Karnataka High Court
The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., ... vs S. Jagadish And Another on 14 September, 1990
Equivalent citations: I(1991)ACC566, 1991ACJ1105, AIR1991KANT258, ILR1990KAR4384, AIR 1991 KARNATAKA 258, (1991) 2 TAC 104, (1991) 1 ACC 566, (1991) 2 ACJ 1105, ILR (1990) KAR 4384
Author: N. Venkatachala
Bench: N. Venkatachala
JUDGMENT
1. These appeals under S. 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 ("the Act"), are of the insurer and the owner of a motor vehicle (Tempo) preferred against the common judgment and separate awards dated 28-3-1988 in Cases -- M.V.C. No. 577/ 86 and M.V.C. No. 578/86, on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bangalore Rural District, Bagalore ("the Claims Tribunal"), awarding compensation to persons who had suffered bodily injuries in an accident arising out of the use of that Tempo.
2. Tempo-- CNS 6061 is the motor vehicle, in which S. Jagadish, claimant in M.V.C. No. 577/86 and respondent in M.F.A. No. 1448/1988. and S. Shivappa Shastri, claimant in M.V.C. No. 578/88 and respondent in M.F.A. No. 1449/1988, were travelling from Shimoga to Bangalore at 4.30 a.m., on 15-6-1986 when that vehicle dashed against a road-side tree near Budihal while on Tumkur--Bangalore Road, resulting in a motor accident. Jagadish and Shivappa Shastri, who sustained bodily injuries in that accident, claimed compensation therefor from Harish Babu, the owner of the Tempo, and the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., the insurer of that Tempo, by filing the cases, M.V.C. No. 577/88 and M.V.C. No. 578/88, before the Claims Tribunal alleging that the motor accident causing bodily injuries to them had occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the Tempo in which they were travelling. The said cases having been clubbed together by consent of parties, common evidence came to be recorded by the Claims Tribunal in M.V.C. No. 577/86. By a common judgment rendered by the Claims Tribunal, while compensation in a sum of Rs. 44,000/- is awarded to S. Jagadish, petitioner in M.V.C. No. 577/86, compensation in a sum of Rs. 71,500/- is awarded to S. Shivappa Shastri, petitioner in M.V.C. No. 578/86. On the said sums of compensation, interest at 12% per annum from the date of petitions till the date of realisation is also awarded. The owner and the insurer of the Tempo are jointly and severally made liable to pay the said sums of compensation and interest together with costs. A separate award in each of the cases has been made in that regard. It is the said common judgment and separate awards which are appealed against in the present appeals, as stated at the out-set.
3. Sri S. P. Shankar, learned Counsel for the appellants in each of the appeals, sought to assail the common judgment and separate awards under appeals, rather severely, insofar as they relate to the award of compensation in favour of the petitioners under the head 'for the injuries affecting their day to day life and future' and the rate of interest on the amount of compensation at 12% per annum from the date of petitions till the date of realisation, on the submission to which we shall advert when each of the points is taken up for consideration.
4. As we have felt that in deciding whether a sum of Rs. 9,600/ - awarded by the Claims Tribunal to Jagadish as compensation under the head 'for the injury affecting his day to day life and future' is justified or not, the nature of bodily injuries suffered by him, the treatment he obtained and the disabilities he has suffered could be of assistance, we propose to advert to the same at the first instance.
At Paragraph 12 of the common judgment under appeal, it is stated that casualty Medical Officer in Sanjay Gandhi Hospital, who examined Jagadish some time after the accident, found on his person the following injuries :
1. Calles fracture over right wrist;
2. Sutured wound on the right and the forehead;
3. Abrasion on the right leg.
In the same paragraph, the Claims Tribunal having referred to the evidence in the case as to the operation Jagadish had to undergo for removal of a dead piece of bone at the lower end of right radius, enumerates the symptoms which were said to be present in him because of the injuries suffered by him in the accident as told by P.W. 1 -- Dr. V. S. Hanumanthaiah, who is said to have examined him later, thus :
1. Linear operation scar over the lower end of ulna right e" in length.
2. The lower end of the ulna is absent.
3. The lower end of the radius is slightly bent towards the palm-side.
4. The movements of the right wrist are restricted to an extent of last 45 degrees over the flexion and extension.
5. The pronation and supination are restricted to an extent of 5 to 10 degrees.
Then, in paragraph 13 of the judgment, there is a reference to the right-hand grip of Jagadish being normal and his disabilities in the opinion of the Doctor being at 4% of the total self.
