Telangana High Court
Sri Madgula Shiva Venkata Krishna vs The State Of Telangana on 2 April, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT
HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SARATH
WRIT PETITIONNo.14377 OF 2025
DATED, THIS THE 2ND DAY OF APRIL, 2026
Between:
Madgula Shiva Venkata Krishna
...Petitioner
AND
The State of Telangana,Rep. by its Principal Secretary,
Labour, Employment Training and Factories Department
and others
...Respondents
ORDER:
The writ petition is filed questioning the proceedings in No. A/209/2021 dated 01.03.2021, issued by respondent No. 3, whereby the petitioner was terminated with effect from 18.02.2021 and sought to reinstate him into service by setting aside the impugned termination order.
2. Heard Sri GSRKV Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader for Services-II appearing for the respondents.
SK,J Page 2 of 15
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was appointed as a Junior Assistant on 14.09.2020 on compassionate grounds after the death of his father, who worked as an Office Subordinate. While he was working in the office of respondent No. 3, one Datla Sainath lodged a complaint with the ACB officials on 08.02.2021 against the petitioner and two others. Based on the said complaint, the ACB officials laid a trap against the Assistant Labour Officer (for brevity 'ALO') Kodad and the petitioner herein and the ACB Officials recovered an amount of Rs.5,000/- from the ALO.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that though there was an allegation of demanding bribe by involving the petitioner, there was no acceptance of any amount by the petitioner and the amount of Rs.5,000/- was recovered from the ALO. Despite the said fact, respondent No. 3 issued the SK,J Page 3 of 15 impugned termination order on 01.03.2021 in contravention of Part IV, Rule 9 read with Explanation
(viii) of the TSCS (CCA) Rules, 1991.
5. The learned counsel further submits that the petitioner, being a probationer, is entitled to certain protections and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily. Though the amount was recovered by the ACB officials from the ALO, the respondent authorities have terminated the services of the petitioner during his probation period in the impugned proceedings, without conducting a regular enquiry and without providing a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Further, the criminal case registered against them is still pending on the file of the I-Additional Special Judge-cum-Additional Judge for SPE and ACB Cases, Nampally.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that even in probationary period, the employee cannot SK,J Page 4 of 15 be terminated without affording an opportunity of hearing if the termination is founded on allegations of misconduct, which cast a stigma on the employee. The impugned termination order is stigmatic in nature, as it is founded on allegations of misconduct and moral turpitude. It is ex facie punitive and has been issued without affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing or conducting an enquiry into the alleged misconduct and requested to allow the writ petition by setting aside the impugned termination order.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following judgments in support of his contentions:
1. Depti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Sateyandanath Bose National centre for Basic Sciences and others 1
2. State of Uttar Pradesh and another Vs. Kaushal Kishroe Shukla 2 1 (1999) 3 SCC 60.2
(1991) 1 SCC 691 SK,J Page 5 of 15
8. The learned Government Pleader for Services-II, basing on the counter filed by respondent No. 3, submits that the petitioner was appointed on compassionate grounds and the petitioner is liable to be terminated at any time without prior notice and without assigning any reasons.
9. The learned Government Pleader further submits that, as on the date of termination, the petitioner had completed only five months of service. He had also failed to pass the prescribed tests and his character and antecedents had not yet been verified. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be regarded as an approved probationer in the said category under Rule 9 of the Telangana Ministerial Service Rules or under the General Rules.
10. The learned Government Pleader further submits that, in view of the clinching digital evidence and other SK,J Page 6 of 15 material on record, issuance of a termination notice was not required. However, the petitioner was, in fact, issued a notice on 08.07.2021, to which he submitted his explanation on 15.07.2021 and the petitioner was appointed purely on a temporary and conditional basis.
11. The learned Government Pleader also submits that the petitioner failed to file any appeal within a period of three months, as stipulated under Rule 35 of the Telangana Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1991 from the date of receipt of the impugned order and in view of the same writ petition is premature, not maintainable and requested to dismiss the writ petition.
