State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Delhi Development Authority vs Swaran Chadha on 7 October, 2024
AEA/10/2024 DDA VS. MRS. SWARAN CHADHA DOD: 07.10.2024
IN THE DELHI STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL
COMMISSION
Date of Institution:05.08.2024
Date of hearing : 20.09.2024
Date of Decision : 07.10.2024
APPEAL EXECUTION NO. 10/2024
IN THE MATTER OF
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
THROUGH ITS VICE CHAIRMAN
VIKAS SADAN, INA, NEW DELHI
(Through Ms. Vrinda Kapoor, Advocate
...APPLICANT/APPELLANT
VERSUS
MRS. SWARAN CHADHA
W/O LATE MR. KIDAR NATH CHADHA
8634, HILLSIDE, MANOR DRIVE
SPRINGFIELD, VA-22152, USA
PRESENTLY AT
E-141, GREATER KAILASH-II, NEW DELHI
....NON-APPLICANT/ RESPONDENT
CORAM:
HON'BLE JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL (PRESIDENT)
HON'BLE MR. J.P. AGRAWAL, MEMBER (GENERAL)
Present: Ms. Vrinda Kapoor along with Ms. Saumya Soni, counsel for
the appellant (Email: [email protected] &
Mobile No. 9899027839).
Ms. Sonam Anand along with Ms. S.L. Soujanya, counsel for
the resopondent (Email: [email protected] &
Mobile No.9871613910).
PER: HON'BLE JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL (PRESIDENT)
1.The present appeal has been filed on 05.08.2024 challenging the impugned order dated 08.05.2024 passed in Execution Application No.483/2014 in Complaint Case No.599/2006 by the District DISMISSED Page 1 of 14 AEA/10/2024 DDA VS. MRS. SWARAN CHADHA DOD: 07.10.2024 Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission-II (South District), Udyog Sadan, C-22 & 23, Qutub Institutional Area (Behind Qutub Hotel Mehrauli) New Delhi (South-I) wherein the JD/appellant was directed to calculate the price of the flat as on 13.05.2008 and offer possession to the DH/respondent within one month from the date of passing of 08.05.2024 i.e. the date of impugned order.
2. This order will dispose off an application bearing IA No.2240/2024 seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal, filed along with the appeal. Affidavit of Manohar Lal, Deputy Director (MIG) with the appellant has been filed along with this application.
3. Record has been carefully and thoroughly perused.
4. The application has been moved under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. However, it is being considered under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as it is arising out of Complaint Case No.599/2006.
5. A bare perusal of the application reflects that it has been preferred under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. However, the entire proceedings of the present case took place according to the Old Act. Hence, before delving into the merits of the present application, it is imperative to ascertain whether the present application bearing IA No.2240/2024 filed along with the appeal on 05.08.2024 is maintainable under the New Act/Old Act.
6. The repeal of a law shall not affect the previous operation of any enactment i.e. the proceedings under Consumer Protection Act, 1986 shall continue for cases which had been filed prior to the implementation of Consumer Protection Act, 2019 on 20.07.2020. The same can be gauged through the repeal and saving section (Section 107) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 which has been reproduced below:
"107. (1) The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is hereby repealed.DISMISSED Page 2 of 14
AEA/10/2024 DDA VS. MRS. SWARAN CHADHA DOD: 07.10.2024 (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under the Act hereby repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act.
(3) The mention of particular matters in sub-section (2) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 with regard to the effect of repeal."
7. We may also take the assistance of Section 6 (b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to further this view. Section 6 (b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 has been reproduced below:
"6 Effect of repeal. : Where this Act, or any 1 [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder"
8. Moreover, unless the legislature explicitly provides that the amendment is retrospective in nature, it will be considered prospective. The aforesaid view has been taken by the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd. reported in (2015) 1 SCC 1 wherein the Court discussed the proviso to Section 113 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and held that it was prospective and not retrospective. While deciding the case, the Constitution Bench laid DISMISSED Page 3 of 14 AEA/10/2024 DDA VS. MRS. SWARAN CHADHA DOD: 07.10.2024 down certain general principles which have been reproduced as under:
"28. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern current activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the past. If we do something today, we do it keeping in view the law of today and in force and not tomorrow's backward adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the law is founded on the bedrock that every human being is entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law and should not find that his plans have been retrospectively upset. This principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit: law looks forward not backward. As was observed in Phillips v. Eyre [Phillips v. Eyre, (1870) LR 6 QB 1] , a retrospective legislation is contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated when introduced for the first time to deal with future acts ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.
29. The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity is the principle of "fairness", which must be the basis of every legal rule as was observed in L'OfficeCherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. [L'OfficeCherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd., (1994) 1 AC 486 DISMISSED Page 4 of 14 AEA/10/2024 DDA VS. MRS. SWARAN CHADHA DOD: 07.10.2024 : (1994) 2 WLR 39 : (1994) 1 All ER 20 (HL)] Thus, legislations which modified accrued rights or which impose obligations or impose new duties or attach a new disability have to be treated as prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain a former legislation. We need not note the cornucopia of case law available on the subject because aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the various decisions and this legal position was conceded by the counsel for the parties. In any case, we shall refer to few judgments containing this dicta, a little later."