The Claims Tribunal, on the basis of the said evidence adverted to by it and other evidence, awards the following amounts of compensation under different heads :
a) Rs. 25,000/- for severe pain and suffering;
b) Rs. 1,200/- each towards nourishing food and service charges at the rate of Rs. 10/- per day which comes to Rs. 2,400/-;
c) Rs. 2,000/- towards purchase of medicine and hospital charges:
d) Rs. 750/- towards travelling charges;
e) Rs. 9,600/- for the injury affecting his day to day life and future;
f)Rs. 4,000/- towards loss of earnings for four months.
The total of the said sums of compensation being Rs. 43,750/-, the same is rounded off to a sum of Rs. 44,000/-.
The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants against the award of a sum of Rs. 9,600/- by the Claims Tribunal to Jagadish as compensation under the head 'for the injury affecting his day to day life and future', was that when 4% disability of total self of Jagadish is taken into account by the Claims Tribunal in awarding Rs. 25,000/- as compensation under the head "severe pain and suffering", the same disability of 4% of total self of Jagadish should not have formed the basis for award of a sum of Rs. 9,600/- under the head 'for the injury affecting his day to day life and future', in that, it would be a duplication of award of compensation for the same disability under two heads. Though this submission of learned Counsel for the appellants was virtually conceded to by the learned Counsel for the respondents, we consider it proper to deal with the sustainabilily of the said submission.
In awarding the sum of Rs. 25,000/- as compensation to Jagadish under the head "pain and suffering", the Claims Tribunal has taken into account the disability of 4% total self of the claimant (Jagadish), the possibility of difficulty in driving a two-wheeler by him as also the serious nature of the injury suffered by him, apart from pain and suffering, as seen from paragraph 13 of its judgment, which reads :
"13. However, the right-hand grip is normal. The disabilities in the opinion of the Doctor are at 4% of the total Self of the claimant. To some extent the claimant will find it difficult to drive two-wheelers. Therefore, in view of the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the claimant. I hold that he must have suffered severe pain and suffering over which head I award him a sum of Rupeess 25,000/-."
But, when it comes to award of compensation of Rs. 9,600/- under the head 'for the injuries affecting his day to day life and future', the disability of 4% of the total self of Jagadish is made the very basis for award of such compensation as seen from paragraph 15 of the judgment, the relevant portion of which reads :
"However, taking into consideration the net turnover as can be seen from Ext. P-I6 series, he can be expected to earn Rs. 1000/-per month. Thus, the disabilities at the rate of 4% in terms of" money comes at Rs. 40/- per month, that is, at Rs. 480/ - per year. In view of the age of the claimant, it is a fit case wherein I should adopt the multiple of 20 years. With that multiple 1 award him a sum of Rs. 9,600/- over the head of the injuries affecting his day-to-day life and future."
Thus, from a reading of the relevant portions of the judgment relating to award of compensation of Rs. 25,000; - under one head and award of a sum of Rs. 9,600/- under another head, it becomes obvious that the award of compensation under the latter head (general damages) is a duplication of compensation under the former head. Hence, the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants as to the unsustainability of the award of damages of Rs. 9,600/- under the head 'for the injury affecting day-to-day life and future' has to be upheld and the award interfered with.
Again, as we have felt that in deciding whether a sum of Rs. 27,000/- awarded by the Claims Tribunal to Shivappa Shastri as compensation under the head 'for the injuries affecting day-to-day life and future' is justified or not, the nature of bodily injury suffered by him, the treatment he has obtained and the disabilities he has suffered could be of assistance, we propose to advert to the same before proceeding with the matter further.
