Supreme Court of India
In Re : T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad vs Union Of India on 15 May, 2025
Author: B.R. Gavai
Bench: B.R. Gavai
2025 INSC 701 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
IN RE: CONSTRUCTION OF MULTI STOREYED BUILDINGS
IN FOREST LAND MAHARASHTRA
I.A.NO. 2079 OF 2007
[Application for Impleadment and Directions]
WITH
I.A. NOS.2301-2302 OF 2008
[Applications for Impleadment and Directions
in I.A. No. 2079 OF 2007]
WITH
I.A. NOS.3044-3045 OF 2011
[Application for Impleadment and Directions
in I.A. No. 2079 OF 2007]
WITH
I.A. NO.254946 OF 2023
[Application for Directions in I.A. Nos. 2301-2302 of
2008 in I.A. No. 2079 OF 2007]
WITH
I.A. NO.39711 OF 2024
[Application for permission to file Additional Documents
in I.A. No.254946 of 2023]
IN
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 202 OF 1995
IN RE: T.N. GODAVARMAN
THIRUMALPAD ….PETITIONER
VERSUS
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ….RESPONDENTS
DEEPAK SINGH
Date: 2025.05.15
16:12:03 IST
Reason:
WITH
1
WRIT PETITION (C) NO.301 OF 2008
WITH
I.A. No. 9108 OF 2024 in WRIT PETITION (C) NO.301 OF
2008
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 3
II. FACTUAL POSITION ............................................................. 3
a. Background .......................................................................... 3
b. Actions of the State Government ......................................... 6
c. Acquisition and Construction by RRCHS .............................. 9
d. Proceedings before this Court............................................. 10
III. SUBMISSIONS .................................................................... 15
IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION ............................................ 19
V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS ............................................... 20
a. As to whether the subject land is a Forest Land.................. 20
b. As to whether the Divisional Commissioner was justified in
recommending the allotment of subject land in favour of the
‘Chavan Family’ and as to whether the State Government was
justified in accepting the said recommendation. ...................... 25
c. As to whether the doctrine of desuetude would be applicable
to the facts of the present case. ............................................... 38
d. As to whether the RRCHS could be said to be a bona fide
purchaser of the subject land. .................................................. 42
e. As to whether the RRCHS would be entitled to allotment of
alternate piece of land in view of the order passed by this Court in
In Re: “Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings in Forest Land
Maharashtra”. .......................................................................... 52
f. As to whether the doctrine of public trust would be applicable
in the facts and circumstances of the present case. .................. 57
VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 85
2
JUDGMENT
B.R. GAVAI, CJI
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The present matter is a classic example as to how the
nexus between the Politicians, Bureaucrats and the Builders
can result in the conversion of precious Forest Land for
commercial purposes under the garb of resettlement of people
belonging to the backward class from whose ancestors,
agricultural land was acquired for public purpose.
II. FACTUAL POSITION
2. The facts in brief, shorn of unnecessary details, giving
rise to present proceedings are as under:
a. Background
2.1 An area admeasuring 32 Acres 35 Gunthas at Survey No.
20 of Village Kondhwa Budruk in Pune District was notified as
a Reserved Forest under the provisions of Section 34 of the
Indian Forest Act, 1878 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1878
Act”) vide Notification dated 1st March 1879.
3
2.2 A portion of the land admeasuring 3 Acres 20 Gunthas
was de-reserved by the State Government vide Notification
dated 5th January 1934.
2.3 It is pertinent to note that no further orders for de-
reservation were passed post 1934. As a result of which the
remaining area of 29 Acres and 15 Gunthas, which was
numbered as Survey No.20-A and subsequently renumbered
as Survey No.21 of Village Kondhwa Budruk remained to be a
Forest Land (hereinafter referred to as “the subject land”).
2.4 During the 1960s, a different parcel of land in Survey
No.37 of Kondhwa Budruk belonging to one ‘Chavan Family’
was acquired by the State Government for the purposes of
construction of “Dr. Bandorwala Leprosy Hospital”.
2.5 It appears from the record that no compensation was
paid to the ‘Chavan Family’. As such, a request was made by
them for allotment of the subject land as an alternative for
their resettlement.
2.6 It further appears from the record that in response to the
request made by the ‘Chavan Family’, the Tehsildar, Haveli
vide his communication dated 13th May 1968, released the
subject land to the ‘Chavan Family’ for cultivation for a period
4
of one year. The subject land was allotted on “Eksali” (yearly)
basis for the year 1968-69.
2.7 The said allotment was accepted by the ‘Chavan Family’.
The members of the ‘Chavan Family’ had also given an
undertaking to the Mamlatdar, Taluka-Haveli, District Pune.
The relevant part of the said undertaking reads thus:
“I accept and agree that the said assessment is
allotted to me under the provision of Bombay Land
Revenue Code 1879 and rules thereunder and shall
be subjected to following terms and conditions.
1. That, no part of the said land shall be leased
out, mortgaged, sold, excavated or no lien shall be
created by me (the term includes self, heirs,
executers, assignees, administrators) without prior
written approval of the Collector.
2. That, I will handover the possession of the land
to any person nominated by the Collector without
any hassle on or before 15/12/1967.
3. That, I will not use the said assessment for any
purpose other than cultivation.
4. That, I do not have any right of the trees
standing on the land and I will behave as per the
rules annexed herewith.”
2.8 It is pertinent to note that a perusal of the record would
reveal that the said Eksali (yearly) lease was never renewed
thereafter.
2.9 It further appears from the record that on 22 nd March
1969, the State Government took a decision that the Forest
5
Land given on lease for cultivation on Eksali basis should be
permanently released for cultivation to the Eksali leaseholders
after de-reservation.
2.10 It appears that in pursuance of this resolution, the
‘Chavan Family’ made an application for permanent release of
the subject land in the year 1988.
2.11 It is relevant to note that in the meanwhile, the Forest
(Conservation) Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as, “the 1980
FC Act”) came into force with effect from 25th October 1980.
Under the provisions of Section 2 of the 1980 FC Act, no Forest
Land could be de-reserved or used for any non-forest purposes
without the permission of the Central Government.
b. Actions of the State Government
2.12 A perusal of the record would reveal that there was a lot
of inter-departmental correspondence between the different
authorities. It appears that the District Collector vide his letter
dated 19th June 1991 found that the members of the ‘Chavan
Family’ were cultivating only 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas and,
therefore, recommended that the said area which was under
actual cultivation be allotted to them in view of the
Government Resolution dated 22nd March 1969. He further
6
recommended that the possession of the remaining land be
handed over to the Forest Department.
2.13 However, surprisingly, the Divisional Commissioner vide
his recommendation to the State Government dated 30th
November 1994, though, specifically recorded that as per the
Collector’s report, the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ were in
cultivation only in 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas, recommended
allotment of the entire subject land to the ‘Chavan Family’. It
is further surprising to note that the Divisional Commissioner
also observed that there is no necessity to obtain the prior
approval of the Central Government for allotment of the said
land. It is also surprising to note that the Divisional
Commissioner also noted that the subject land was a Reserved
Forest.
2.14 It appears that thereafter the file was pending before the
State Government. At that stage, the then Minister for
Revenue opined that the said land was granted by the
Government for Agricultural purpose and that the applicants
(the ‘Chavan Family’) were using the said land continuously
for such purpose and, therefore, the provisions of the 1980 FC
Act were not applicable in the said case. He therefore sought
7
legal advice on the point from the Law and Judiciary
Department of the Government of Maharashtra. This could be
gathered from the reply given by the Deputy Secretary to the
Government, Revenue and Forest Department dated 8th April
2008 to the Central Empowered Committee (“CEC” for short)
in response to certain queries.
2.15 It would further appear that thereafter on 27th July 1998,
the Deputy Secretary to Government, Law and Judiciary
Department, gave his opinion that there is no necessity for
obtaining prior sanction of the Government of India if the
Forest Land is already broken up and acquired before coming
into force of the 1980 FC Act. Accordingly, the Minister for
Revenue, the Government of Maharashtra sanctioned the
allotment of the subject land and an order came to be issued
by the Government of Maharashtra vide Memorandum dated
4th August 1998 to that effect.
2.16 In pursuance to the order passed by the State
Government, the Collector issued an order of allotment of land
on 28th August 1998. The said allotment, however, was
subject to certain conditions. It will be relevant to refer to
8
Condition Nos. 2, 4, 5 and 7 of the said allotment order dated
28th August 1998, which read thus:
“2) The allottee shall not be entitled to mortgage,
donate, sell, partition or exchange in any other
manner without the prior permission of the
District Collector, Pune. Similarly, shall not sell
or transfer the said land or any part thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
4) The allotee shall not lease the aforesaid land
granted to him to any other person.
5) It is necessary for the allottee to bring the said
land under cultivation within a period of two
years from the date of this order.
xxx xxx xxx
7) The said land shall be used for agricultural
purposes. Except agriculture, it shall not be
used for any other purpose.”
c. Acquisition and Construction by RRCHS
2.17 It would further appear from the record that immediately
after the land was allotted, the Divisional Commissioner vide
order dated 30th October 1999 granted permission to the
‘Chavan Family’ to sell the land in question to one Mr.
Aniruddha P. Deshpande, the Chief Promotor of Richie Rich
Cooperative Housing Society Limited (“RRCHS” for short) for
residential purposes.
9
2.18 However, a perusal of the material on record would reveal
that much prior to the said permission or even much prior to
the actual allotment of the subject land to the ‘Chavan Family’,
the transactions were entered into by the members of the
‘Chavan Family’ with Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande, Chief
Promoter, RRCHS. We will be referring to those documents
when we discuss the rival submissions.
2.19 The District Collector, Pune thereafter vide order dated
8th July 2005 granted permission for use of the subject land
for Non-Agricultural purposes i.e. for construction of the
residential buildings.
2.20 On 27th February 2006, the Pune Municipal Corporation
issued a Commencement Certificate and sanctioned the
Building Plan.
2.21 Thereafter, on 3rd July 2007, the Ministry of Environment
and Forest (MoEF) granted environmental clearance for
construction of “Raheja Richmond Park”, a Residential,
Shopping and IT Complex.
d. Proceedings before this Court
2.22 After noticing the aforesaid aspects, one Nagrik Chetna
Manch filed I.A. No. 2079-2080 of 2007 in Writ Petition (Civil)
10
No. 202 of 1995 before this Court challenging the allotment of
Reserved Forest Land to private persons and its use for
construction of multi-storeyed buildings in violation of the
1980 FC Act.
2.23 In the said proceedings, this Court vide order dated 23rd
November 2007, directed the CEC to enquire into the matter
and submit its report.
2.24 In pursuance to the orders passed by this Court, the CEC
started conducting enquiries into the matter and held various
meetings. When the CEC started conducting enquiries,
various queries were made to the State Government. The
Revenue and Forest Department of the State of Maharashtra
issued a notice dated 2nd July 2008 to the RRCHS and one of
the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ thereby informing them
about the Government’s decision to review the Government
Order dated 4th August 1998 vide which the land was allotted
to the ‘Chavan Family’.
2.25 It would further appear that the Forest Department
issued a notice to the RRCHS dated 4th July 2008, notifying
the RRCHS that the possession of the subject land was
required to be taken back. Aggrieved thereby, the RRCHS filed
11
I.A. No.2301-2302 of 2008 in I.A. No.2079 of 2007 praying for
impleadment as well as challenging the aforementioned
notices dated 2nd July 2008 and 4th July 2008.
2.26 The said RRCHS also filed a writ petition being Writ
Petition (Civil) No.301 of 2008, praying for the following reliefs:
“(a) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other
appropriate writ order or direction under Article
32 of the Constitution of India for quashing the
notice dated 2.7.2008 bearing no. Land-
3408/1025/PKP 935/Part 2/J-5, issued by the
State Government; and/or
(b) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other
appropriate writ order or direction under Article
32 of the Constitution of India for quashing the
notice dated 4.7.2008 bearing no. 57 of 2008-
09, issued by the Forest Department,
Government of Maharashtra; and/or
(c) Pass such other of further orders as this
Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
facts and circumstances of the case.”