(emphasis in original)
9. Similarly, the Apex Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur vs State of Maharashtra reported in 1994 (4) SCC 602, the court has culled out the ambit and scope of an amending Act and its retrospective operation and has held the following:
"26. The Designated Court has held that the amendment would operate retrospectively and would apply to the pending cases in which investigation was not complete on the date on which the Amendment Act came into force and the challan had not till then been filed in the court. From the law settled by this Court in various cases the illustrative though not exhaustive principles which emerge with regard to the ambit and scope of an Amending Act and its retrospective operation may be culled out as follows:DISMISSED Page 5 of 14
AEA/10/2024 DDA VS. MRS. SWARAN CHADHA DOD: 07.10.2024
(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits.
(ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature.
(iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law.
(iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished.
(v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication."
10. Taking into account the aforesaid discussion, we conclude that the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 is prospective in nature. Thus, the cases pending or adjudicated and rights/obligations created before the coming into effect of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 will continue to be adjudicated under the Old Act i.e. Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Hence, the Applicant cannot resort to the provisions as inculcated in the New Act so far as the present case is concerned this case will be governed by the provisions of the Old Act.
11. Application for condonation of delay has been filed on various grounds. Para No. 2 to 11 of the application read as follows:
DISMISSED Page 6 of 14AEA/10/2024 DDA VS. MRS. SWARAN CHADHA DOD: 07.10.2024 "2. That on 27.05.2024, the Appellant entrusted a new Panel Lawyer for filing of appeal against the impugned order dated 08.05.2024 and thereby it was crucial to confirm crucial facts and documents from various concerned departments of the Appellant for ensuring that the Panel Lawyer is assisted properly for preparing the draft of the present Appeal.
3. That on 15.06.2024, after necessary internal discussions and approval, the Appellant informed the present counsel that the appeal by way of CM(main) will lie against the impugned order dated 08.05.2024 before Hon'ble High Court in terms of Karnataka Housing Board v. Κ.Α. Nagamani [Civil Appeal No.4631 of 2019]and the same is within limitation.
4. That on 26.06.2024, the Appellant filed CM Main No. 2966 of 2024 before Hon'ble High Court of Delhi under Article 227 of the Constitution. However, certain objections were raised by the Registry of Hon'ble High Court.
5. That thereafter, the file was resent to department on 05.07.2024 by counsel for signing as certain pages were not legible and the same were required for filing.
6. That on 12.07.2024, after rectifying the objections, the counsel sought essential documents, particularly order dated 03.10.2023 by the Execution Court, from the Appellant as the same was not traceable.
7. That the appeal was refiled by the counsel for Appellant and the same was listed bearing CM Main No. 2966 of 2024 for hearing before Hon'ble Delhi High Court on 22.07.2024.
8. That it is submitted that in light of the judgement in Karnataka Housing Board v. K.A. Nagamani [Civil Appeal No.4631 of 2019] decided on 6th May, 2019, the Appellant in good faith approached the Hon'ble High Court considering that the remedy of Appeal lies DISMISSED Page 7 of 14 AEA/10/2024 DDA VS. MRS. SWARAN CHADHA DOD: 07.10.2024 before the Hon'ble High Court against the impugned order. The relevant portion of the said judgment which was inadvertently considered to be correct approach by the Appellant in all bonafide reasons and in sheer misunderstanding in its interpretation and extent is reiterated below which is sufficient cause that establishes all bonfides that no Intentional delay was intended.
That relevant extract in the case of Karnataka Housing Board v. Κ.Α. Nagamani Supra the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "execution proceedings even though they are proceedings in a suit, cannot be considered to be a continuation of the original suit. Execution proceedings are separate and independent proceedings for execution of the decree. The merits of the claim or dispute, cannot be considered during execution proceedings. They are independent proceedings initiated by the decree holder to enforce the decree passed in the substantive dispute.",
9. That vide order dated 22.07.2024 in CM MAIN No. 2966/2024, Hon'ble High Court of Delhi after hearing arguments in brief on maintainability granted liberty to the Appellant to avail other correct legal remedies as available and permissible under law.
10. That the aforesaid proceeding before Hon'ble High Court was prosecuted in good faith and due to defect of jurisdiction, the Hon'ble Court was unable to entertain it and thereby granted liberty to the Appellant to approach this Court against the impugned order dated 08.05.2024.
11. That due to the above bonafide reasons, it is submitted that the present Appeal is filed immediately within one week of the of the withdrawal of the aforesaid proceedings and is therefore within limitation. Furthermore, the time-period gone under proceeding before the Hon'ble High Court should be DISMISSED Page 8 of 14 AEA/10/2024 DDA VS. MRS. SWARAN CHADHA DOD: 07.10.2024 excluded in good faith and in interest of justice under section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963."