At paragraph 12 of the common judgment under appeal, it is stated that the Casualty Medical Officer in Sanjay Gandhi Hospital, who examined Shivappa Shastri some time after the accident, found on his person the following injuries :
1. Fracture of cervical vertebrae No. 5, 6, 7 with involvement of nerve groups.
2. Fracture of coreoid of right scapular.
In the same paragraph, the Claims Tribunal has said that the claimant was treated on conservative lines and he was given bed rest under observation for four weeks. Then, in paragraph 16 of the judgment, there is enumeration of the symptoms which were found on the person of the claimant as told by P.W. 1, Dr. V. S. Hanumanthaiah, who is said to have examined him later :
1. A cervical collar and walks cautiously.
2. Cervical spine has tenderness at C5 and C6.
3. The movements over the neck are restricted to an extent of last 10 to 15 degrees.
4. On neurological examination, the claimant was found to have itching over the fingers on both the palms,
5. The claimant has dullness in sensation over both the lower limbs but however motor power is normal as well as reflexes.
In the same paragraph, there is a reference to the opinion of the expert to the effect that the disabilities are of 20% of the total self of Shivappa Shastri (claimant).
The Claims Tribunal, on the basis of the said evidence, adverted to by it, and other evidence, awards the following amounts of compensation under different heads :
a) Rs. 35,000/- for pain and suffering;
b) Rs. 2,700/- towards nourishing food and service charges at the rate of Rs. 15/- per month which comes to Rs. 5,400/-;
c) Rs. 3,000/- towards medicine, hospital expenses etc.;
d) Rs. 1,000/- towards travelling charges;
e)Rs. 27,000/- for injuries affecting his day-to-day life and future.
The total of the said sums of compensation being Rs. 71,400/-, the same is rounded off to Rs. 71,500/-.
The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants against the award of a sum of Rs. 27,000/- by the Claims Tribunal to Shivappa Shastri as compensation under the head 'for the injury affecting his day-to-day life and future', was that when 20% disability of total self of Shivappa Shastri is taken into account by the Claims Tribunal in awarding Rs. 35,000/- as compensation under the head "severe pain and suffering", the same disability of 20% of total self of Shivappa Shastri should not have formed the basis for award of a sum of Rs. 27,000/- under the head 'for the injury affecting his day-to-day life and future', in that, it would be a duplication of award of compensation for the same disability under two heads. Though this submission of learned Counsel for the appellants was virtually conceded to by the learned Counsel for the respondents, we consider it proper to deal with the sustainability of the said submission.
In awarding the sum of Rs. 35,000/- as compensation to Shivappa Shastri under the head "pain and suffering", the Claims Tribunal has taken into account the disability of 20% of total self of Shivappa Shastri, the injury, that is, tenderness over the cervical spines, that is, C5 and C6, difficulty in making use of the finger aspects of both the palms, as seen from paragraph 16 of its judgment, which reads :
"In the opinion of the expert, the disabilities are of 20% of the total self of the claimant. Even as on 10-11-87, there was tenderness over the cervical spines C5 and C6. He may find it difficult to make use of the finger aspects of his both the palms. Therefore taking into consideration all these aspects of the case, I hold that the claimant had suffered severe pain and suffering over which head 1 award him a sum of Rs. 35,000/- as the spinal cord at C5 to C7 are involved along with the nerves."
But, when it comes to award compensation of Rs. 27,000/- under the head 'for the injuries affecting his day-to-day life and future', the disability of 20% of the total self of Shivappa Shastri is made the very basis for award of such compensation after referring to his age as 55 years, as seen from paragraph !9 of the judgment, the relevant portion of which reads :
"Therefore, it can be safely held that the claimant was earning Rs. 1,500/- per month. His disabilities in terms of money per month at the rate of 20% of his total self comes at Rs. 300/- per month that is at Rs. 3,600/- per year. In view of his age, it is a fit case wherein I should adopt the multiplier of 7 1/2 years. With that multiple, 1 award him a sum of Rs. 27,000/- over the head of injuries affecting his day-to-day life and future."