2.27 After an elaborate enquiry, the CEC submitted its report
dated 27th November 2008 and recommended thus:
i) the allotment of 11.89 ha of Reserve Forest land
in Survey No.21 (old Survey No.20A) Kondhwa
Bk in District Pune for agriculture purposes
and subsequent permission given for its sale in
favour of M/s Richie Rich Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd. and construction of buildings
should be cancelled.
ii) the area should be restored back as forest;
12
iii) the senior functionaries and officers of the
Government of Maharashtra responsible for the
allotment/use of the said Reserve Forest land in
violation of the provision of the FC Act and this
Hon’ble Court’s order dated 12.12.1996 should
be prosecuted for criminal breach of trust and
other provisions of the Indian Penal Code. It is
imperative that amongst others the then
Revenue Minister, Maharashtra, who approved
the land allotment along with the then
Divisional Commissioner, Pune who granted the
permission for the sale of the land in favour of
private person for the construction of buildings,
Mr. Ashok Khadse, the then Deputy
Conservator of Forests, Pune who has issued
“No Objection Certificate” not only in this case
but in many other cases facilitating illegal use
of the forest land for private gains and Mr.
Aniruddha P. Deshpande, Developer, who
entered into various Development Agreements
for purchase and use of the Reserve Forest for
construction of buildings are prosecuted.
iv) Mr. Khadse who is presently under suspension
should not be reinstated without obtaining
permission of this Hon’ble Court;
v) the Chairman, Central Empowered Committee
may be authorized to constitute a multi
disciplinary “Special Investigation Team” to
examine the details of all the Reserve Forest
under the administrative control of the Revenue
Department in Pune and which have been
allotted/allowed to be used in the past without
obtaining approval under the FC Act. All such
allotment/uses should be treated as null and
void and the Government of Maharashtra
should be directed to cancel all such orders.
State functionaries/officers who are found to be
responsible for allotment/use of the forest land
in all such cases, should be prosecuted for
criminal breach of trust; and
13
vi) the Chief Secretary, Government of
Maharashtra should be directed to ensure
immediate compliance of this Hon’ble Court’s
order dated 22.9.2006 in IA No.1483 regarding
transfer of forest land in charge of the Revenue
Department to the Forest Department. Till the
entire exercise is completed, he should be
directed to file fortnightly Action Taken Report
before the Hon’ble Court as well as the CEC.”
2.28 Subsequent reports have been filed by the CEC on 1st
November 2010 and 14th August 2013.
2.29 I.A. Nos. 3044-45 of 2011 are filed by one Greenfield
Cooperative Housing Society (“GCHS” for short) praying for
impleadment in the matter and for quashing of the order dated
29th September 2008 by which the Divisional Commissioner,
Pune had cancelled the permission to sell by virtue of which
the GCHS had purchased the land from the original
leaseholder.
2.30 I.A. No.254946 of 2023 for directions has been filed by
RRCHS contending that the Gazette Notification dated 9th
March 1944 did not show the subject land as the Forest Land
and, therefore, prayed for disposal of the present proceedings
in view of the said Gazette Notification.
14
2.31 I.A. No.39711 of 2024 has been filed by the State to place
on record the original Gazette Notification dated 9th March
1944. It was contended by the State that the Gazette
Notification dated 9th March 1944 placed by RRCHS was a
fabricated document.
2.32 This Court, therefore, vide order dated 9th May 2024,
directed enquiry to be conducted by the Additional Director
General of State CID, Pune. The Additional Director General
of State CID, Pune conducted an enquiry and submitted his
report on 16th August 2024 pointing out therein that the
Gazette Notification dated 9th March 1944 placed by the
RRCHS was a forged one and not genuine one.
2.33 That is how the present proceedings have reached this
stage.
III. SUBMISSIONS
3. We have heard Shri K. Parameshwar, learned Senior
Counsel (Amicus Curiae) ably assisted by Mr. M.V. Mukunda,
Ms. Kanti, Ms. Raji Gururaj and Mr. Shreenivas Patil, learned
counsel. We have also heard Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi,
learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the RRCHS and
Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
15
behalf of the GCHS and Shri Aniruddha Joshi, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the State.
4. Shri K. Parameshwar submitted that the allotment of the
Forest Land to the ‘Chavan Family’ was in flagrant breach of
the orders of this Court and the provisions of the 1980 FC Act.
He submits that though the record would clearly reveal that
the subject land was recorded as a Forest Land, the land was
allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’ in flagrant violation of the law.
He submits that the record would reveal that the ‘Chavan
Family’ was only a front, while, in fact, the allotment was made
by the State Government in favour of a Builder. He submits
that the record would reveal that much prior to 1998 when the
land was actually allotted in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’, the
‘Chavan Family’ had already entered into a deal with Mr.
Aniruddha P. Deshpande, the Chief Promoter of RRCHS.
5. The learned Amicus submits that in the present case it
would clearly reveal that the then Revenue Minister and the
then Divisional Commissioner of Pune had acted in total
breach of the doctrine of public trust and misused their power
to aid the illegal activities of the Builder. The learned Amicus
further submits that, considering for a moment that the
16
allotment of the subject land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’
was legal, it is clear that the subsequent allocation thereof in
favour of RRCHS was totally in contravention of the conditions
on which the land was allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’. He
further submits that the record would reveal that the subject
land was in fact used for the purposes of plantation.
6. The learned Amicus, therefore, would submit that this
Court should accept the report of the CEC and set aside the
allotment in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’.
7. Shri Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel
submitted that the subject land was not used as a Forest Land
for a long period. It is submitted that the land in question was
allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’ in lieu of compensation for
acquisition of their land. It is submitted that the subject land
lost its character as a Forest Land on account of non-use of it
for a long time for the said purpose. It is therefore submitted
that in view of the doctrine of desuetude, the subject land no
longer remained a Forest Land and, therefore, the allotment of
the subject land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’ was totally
valid in law. In this respect, he relied on the judgment of this
17
Court in the case of Municipal Corporation for City of Pune
and another v. Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. and others1
8. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that the
RRCHS is the bona fide purchaser of the subject land from the
‘Chavan Family’. It is submitted that the records viz., the
revenue records as well as the Final Regional Plan of Pune
Region would show that the land in question was shown in a
Public/Semi Public Zone which could be used for residential
purposes. It is submitted that the Final Regional Plan of Pune
Region was published in accordance with the provisions of the
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, which is
a complete code in itself. It is submitted that since the subject
land was not shown in a green zone, the RRCHS was the bona
fide purchaser and, therefore, it cannot be penalized for
purchasing the said land.
9. An alternative submission made by the learned Senior
Counsel is that, as held by this Court in In Re: “Construction
of Multi Storeyed Buildings in Forest Land
Maharashtra2”, the RRCHS should be allotted an alternate
1 (1995) 3 SCC 434 : 1995 INSC 181
2 I.A. No.2771-2772 of 2009 etc. dated 9th September 2024
18
piece of land inasmuch as the land allotted to the ‘Chavan
Family’ was in lieu of their land acquired by the Government.
10. Shri K. Parameshwar, learned Amicus, in rejoinder,
submitted that the doctrine of desuetude would not be
applicable to the facts of the present case. He relied on the
following judgments of this Court in this regard:
(i) State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao
Puranik and Others3;
(ii) Cantonment Board, MHOW and Another v. M.P.
State Road Transport Corpn.4; and
(iii) Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited v. Union of
India and Others5
IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
11. In the background of these submissions, the following
points arise for consideration:
a. As to whether the subject land is a Forest Land;
b. As to whether the Divisional Commissioner was
justified in recommending the allotment of subject
land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’ and as to
3 (1982) 3 SCC 519 : 1982 INSC 78
4 (1997) 9 SCC 450 : 1997 INSC 401
5 (2012) 11 SCC 1 : 2012 INSC 305
19
whether the State Government was justified in
accepting the said recommendation;
c. As to whether the doctrine of desuetude would be
applicable to the facts of the present case;
d. As to whether the RRCHS could be said to be bona
fide purchaser of the subject land;
e. As to whether the RRCHS would be entitled to
allotment of alternate piece of land in view of the
order passed by this Court in In Re: “Construction
of Multi Storeyed Buildings in Forest Land
Maharashtra”6;
f. As to whether the doctrine of public trust would be
applicable in the facts and circumstances of the
present case.
V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
a. As to whether the subject land is a Forest Land.
12. A perusal of the Gazette Notification dated 1st March
1879 would reveal that it declares the lands described in the
Schedule annexed thereto to be Reserved Forest in the Poona
6 I.A. No.2771-2772 of 2009 in WP(C) No.202 of 1995 etc. dated 9th September
2024
20
Collectorate. The said Notification has been issued in exercise
of the powers conferred by Section 34 of the 1878 Act. A
perusal of the Schedule thereto would reveal that the land in
Village Kondhwa Budruk having survey No. 20, admeasuring
an area of 32 Acres and 35 Gunthas (13.27 ha) has been
included in the said Schedule. Subsequently, by way of
Notification issued on 5th January 1934, it was declared that
out of the said area in Survey No.20, an area admeasuring 3
Acres and 20 Gunthas would cease to be a Reserved Forest.
As such, after deforestation of 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas, the
balance area of 29 Acres and 15 Gunthas (11.89 ha) continued
to be notified as a Reserved Forest. The said area of 29 Acres
and 15 Gunthas was numbered as Survey No.20-A, which was
subsequently renumbered as Survey No.21 Kondhwa Budruk.
13. A perusal of the records of the Forest Department would
reveal that the said area continued to be shown as notified
‘Reserved Forest’.
14. However, in the records maintained by the Revenue
Department, the said area of Survey No.21 Kondhwa Budruk
has been recorded as “Government Grazing Ground”.
21
15. It will be relevant to note that in order to clear this
anomaly, the officers of the Forest Department have addressed
number of letters to the Collector, Pune for rectification of the
revenue records, which are as under:
(i) Letter dated 18.3.1991 from Deputy
Conservator of Forests, Pune to District
Collector, Pune.
(ii) Letter dated 5.1.1994 from the Deputy
Conservator of Forests to the Tahsildar, Haveli.
(iii) Letter dated 9.7.1998 from the Range Forest
Office to the Tahsildar, Haveli
(iv) Letter dated 29.7.1998 from the Deputy
Conservator of Forests to the Collector, Pune
(v) Letter dated 10.9.1998 from the Range Forest
Officer to the Tahsildar, Haveli
(vi) Letter dated September, 1998 from the Deputy
Conservator of Forests to the Collector, Pune.
(vii) Letter dated 11.9.1998 from the Deputy
Conservator of Forests to the Collector, Pune.
(viii) Letter dated 17.12.1998 from the Deputy
Conservator of Forests to the Collector, Pune
16. Not only this, but the perusal of the communication
dated 26th August 1994, addressed by the District Collector,
Pune to the Executive Engineer (Estd.), Maharashtra State
Electricity Board (“MSEB” for short) would reveal that it is
reserved as a “Forest Land”. It is to be noted that the MSEB
had sought allotment of this land for construction of High-
22
Tension Sub-Station. While refusing the said request, the
Collector, Pune informed the MSEB vide letter dated 26th
August 1994 as under:
“In reference to your above letter please note that the
land referred by you is reserved as “Forest Land” as
per the Indian Forest Rules, 1897 vide circular No.
24F dt. 1st March, 1879 and amended in 1890.
Hence same cannot be allotted to you. The
application is therefore filed.”
17. It is further relevant to note that the Collector, Pune while
forwarding the request of the ‘Chavan Family’ to the State
Government vide communication dated 19th June 1991,
referred to the said land as “Government Forest Land”.