12. To adjudicate this issue, we deem it appropriate to refer to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which provides as under:-
"Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed.
Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:
[Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Forum, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent. of the amount or rupees twenty-five thousand, whichever is less]"
13. A perusal of the aforesaid statutory position reflects that the appeal against an order should be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of impugned order. On perusal of record before us, it is clear that the impugned order was pronounced on 08.05.2024 and the present appeal was filed on 05.08.2024 i.e. after a delay of 59 days.
14. In order to condone the delay, the appellant has to satisfy this Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the appeal after the stipulated period. The term 'sufficient cause' has been explained by the Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose DISMISSED Page 9 of 14 AEA/10/2024 DDA VS. MRS. SWARAN CHADHA DOD: 07.10.2024 intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive".
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose."
15. We also deem it appropriate to refer to Anil Kumar Sharma vs. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. Reported in IV(2015)CPJ453(NC), wherein the Hon'ble NCDRC held as under:-
"12. .........we are not satisfied with the cause shown to justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has not been explained. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are entertained."
16. We further deem it appropriate to refer to Lingeswaran Etc. Versus Thirunagalingam in Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.2054- 2055/2022 decided on 25.02.2022, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: -
"5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the DISMISSED Page 10 of 14 AEA/10/2024 DDA VS. MRS. SWARAN CHADHA DOD: 07.10.2024 learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of PopatBahiruGoverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
17. From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble National Commission, it is clear that 'sufficient cause' means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part and the applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.
18. Reverting to the material available before us, we find that the impugned order was passed on 08.05.2024 and the period of limitation starts from the date of order which had expired on 07.06.2024. However, the reasons stated for the delay are that the appellant entrusted a new panel lawyer for filing the appeal against the impugned order; after necessary internal discussions and approval, on 15.06.2024 the appellant informed the present DISMISSED Page 11 of 14 AEA/10/2024 DDA VS. MRS. SWARAN CHADHA DOD: 07.10.2024 counsel by way of CM(M) will lie against the impugned order before the High Court of Delhi; thereafter the appellant filed CM (M) No.2966/2024 before the High Court of Delhi on 26.06.2024 where certain objections were raised by the Registry of the High Court of Delhi; thereafter the file was re-sent to the appellant on 05.07.2024; after rectifying the objections, counsel sought essential documents from the appellant on 12.07.2024 as the same was not traceable; thereafter the appeal was refiled before the High Court of Delhi which was listed bearing CM (M) No.2966/2024 for hearing before the High Court of Delhi on 22.07.2024 whereby the appellant was granted liberty to avail other correct legal remedies as available and permissible under law; and thereafter the present appeal was filed before this Commission on 05.08.2024.
19. A perusal of Annexure A i.e. the certified copy of the impugned order at page no. 55 to 57 shows that the same has been received by the appellant/DH on 08.05.2024 i.e. the date of passing of the impugned order.
20. It is pertinent to mention that it is the duty of the appellant to be aware of statutory period of filing the appeal. Further, the limitation period for filing the appeal has already been elapsed i.e. much prior to averments made in para no. 4 of the application. Para 4 of the application reads as under:
"4. That on 26.06.2024, the Appellant filed CM Main No. 2966 of 2024 before Hon'ble High Court of Delhi under Article 227 of the Constitution. However, certain objections were raised by the Registry of Hon'ble High Court."
21. Additionally, the appellant's sole justification in the aforementioned application was that the delay in filing the Appeal is Procedural delay. To this argument of the Appellant, we deem it appropriate to refer to the case of Office of the Chief Post Master General and DISMISSED Page 12 of 14 AEA/10/2024 DDA VS. MRS. SWARAN CHADHA DOD: 07.10.2024 Ors. Vs. Living Media India Ltd. and Ors. reported in AIR 2012 SC 1506, wherein the apex court has held as under:
"12. .......The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.
13. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."
22. Relying on the above settled law and considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the appellant for the delay except inculpating the government lengthy approval procedures. According to us, the appellant has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent sufficient reasons to condone such delay. As a result, it is abundantly clear from the above that the appellant was moving at its own pace unmindful that the prescribed period to file an appeal is 30 days from the date of impugned judgment.
23. Therefore, the application (IA-2240/2024) filed by the appellant seeking condonation of delay cannot be admitted and accordingly, the same is dismissed on the above grounds.
DISMISSED Page 13 of 14AEA/10/2024 DDA VS. MRS. SWARAN CHADHA DOD: 07.10.2024
24. Consequently, the present appeal filed beyond the statutory period also stands dismissed. However, in the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.
25. File be consigned to record room.
JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL (PRESIDENT) J.P. AGRAWAL MEMBER (GENERAL) Pronounced on 07.10.2024.
DISMISSED Page 14 of 14