Thus, from a reading of the relevant portions of the judgments relating to award of compensation of Rs. 35,000/- under one head and award of a sum of Rs. 27,000/ - under another head, it becomes obvious that the award of compensation under the latter head (general damages) is a duplication of compensation under the former head. Hence, the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants as to the unsustainability of the award of damages of Rs. 27,000/- under the head 'for the injury affecting day-to-day life and future' has to be upheld and the award interfered with.
5. What remains for our consideration is the award of interest at 12% per annum made by the Claims Tribunal on the total amount of compensation awarded under various heads.
Paragraphs 20 and 21 of the common judgment of the Claims Tribunal relating to award of interest reads thus :
"20. Now, the question of interest. The earlier normal trend was to grant interest at 6% in Motor Accident as well as land acquisition cases. At present, as held by the Supreme Court in 1985 ACJ 645 (Chameli-wati v, Delhi Municipal Corporation) the trend is to award interest at 12%. In that case, the Supreme Court while disagreeing with the interest awarded by the Courts below at 6%, held that the discretion vested in the Tribunal under Section 110-CC should be exercised in a better way in favour of the claimants.
21. In this connection, it is necessary to take into consideration the interest that is being awarded in L.A. cases. Notice of acquisition under Ss. 4, 6 and 12 are issued much earlier to the time when land or property is snatched away from the claimants or they are dispossessed therefrom. Even then, the claimants in L.A. cases are statutorily granted interest at 15%, substituting the original interest at 6%. When the claimants in those cases who have notice of their properties being taken away are granted interest at 15%, I do not find any justification to continue to award interest at the same old rate of 6%, specially when in motor accident cases, the claimants are taken by surprise when they lose their kith and kin or their limbs without the least knowledge or indication of the things to happen. First of all, they will be under shock and find life very hard. When trailed upon to pay adequate interest so that they will not postpone the payment. I state so, as the principle in these M.V. cases in that their claims should be settled expeditiously before tears drop from their eyes. The discretion vested in the Tribunal should be exercised favourably in favour of the victims but not in favour of wrong doers. Therefore, in my opinion, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chameliwati's case referred to above has to be followed. We are awarding interest under S. 111 of ACC but not under Sec. 34 of C.P.C, Under Sec. 111 a discretion is vested in the Tribunal. That discretion rightly supported by Supreme Court in the case referred earlier, should be exercised only in favour of wrongdoers. Further, the money value is diminishing year by year and as we are calculating the loss of dependency with multiple as and when the years pass the interest rate is bound to increase. Therefore, I fix the interest at the rate of 12%."
The serious criticism of the learned Counsel for the appellants levelled against the award of interest by the Claims Tribunal related to the manner in which the Claims Tribunal dealt with the quest ion of interest, rather than the rate at which interest was awarded. According to the learned Counsel for the appellants, the Claims Tribunal, a learned District Judge, was deliberately ignoring the Division Bench decision of this Court in Managing Director, Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v. Geetha, , wherein His Lordship Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was in this Court), speaking for the Division Bench, had laid down the guidelines in the matter of award of interest on the amounts of compensation payable in the awards relating to accident claims, by adhering to its own views on the rate of interest, reproduced in the present judgment under appeal, as done in all other awards of the same Claims Tribunal. The further submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants was that the adamant conduct of a senior District Judge of a Court subordinate to the High Court refusing to follow the judgment of the High Court in a matter even when brought to his notice and persisting in proceeding to decide such matter in his own pre-determined way, which has undermined the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court generally and has a disastrous impact on persons who have respect for Rule of law, cannot be overlooked by us. According to him, such an attitude of the Judge should be viewed with deep concern and we must take such action as is necessary to prevent him from adopting such stance amounting to judicial indiscipline. The learned Counsel for the appellants brought to our notice the decision of the Supreme Court in Baradakanta Mishra v. Bhemsen Dixit, , where the Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with the conduct of a Judge as the one with whom we are concerned in the present case, for not following a judicial precedent which he was bound to follow. The learned Counsel for the respondents was not in a position to refute the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellants though it is he who had appeared in the cases under appeal, before the Claims Tribunal. Even then, we consider it very appropriate to examine whether the complained attitude of the Claims Tribunal towards the Division Bench decision of this Court in Geetha's case (supra) is a matter to be viewed with deep concern and appropriate action to be taken to prevent its repetition.