However, noting that the ‘Chavan Family’ was in cultivation of
the land admeasuring 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas, he
recommended allotment of the said land to the ‘Chavan
Family’. He also recommended that the possession of the
remaining land be handed over to the Forest Department. In
the said letter, the Collector noted thus:
“S.No.20 is reserved for afforestation. As per the
Govt. notification No. AS/36/13//14032 dt
5.01.1934 (Pg 175) the rights for cultivation of the
area admeasuring 3 Acres 20 Gunthas out of
S.No.20A have been allotted to Shri Chauhan family
for which the Forest Dept has given their consent.
The Forest Department has requested for the
possession of the remaining land i.e. 29 Acres 15
Gunthas since reserved for Forest only.”
23
18. It could thus be seen that the though the Collector
recorded that Survey No. 20 was reserved for afforestation, he
recommended the allotment of the land admeasuring 3 Acres
20 Gunthas to ‘Chavan Family’. While doing so, he recorded
“No Objection” of the Forest Department. We will be referring
to the said aspect subsequently inasmuch as the said “No
Objection given by one of the Forest Officers, was
subsequently cancelled by the Forest Authorities.
19. Surprisingly, the Divisional Commissioner vide his
communication dated 30th November 1994, addressed to the
Secretary, Revenue and Forest Department, noticing the stand
taken by the Collector, Pune, recommended the entire land be
allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’. It is further to be noted that
in the said communication, the Divisional Commissioner also
specifically recorded that the ‘Chavan Family’ was in illegal
possession of the land after 1969.
20. After the 1980 FC Act came into effect, no Forest Land
could have been de-reserved without the permission of the
Central Government. It is to be noted that though the reliance
is placed by the RRCHS on the Gazette Notification dated 9th
March 1944 to contend that the said subject land was de-
24
reserved, on an enquiry conducted by the Additional
Superintendent of Police State CID under the orders of this
Court, the said Gazette Notification is found to be fabricated.
21. It would thus be amply clear from the record that the said
land was notified as early as in 1879 as Reserved Forest and
which reservation continues to be so till date.
b. As to whether the Divisional Commissioner was
justified in recommending the allotment of subject
land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’ and as to
whether the State Government was justified in
accepting the said recommendation.
22. Having held that the subject land is a reserved Forest
Land, the next question that would be required to be
considered is as to whether the said land could have been
allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’.
23. It will be relevant to refer to Section 2 of the 1980 FC Act
(as it originally exists, without amendment), which reads thus:
“2. Restriction on the de-reservation of forests or
use of forest land for non-forest purpose.—
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
for the time being in force in a State, no State
Government or other authority shall make, except
with the prior approval of the Central Government,
any order directing—
(i) that any reserved forest (within the
meaning of the expression “reserved
forest” in any law for the time being in
25
force in that State) or any portion thereof,
shall cease to be reserved;
(ii) that any forest land or any portion thereof
may be used for any non-forest purpose;
(iii) that any forest land or any portion thereof
may be assigned by way of lease or
otherwise to any private person or to any
authority, corporation, agency or any
other organization not owned, managed or
controlled by Government.
(iv) that any forest land or any portion thereof
may be cleared of trees which have grown
naturally in that land or portion, for the
purpose of using it for reafforestation].
Explanation.—For the purposes of this
section “non-forest purpose” means the
breaking up or clearing of any forest land
or portion thereof for—
(a) the cultivation of tea, coffee, spices,
rubber, palms, oil-bearing plants,
horticulture crops or medicinal plants;
(b) any purpose other than reafforestation,
but does not include any work relating to
or ancillary to conservation, development
and management of forests and wildlife,
namely, the establishment of check-posts,
fire lines, wireless communications and
Construction of fencing, bridges and
culverts, dams, waterholes, trench marks,
boundary marks, pipelines or other like
purposes.”
24. It would thus be clear that after the 1980 FC Act was
brought into effect, no State Government or any other
authority, unless there is prior approval by the Central
26
Government, could have directed any Reserved Forest or any
portion thereof to cease to be under the status of “reserved” or
any forest land or any portion thereof to be used for any non-
forest purposes. Nor could it have assigned any forest land or
any portion thereof, by way of lease or otherwise to any private
person or to any authority, corporation, agency or any other
organization.
25. Reliance is placed by the RRCHS on the judgment of this
Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram Modi and
Others7. The legal opinion given by the Deputy Secretary, Law
and Judiciary Department, Government of Maharashtra also
relies on the said judgment.
26. No doubt that in the case of Banshi Ram Modi (supra),
this Court held that if an area had already been dug up and
mining operations were carried on prior to coming into force of
the 1980 FC Act, the State Government, for continuing the
said lease for the purposes of mining, shall not need prior
approval of the Central Government. It has been held that
though it would be necessary to seek prior approval of the
Central Government for starting mining operations on a virgin
7 (1985) 3 SCC 643 : 1985 INSC 126
27
area, it would not be necessary to seek such approval for the
purposes of carrying out mining operations in a forest area
which is broken up or cleared before the commencement of the
1980 FC Act.
27. We find that even on facts, the said judgment would not
be applicable. There is no order permitting the subject land to
be used for non-forest purposes by any of the competent
authorities. A reliance is sought to be placed on the letter
issued by the Tehsildar, Taluka Haveli dated 13th May 1968,
thereby informing the ‘Chavan Family’ about its decision to
lease the subject land on “Eksali” basis for the year 1968-69.
However, it is to be noted that the said lease was only for a
period of one year. It is further to be noted that while
accepting the said yearly lease, the ‘Chavan Family’ has given
an undertaking that they will hand over the vacant and
peaceful possession on 15.12.1967 (sic) i.e. prior to 1980.
28. In any case, nothing is placed on record to show that the
land was permitted to be used by the State for any non-forest
purposes prior to 1980. In any event, since the lease deed was
valid only for one year, after the 1980 FC Act came into effect,
in view of the restrictions imposed in clause (iii) of Section 2 of
28
the 1980 FC Act, the forest land could not have been assigned
either by way of lease or any other mode to any private person
unless there was prior approval of the Central Government.
29. In the case of Ambica Quarry Works v. State of
Gujarat and Others8, this Court while distinguishing the
judgment in the case of Banshi Ram Modi (supra) observed
thus:
“15. The rules dealt with a situation prior to the
coming into operation of 1980 Act. The “1980 Act”
was an Act in recognition of the awareness that
deforestation and ecological imbalances as a
result of deforestation have become social
menaces and further deforestation and
ecological imbalances should be prevented. That
was the primary purpose writ large in the Act of
1980. Therefore the concept that power coupled
with the duty enjoined upon the respondents to
renew the lease stands eroded by the mandate of
the legislation as manifest in 1980 Act in the
facts and circumstances of these cases. The
primary duty was to the community and that
duty took precedence, in our opinion, in these
cases. The obligation to the society must
predominate over the obligation to the
individuals.
*** *** ***
18. The aforesaid observations have been set out in
detail in order to understand the true ratio of the said
decision in the background of the facts of that case.
It is true that this Court held that if the permission
had been granted before the coming into operation of
the 1980 Act and the forest land has been broken up
8 (1987) 1 SCC 213 : 1986 INSC 267
29
or cleared, clause (ii) of Section 2 of 1980 Act would
not apply in such a case. But that decision was
rendered in the background of the facts of that case.
The ratio of any decision must be understood in the
background of the facts of that case. It has been said
long time ago that a case is only an authority for what
it actually decides, and not what logically follows
from it. (See Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem)
[(1901) AC 495] . But in view of the mandate of Article
141 that the ratio of the decision of this Court is a
law of the land, Shri Gobind Das submitted that the
ratio of a decision must be found out from finding out
if the converse was not correct. But this Court,
however, was cautious in expressing the reasons
for the said decision in State of Bihar v. Banshi
Ram Modi [(1985) 3 SCC 643]. This Court observed
in that decision that the result of taking the contrary
view would be (SCC p. 648, para 10) that while the
digging for purposes of winning mica can go on, the
lessee would be deprived of collecting felspar or
quartz which he may come across while he is
carrying on mining operations for winning mica. That
would lead to an unreasonable result which would
not in any way subserve the object of the Act. There
was an existing lease where mining operation
was being carried on and what was due by
incorporation of a new term was that while
mining operations were being carried on some
other minerals were available, he was giving
right to collect those. The new lease only
permitted utilisation or collection of the said
other minerals.
19. In the instant appeals the situation is entirely
different. The appellants are asking for a renewal of
the quarry leases. It will lead to further deforestation
or at least it will not help reclaiming back the areas
where deforestations have taken place. In that view
of the matter, in the facts and circumstances of the
case, in our opinion, the ratio of the said decision
cannot be made applicable to support the appellants'
demands in these cases because the facts are entirely
different here. The primary purpose of the Act
30
which must subserve the interpretation in order
to implement the Act is to prevent further
deforestation. The Central Government has not
granted approval. If the State Government is of
the opinion that it is not a case where the State
Government should seek approval of the Central
Government, the State Government cannot
apparently seek such approval in a matter in
respect of which, in our opinion, it has come to
the conclusion that no renewal should be
granted.”
[Emphasis supplied]
30. It could thus be seen that this Court in unequivocal
terms held that the obligation to society must predominate
over the obligation to the individuals. This Court held that in
the case of Banshi Ram Modi (supra), there was an existing
lease where mining operations were being carried on and what
was due by incorporation of a new term was that while mining
operations were being carried on some other minerals were
available, he was given right to collect those. This Court
observed that, however, in Ambica Quarry Works (supra), the
situation is entirely different. The appellants therein were
asking for a renewal of the quarry leases. It would lead to
further deforestation or at least it will not help reclaiming back
the areas where deforestations have taken place. The Court,
therefore, observed thus:
31
“20. In that view of the matter and the scheme of the
Act, in our opinion, the respondents were right and
the appellants were wrong. All interpretations
must subserve and help implementation of the
intention of the Act. This interpretation, in our
opinion, will subserve the predominant purpose of
the Act.”
[Emphasis supplied]
31. It is thus clear that this Court in unequivocal terms held
that taking into consideration the Scheme of the Act, all
interpretations which subserve and help implementation of
the intention of the Act i.e. the protection of the forests must
be accepted.
32. It would further be apposite to note that this Court in the
present proceedings had an occasion to consider the
judgments in the cases of Banshi Ram Modi (supra) and
Ambica Quarry Works (supra). In the order dated 12th
December 1996, this Court observed thus:
“4. The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 was enacted
with a view to check further deforestation which
ultimately results in ecological imbalance; and
therefore, the provisions made therein for the
conservation of forests and for matters connected
therewith, must apply to all forests irrespective of the
nature of ownership or classification thereof. The
word “forest” must be understood according to its
dictionary meaning. This description covers all
statutorily recognised forests, whether designated as
reserved, protected or otherwise for the purpose of
Section 2(i) of the Forest Conservation Act. The term
“forest land”, occurring in Section 2, will not only
32
include “forest” as understood in the dictionary
sense, but also any area recorded as forest in the
Government record irrespective of the ownership.
This is how it has to be understood for the purpose
of Section 2 of the Act. The provisions enacted in the
Forest Conservation Act, 1980 for the conservation of
forests and the matters connected therewith must
apply clearly to all forests so understood irrespective
of the ownership or classification thereof. This aspect
has been made abundantly clear in the decisions of
this Court in Ambica Quarry Works v. State of
Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC 213] , Rural Litigation and
Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. [1989 Supp (1)
SCC 504] and recently in the order dated 29-11-1996
(Supreme Court Monitoring Committee v. Mussoorie
Dehradun Development Authority [ WP (C) No 749 of
1995 decided on 29-11-1996] ). The earlier decision
of this Court in State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram
Modi [(1985) 3 SCC 643] has, therefore, to be
understood in the light of these subsequent
decisions. We consider it necessary to reiterate this
settled position emerging from the decisions of this
Court to dispel the doubt, if any, in the perception of
any State Government or authority. This has become
necessary also because of the stand taken on behalf
of the State of Rajasthan, even at this late stage,
relating to permissions granted for mining in such
area which is clearly contrary to the decisions of this
Court. It is reasonable to assume that any State
Government which has failed to appreciate the
correct position in law so far, will forthwith correct its
stance and take the necessary remedial measures
without any further delay.
