Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench
J&K State Board Of School Education And ... vs Mir Asif Fayaz And Another on 12 November, 2020
Author: Vinod Chatterji Koul
Bench: Vinod Chatterji Koul
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
AT SRINAGAR
(Through Video Conferencing)
...
CR no.50/2018
Reserved on: 20.10.2020
Pronounced on: 12 .11.2020
J&K State Board of School Education and another
.........Petitioner(s)
Through: Mr Mir Majid Bashir, Advocate
Versus
Mir Asif Fayaz and another
.........Respondent(s)
Through: Mr Sheikh Mushtaq, Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VINOD CHATTERJI KOUL, JUDGE
JUDGEMENT
1. Mir Asif Fayaz son of Fayaz Ahmad Mir resident of Avengund Tehsil and District Pulwama - respondent no.1 herein, had filed a Suit for Declaration and Mandatory Injunction before the court of Sub Judge (Special Mobile Magistrate) Pulwama (for short "Trial Court"), to declare decision, taken on his representation by J&K Board of School Education/defendants - petitioners herein, issued vide communication no.1602(Certs-Cers-1) B/2010 dated 13.12.2010, as inoperative, ineffective and null and void and also direct petitioner-Board, to carry necessary correction in the relevant records, showing plaintiff/ respondent no.1, as son of Fayaz Ahamd Mir instead of Ali Muhammad Mir. By judgement and decree dated 2nd July 2015, allowing suit of respondent no.1, the Trial Court directed petitioner-Board to carry necessary correction in the records showing father's name of 2 CR no.50/2018 plaintiff/respondent no.1 as Fayaz Ahmad Mir instead of Ali Muhammad Mir and in this regard issue necessary certificate.
2. Petitioner Board preferred an Appeal against Trial Court judgement and decree before the court of Principal District Judge, Pulwama (hereinafter referred to as "Appellate Court"). However, since there was delay in preferring Appeal against Trial Court judgement and decree, an application for condoning delay was also filed by petitioners before Appellate Court. The said application, vide judgement dated 2nd July 2015, has been dismissed by Appellate Court. It is how petitioners have come up before this Court with Civil Revision on hand under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking setting-aside of judgement of Appellate Court.
3. I have heard learned counsel for parties and considered the matter.
4. Learned counsel for petitioner has stated that Appellate Court did not appreciate explanation tendered by petitioners in preferring Appeal beyond the period of limitation. Copy of judgement and decree is stated to have been received by petitioners on 29th August 2015, which was conveyed to counsel so as to file an Appeal, who for reason of frequent strikes, particularly in the month of August and October, filed Appeal late by a month, which period, as maintained by learned counsel for petitioners, is a small interval and does not require any stringent application. Learned counsel for petitioner, in support of his submissions, has placed on Reliable Water Supply Service of India v. Union of India, (1972) 4 SCC 168; Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag and another v. Mst Khatiji and others, AIR 1987 SCC 1353; 3 CR no.50/2018 Pepsi Foods Limited v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, 1998 (5) SCC 749; Riyaz Ahmad Bhat v. Abdul Majid Bhat, 2004 (1) JKJ 608 HC; Kishori Lal and others v. Chaman Lal and others, 2007 (1) SLJ 268; Ajay Bansal v. Anup Mehta and others, AIR 2007 SC 909; Col. Anil Kak (Retd.) v. Municipal Corporation Indore and others, AIR 2007 SC 1130; and Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan and others v. Nawab Imdad Jah Bahadur and others, 2009 (5) SCC 162.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent no.1 vehemently insists that petitioner-Board has miserably failed before Appellate Court to demonstrate sufficient cause for delay in preferring Appeal, inasmuch as application for condonation of delay was totally incorrect vague, false and baseless. According to him petitioner-Board being most highest and responsible hierarchy of public servants, deliberately and intentionally gave a false affidavit by submitting that they were having no knowledge of judgement and decree notwithstanding the fact that they participated in proceedings before Trial Court, submitted its written statement, cross-examined witnesses, submitted Arguments through their counsel, and heard judgement when learned Trial Court pronounced the same in open Court in presence of counsels for parties. Thus, the time against petitioner-Board started from the date of judgement/decree i.e. 2nd July 2015 and that petitioner-Board suppressed the date when it applied for certified copy of judgement and decree; besides there was no change in standing counsel of appellant- Board, who was all along Mr M.D. Parvaiz, Advocate, and he appeared throughout in the suit and was also present at the time of 4 CR no.50/2018 pronouncement of judgement. So the legal presumption is that said Advocate had informed petitioner-Board regarding judgement and decree when it was pronounced by Trial Court. His next submission is that the whole controversy relates only about correction of parentage and petitioner-Board has unnecessarily dragged respondent no.1 by protracting the matter. Learned counsel has relied upon Shyam Sunder Sarma v. Pannalal Jaiswal and others, AIR 2005 SC 226; Abdul Aziz Mir v. Suhail Nabi and others, SLJ 2018 (2) HC 760; D. Tarini Patro and others v. M. Jagannath Rao, AIR 2018 Orissa 53.