His Lordship Venkatachaiiah, J. (as he then was in this Court), speaking for the Division Bench, which decided Geetha's case (supra), observed therein as follows as regards indiscriminate manner in which the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals were awarding interest on the awards made by them (at page 107 of AIR 1989 Kant) :
"What remains to be considered is the rate of interest. That is a matter of discretion under Sec, 110CC. But, can the discretion be said to have been exercised judicially and judiciously. If without reference to the circumstances, justifications and compulsions of the particular case, a uniform rate of interest at 12% is awarded, some Tribunals carry the impression that they are bound to award 12 percent. and that the 12 percent. is the rule and anything less is the exception. This impression is not justified."
In the same paragraph, referring to the pronouncements of the High Courts and the Supreme Court, where interest at 12% per annum has come to be awarded, it is speci fically stated that they are not declarations of law on the point under Art, 141 of the Constitution and should not be treated as words of a statute, thus :
"In some pronouncements of the High Courts and of the Supreme Court, interest at 12% per annum has come to be awarded. The pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Narcinva Kamat v. Alfredo Antonio Doc Martins and in Chameliwati v. Delhi Municipal Corporation are decisions on the facts of the cases. They are not declarations of the law under Art. 141 of the Constitution, on the point, as the Supreme Court has had occasion to point out that the decisions in particular cases are not to be treated as the words of a statute."
In paragraph 9 of the same judgment, it is pointed out that the interest in accident claims cases is not awarded as damages but the same is awarded to the plaintiff only for being kept out of the money which ought to have been paid to him taking care of the period between the date of the claim and the date of realisation and not what erosion of the fund suffers owing to future inflation, thus (at page 109 of AIR 1989) :
"9. There is a discernible tendency in some judicial pronouncements that the hazards of inflation of the future should be mitigated by a generous rate of interest. There is no reason why this class of holders of funds should alone receive separate treatment. Inflation is an economic and financial condition of general application. Its impact on any particular plaintiff has been neither more nor less than upon everybody else; there is nothing special about it. It affects every one else -- other persons who have money in their hands -- in the same way. Effects of inflation have to be neutralised at least partially -- by wiser investments. Interest, is not awarded as damages; it is awarded to plaintiff only for being kept out the money which ought to have been paid to him. It takes care of the period between the date of the claim and the date of realisation. It has nothing to do with what erosion the fund suffers thereafter owing to future inflation."
Again, dealing with the rate of interest awardable under S. 110-CC of the Act, this is what is stated by his Lordship in paragraphs 11 and 12 (at page 111 of AIR 1989) :
"11..... The matter is, in the ultimate analysis, one of discretion. Discretion cannot be bound by rules. General words must remain general discretion must remain as discretion and should not be reduced to the sum total of the individual cases. Earlier instances can only afford a general guidance as to the manner in which, in similar circumstances, that discretion is exercised. To deduce a principle that in all cases, 12% is the rule and the award of a lesser rate, an exception is to over-simplify and reduce to a rule, what is best left untramelled by any rule. S. 110CC gives a general discretion. It is best that it is kept that way.
12. But, this is not to say, having regard to the express language of S. 110CC, that Tribunals cannot award, in exercise of their discretion, higher rates of interest if the circumstances of the case justify. Tribunal can grant interest at, say, 9% or even 12% if the circumstances justify. The matter is essentially one of discretion..............................
In an award of interest on damages in fatal accident actions and the rate of it, there is discretion, indeed in appropriate a duty, to differentiate between one component of the damages and another having regard to the nature of the heads of damages between different kinds of losses, that ensue from a fatal accident. There are economic losses and non-economic losses. Both cannot be placed on the same footing for the award and the rate of interest. But having regard to the general discretion under S. 110CC of the 'Act', it is not strictly necessary to award different rates of interest on the different heads of damages and a rate can yet be tailored which, as a composite rate, may take into account the different considerations that guide the award of interest on the different components on the Award."