5. We further direct as under:
I. General
1. In view of the meaning of the word
“forest” in the Act, it is obvious that
prior approval of the Central
Government is required for any non-
forest activity within the area of any
“forest”. In accordance with Section 2
33
of the Act, all on-going activity within
any forest in any State throughout the
country, without the prior approval of
the Central Government, must cease
forthwith. It is, therefore, clear that the
running of saw mills of any kind including
veneer or plywood mills, and mining of any
mineral are non-forest purposes and are,
therefore, not permissible without prior
approval of the Central Government.
Accordingly, any such activity is prima
facie violation of the provisions of the
Forest Conservation Act, 1980. Every
State Government must promptly ensure
total cessation of all such activities
forthwith.”
[Emphasis supplied]
33. A perusal of the aforesaid observation of this Court in the
present proceedings would reveal that this Court after
considering the judgment in Banshi Ram Modi (supra) has in
unequivocal terms held that in accordance with Section 2 of
the Act, all on-going activity within any forest in any State
throughout the country, without the prior approval of the
Central Government, must be ceased immediately. It can thus
clearly be seen that this Court has in unequivocal terms
overruled what was held in Banshi Ram Modi (supra).
34. It is thus amply clear that for permitting any non-forest
activity within the area of any “forest”, it was necessary to have
prior approval of the Central Government. It has
34
unequivocally been directed that all on-going activity within
any forest in any State throughout the country, without the
prior approval of the Central Government, must cease
forthwith. This Court specifically directed that running of saw
mills of any kind including veneer or plywood mills, and
mining of any mineral are non-forest purposes and they are
not permissible without prior approval of the Central
Government.
35. It is further to be noted that this court in the case of
Nature Lovers Movement v. State of Kerala9 has observed
thus:
“52. In the result, the appeal is disposed of in the
following terms:
(1) ………………………………………………...
(2) After the enforcement of the 1980
Act, neither the State Government nor
any other authority can make an order
or issue direction for dereservation of
reserved forest or any portion thereof
or permit use of any forest land or any
portion thereof for any non-forest
purpose or assign any forest land or
any portion thereof by way of lease or
otherwise to any private person or to
any authority, corporation, agency or
organisation not owned, managed or
controlled by the Government except
after obtaining prior approval of the
9 (2009) 5 SCC 373 : 2009 INSC 371
35
Central Government.
(3) Conclusion D recorded by the High
Court in para 103 of the impugned
judgment is legally unsustainable and is
set aside.
(4) As and when the State Government
decides to assign 10,000 ha of forest land
to unauthorised occupants/encroachers,
it shall do so only after obtaining prior
approval of the Central Government and
the latter shall take appropriate decision
keeping in view the object of the 1980 Act
and the guidelines framed for
regularisation of encroachments on forest
land.”
[Emphasis supplied]
36. The legal position, therefore, has been clarified by this
Court in the case of Nature Lovers Movement (supra) after
considering the earlier judgments reiterating the position that
neither the State Government nor any other authority can
make an order or issue a direction for de-reservation of
reserved forest or any portion thereof or permit use of any
forest land or any portion thereof for any non-forest purpose.
Neither is it permissible to assign any forest land or any
portion thereof by way of lease or otherwise to any private
person or to any authority, corporation, agency or organization
not owned, managed or controlled by the Government except
after obtaining prior approval of the Central Government.
36
37. It is further to be noted that in the present case, the
opinion given by the Deputy Secretary to the Government, Law
and Judiciary Department was on 27th July 1998. The order
approving allotment of land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’
was issued by the Government of Maharashtra on 4th August
1998 and the order of allotment by the Collector was passed
on 28th August 1998. It is thus clear that all these events have
taken place well after the directions were issued by this Court
on 12th December 1996 in the present proceedings.
38. It is thus clear that the Deputy Secretary to the
Government of Maharashtra had totally erred in relying on the
judgment of this Court in the case of Banshi Ram Modi
(supra) by ignoring the observations made by this Court in the
case of Ambica Quarry Works (supra) and specific directions
issued by this Court in the present proceedings. For that very
said reason, the decision of the State Government of allotting
the land and implementing the same by the Collector is not at
all sustainable in law. In that view of the matter, we have no
hesitation in holding that the allotment of the land in favour
of the ‘Chavan Family’ vide orders dated 4th August 1998 and
28th August 1998 is not sustainable in law.
37
c. As to whether the doctrine of desuetude would be
applicable to the facts of the present case.
39. An argument is sought to be raised on behalf of the
RRCHS that the doctrine of desuetude would be applicable to
the facts of the present case. Let us test the correctness of the
said argument.
40. Reliance in this respect is sought to be placed on behalf
of the RRCHS on the judgment of this Court in the case of
Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. (supra). In the said case, the liability
of the respondents therein to pay octroi to the Municipal
Corporation was under consideration. It was sought to be
argued that since the 1918 Notifications had not been
implemented, they stood repealed ‘quasily’ by the time new
Octroi Rules came to be framed in 1963 and, in fact, they were
applied to realize octroi from the respondents. In this
background, this Court observed thus:
“34. Though in India the doctrine of desuetude does
not appear to have been used so far to hold that any
statute has stood repealed because of this process,
we find no objection in principle to apply this doctrine
to our statutes as well. This is for the reason that a
citizen should know whether, despite a statute
having been in disuse for long duration and instead
a contrary practice being in use, he is still required
to act as per the “dead letter”. We would think it
would advance the cause of justice to accept the
application of doctrine of desuetude in our country
38
also. Our soil is ready to accept this principle; indeed,
there is need for its implantation, because persons
residing in free India, who have assured
fundamental rights including what has been stated
in Article 21, must be protected from their being, say,
prosecuted and punished for violation of a law which
has become “dead letter”. A new path is, therefore,
required to be laid and trodden.
35. In written submissions filed on behalf of
respondents, it has been stated that the theory of
desuetude can have no application to the facts of the
present case, since the challenge by the respondents
is to the levy and calculation under the 1963
Schedule, and not to the rates enforced since 1918.
This submission has been characterised as “most
important”. As to this we would observe that if
Notification of 1818 were to prevail despite 1918
Notifications, the fact that some changes were made
in the Schedule in 1963 has no legal bearing on the
question under examination. The theory of
desuetude has been pressed into service by the
appellant only to take care of relevant 1918
Notifications. If those notifications can be said to
stand eclipsed, the fact that changes were made in
the rates etc. in 1963 cannot stand in the way of
application of the theory of desuetude.”
41. It could thus be seen that the Court observed that the
doctrine of desuetude would apply to our statutes as well for
the reason that a citizen should know whether, despite a
statute having been in disuse for long duration and instead a
contrary practice being in use, he is still required to act as per
the “dead letter”. It has been observed that it would advance
the cause of justice to accept the application of doctrine of
39
desuetude in our country as well. The Court observed that in
view of the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, a citizen must be protected from being
prosecuted and punished for violation of a law which has
become “dead letter”.
42. However, it is clear from the aforesaid observations that
for applicability of the doctrine of desuetude, the statute must
not only be required to be in disuse for long duration but
instead a contrary practice must also be prevalent.
43. We fail to understand as to how the said doctrine of
desuetude would be applicable in the facts of the present case.
44. It is sought to be contended on behalf of the RRCHS that
though the subject land was shown as Reserved Forest Land,
as far back as in 1879, it was not used as a Forest Land for a
long period and therefore it ceased to be Reserved Forest Land.
We fail to appreciate such a submission. The subject land has
continuously been recorded as ‘Reserved Forest’ in the Forest
Records. Not only that, as we have already reproduced
hereinabove, the Forest Authorities through a number of
communications had requested the Revenue Authorities to
correct the revenue entries and transfer the land to the Forest
40
Department. In any case, this Court in the case of Monnet
Ispat and Energy Limited (supra) has correctly laid down the
legal position as under:
“201. From the above, the essentials of the doctrine
of desuetude may be summarised as follows:
(i) The doctrine of desuetude denotes a
principle of quasi-repeal but this doctrine
is ordinarily seen with disfavour.
(ii) Although the doctrine of desuetude has
been made applicable in India on few
occasions but for its applicability, two
factors, namely, (i) that the statute or
legislation has not been in operation
for a very considerable period, and (ii)
the contrary practice has been
followed over a period of time must be
clearly satisfied. Both ingredients are
essential and want of any one of them
would not attract the doctrine of
desuetude. In other words, a mere neglect
of a statute or legislation over a period of
time is not sufficient but it must be firmly
established that not only the statute or
legislation was completely neglected but
also the practice contrary to such statute
or legislation has been followed for a
considerably long period.”
[Emphasis supplied]
45. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the
doctrine of desuetude is ordinarily seen with disfavour. It has
also been held that although this doctrine has been made
applicable in India on a few occasions, however, for its
applicability, two factors are necessary, namely, (i) that the
41
statute or legislation has not been in operation for a very
considerable period, and (ii) the contrary practice has been
followed over a period of time. It has been held that, not one
but, both the conditions must be available to attract the
applicability of the said doctrine of desuetude.
46. In the present case, the legislative history would clearly
show that, right from 1878, when the 1878 Act was enacted,
under Section 34 of the said Act, the law with regard to
protection and conservation of forest has been consistently
evolving more and more in favour of protection of forests.
47. We do not find any substance in the argument that the
Notification dated 1st March 1879 issued under Section 34 of
the 1878 Act has been put to disuse for a long time. In any
case, nothing has been brought on record to show that a
practice contrary to the provisions of the said Act was being
applied. In that view of the matter, such an argument has to
be heard only to be rejected.
d. As to whether the RRCHS could be said to be a bona
fide purchaser of the subject land.
48. It is sought to be urged on behalf of the RRCHS that they
are the bona fide purchaser of the subject land in question. It
42
is submitted on behalf of the RRCHS that the land in question
was reflected as revenue land. It is submitted that the Final
Regional Plan of Pune Region, which has statutory force, had
shown the subject land as municipal land. It is further
submitted that even prior to that in the Pune Regional Plan
implemented on 17th May 1976, the land in question was
included in the agricultural zone. As such, by no stretch of
imagination, the RRCHS could have known that the subject
land was Forest Land and not Revenue Land. It is further
stated that even the revenue record pertaining to the subject
land had shown the possession of the ‘Chavan Family’ over the
said land. It is, therefore, submitted that the RRCHS, which
is a bona fide purchaser of the land in question, could not be
faulted with and penalized for no fault of theirs.
49. As already stated herein above, the subject land was
allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’ by the Tehsildar, Haveli on 13th
May 1968 on Eksali (yearly) lease for the year 1968-69. Not
only that, the ‘Chavan Family’ had given an undertaking to the
Mamlatdar, Haveli to surrender the said land prior to
completion of one year. The ‘Chavan Family’ had further given
an undertaking that the said land would not be put to any
43
other use except for the agricultural purposes. It is further
pertinent to note that after the grant of lease for one year, there
has been no renewal of the said lease, although the names of
the ‘Chavan Family’ do appear in the 7/12 extracts of revenue
records.
50. This Court in the case of Suraj Bhan and others v.
Financial Commissioner and Others10 has held as follows:
“9. ….. It is well settled that an entry in revenue
records does not confer title on a person whose name
appears in record-of-rights. It is settled law that
entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have
only “fiscal purpose” i.e. payment of land revenue,
and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such
entries. So far as title to the property is concerned, it
can only be decided by a competent civil court
(vide Jattu Ram v. Hakam Singh [(1993) 4 SCC 403 :
AIR 1994 SC 1653] ). As already noted earlier, civil
proceedings in regard to genuineness of will are
pending with the High Court of Delhi. In the
circumstances, we see no reason to interfere with the
order passed by the High Court in the writ petition.”
