCOCA seeks to prevent or control. In other words, an offence falling within the definition of organised crime and committed by an organised crime syndicate is the offence contemplated by the Statement of Objects and Reasons. There are offences and offences under the Indian Penal Code and other penal statutes providing for punishment of three years or more and in relation to such offences more than one chargesheet may be filed. As we have indicated hereinbefore, only ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:23 ::: 56 cr.apeal-20.11--
because a person cheats or commits a criminal breach of trust, more than once, the same by itself may not be sufficient to attract the provisions of MCOCA.
The Apex Court had held that it will be safe to presume that the expression `any unlawful means' must refer to any such act which has a direct nexus with the commission of a crime which MCOCA seeks to prevent or control.
38. It is difficult to accept the contention that if the wider meaning is given to the provision of section 2(e), provisions of MCOCA would be invoked even for petty offences. In case of Sherbahadur Akram Khan v. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), some of the offences resulted from the quarrel at public water tap. In the said matter, as in many of the cases, the accused had assaulted the injured with a fist blow. By no stretch of imagination, such an activity could be construed to be the one for which MCOCA could be invoked. If there are some altercations between two businessmen within four corners of shop and, as a result of which one of them slaps the other, by no stretch of imagination it can be said to be an offence for which MCOCA is to be invoked. Similarly, a dispute between two brothers on some property issue and even assault and that too by a ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:23 ::: 57 cr.apeal-20.11--
deadly weapon would not come in the ambit of MCOCA. The legislative intent is clear, that MCOCA is for curbing the organised crime. Unless there is prima facie material, firstly, to establish that there is an organised crime syndicate and, secondly, that organised crime has been committed by any member of the organised crime syndicate or any person on behalf of such syndicate, the provisions of MCOCA cannot be invoked. In the earlier paragraph we have discussed in detail as to what are the ingredients so as to constitute an offence of "organised crime".
The prosecution will, therefore, have to firstly establish that there is an organised crime syndicate. It will have to satisfy that there exist the ingredients of "continuing unlawful activity". It will thereafter have to satisfy that the ingredients of the "organised crime" as spelt out by us hereinbefore exist, prior to invoking the provisions of MCOCA. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention that if the wider meaning is given, the MCOCA can be invoked even for sundry offences. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma (supra), merely because the person who cheats or commits a criminal breach of trust more than once, the same by itself may not be sufficient to attract the provisions of MCOCA. By the same analogy, if a person commits murder more than once, would not by itself be sufficient to attract the provisions of MCOCA. At the cost of repetition, we make it clear that unless ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:23 ::: 58 cr.apeal-20.11--
all the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under MCOCA are available, it will not be permissible to invoke the provisions of MCOCA.
39. Apart from that it can be seen that there is inbuilt safe-guard in section 23 of the said Act, in as much as no information of the commission of the offence of the organised crime shall be recorded by the police officer without prior permission of the police officer not below the rank of Deputy Inspector General of Police. A further safe-guard is provided by sub-section (2) of section 23 to the effect that no Special Court shall take cognizance of the offence under this Act without previous sanction of the police officer not below the rank of Additional Director General of Police. It is implicit that while granting permission under sub-
section (1) and granting sanction under sub-section (2) of section 23 of MCOCA, the police officers, who are undisutedly high ranking, will be required to apply their mind to the facts of the case and come to a prima facie satisfaction as to whether the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under MCOCA are made out or not. Equally, the Special Courts, which are manned with senior judicial officials of the rank of Sessions Judge, while taking cognizance would be required to come to a prima facie satisfaction that the ingredients to constitute an offence punishable under MCOCA are made out. The Special Judge, if upon material ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:23 ::: 59 cr.apeal-20.11--
placed by the police is satisfied that the ingredients to constitute offence punishable under MCOCA are not made out, would be required to transmit the case for trial of such offence to any court having jurisdiction under the Code, in view of the provisions of section 11 of MCOCA.
40. In this respect, we will also refer to the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Kartar Singh, which are reproduced by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Prakash Kumar alias Prakash Bhutto v. State of Gujarat (cited supra). The observation of the Apex Court reads as under:
"43. Having said so, we also notice the note of caution of this Court in Kartar Singh (supra) in paragraph 352 ( SCC p.707) as under:-
"352. It is true that on many occasions, we have come across cases wherein the prosecution unjustifiably invokes the provisions of the TADA Act with an oblique motive of depriving the accused persons from getting bail and in some occasions when the courts are inclined to grant bail in cases registered under ordinary criminal law, the investigating officers in order to circumvent the authority of the courts invoke the provisions of the TADA Act. This kind of invocation of the provisions of TADA in cases, the facts of which ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:23 ::: 60 cr.apeal-20.11--
do not warrant, is nothing but sheer misuse and abuse of the Act by the police. Unless, the public prosecutors rise to the occasion and discharge their onerous responsibilities keeping in mind that they are prosecutors on behalf of the public but not the police and unless the Presiding Officers of the Designated Courts discharge their judicial functions keeping in view the fundamental rights particularly of the personal right and liberty of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution to which they have been assigned the role of sentinel on the qui vive, it cannot be said that the provisions of TADA Act are enforced effectively inconsonance with the legislative intendment."
(emphasis supplied)
44. In our view the above observation is eloquently sufficient to caution police officials as well as the Presiding Officers of the Designated Courts from misusing the Act and to enforce the Act effectively and inconsonance with the legislative intendment which would mean after the application of mind. We reiterate the same."
41. We do hope that as already observed by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the aforesaid two judgments, the above observation is eloquently sufficient to caution police officials as ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:23 ::: 61 cr.apeal-20.11--
well as the Presiding Officers of the Designated Courts from misusing the Act and to enforce the Act effectively and in consonance with the legislative intendment.
42. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the issue that the term "other advantage" cannot be read as ejusdem generis with the words "pecuniary benefits" and "undue economic".
43. Having answered the reference, we direct the registry to place the matters before the appropriate Benches.
(CHIEF JUSTICE) (B.R.GAVAI, J.) (ROSHAN DALVI, J.) ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:36:23 :::