12. After hearing both sides and upon perusal of the record, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner was appointed as a Junior Assistant on compassionate grounds on 14.09.2020. While it being so, the respondent No.3 issued the impugned SK,J Page 7 of 15 proceedings in Proc. No. A/209/2021 dated 01.03.2021, terminating the services of the petitioner retrospectively from 18.02.2021, on the ground that the petitioner, being a probationer appointed on a temporary basis, was involved in a criminal case registered by the ACB officials vide Crime No.01/RCT-ACB-NLG/2021 dated 18.02.2021 and was remanded to judicial custody on the same day. The impugned termination order was passed without conducting any enquiry and merely on the ground of the involvement of the petitioner in the criminal case, registered basing on a complaint that the ALO demanded an amount of Rs.15,000/- through the petitioner and the ALO was caught red-handed while accepting a bribe of Rs.5,000/-. Admittedly, the said amount was recovered from the ALO. The said criminal case is still pending on the file of the I-Additional Special Judge-cum-Additional Judge for SPE and ACB Cases, Nampally.
SK,J Page 8 of 15
13. The main contention of the petitioner is that the respondents terminated his services without conducting any enquiry, which is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deepti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Satvendranath Bose National Centre for Basic Science and others (supra 1) and the said Judgment squarely apply to the facts of the instant case.
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ratnesh Kumar Choudary Vs. Indira Gandhi Institute of Medical Science3 held as under:
"27. In the case at hand, it is clear as crystal that on the basis of a complaint made by a member of the Legislative Assembly, an enquiry was directed to be held. It has been innocuously stated that the complaint was relating to illegal selection on the ground that the appellant did not possess the requisite qualification and was appointed to the post of Chest Therapist. The report that was submitted by the Cabinet (Vigilance) Department eloquently states about the conduct and character of the appellant. The stand taken in the counter affidavit indicates about the behaviour of the appellant. It is also noticeable that the authorities after issuing the notice to show cause and obtaining a reply from the delinquent 3 (2015) 15 SCC 151 SK,J Page 9 of 15 employee did not supply the documents. Be that as it may, no regular enquiry was held and he was visited with the punishment of dismissal. It is well settled in law, if an ex parte enquiry is held behind the back of the delinquent employee and there are stigmatic remarks that would constitute foundation and not the motive. Therefore, when the enquiry commenced and thereafter without framing of charges or without holding an enquiry the delinquent employee was dismissed, definitely, there is clear violation of principles of natural justice. It cannot be equated with a situation of dropping of the disciplinary proceedings and passing an order of termination simpliciter. In that event it would have been motive and could not have travelled to the realm of the foundation. We may hasten to add that had the appellant would have been visited with minor punishment, the matter possibly would have been totally different. That is not the case. It is also not the case that he was terminated solely on the ground of earlier punishment. In fact, he continued in service thereafter. As the report would reflect that there are many an allegation subsequent to the imposition of punishment relating to his conduct, misbehaviour and disobedience. The Vigilance Department, in fact, had conducted an enquiry behind the back of the appellant. The stigma has been cast in view of the report received by the Central Vigilance Commission which was ex parte and when that was put to the delinquent employee, holding of a regular enquiry was imperative. It was not an enquiry only to find out that he did not possess the requisite qualification. Had that been so, the matter would have been altogether different. The allegations in the report of the Vigilance Department pertain to his misbehaviour, conduct and his dealing with the officers and the same also gets accentuated by the stand taken in the counter affidavit. Thus, by no stretch of imagination it can be accepted that it is termination SK,J Page 10 of 15 simpliciter. The Division Bench has expressed the view that no departmental enquiry was required to be held as it was only an enquiry to find out the necessary qualification for the post of Chest Therapist. Had the factual score been so, the said analysis would have been treated as correct, but unfortunately the exposition of factual matrix is absolutely different. Under such circumstances, it is extremely difficult to concur with the view expressed by the Division Bench.
(Emphasis added)
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in another Judgment while dealing with similar issue, in State of Punjab and others Vs., Sukhwinder Singh,4 held as under:
"19. It must be borne in mind that no employee whether a probationer or temporary will be discharged or reverted, arbitrarily, without any rhyme or reason. Where a superior officer, in order to satisfy himself whether the employee concerned should be continued in service or not makes inquiries for this purpose, it would be wrong to hold that the inquiry which was held, was really intended for the purpose of imposing punishment. If in every case where some kind of fact finding inquiry is made, wherein the employee is either given an opportunity to explain or the inquiry is held behind his back, it is held that the order of discharge or termination from service is punitive in nature, even a bona fide attempt by the superior officer to decide whether the employee concerned should be retained in service or not would run the risk of being dubbed 4 (2005) 5 SCC 569 SK,J Page 11 of 15 as an order of punishment. The decision to discharge a probationer during the period of probation or the order to terminate the service of a temporary employee is taken by the appointing authority or administrative heads of various departments, who are not judicially trained people. The superior authorities of the departments have to take work from an employee and they are the best people to judge whether an employee should be continued in service and made a permanent employee or not having regard to his performance, conduct and overall suitability for the job. As mentioned earlier a probationer is on test and a temporary employee has no right to the post. If mere holding of an inquiry to ascertain the relevant facts for arriving at a decision on objective considerations whether to continue the employee in service or to make him permanent is treated as an inquiry "for the purpose of imposing punishment" and an order of discharge or termination of service as a result thereof "punitive in character", the fundamental difference between a probationer or a temporary employee and a permanent employee would be completely obliterated, which would be wholly wrong.