6. Instant Civil Revision has been filed under and in terms of provisions of Section 115, CPC, which provides that the High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, or to have caused failure of justice, the High Court, in such situation, may make such order in the case as it thinks fit. After saying this, it would be apt to have glance of application for condonation of delay, filed by petitioner-Board before the Appellate Court, and thereafter go through the averments of Appeal alongside application for condonation of delay, so as to see as to whether a case was coming to fore from the contentions contained in the memo of Appeal filed by petitioner-Board before the Trial Court. The contents of Application for condonation of delay are:
5CR no.50/2018
1. That the above titled appeal is pending before this Hon'ble court for adjudication and the application hereby adopts all the averments of the appeal in this application also.
2. That the Ld. Sub Judge/ Special Mobile Magistrate Pulwama has decreed the suit of the non applicant No.1 on 02.07.2015 whereby the applicants were directed to correct the parentage of the non applicant No.1 and also declared the communication issued by applicant BOSE dated: 13.12.2010 as inoperative, ineffective and null and void against the rights of the non applicant No.1.
3. That the applicants have received the copy of the Judgment on 29.08.2015 and the applicants accordingly conveyed the same to his counsel hence there is no delay on part of the applicants and if there is any delay caused by the applicants it is neither deliberate nor intentional on part of the applicant.
4. That the applicants/ appellants had been never negligent and wilful in challenging the impugned judgment but they were having no knowledge of the impugned judgment and decree.
7. Averments of above quoted application for condonation of delay would portray that petitioner-Board, on receiving copy of judgment on 29th August 2015, conveyed it to counsel; thus, there was no delay on its part and if there was any delay that was neither deliberate nor intentional on its part and it had no knowledge of Trial Court judgement and decree. On the other hand, respondent no.1 strenuously resisted application for condonation of delay as according to him, petitioner- Board did not show any sufficient cause to seek condoning of delay in filing the Appeal inasmuch as judgement was pronounced in presence of counsel for petitioner-Board.
8. In view of what has been averred in application for condonation of delay, filed by petitioner-Board before Appellate Court and objections raised by respondent no.1 in opposition thereto, it is imperative to go through contents of Appeal, filed alongside application for condonation of delay, so as to come at a definite conclusion and set at rest the 6 CR no.50/2018 controversy once and for all, thereby advance cause of justice, which are for ready reference reproduced infra:
1. That the Ld. Sub Judge (Special Mobile Magistrate Pulwama) has decreed the suit of the respondent No.1 on 02.07.2015 whereby the appellant has been directed to carry necessary correction in the records showing the father's name of the respondent No.1 as Fayaz Ahmad Mir instead of Ali Mohd Mir and issue necessary correction and certificate accordingly and also declared the communication issued by the appellants Board of School Education under No.1602B/2010 dated 13.12.2020 as inoperative, ineffective and null and void against the rights of the plaintiff.
2. That the appeal is being filed along with the application for condonation of delay which has been caused to the appellants due to the reason that the appellants have received the copy of the judgment on 29.08.2015 and accordingly the appellant has conveyed the same to his counsel. Hence there is no delay on part of the appellants.