Thereafter, in paragraph 13 of the judgment, a summary of what emerges from a con-spectus of authorities, both English and Indian, as to the determination of the rate of interest is stated thus :
"13. What emerges from a conspectus of the authorities is that : The determination of the rate of interest is guided not by a single criterion but a combination of factors. The purpose in S. 110CC fixing the date of the petition as the earliest part from which interest could be reckoned is to see that a claimant does not stand to gain by his own delay in bringing the action. Unlike the position under the Administration of Justice Act, 1969 in England, the Tribunals under S. 110CC are not compelled to exercise the power to award interest.
The interest should not be awarded for the damage done. It should be awarded to the claimants for being kept out of money which ought to have paid to them. When a composite rate is applied, it is important to make a mental note of what items of the award go to the 'interest-pool' and what item do not go to 'interest-pool'. While special damages-sums actually spent or lost, up to the date of trial such as medical charges, loss of earnings, and out of pocket expenses, etc. -- qualify for interest, however, the award for loss of future earning or the loss of dependency cannot be said to be money kept out of the claimants because they pertain to a loss of the future income and are in fact paid in advance. This would mean that any composite rate of interest must take into account the size of the awards in the 'interest-pool' and of those in the 'non-interest pool'. The provisions for erosion of value of the money could only be, so far as special damages are concerned, for the period between the incurring of the special damages and their realisation; and in the case of loss of future pecuniary benefits from the date of the award till the date of realisation. But, as staled earlier, a composite rate can be evolved and applied keeping these distinctions in mind.
It is erroneous to predicate that there is anything in the law of the binding precedents that wherever interest is awarded, its rate should not be less than 12%. Both the award and the rate of interest are in the discretion of the Tribunal to be exercised judicially and judiciously, not arbitrarily or capriciously: but in accordance with sound principles.
Generally speaking, a composite rate of 6% should be considered satisfactory without any specific itemisation because the component of compensation in the 'interest-pool' is comparatively smaller and the sizable component is the amount awarded for the loss of future dependency. We, however, hasten to add that the Tribunals have an undoubted discretion to award higher rates of interest, if in their opinion, the circumstances of the particular case justify such higher-rates."
When we see the manner in which the claims Tribunal has dealt with the question of award of interest as found in paragraphs 20 and 21 of its judgment, excerpted earlier, we find that there is every justification for the criticism that the interest awarded on the amount of compensation awarded in the instant cases by the Claims Tribunal totally ignores the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Managing Director, Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v. Geetha (supra), to which we have adverted. Though, in the said Division Bench judgment, it is clearly stated that what is stated by the Supreme Court in Chameliwati v. Delhi Municipal Corporation (supra) as to interest is a decision on the facts of that case and it is not a declaration of law on the point under Art. 141 of the Constitution, the Claims Tribunal, as seen from paragraph 20 of the common judgment, has depended upon the Chameliwati's case (supra) for awarding interest on the amount of compensation at 12% per annum. Again, as seen from paragraph 21 of that common judgment, it seeks to draw support for award of interest at 12% on the compensation (damages) in accidents claims cases, on the basis of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act providing for payment of interest on compensation for acquired lands. Such reliance on the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for awarding of interest on compensation in fatal accidents cases indicates the Claims Tribunal's unprepared ness to follow the principles enunciated by the Division Bench Judgment of this Court as to how the rate of interest on compensation in claims cases has to be determined. Thus, the manner in which the Claims Tribunal has dealt with the matter relating to award of interest, clearly demonstrates that the Claims Tribunal has refused to take guidance given by the aforesaid Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Geetha's case (supra), rather deliberately, and has gone about in its own predetermined way in the matter of awarding interest, as very rightly and appropriately pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants. In facts, the learned counsel for the respondent, who had appeared as a counsel for the claimants before the Claims Tribunal, did not venture to justify, rather very rightly, the adament conduct of the Claims Tribunal in determining the rate of interest payable on the amounts payable according to its predetermined view ignoring the binding decision of the High Court in the matter. In Baradakanta Mishra's case (supra), the Supreme Court, which was considering the conduct of a District Judge who had not followed the previous decision of the High Court, has denounced such conduct thus :
"The conduct of the appellant in not following the previous decision of the High Court is calculated to create confusion in the administration of law. It will undermine respect for law laid down by the High Court and impair the constitutional authority of the High Court. His conduct is therefore comprehended by the principles underlying the law of contempt. The analogy of the inferior court's disobedience to the specific order of a superior Court also suggests that his conduct falls. within the purview of the law of contempt. Just as the disobedience of a specific order of the Court undermines the authority and dignity of the Court in a particular case, similarly any deliberate and mala fide conduct of not following the law laid down in the previous decision undermines the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court. Indeed, while the former conduct has repercussions on an individual case and on a limited number of persons, the latter conduct has a much wider and more disastrous impact. It is calculated not only to undermine the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court generally, but is also likely to subvert the rule of law and endanger harassing uncertainty and confusion in the administration of law."