20. In the present case neither any formal departmental inquiry nor any preliminary fact finding inquiry had been held and a simple order of discharge had been passed. The High Court has built an edifice on the basis of a statement made in the written statement that the respondent was habitual absentee during his short period of service and has concluded therefrom that it was his absence from duty that weighed in the mind of Senior Superintendent of Police as absence from duty is a misconduct. The High Court has further gone on to hold that there is direct nexus between the order of discharge of the respondent from service and his absence from duty and, therefore, the order discharging SK,J Page 12 of 15 him from service will be viewed as punitive in nature calling for a regular inquiry under Rule 16.24 of the Rules. We are of the opinion that the High Court has gone completely wrong in drawing the inference that the order of discharge dated 16.3.1990 was, in fact, based upon the misconduct and was, therefore, punitive in nature, which should have been preceded by a regular departmental inquiry. There cannot be any doubt that the respondent was on probation having been appointed about eight months back. As observed in Ajit Singh and others etc. vs. State of Punjab and another (supra) the period of probation gives time and opportunity to the employer to watch the work ability, efficiency, sincerity and competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post, the master reserves a right to dispense with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period, which is styled as period of probation. The mere holding of preliminary inquiry where explanation is called from an employee would not make an otherwise innocuous order of discharge or termination of service punitive in nature. Therefore, the High Court was clearly in error in holding that the respondent's absence from duty was the foundation of the order, which necessitated an inquiry as envisaged under Rule
16.24(ix) of the Rules".
(Emphasis added)
16. The findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above Judgments clearly shows that the respondents cannot discharge the services of the probationer without conducting enquiry. In the instant case, the impugned SK,J Page 13 of 15 termination order it is mentioned that the petitioner was terminated in view of involvement in a criminal case and without any enquiry and without opportunity to the petitioner, which casts a stigma on his service and future employment. In view of the same, the impugned termination order is liable to be set aside. If the respondents wants to conduct enquiry against the petitioner on par with the other employee, they can initiate disciplinary proceedings, if so advised.
17. It is settled law that the imposing of major punishment of removal of service cannot be made retrospectively as held by this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in several cases.
18. The Hon'ble Court in State Bank of Patiala Vs. Ram Niwas Bansal (dead) through Legal Representatives in a similar matter held as under:
SK,J Page 14 of 15 "41. In the case on hand, the disciplinary proceedings was initiated against the delinquent officer while he was in service. The first order of dismissal was passed on 23.04.1985. The said order of punishment was set aside by the High Court and the officer concerned was directed to be reinstated for the limited purpose i.e. supply of enquiry report and to proceed in the disciplinary proceeding from that stage. The said order was not interfered with by this Court. The Bank continued the proceeding. Needless to emphasize, the said continuance was in pursuance of the order of the Court. Under these circumstances, it has to be accepted that the concept of deemed continuance in service of the officer would have full play and, therefore, an order of removal could have been passed after finalization of the departmental proceedings on 22.11.2001. We have already held that the said order would not have been made retrospectively operative, but that will not invalidate the order of dismissal but it would only have prospective effect as been held in R.Jeevaratnam Vs. State of Madras (AIR 1966 SC
951)"
(Emphasis added).
19. In view of the above finding of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the respondents cannot pass removal SK,J Page 15 of 15 order with retrospective effect i.e. from 18.02.2021 and the same is liable to be set aside.
20. With the above finding, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned Order passed by the respondent No.3 in proceedings in Proc. No.A/209/2021 dated 01.03.2021 is set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner into service. This order does not preclude the respondent authorities from initiating appropriate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, in accordance with law, if so advised. There shall be no order as to costs.
Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this Writ Petition shall stand closed.
_____________________ JUSTICE K.SARATH Date:02.04.2026.
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