3. That the impugned judgement and decree being illegal, erroneous illegally and factually untenable is liable to be set-aside among other grounds on the following:
a. That the suit filed by the respondent No.1 was liable to be dismissed on this ground that the suit has been filed against the necessary party i.e. principal MMET School Pulwama as such the judgement and decree needs to be set-aside. b. That the alleged mistake of parentage of the respondent No.1 has kept in the basic admission record. In fact the respondent No.1 was admitted in the primary class with the parentage of Fayaz Ahmad Mir R/o Avengund Pulwama. This was done deliberately and intentionally as the respondent No.1 started his education carrier from MMET Pulwama. At the time mof registration of respondent No.1 in the records of Board of school Education, the school authorities forwarded the same record to the appellants and accordingly certificate was issued in favour of respondent No.1 and showing his parentage as per available record. This sort of mistake cannot correct by the appellants under the rules governing Board of School Education. This important fact has not been looked by the below court while passing the impugned judgment.
c. That there is no variation in the name, parentage and other details of the respondent No.1 between the school and Board records. The appellants have carried and recorded same name, parentage an address of the respondent No.1 which has been provided to the appellants at the time of registration of the respondent No.1's name in the Board record. So there is no fault on the part of the appellants and a duly constituted committee for correction of the records had also observed that the respondent No.1 is not entitled for correction of his parentage. Hence respondent No.1 has no cause of action against the appellants. On this count also the impugned judgment and decree is liable to be set-aside.
d. That the respondent No.1 has not produced cogent evidence to earn the judgment and decree in his favour. the trial court has misappropriated the facts and has not properly appreciated the facts and law while passing the impugned judgment.7 CR no.50/2018
e. That the suit of the respondent No.1 is hopelessly time bard and, on this count, also the judgment and decree is liable to be set- aside.
f. That the issues were not framed properly and, on this count, also the judgment and decree is liable to be set-aside.
9. Appeal, filed by petitioner-Board before Appellate Court, would, intrinsically, show that parentage cannot be changed or, for that matter, corrected, while impugning judgement and decree of the Trial Court. Thus, petitioner-Board is stick to its stand that parentage cannot be changed even if wrongly mentioned in records. Here, it is not impertinent to mention that what has been done and said by Trial Court, while passing judgement and decree dated 2nd July 2015, is to be looked into and gone through as, in nutshell, present litigation revolves around Trial Court judgement and decree. A civil suit was filed by respondent no.1 before Trial Court; there petitioner-Board filed its written statement and contested the case. Trial Court, upon considering pleadings framed following issues for adjudication:
1. Whether the plaintiff is real son of Fayaz Ahmad Mir R/o Avengund Pulwama? OPP
2. Whether the plaintiff was admitted in the school by his parental uncle, Ali Muhammad Mir, due to psychiatric problem of the father of the plaintiff and has wrongfully written the parentage of the plaintiff? OPP
3. Whether the plaintiff after attaining the age of majority has approached defendants for correction of his date of birth which was rejected by the defendants in an arbitrary manner? OPP
4. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendants? OPD
5. Whether the correction of parentage of plaintiff not covered by the rules and regulations of the Board. Hence the suit is not maintainable? OPD
6. To what relief the parities are entitled.
10.Both the parties produced and examined witnesses. Trial Court discussed all facets of the matter in lucid and eloquent manner. Trial Court has, thus, given a comprehensive judgement that need not be interfered with at any stage or, for that matter, at appellate stage. If we 8 CR no.50/2018 go by contention of petitioner-Board intuitively, then petitioner will be back to square one, where he had been way back in the year 2006, when he entreated correction of his father's name, and simultaneously injustice will be at galore.
In that view of the matter, order of the Appellate Court, dismissing condonation of delay application, does not warrant interference in this Revision Petition, more particularly when respondent no.1 has been dragged since the year 2006, i.e. for long 14 years. Respondent no.1 has been requesting, praying and craving for correction of his father's name. Ends of justice will be served only when petitioner-Board implements judgement and decree of the Trial Court and in this regard makes necessary corrections in its record and issues a Certificate accordingly.
11.It may not be out of place to mention here that Appellate Court, while passing impugned order, has not exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it or has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity or that impugned order has caused failure of justice. It is not a case of petitioner-Board that Appellate Court does not possess the jurisdiction to decide application for condonation of delay. Appellate Court has taken into account all aspects of the matter and only thereafter passed order impugned.