What is said by the Supreme Court of the conduct of a District Judge in the above decision, we cannot help holding, applies to the adamant conduct of the Judge of the Claims Tribunal with whom we are now concerned, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants.
As the Claims Tribunal, in awarding interest at 12% per annum on the amounts of compensation made payable to the claimants-respondents in the two claims cases, totally ignoring the guidelines laid down in that regard in Managing Director, Karnataka Power Corporation v. Geetha (supra), it has become necessary for us to determine the rate of interest payable to the amounts of compensation awarded to the claimants on the basis of the guidance available in the aforesaid judgment.
As could be seen from the heads under which compensation is awarded to the claimant -- Jagadish, excluding the amount of compensation awarded under the head 'for injuries affecting day to day life and future', the total amount of compensation payable as special damages which comes to Rs. 9,150/-, the amount of general damages would be Rs. 25,000/-. As the consent of special damages about one-third of the amount of the compensation payable towards general damages, we find that it would be reasonable to fix the rate of interest payable on the amount of total compensation to the claimant -- Jagadish at 6% per annum. So also, as could be seen from the heads under which compensation is awarded to the claimant -Shivappa Shastri, excluding the amount of compensation awarded under the head 'for injuries affecting day to day life and future', the total amount of compensation payable as special damages while comes to Rs. 9,400/-, the amount of general damages would be Rs. 35,000/-. As the component of special damages is about one-third of the amount of compensation payable towards general damages, we find that it would be reasonable to fix the rate of interest payable on the amount of total compensation to Shivappa Shastri at 6% per annum.
6. Before parting with these appeals, we are constrained to observe that it is rather very unfortunate that Sri R. G. Sejekhan, a senior District Judge, who constituted the Claims Tribunal, should have given scope for complaining against him of undermining the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court by deliberately ignoring to follow the decision of the High Court in Geetha's case (supra) in deciding the question of I interest awardable on the amounts of compensation in Motor Accidents Claims Cases decided by him. However, we think it is not necessary to initiate any action against him in the matter, as sought by learned counsel for the appellants, as we feel and hope that a communication of this judgment to him would be enough to bring about a change in his attitude in the matter.
7. In the result, we allow these appeals partly and modify the common judgment and separate awards of the Claims Tribunal directing the appellants to pay a sum of Rs. 34,150/- together with interest at 6% per annum, instead of Rs. 44,000/- awarded by the Claims Tribunal, to Jagadish claimant in M.V.C. No. 577/86 and to pay a sum of Rs. 44,400/- together with interest at 6% per annum, instead of Rs. 71,500/- awarded by the Claims Tribunal to Shivappa Shaslri-claimant in M.V.C. 758/86, such interest being payable from the date of petition till the date of payment.
Costs awarded by the Claims Tribunal in the awards under appeals shall be payable by the appellants to the respondents (claimants) together with Advocate's fee in each case at Rs. 300/-.
Parties to bear their respective costs in these appeals.
Registrar of this Court to communicate a copy of this judgment to Shri R. G. Scjckan, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bangalore District, Bangalore.
8. Appeals partly allowed.