51. Recently, this Court in the case of P. Kishor Kumar v.
Vittal K. Patkar11 has also observed thus:
“13. …. mutation in revenue records neither creates
nor extinguishes title, nor does it have any
presumptive value on title. All it does is entitle the
person in whose favour mutation is done to pay the
land revenue in question.”
10 (2007) 6 SCC 186 : 2007 INSC 424
11 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1483
44
52. It is well-settled law that the entries in the revenue record
do not confer a title to the property.
53. It would further appear from the record that after the
lease was not renewed in 1969, for a period of about 20 years,
the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ kept silent. It appears
that only in the year 1988, they started moving the authorities
for allotment of land in lieu of compensation. However, much
prior to the actual allotment of land in their favour, they had
already entered into transactions with the Builders. A perusal
of the record would reveal that one Mr. Rajesh Shah had filed
a civil suit, being Civil Suit No. 1023 of 1998 for permanent
injunction against Mr. Raghunath Shripati Chavan and
others. In the said suit, Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande, Chief
Promoter of the RRCHS, was also made a party respondent.
The other members of the ‘Chavan Family’ were also made
respondents. In the said suit, Mr. Rajesh Shah had claimed
that he had purchased 75% share of the subject land from
some of the co-owners of the said land. The said co-owners
had executed the Development Agreement dated 16th February
1995 and had granted development rights as well as executed
45
Power of Attorney to the plaintiff along with one Mr. Yogesh
Kariya. In the said proceedings, Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande,
Chief Promoter of the RRCHS had filed an affidavit dated 28th
August 1998, wherein it was stated that the owners/holders
of the said land had executed the Development Agreement
dated 25th July 1992 and thereafter the Supplementary
Agreement dated 23rd June 1995 in his favour and that the
possession of the said property to the extent of their share had
been delivered to him. He had also placed on record the copies
of the General Power of Attorney dated 22nd June 1995 and
12th February 1996 executed by one Mr. Kesu Hari Chavan
and others in his favour.
54. It will be relevant to reproduce Para 2 of the Affidavit
dated 28th August 1998 filed by Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande,
Chief Promoter, RRCHS in Civil Suit No. 1023 of 1998, which
reads thus:
“2. It is submitted that the owners/holders of the
suit property Shri Abu G. Chavan, Sarubai S.
Chavan, Pandurang Bhau Chavan, Kesu Hari
Chavan, Dattatraya R. Chavan, Narayan Nana
Chavan, Rakhmabai Vithal Chavan and others have
executed Development agreement 25/7/92 and
thereafter supplementary agreement dated 23/6/95
in favour of this applicant. The said owners have also
delivered the possession of the suit property to the
extent of their share to this applicant. As such this
46
applicant is in possession of the suit property to the
extent of the undivided share of the above owners. In
view of the said fact this applicant is necessary party
to the suit. It is submitted that if any order is passed
in the suit the same may seriously affect the right of
this applicant and the applicant may suffer
irreparable loss and hardship. The orders passed in
the suit may also lead to multiplicity of litigation as
such it is necessary that this third party may be
added as the Defendant to the suit. If this applicant
is added as the necessary party to the suit no
hardship or injustice will be caused either to the
plaintiff or the Defendant, on the contrary this
applicant may suffer irreparable loss and hardship,
hence in the interest of justice this applicant may
please be added as the necessary party to the suit.
The details of this applicant is as under:
SHRI ANIRUDDH P. DESHPANDE
AGE : 37 YEARS, OCC : BUSINESS
RESIDING AT : 66/2, APEKSHA,
OPPOSITE LAW COLLEGE,
PUNE 411 004.”
55. It is further to be noted that another suit being Civil Suit
No.1364 of 1998 was filed by one Mr. Raju Shivaji Bhonsale
and another challenging the allotment of the subject land to
the ‘Chavan Family’. In the said suit also, Mr. Aniruddha P.
Deshpande, Chief Promoter of the RRCHS was made a party
respondent. Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande had also filed an
affidavit dated 14th February 2005 in the said suit inter alia
stating therein that during 1995 Mr. Chavan and others had
granted the Development Rights in his favour.
47
56. It is further to be noted that the members of the ‘Chavan
Family’ had entered into Development Agreement with Mr.
Aniruddha P. Deshpande on 18th August 1998.
57. It is further to be noted that an order approving the
allotment of the land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’ was
passed by the Government vide order dated 4th August 1998,
whereas the actual allotment of land by the Collector is by
order dated 28th August 1998.
58. It is relevant to note that in the civil suit filed by Mr.
Rajesh Shah, a Compromise Pursis dated 29th August 1998
was filed by the members of the ‘Chavan Family’, Mr.
Aniruddha P. Deshpande and Mr. Rajesh Shah, which reads
thus:
“i) the members of the Chavan family (allottees of
the said land) and Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande
(Chief Promoter of the Richie Rich Co-operative
Housing Society) admit, agree and confirm that
(a) the Development Agreement dated
16.2.1995 pertaining to the said land has been
executed by the three members of the Chavan
family in favour of Mr. Rajesh Shah and Mr.
Yogesh Kariya, and (b) the possession of the
said property was delivered to Mr. Rajesh Shah
and Yogesh Shah to the extent of shares of
owners executing the agreement.
ii) the Agreement dated 25.7.1992 and the
Supplementary Agreement dated 23.6.1995
and Agreement dated 16.2.1995 executed by
48
the other owners in favour of Mr. Aniruddha P.
Deshpande is also valid and subsisting and that
the possession of the said property has been
given to him to the extent of shares of the
owners executing the said agreement.
iii) the said land is exclusively in the joint
possession of Mr. Rajesh Shah, Mr. Yogesh
Kariya, Raghunath Chavan and Aniruddha P.
Deshpande.
iv) an Agreement has been reached between Mr.
Rajesh Shah and Aniruddha P. Deshpande that
out of the said land Mr. Shah and Mr. Kariya
shall be entitled to an area of 8 acres and Mr.
Aniruddha P. Deshpande shall be entitled to the
balance area. They shall be deemed to be in
possession of the respective area; and
v) Mr. Raghunath Chavan and other 19 members
of Chavan family have agreed to sell/grant
development rights for the respective area to
Mr. Rajesh Chavan and Mr. Yogesh Kariya and
Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande.”
59. On the very same date i.e., 29th August 1998, after
recording the Compromise Pursis, the said civil suit being Civil
Suit No. 1023 of 1998 came to be disposed of.
60. We ask a question to ourselves as to whether the short
span within which the decision was taken by the Government
to allot the land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’, the actual
allotment of the land to the ‘Chavan Family’ by the Collector
and the disposal of the suit in terms of the compromise on the
very next day, is merely a coincidence.
49
61. It is further to be noted that the allotment order dated
28th August 1998, specifically prohibited the ‘Chavan Family’
in view of conditions (2) and (4), reproduced hereinabove, from
mortgaging, donating, selling, partitioning or exchanging in
any other manner, or allotting the said land on lease to any
other person without the prior permission of the District
Collector. The allotment order further mandated the ‘Chavan
Family’ to bring the said land under cultivation within a period
of two years from the date of the allotment. It further
prohibited the said land from being used for any other purpose
than agricultural purpose.
62. In the light of these glaring facts, can it be said that the
RRCHS is a bona fide purchaser? The records amply speak
for themselves.
63. It is amply clear that though the Eksali (yearly) lease
expired in 1969, the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ were
silent for a period of almost 20 years. Things started moving
only in 1988. During the said period, much before the
allotment could be done, the members of the ‘Chavan Family’
had already started negotiating the deals with Mr. Aniruddha
P. Deshpande, the Chief Promoter of RRCHS and Mr. Rajesh
50
Shah. The files were moving at different levels from 1991 to
1998, culminating in the final allotment in the year 1998. In
the meantime, all the Development Rights in the land already
stood transferred either to Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande, the
Chief Promoter of the RRCHS or to Mr. Rajesh Shah. For the
said purpose, not only had some of the members of the
‘Chavan Family’ entered into a Development Agreement, but
they had also executed Power of Attorney in favour of said Mr.
Aniruddha P. Deshpande surrendering their entire rights in
his favour.
64. In that view of the matter, we find no substance in the
argument that the RRCHS was a bona fide purchaser of the
subject land. The facts point out that the ‘Chavan Family’ was
only set up as a front for the benefit of the Developers. The
fact that the agricultural land of the ‘Chavan Family’ was
acquired, was being misused by the Developers as a pretext
for grabbing the valuable piece of Forest Land for the purposes
of commercial development. For doing so, even the status of
a person who belongs to backward class was being misused.
51
e. As to whether the RRCHS would be entitled to
allotment of alternate piece of land in view of the
order passed by this Court in In Re: “Construction of
Multi Storeyed Buildings in Forest Land
Maharashtra”.
65. An alternate submission made on behalf of the RRCHS is
that since they are the bona fide purchaser of the subject land
from the members of the ‘Chavan Family’, they would be
entitled to allotment of an alternate piece of land as has been
done by this Court in I.A. No.2771 of 2009.
66. The facts in the present case and the facts in I.A. No.2771
of 2009 are totally different. In the said case (i.e. I.A. No.2771
of 2009), the State had illegally taken possession of the land
belonging to the predecessor-in-title of the applicants therein.
Not only that, but the said land was given to the Armament
Research Development Establishment Institute (“ARDEI” for
short), which was a unit of Defence Department of the Union
of India. There was no acquisition proceeding. The applicants
therein fought right from the Trial Court to this Court and
succeeded in getting a decree for possession of the land. When
they put the decree in execution, the ARDEI opposed the same
contending therein that an Armament Defence establishment
was constructed thereon.
52
67. Faced with this situation and realizing its mistake, the
State Government allotted another piece of land in lieu of the
land which was already given in possession of the ARDEI.
However, the record subsequently revealed that the land
which was allotted to the applicants therein was notified as a
Forest Land.
68. The Court noted the following special circumstances in
the said case:
(i) “That the applicants had succeeded upto this
Court and as such, they cannot be denied the
benefits of the decree passed in their favour;
(ii) That the action of the State Government in
encroaching upon the land of a citizen was itself
illegal;
(iii) The State Government ought to have taken due
precautions before allotting an alternate piece
of land to the applicants;
(iv) That the land which was notified as a Forest
Land could not have been allotted;
(v) That the State ought to have allotted a land,
which had a clear title and also had a
marketable value; and
(vi) That after the proceedings had reached finality
in favour of the petitioners/applicants, the
matter was lingering in the Court for almost 15
years.”
69. In the aforesaid factual scenario, this Court passed the
order dated 23rd July 2024, which is as under:
53
“8. We, therefore, direct the State Government to
come with a clear stand:
i. As to whether another piece of
equivalent land will be offered to the
petitioner(s)/applicant(s); or
ii. As to whether adequate
compensation would be paid to the
petitioner(s)/applicant(s); or
iii. As to whether the State Government
proposes to move the Central Government
for denotification of the said land as forest
land.”
70. Thereafter, the Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue and
Forest Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai tendered an
undertaking before this Court, agreeing to allot an alternate
piece of land in favour of the applicants therein. Accepting the
said undertaking, this Court passed the order dated 9th
September, 2024, which is as under:
“7. We accept the undertaking and take it on
record. However, in addition, we direct that the
Collector, Pune shall personally ensure that the
alternate land admeasuring 24 acres 38 guntas out
of Survey No.7 situated at Mouje Yewalewadi, Tq.
Haveli, District Pune would be measured and
demarcated and thereafter peaceful and vacant
possession of the said land would be handed over to
the applicants/petitioners.
8. It is needless to state that if any encroachments
are there on the said land, the same shall be removed
prior to the said land being handed over to the
applicants/petitioners.