12.Learned counsel for petitioner, inter alia, has placed reliance on Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag v. Mst Khatiji (supra), to lay 9 CR no.50/2018 particular emphasis on six factors recited in the said judgement. These six factors are as under:
"1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that the cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. Every day's delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common-sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."
13.Learned counsel for petitioner-Board after relying upon afore-quoted factors has vehemently argued that if the Court refuses to condone delay in a matter, which is meritorious in substance, the matter would be thrown out at the very threshold and this would result in injustice. He has also stated that above-quoted factors support his contention that the ordained function of a Court being to render substantial justice; the cause of substantial justice must be preferred and cannot be overshadowed or negatived by technical considerations such as the bar of limitation.
14.In the backdrop of submissions made by learned counsel for petitioner- Board, I am bound to observe that these six factors have been enumerated in the said decision of the Supreme Court for a limited and specific purpose. These factors have not been enumerated, in my opinion, with a view to furnishing any particular guidelines as to how 10 CR no.50/2018 an Application for condonation of delay should be decided on merits. When these factors are considered in the context of the observations made in paragraph 3 of aforesaid decision, the reason for enumerating these factors becomes amply clear. In fact, the sentence, which enumerates these six factors begins with "And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that". Thus, in my opinion, that the Supreme Court has stated on principle or laid down by way of the ratio is not that these six factors are required to be individually considered and evaluated in the context of the facts of a particular application for condonation of delay. The only principle laid down in the said decision is that, on account of these factors, a liberal approach is required to be adopted by a Court in deciding an application for condonation of delay. This decision does not, in my opinion, in any manner deal with what facts should or should not constitute "sufficient cause" on the facts of case. Obviously, the sufficiency of the cause for condonation of delay must necessarily depend upon the facts of each case.
15.I must not lose focus on the relevancy of these six factors. Having perused this decision carefully, I am unable to locate therefrom any principle laid down to the effect that these six factors, whether considered individually, collectively or in combination with other facts, when factually established in a given case for condonation of delay, would by itself constitute "sufficient cause" for condonation. Thus, the Court, when examining facts that supposedly constitute "sufficient cause" for condonation, is not required to focus its attention on any of 11 CR no.50/2018 these six factors, but is only required to keep in mind that it is on the basis of these factors that a liberal view should be taken, so far as the interpretation of facts is concerned. This is so because the only relevancy of these six factors, which I can ascertain from aforesaid decision, is that existence of these factors in abstract, which fall within realm of realities of life, and not on the facts of a given case, constitute basis upon which the decision lays down the ratio, viz. that the Court should normally take a liberal view when appreciating those facts, which supposedly constitute "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay. In the said decision, the Supreme Court considered whether or not to apply the same standard in applying the "sufficient cause" test to all the litigants regardless of their personality character or capacity. In this case, a delay of 4 days in filing appeal was not condoned and application was rejected. The Court observed that Legislature has conferred power on the Courts to condone delay, by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of the matter on merits. It further observed that expression "sufficient cause" employed by Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply law in a meaningful manner so as to subserve the ends of justice and such liberal approach is adopted on principles stated therein. This would clearly mean that six factors narrated above are the reasons why facts constituting "sufficient cause" should be liberally interpreted so that substantial justice is done to the parties. The Supreme Court further observed that doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants including the State as a 12 CR no.50/2018 litigant are accorded same treatment and law is administered in an even- handed manner.
16.Nowhere does this decision even suggest that, for State Government or local authorities to aver "that court below failed to appreciate that Board authorities (petitioners) being an impersonal body, there had to be departmental correspondence, consultations and obtaining of sanctions, approvals and the like" would constitute "sufficient cause". There is a contention that "learned court below failed to appreciate serious issues of law and facts as taken by petitioners in memorandum of appeal qua maintainability of suit and application seeking condonation of delay"; and it is also contention of petitioner-Board that "procedural laws, being director and not mandatory in nature are meant to further the ends of justice and are always designed to aid and subservient the substantive laws. None should suffer on technicalities of law." While saying this and using these words, petitioner-Board has forgot that these words also apply and bottom out the case of petitioner-Board and is it's a weak point for them. On one hand, petitioner-Board maintains that rules and regulations are to be strictly followed and it would not change/correct name of father of respondent no.1 and on other hand petitioner-Board says that laws, rules and regulations are meant to further the ends of justice. Petitioner-Board should keep in mind that in the present case, ends of justice would serve only when name of father of respondent no.1 is corrected and not otherwise. Petitioner-Board has unnecessarily dragged respondent no.1 for last 14 years and pushed him to wall, just for correction of his father's name. Besides, such act of petitioner- 13 CR no.50/2018 Board is neither "in the interest of public" nor will "serve any public purpose" but vice-versa. In addition to this, if contention of petitioner- Board is accepted, it would simply mean that in all cases, the Court should accept that in the Government or semi-government or local self- government agencies, nobody is personally involved or interested in decision-making process, the Court should condone delay, even where specific facts are not brought on record to justify sufficiency of cause. Such an approach would result in applying different standards in favour of such bodies. This, in my view, would be discriminatory. On the contrary, in aforesaid case, it is specifically observed: "The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants including the State as a litigant are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in even-handed manner".
17.It would also be germane to examine provisions pertaining to condonation of delay viz. Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It reads as under:
"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain - Any appeal or application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period."
18.Bare perusal of this provision specifies that firstly this is an enabling provision and nothing more. It enables a Court to condone the delay, subject to the Court being satisfied that there was "sufficient cause" for the delay. The Court can only examine the submissions of the parties on the basis of facts averred and made out in application for 14 CR no.50/2018 condonation. The Court cannot decide sufficiency of cause de hors the facts pleaded and made out. Whether cause shown was sufficient or otherwise, cannot be converted into a question of principle, as attempted by learned counsel for petitioner-Board, on the basis of the decision in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra). Thus, I have no hesitation in coming to conclusion that phrase "sufficient cause" involves only questions of fact to be considered by the Court dealing with an application for condonation of delay, and in considering sufficiency of cause, no question of principle is involved, except that a liberal view should be adopted in the examination and interpretation of the facts which seek to establish. "sufficient cause", as laid down in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra).
19.This takes me to next contention that cause referred to variously as "administrative delay / administrative reasons / administrative procedure" is itself a sufficient cause, irrespective of facts of the case, on the premise that the same is a question of principle. This submission on the part of counsel for petitioner-Board is misconceived inasmuch as when delay is sought to be condoned for cause or causes referred to as "administrative delay / administrative reasons / administrative procedure", this is merely a reason set out for condonation of delay. Moreover, I cannot ignore the fact that setting out such a reason is merely in the nature of a plea or an averment, and this can only be made good by establishing the same on the basis of appropriate facts brought on record, which would assist an applicant in satisfying the Court as regards sufficiency of cause. When an applicant sets out that delay was 15 CR no.50/2018 on account of "administrative reasons", etcetera, it is certainly a cause for delay, i.e. it is reason behind delay. This by itself does not necessarily make it a "sufficient cause" within meaning of the provision. The submission of counsel for petitioner-Board in this context clearly ignores the word "sufficient" which occurs within the phrase "sufficient cause". Thus, it is obvious that what may be a reason or the reason for delay, may not be a good reason, i.e. may not be "sufficient" reason for condoning delay. In other words, sufficiency of reason for condoning the delay must necessarily be established from the facts, both averred and established, and such facts would necessarily differ from case to case. Undoubtedly, therefore, merely pleading or even asserting that cause for delay was "administrative delay / administrative reasons / administrative procedure" would not establish sufficiency of cause. Necessarily, therefore, the Court considering application for condonation of delay is required to go into facts of the case, i.e. the facts of particular application, and determine on the basis of those facts alone as to whether cause is sufficient or otherwise, for condoning delay.
20.At this juncture, I may also take note of the contention raised by learned counsel for respondent no.1 to the effect that on a true and correct interpretation of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, mandate of Section for purposes of condoning delay is only that a "sufficient cause" be made out for obtaining condonation. For making out "sufficient cause" a factual foundation is essential, and that therefore, question of sufficiency of cause cannot be decided on abstract 16 CR no.50/2018 principles and de hors the facts of the case which constitute reasons for the delay. I am inclined to uphold this submission.