54
9. Insofar as the modification to be issued under
Section 37 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town
Planning Act, 1966 for changing the land use in
question from Private/Semi-Private to Residential is
concerned, we direct that the said procedure shall be
completed within a period of three months from
today.
10. It is further directed that all the formalities for
conveying the title of the said land in favour of the
applicants/petitioners shall be completed within a
period of six weeks from today.”
71. That is not the case here. The RRCHS knowing very well
that the land was a Forest Land had entered into transactions
with the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ much prior to the
land even being allotted in their favour. The transactions
between the RRCHS and the members of the ‘Chavan Family’
were totally illegal and contrary to the conditions on which the
land was allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’. As per the conditions
of allotment, the land or any part thereof could not have been
transferred by the ‘Chavan Family’ to anyone without the prior
permission of the District Collector. The land was required to
be brought under cultivation within a period of two years from
the date of the allotment and that the land or any part thereof
was not to be used for any other purpose than the agricultural
purpose.
55
72. As already discussed hereinabove, the RRCHS through
Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande had already entered into
transactions with the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ much
before the land was allotted in their favour. The members of
the ‘Chavan Family’ had given the developmental rights as well
as executed Power of Attorney in favour of said Mr. Aniruddha
P. Deshpande even prior to the allotment of land in their
favour. As discussed hereinabove, immediately on the next
day on which the land was allotted in favour of the ‘Chavan
Family’, the suit with regard to the subject property was
compromised between Mr. Rajesh Shah, plaintiff and Mr.
Aniruddha P. Deshpande. It is thus clear that the case of the
RRCHS, in no way, bears any resemblance to the case in
I.A.No. 2771 of 2009.
73. The RRCHS through Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande had,
with open eyes, entered into illegal transactions with the
members of the ‘Chavan Family’. If a direction, as sought by
the applicant-RRCHS is issued, it will amount to granting a
premium to the RRCHS for the illegalities committed by them.
74. In that view of the matter, we do not find any merit in the
said submission.
56
f. As to whether the doctrine of public trust would be
applicable in the facts and circumstances of the
present case.
75. That leaves us with the issue with regard to the doctrine
of public trust.
76. Recently, this Court in the case of In Re: T.N.
Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and others12
had an occasion to consider the importance of doctrine of
public trust in the environmental matters. It will be apposite
to refer to the following observations of this Court:
“151. The importance of the ‘Public
Trust’ doctrine in environmental and ecological
matters has been explained by this Court in the case
of M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath. This Court has
elaborately referred to various articles and the
judgments on the issue to come to a conclusion that
the ‘public trust’ doctrine is a part of the law of the
land in the following paragraphs:
“23. The notion that the public has a right
to expect certain lands and natural areas
to retain their natural characteristic is
finding its way into the law of the land. The
need to protect the environment and
ecology has been summed up by David B.
Hunter (University of Michigan) in an
article titled An ecological perspective on
property : A call for judicial protection of the
public's interest in environmentally critical
resources published in Harvard
Environmental Law Review, Vol. 12 1988,
p. 311 is in the following words:
12 (2025) 2 SCC 641 : 2024 INSC 178
57
“Another major ecological tenet is
that the world is finite. The earth can
support only so many people and
only so much human activity before
limits are reached. This lesson was
driven home by the oil crisis of the
1970s as well as by the pesticide
scare of the 1960s. The current
deterioration of the ozone layer is
another vivid example of the
complex, unpredictable and
potentially catastrophic effects posed
by our disregard of the
environmental limits to economic
growth. The absolute finiteness of the
environment, when coupled with
human dependency on the
environment, leads to the
unquestionable result that human
activities will at some point be
constrained.
‘Human activity finds in the natural
world its external limits. In short, the
environment imposes constraints on
our freedom; these constraints are
not the product of value choices but
of the scientific imperative of the
environment's limitations. Reliance
on improving technology can delay
temporarily, but not forever, the
inevitable constraints. There is a
limit to the capacity of the
environment to service … growth,
both in providing raw materials and
in assimilating by-product wastes
due to consumption. The largesse of
technology can only postpone or
disguise the inevitable.’
Professor Barbara Ward has written of this
ecological imperative in particularly vivid
language:
58
‘We can forget moral imperatives. But
today the morals of respect and care
and modesty come to us in a form we
cannot evade. We cannot cheat on
DNA. We cannot get round
photosynthesis. We cannot say I am
not going to give a damn about
phytoplankton. All these tiny
mechanisms provide the
preconditions of our planetary life. To
say we do not care is to say in the
most literal sense that “we choose
death”.’
There is a commonly-recognized link
between laws and social values, but
to ecologists a balance between laws
and values is not alone sufficient to
ensure a stable relationship between
humans and their environment.
Laws and values must also contend
with the constraints imposed by the
outside environment. Unfortunately,
current legal doctrine rarely
accounts for such constraints, and
thus environmental stability is
threatened.
Historically, we have changed the
environment to fit our conceptions of
property. We have fenced, plowed
and paved. The environment has
proven malleable and to a large
extent still is. But there is a limit to
this malleability, and certain types of
ecologically important resources —
for example, wetlands and riparian
forests — can no longer be destroyed
without enormous long-term effects
on environmental and therefore
social stability. To ecologists, the
need for preserving sensitive
resources does not reflect value
59
choices but rather is the necessary
result of objective observations of the
laws of nature.
In sum, ecologists view the
environmental sciences as providing
us with certain laws of nature. These
laws, just like our own laws, restrict
our freedom of conduct and choice.
Unlike our laws, the laws of nature
cannot be changed by legislative fiat;
they are imposed on us by the
natural world. An understanding of
the laws of nature must therefore
inform all of our social institutions.”
24. The ancient Roman Empire developed
a legal theory known as the “Doctrine of
the Public Trust”. It was founded on the
ideas that certain common properties
such as rivers, seashore, forests and the
air were held by Government in
trusteeship for the free and unimpeded
use of the general public. Our
contemporary concern about “the
environment” bear a very close conceptual
relationship to this legal doctrine. Under
the Roman law these resources were either
owned by no one (res nullious) or by every
one in common (res communious). Under
the English common law, however, the
Sovereign could own these resources but
the ownership was limited in nature, the
Crown could not grant these properties to
private owners if the effect was to interfere
with the public interests in navigation or
fishing. Resources that were suitable for
these uses were deemed to be held
in trust by the Crown for the benefit of
the public. Joseph L. Sax, Professor of
Law, University of Michigan — proponent
of the Modern Public Trust Doctrine — in
60
an erudite article “Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law : Effective Judicial
Intervention”, Michigan Law Review, Vol.
68, Part 1 p. 473, has given the historical
background of
the Public Trust Doctrine as under:
“The source of
modern public trust law is found in a
concept that received much attention
in Roman and English law — the
nature of property rights in rivers,
the sea, and the seashore. That
history has been given considerable
attention in the legal literature, need
not be repeated in detail here. But
two points should be emphasized.
First, certain interests, such as
navigation and fishing, were sought
to be preserved for the benefit of
the public; accordingly, property
used for those purposes was
distinguished from
general public property which the
sovereign could routinely grant to
private owners. Second, while it was
understood that in certain common
properties — such as the seashore,
highways, and running water —
‘perpetual use was dedicated to
the public’, it has never been clear
whether the public had an
enforceable right to prevent
infringement of those interests.
Although the State apparently did
protect public uses, no evidence is
available that public rights could be
legally asserted against a recalcitrant
government.”
25.The Public Trust Doctrine primari
ly rests on the principle that certain
resources like air, sea, waters and the
61
forests have such a great importance to
the people as a whole that it would be
wholly unjustified to make them a subject
of private ownership. The said resources
being a gift of nature, they should be made
freely available to everyone irrespective of
the status in life. The doctrine enjoins
upon the Government to protect the
resources for the enjoyment of the
general public rather than to permit their
use for private ownership or commercial
purposes. According to Professor Sax
the Public Trust Doctrine imposes
the following restrictions on governmental
authority:
“Three types of restrictions on
governmental authority are often
thought to be imposed by
the public trust : first, the property
subject to the trust must not only be
used for a public purpose, but it
must be held available for use by the
general public; second, the property
may not be sold, even for a fair cash
equivalent; and third the property
must be maintained for particular
types of uses.”
26. The American law on the subject is
primarily based on the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. People of the State
of Illinois, [146 US 387 (1892) : 36 L.Ed.
1018]. In the year 1869 the Illinois
Legislature made a substantial grant of
submerged lands — a mile strip along the
shores of Lake Michigan extending one
mile out from the shoreline — to the
Illinois Central Railroad. In 1873, the
Legislature changed its mind and repealed
the 1869 grant. The State of Illinois sued
to quit title. The Court while accepting the
62
stand of the State of Illinois held that the
title of the State in the land in dispute was
a title different in character from that
which the State held in lands intended for
sale. It was different from the title which
the United States held in public lands
which were open to preemption and sale.
It was a title held in trust — for the people
of the State that they may enjoy the
navigation of the water, carry on
commerce over them and have liberty of
fishing therein free from obstruction or
interference of private parties. The
abdication of the general control of the
State over lands in dispute was not
consistent with the exercise of
the trust which required the Government
of the State to preserve such waters for the
use of the public. According to Professor
Sax the Court in Illinois Central [146 US
387 : 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892)] “articulated a
principle that has become the central
substantive thought
in public trust litigation. When a State
holds a resource which is available for the
free use of the general public, a court will
look with considerable skepticism upon
any governmental conduct which is
calculated either to relocate that resource
to more restricted uses or to
subject public uses to the self-interest of
private parties”.
27. In Gould v. Greylock Reservation
Commission, [350 Mass 410 (1966)] the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
took the first major step in developing
the doctrine applicable to changes in the
use of lands dedicated to
the public interest. In 1886 a group of
citizens interested in preserving Mount
Greylock as an unspoiled natural forest,
promoted the creation of an association for
63
the purpose of laying out a public park on
it. The State ultimately acquired about
9000 acres, and the legislature enacted a
statute creating the Greylock Reservation
Commission. In the year 1953, the
legislature enacted a statute creating an
Authority to construct and operate on
Mount Greylock an Aerial Tramway and
certain other facilities and it authorised
the Commission to lease to the Authority
any portion of the Mount Greylock
Reservation. Before the project
commenced, five citizens brought an
action against both the Greylock
Reservation Commission and the
Tramway Authority. The plaintiffs brought
the suit as beneficiaries of
the public trust. The Court held both the
lease and the management agreement
invalid on the ground that they were in
excess of the statutory grant of the
authority. The crucial passage in the
judgment of the Court is as under:
“The profit-sharing feature and some
aspects of the project itself strongly
suggest a commercial enterprise. In
addition to the absence of any clear
or express statutory authorization of
as broad a delegation of
responsibility by the Authority as is
given by the management agreement,
we find no express grant to the
Authority or power to permit use
of public lands and of the Authority's
borrowed funds for what seems, in
part at least, a commercial venture
for private profit.”
Professor Sax's comments on the above-
quoted paragraph from Gould decision are
as under:
“It hardly seems surprising, then,
64
that the court questioned why a State
should subordinate a public park,
serving a useful purpose as relatively
undeveloped land, to the demands of
private investors for building such a
commercial facility. The court, faced
with such a situation, could hardly
have been expected to have treated
the case as if it involved nothing but
formal legal issues concerning the
State's authority to change the use of
a certain tract of land…. Gould,
like Illinois Central, was concerned
with the most overt sort of imposition
on the public interest : commercial
interests had obtained advantages
which infringed directly
on public uses and promoted private
profits. But the Massachusetts court
has also confronted a more
pervasive, if more subtle, problem —
that concerning projects which
clearly have
some public justification. Such cases
arise when, for example, a highway
department seeks to take a piece of
parkland or to fill a wetland.”
28.In Sacco v. Development
of Public Works, [532 Mass 670], the
Massachusetts Court restrained the
Department of Public Works from filling a
great pond as part of its plan to relocate
part of State Highway. The Department
purported to act under the legislative
authority. The court found the statutory
power inadequate and held as under:
“the improvement of public lands
contemplated by this section does
not include the widening of a State
highway. It seems rather that the
improvement of public lands which
65
the legislature provided for … is to
preserve such lands so that they may
be enjoyed by the people for
recreational purposes.”
29. In Robbins v. Deptt. of Public Works,
[244 NE 2d 577], the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts restrained
the Public Works Department from
acquiring Fowl Meadows, “wetlands of
considerable natural beauty … often used
for nature study and recreation” for
highway use.
30. Professor Sax in the article (Michigan
Law Review) refers to Priewev v. Wisconsin
State Land and Improvement Co., [93 Wis
534 (1896)], Crawford County Lever and
Drainage Distt. No. 1, [182 Wis 404], City
of Milwaukee v. State, [193 Wis
423], State v. Public Service Commission,
[275 Wis 112] and opines that “the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin has probably
made a more conscientious effort to rise
above rhetoric and to work out a
reasonable meaning for
the public trust doctrine than have the
courts of any other State”.
31. Professor Sax stated the scope of
the public trust doctrine in the following
words:
“If any of the analysis in this Article
makes sense, it is clear that the
judicial techniques developed
in public trust cases need not be
limited either to these few
conventional interests or to
questions of disposition
of public properties. Public trust pro
blems are found whenever
governmental regulation comes into
question, and they occur in a wide
range of situations in which
66
diffused public interests need
protection against tightly organized
groups with clear and immediate
goals. Thus, it seems that the
delicate mixture of procedural and
substantive protections which the
courts have applied in
conventional public trust cases
would be equally applicable and
equally appropriate in controversies
involving air pollution, the
dissemination of pesticides, the
location of rights of way for utilities,
and strip mining of wetland filling on
private lands in a State where
governmental permits are required.”
32. We may at this stage refer to the
judgment of the Supreme Court of
California in National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County,
[33 Cal 3d 419]. The case is popularly
known as “the Mono Lake case”. Mono
Lake is the second largest lake in
California. The lake is saline. It contains
no fish but supports a large population of
brine shrimp which feed vast numbers of
nesting and migrating birds. Islands in the
lake protect a large breeding colony of
California gulls, and the lake itself serves
as a haven on the migration route for
thousands of birds. Towers and spires of
tura (sic) on the north and south shores
are matters of geological interest and a
tourist attraction. In 1940, the Division of
Water Resources granted the Department
of Water and Power of the City of Los
Angeles a permit to appropriate virtually
the entire flow of 4 of the 5 streams flowing
into the lake. As a result of these
diversions, the level of the lake dropped,
the surface area diminished, the gulls
67
were abandoning the lake and the scenic
beauty and the ecological values of Mono
Lake were imperilled. The plaintiffs
environmentalist — using
the public trust doctrine — filed a law suit
against Los Angeles Water Diversions. The
case eventually came to the California
Supreme Court, on a Federal Trial Judge's
request for clarification of the
State's public trust doctrine. The Court
explained the concept
of public trust doctrine in the following
words:
“‘By the law of nature these things
are common to mankind — the air,
running water, the sea and
consequently the shores of the sea.’
(Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1) From
this origin in Roman law, the English
common law evolved the concept of
the public trust, under which the
sovereign owns ‘all of its navigable
waterways and the lands lying
beneath them as trustee of
a public trust for the benefit of the
people.’”
The Court explained the purpose of
the public trust as under:
“The objective of
the public trust has evolved in
tandem with the
changing public perception of the
values and uses of waterways. As we
observed in Marks v. Whitney, [6 Cal
3d 251], ‘[p]ublic trust easements
(were) traditionally defined in terms
of navigation, commerce and
fisheries. They have been held to
include the right to fish, hunt, bathe,
swim, to use for boating and general
recreation purposes the navigable
68
waters of the State, and to use the
bottom of the navigable waters for
anchoring, standing, or other
purposes. We went on, however, to
hold that the traditional triad of uses
— navigation, commerce and fishing
— did not limit the public interest in
the trust res. In language of special
importance to the present setting, we
stated that ‘[t]he public uses to
which tidelands are subject are
sufficiently flexible to encompass
changing public needs. In
administering the trust the State is
not burdened with an outmoded
classification favouring one mode of
utilization over another. There is a
growing public recognition that one
of the important public uses of the
tidelands — a use encompassed
within the tidelands trust — is the
preservation of those lands in their
natural state, so that they may serve
as ecological units for scientific
study, as open space, and as
environments which provide food
and habitat for birds and marine life,
and which favourably affect the
scenery and climate of the area.’
Mono Lake is a navigable waterway.
It supports a small local industry
which harvests brine shrimp for sale
as fish food, which endeavour
probably qualifies the lake as a
‘fishery’ under the
traditional public trust cases. The
principal values plaintiffs seek to
protect, however, are recreational
and ecological — the scenic views of
the lake and its shore, the purity of
the air, and the use of the lake for
nesting and feeding by birds.
69
Under Marks v. Whitney, [6 Cal 3d
251], it is clear that protection of
these values is among the purposes
of the public trust.”
The Court summed up the powers of the
State as trustee in the following words:
“Thus, the public trust is more than
an affirmation of State power to
use public property
for public purposes. It is an
affirmation of the duty of the State to
protect the people's common heritage
of streams, lakes, marshlands and
tidelands, surrendering that right of
protection only in rare cases when
the abandonment of that right is
consistent with the purposes of
the trust….”
The Supreme Court of California, inter
alia, reached the following conclusion:
“The State has an affirmative duty to
take the public trust into account in
the planning and allocation of water
resources, and to
protect public trust uses whenever
feasible. Just as the history of this
State shows that appropriation may
be necessary for efficient use of water
despite unavoidable harm
to public trust values, it
demonstrates that an appropriative
water rights system administered
without consideration of
the public trust may cause
unnecessary and unjustified harm
to trust interests. (See Johnson, 14
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 233, 256-57/;
Robie, Some Reflections on
Environmental Considerations in
Water Rights Administration, 2
Ecology L.Q. 695, 710-711 (1972);
70
Comment, 33 Hastings L.J. 653,
654.) As a matter of practical
necessity, the State may have to
approve appropriations despite
foreseeable harm
to public trust uses.
In so doing, however, the State must
bear in mind its duty as trustee to
consider the effect of the taking on
the public trust (see United
Plainsmen v. N.D. State Water Cons.
Comm'n, [247 NW 2d 457 (ND 1976)]
at pp. 462-463, and to preserve, so
far as consistent with
the public interest, the uses
protected by the trust.”
The Court finally came to the conclusion
that the plaintiffs could rely on
the public trust doctrine in seeking
reconsideration of the allocation of the
waters of the Mono basin.
33. It is no doubt correct that
the public trust doctrine under the
English common law extended only to
certain traditional uses such as
navigation, commerce and fishing. But the
American Courts in recent cases have
expanded the concept of
the public trust doctrine. The
observations of the Supreme Court of
California in Mono Lake case, [33 Cal 3d
419] clearly show the judicial concern in
protecting all ecologically important lands,
for example fresh water, wetlands or
riparian forests. The observations of the
Court in Mono Lake case, [33 Cal 3d 419]
to the effect that the protection of
ecological values is among the purposes
of public trust, may give rise to an
argument that the ecology and the
environment protection is a relevant factor
71
to determine which lands, waters or airs
are protected by the public trust doctrine.
The Courts in United States are finally
beginning to adopt this reasoning and are
expanding the public trust to encompass
new types of lands and waters. In Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, [108 S.Ct.
791 (1988)] the United States Supreme
Court upheld Mississippi's extension
of public trust doctrine to lands
underlying non-navigable tidal areas. The
majority judgment adopted ecological
concepts to determine which lands can be
considered tide lands. Phillips Petroleum
case, [108 S.Ct. 791 (1988)] assumes
importance because the Supreme Court
expanded the public trust doctrine to
identify the tide lands not on commercial
considerations but on ecological concepts.
We see no reason why
the public trust doctrine should not be
expanded to include all ecosystems
operating in our natural resources.
34. Our legal system-based on English
common law-includes
the public trust doctrine as part of its
jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of
all natural resources which are by nature
meant for public use and
enjoyment. Public at large is the
beneficiary of the seashore, running
waters, airs, forests and ecologically fragile
lands. The State as a trustee is under a
legal duty to protect the natural resources.
These resources meant for public use
cannot be converted into private
ownership.
35. We are fully aware that the issues
presented in this case illustrate the classic
struggle between those members of
72
the public who would preserve our rivers,
forests, parks and open lands in their
pristine purity and those charged with
administrative responsibilities who, under
the pressures of the changing needs of an
increasingly complex society, find it
necessary to encroach to some extent
upon open lands heretofore considered
inviolate to change. The resolution of this
conflict in any given case is for the
legislature and not the courts. If there is a
law made by Parliament or the State
Legislatures the courts can serve as an
instrument of determining legislative
intent in the exercise of its powers of
judicial review under the Constitution.
But in the absence of any legislation, the
executive acting under
the doctrine of public trust cannot
abdicate the natural resources and
convert them into private ownership, or for
commercial use. The aesthetic use and the
pristine glory of the natural resources, the
environment and the ecosystems of our
country cannot be permitted to be eroded
for private, commercial or any other use
unless the courts find it necessary, in good
faith, for the public good and
in public interest to encroach upon the
said resources.”
152. This Court in unequivocal terms has held that
the executive acting under
the doctrine of public trust cannot abdicate the
natural resources and convert them into private
ownership, or for commercial use. The aesthetic use
and the pristine glory of the natural resources, the
environment and the ecosystems of our country
cannot be permitted to be eroded for private,
commercial or any other use unless the courts find it
necessary, in good faith, for the public good and
in public interest to encroach upon the said
resources.
73
153. The law with regard to the importance of the
‘public trust’ doctrine in ecological/environmental
matters has further been evolved and expanded by
this Court in subsequent judgments. In the case
of Association for Environment Protection v. State of
Kerala11, this Court has referred to some of the
judgments which followed the law laid down in the
case of Kamal Nath (supra), which are as under:
“6. In M.I. Builders (P) Ltd. v. Radhey
Shyam Sahu, [(1999) 6 SCC 464], the
Court applied the public trust doctrine for
upholding the order of the Allahabad High
Court which had quashed the decision of
Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika permitting
appellant M.I. Builders (P) Ltd. to
construct an underground shopping
complex in Jhandewala Park, Aminabad
Market, Lucknow, and directed demolition
of the construction made on
the park land. The High Court had noted
that Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika had
entered into an agreement with the
appellant for construction of shopping
complex and given it full freedom to lease
out the shops and also to sign agreement
on its behalf and held that this was
impermissible. On appeal by the builders,
this Court held that the terms of
agreement were unreasonable, unfair and
atrocious. The Court then invoked
the public trust doctrine and held that
being a trustee of the park on behalf of
the public, the Nagar Mahapalika could
not have transferred the same to the
private builder and thereby deprived the
residents of the area of the quality of life to
which they were entitled under the
Constitution and municipal laws.
7. In Intellectuals Forum v. State of A.P.,
[(2006) 3 SCC 549], this Court again
invoked the public trust doctrine in a
74
matter involving the challenge to the
systematic destruction of percolation,
irrigation and drinking water tanks in
Tirupati Town, referred to some judicial
precedents including M.C. Mehta v. Kamal
Nath [M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1
SCC 388], M.I. Builders (P) Ltd., [(1999) 6
SCC 464], National Audubon
Society [National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court, 658 P 2d 709 :
33 Cal 3d 419 (1983)] and observed :
(Intellectuals Forum case, [(2006) 3 SCC
549], SCC p. 575, para 76)
“76. … This is an articulation of
the doctrine from the angle of the
affirmative duties of the State with
regard to public trust. Formulated
from a negatory angle,
the doctrine does not
exactly prohibit the alienation of the
property held as a public trust.