21.The law of limitation is intended to provide some sort of discipline in proceedings before the Court. The very fact that this law prescribes certain fixed period for doing certain things itself means that the legislative intention is to enforce discipline in Court affairs which cannot be left to the personal whims of a person or to his convenience. Certain discipline is therefore, inherent in every concept of the law of limitation and this can offer no ground for grudge to any one, much less, the State. If State actions are weighted by cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, the private individual also may suffer from paucity of hands and funds. If law expects a person to leave his business, cultivation or service alone in order to approach the Courts in time, why cannot the State, with its large work force and immense resources, cannot be expected to do so? All that is required is a properly coordinated action. If sufficient time-bound guidelines are laid down this work can be accomplished within time. The problem only is that more the Courts become liberal the more the Government become complacent. This must stop and the Courts will have to take notice of this casualness which is creeping into the functioning of the Government, particularly in the law Department. It is a matter of regret that those who must know the law should seem to be so ignorant about its rigours and requirements. The Government should now wake up soon and devise some methodology to see that papers for appeals are 17 CR no.50/2018 processed quickly and vigorously at all stages and scope for delay minimised to the bare minimum.
22.The law of limitation is intended to provide some sort of discipline in proceedings before the Court. The very fact that this law prescribes certain fixed periods for doing certain things itself means that the legislative intention is to enforce discipline in Court affairs which cannot be left to the personal whims of a person or to his convenience. Certain discipline is, therefore, inherent in every concept of the law of limitation and this can offer no ground for grudge to any one, much less, the State. If State actions are weighed by cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, private individual also may sutler from paucity of hands and funds. If law expects a person to leave his business, cultivation or service alone in order to approach the Courts in time, why cannot the State, with its large work force and immense resources, be expected to do so? All that is required is a properly coordinated action. If sufficient time-bound guidelines are laid down, this work can be accomplished within time. The problem only is that more the Courts become liberal, the more the Government becomes complacent. This must stop and the Courts will have to take notice of this casualness which is creeping into the functioning of the, Government. It is a matter of regret that those who must know the law should seem to be so ignorant about its rigours and requirements. The Government should now wake up soon and devise some methodology to see that papers for appeals are processed quickly and vigorously at all stages and scope for delay minimised to the bare minimum.
18CR no.50/2018
23.It may not be incongruous to say that though the Supreme Court has taken lenient view while condoning delay in filing a motion/appeal, yet that discretion has been taken only after considering the merits of the case, so that the merit shall not become a casualty. In the case in hand, as discoursed herein before as well, contents of Appeal, concomitant with the Condonation of Delay Application, do not portray any merit to take a lenient view in condoning the delay inasmuch as condoning the delay in filing the Appeal would have become a casualty, and simultaneously it would have become an irretrievable casualty and injury to respondent no.1, who, for correction of name of his father, has been all along, for one and a half decade, put in melancholy.
24.Having reviewed the case laws cited by learned counsels for parties, it is deducible that each case deserves to be decided on its own facts and circumstances and no straight jacket formulae can be prescribed, and that sufficiency of the cause for condoning the delay must ultimately be decided by the Court, on the facts of each case. In the present case, impugned order, having an overall view of the case set up by petitioner- Board and rival submissions of learned counsel for parties, does not warrant any interference and as a corollary thereof revision petition is liable to be dismissed.
25.There is also a submission on the part of learned counsel for respondent no.1, and that submission has a substance, that logical sequitur of the analysis made in the case of Shyam Sunder v. Pannalal Jaiswaland (supra) is that an appeal along with an application for delay in filing 19 CR no.50/2018 that appeal, when dismissed on refusal to condone the delay, is a decree within meaning of Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in ultimate analysis revision petition on hand fails as the same is not maintainable.
26.For all that has been discussed herein above, civil revision petition on hand is dismissed with connected CM(s). Interim direction, if any, shall stand vacated.
27.Record of the Court below be sent down along with copy of this judgement.
(Vinod Chatterji Koul) Judge Srinagar 12.11.2020 Ajaz Ahmad, PS Whether approved for reporting? Yes/No QAZI AMJAD YOUSUF 2020.11.13 12:26 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document