However, when the State holds a
resource that is freely available for
the use of the public, it provides for a
high degree of judicial scrutiny on
any action of the Government, no
matter how consistent with the
existing legislations, that attempts to
restrict such free use. To properly
scrutinise such actions of the
Government, the courts must make a
distinction between the
Government's general obligation to
act for the public benefit, and the
special, more demanding obligation
which it may have as a trustee of
certain public resources….”
(emphasis in original)
8. In Fomento Resorts and Hotels
Ltd. v. Minguel Martins, [(2009) 3 SCC
571 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 877], this Court
75
was called upon to consider whether the
appellant was entitled to block the passage
to the beach by erecting a fence in the garb
of protecting its property. After noticing
the judgments to which reference has been
made hereinabove, the Court held : (SCC
pp. 614-15 & 619, paras 53-55 & 65)
“53. The public trust doctrine enjoin
s upon the Government to protect the
resources for the enjoyment of the
general public rather than to permit
their use for private ownership or
commercial purposes.
This doctrine puts an implicit
embargo on the right of the State to
transfer public properties to private
party if such transfer
affects public interest, mandates
affirmative State action for effective
management of natural resources
and empowers the citizens to
question ineffective management
thereof.
54. The heart of
the public trust doctrine is that it
imposes limits and obligations upon
government agencies and their
administrators on behalf of all the
people and especially future
generations. For example, renewable
and non-renewable resources,
associated uses, ecological values or
objects in which the public has a
special interest (i.e. public lands,
waters, etc.) are held subject to the
duty of the State not to impair such
resources, uses or values, even if
private interests are involved. The
same obligations apply to managers
of forests, monuments, parks,
the public domain and
76
other public assets. Professor
Joseph L. Sax in his classic article,
‘The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resources Law : Effective
Judicial Intervention’ (1970),
indicates that
the public trust doctrine, of all
concepts known to law, constitutes
the best practical and philosophical
premise and legal tool for
protecting public rights and for
protecting and managing resources,
ecological values or objects held
in trust.
55. The public trust doctrine is a
tool for exerting long-
established public rights over short-
term public rights and private gain.
Today every person exercising his or
her right to use the air, water, or land
and associated natural ecosystems
has the obligation to secure for the
rest of us the right to live or otherwise
use that same resource or property
for the long-term and enjoyment by
future generations. To say it another
way, a landowner or lessee and a
water right holder has an obligation
to use such resources in a manner as
not to impair or diminish the people's
rights and the people's long-term
interest in that property or resource,
including downslope lands, waters
and resources.
***
65. We reiterate that natural resources including forests, water bodies, rivers, seashores, etc. are held by the State as a trustee on behalf of the people and especially the future generations. These 77 constitute common properties and people are entitled to uninterrupted use thereof. The State cannot transfer public trust properties to a private party, if such a transfer interferes with the right of the public and the court can invoke the public trust doctrine and take affirmative action for protecting the right of people to have access to light, air and water and also for protecting rivers, sea, tanks, trees, forests and associated natural ecosystems.”
154. The importance of the doctrine of ‘public trust’ has further been emphasized in the case of Tata Housing Development Company Limited v. Aalok Jagga (2020) 15 SCC 784 to which one of us (B.R. Gavai, J.) was a party.”
77. In the present case, it appears that the then Minister for Revenue and the then Divisional Commissioner had totally given a go-bye to the doctrine of public trust. The facts appearing on the record are glaring.
78. As already discussed hereinabove, as per the order of the Tehsildar, Haveli, the land was allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’ on Eksali (yearly) lease and as per the undertaking of the ‘Chavan Family’ the possession of the land was to be returned on the expiry of the one year and there has been no further renewal. It further appears that thereafter the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ were in deep slumber.
78
79. From the records, it appears that one Mr. R.S. Chauhan, a retired Police Inspector, residing in Pune and others, for the first time, started agitating their rights on 4th August 1988. They had addressed communications dated 4th August 1988, 30th August 1988 and 27th December 1990 for allotment of subject land on permanent basis for cultivation in lieu of their land at Survey No. 37, acquired for Kondhwa Leprosy Hospital.
80. It appears that thereafter for the first time the Collector, Pune on 19th June 1991 recommended the permanent allotment of the subject land to the ‘Chavan Family’ only insofar as 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas are concerned. The Collector, Pune specifically observed that the ‘Chavan Family’ had the cultivation rights from 1969 only on 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas, whereas the rest of the land was reserved for village animal feeding. The Collector, Pune, therefore, recommended allotment of only 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas to the ‘Chavan Family’ and also recommended that possession of rest of the land should be handed over to the Forest Department.
81. It is to be noted that the office of the Collector, Pune on 26th August 1994, rejected the request of the Executive Engineer, MSEB for establishment of High-Tension Sub- 79 Station on the ground that the land in question was reserved as “Forest Land”.
82. The Divisional Commissioner in his letter dated 30th November 1994 addressed to the Secretary, Revenue and Forest Department, Mantralaya noted that the Collector, Pune had opined that the ‘Chavan Family’ was entitled only to 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas. He also recorded the objection of the Forest Department to the effect that the Forest Department had asked for possession of the subject land for the purposes of afforestation.
83. In spite of noticing all of these facts, the Divisional Commissioner recommended that the entire subject land of 11 Hectare 89 Are be granted to the ‘Chavan Family’. Thereafter the matter remained pending at the level of the State Government.
84. The then Minister for Revenue considered the proposal and came to a conclusion that the provisions of the 1980 FC Act were not applicable to the present case. However, he decided to seek the opinion of the Law and Judiciary Department of the Government of Maharashtra. The Deputy Secretary to Government, Law and Judiciary Department on 80 27th July 1998, relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of Banshi Ram Modi (supra) opined that the permission of the Government of India is not necessary. While doing so, he specifically ignored the specific judgment of this Court in the case of Ambica Quarry Works (supra) and the direction of this Court dated 12th December 1996 in the present proceedings.
85. Almost within a week thereafter, i.e. on 4th August 1998, the Government of Maharashtra issued an order allotting the land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’. A corrigendum thereto, vide order dated 13th August 1998, specifically provided that the allotment of land was specifically for “Agricultural purpose”. The Collector, Pune thereafter within a short span, i.e. on 28th August 1998, allotted the subject land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’.
86. The alarming speed with which the events took place from July to August 1998 speaks volumes.
87. As already discussed hereinabove, though the ‘Chavan Family’ had already entered into transactions with Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande, the Chief Promoter of the RRCHS, they transferred the land in favour of RRCHS on 19th 81 December 1998. This is again done in breach of the allotment order of 28th August 1998. The Divisional Commissioner thereafter vide order dated 30th October 1999, permitted the sale of the subject land to the RRCHS on payment of 75% of the price fixed by the Collector, Assistant Director, Town Planning Department, Pune.
88. It is to be noted that though the powers for grant of permission are with the Collector, it is the Divisional Commissioner who exercised the said powers for reasons best known to him. Thereafter the District Collector granted permission for use of the subject land for Non-Agricultural purposes on 8th July 2005.
89. It is to be noted that all this has been done in the teeth of various communications of the Forest Department since 1991 requesting the Revenue Department to transfer the land to the Forest Department. It was also brought to the notice of the Revenue Authorities by the Forest Department that a plantation had already been carried out on the subject land in the year 1995-96.
90. In the light of these glaring facts, we have no hesitation in holding that the then Minister for Revenue, Government of 82 Maharashtra and the then Divisional Commissioner, Pune have acted totally in breach of public trust to illegally cause gain to private individuals at the cost of sacrificing precious Forest Land.
91. In the conclusion, we have no hesitation to hold that the allotment of the subject land to the ‘Chavan Family’ was in blatant disregard to the provisions of the law inasmuch as it was violative of Section 2 of the 1980 FC Act as well as the directions issued by this Court from time to time. We also hold that the allotment of the subject land was made, ignoring the communications of the Forest Department which had insisted that the said land could not be allotted inasmuch as, the same was classified as a Forest Land. We also have no hesitation to hold that the then Minister for Revenue and the then Divisional Commissioner, Pune have given a total go-bye to the doctrine of public trust inasmuch as, valuable forest land was allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’ de hors the provisions of the law.
92. While hearing this matter, another glaring issue has come to the notice of the Court. It has been noticed that a vast stretch of the land which is notified as ‘Forest Land’ is still in 83 possession of the Revenue Department. Such a situation creates many complexities as is evident in the present matter. The Revenue Department, despite resistance from the Forest Department, allotted the land to private individuals/institutions for non-forestry purposes. This, in turn, reduced the vital green cover. We, therefore, find that it is necessary that a direction needs to be issued to all the State Government and the Union Territories to hand over the possession of the lands which are recorded as ‘Forest Land’ and which are in possession of the Revenue Department to the Forest Department.
93. The report of the CEC would also reveal that there is material to show that many of the Forest Lands have been allotted to private individuals/institutions for non-forestry purposes. Any such allotment after 12th December 1996, i.e., the date on which the directions were given by this Court in the present proceedings, would not be sustainable in law.
94. It would, therefore, be imperative that wherever it is possible to take back the possession of such land, the State/Union Territory should do so and hand over the possession to the Forest Department for forestry purposes. 84 However, if on account of such lands already being converted for non-forest activities, it is found that taking back the possession of the land would not be in the larger public interest, then the States/Union Territories should recover the cost of the land from such individuals/institutions and use the said amount for the purpose of afforestation, restoration and conservation.
VI. CONCLUSION
95. We, therefore, dispose of the Interlocutory Applications and the Writ Petition in the following terms:
(i) We hold that the allotment of 11.89 ha of Reserve Forest land in Survey No.21 (old Survey No.20A) Kondhwa Budruk in District Pune for agriculture purposes on 28th August 1998 and subsequent permission given for its sale in favour of RRCHS on 30th October 1999 was totally illegal;
(ii) We further hold that Environmental Clearance granted by the MoEF on 3rd July 2007 to RRCHS is illegal and is accordingly quashed and set aside;
85
(iii) Since the State of Maharashtra has recalled the communication dated 4th August 1998 approving the allotment of the subject land to the ‘Chavan Family’, we uphold the same;
(iv) We direct that the possession of the subject land, which is reserved as a Forest Land, but is in possession of the Revenue Department, should be handed over to the Forest Department within a period of three months from today;
(v) We further direct the Chief Secretaries of all the States and the Administrators of all the Union Territories to constitute Special Investigation Teams for the purpose of examining as to whether any of the reserved Forest Land in the possession of the Revenue Department has been allotted to any private individuals/institutions for any purpose other than the forestry purpose;
(vi) The State Governments and the Union Territories are also directed to take steps to 86 take back the possession of the land from the persons/institutions in possession of such lands and handover the same to the Forest Department. In case, it is found that taking back the possession of the land would not be in the larger public interest, the State Governments/Union Territories should recover the cost of the said land from the persons/institutions to whom they were allotted and use the said amount for the purpose of development of forests; and
(vii) We further direct the Chief Secretaries of all the States and the Administrators of all the Union Territories to constitute Special Teams to ensure that all such transfers take place within a period of one year from today.
Needless to state that hereinafter such land should be used only for the purpose of afforestation.
87
96. Before we part with this judgment, we place on record our deep appreciation for Shri K. Parameshwar, learned Senior Counsel, ably assisted by Mr. M.V. Mukunda, Ms. Kanti, Ms. Raji Gururaj and Mr. Shreenivas Patil, learned counsel, for rendering valuable assistance to this Court as Amicus Curiae. We also place on record our appreciation for the efforts put in by Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Shri Shekhar Naphade and Shri Aniruddha Joshi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the parties.
.................CJI (B.R. GAVAI) …………...................................J (AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH) …………................................J (K. VINOD CHANDRAN) NEW DELHI;
MAY 15, 2025.
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