Allahabad High Court
Aftab Qureshi @ Raja And 3 Others vs Devendra Dhawan on 7 May, 2026
Author: Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
Bench: Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 2864 of 2026 Aftab Qureshi @ Raja and 3 others ..Petitioner(s) Versus Devendra Dhawan ..Respondent(s) Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Rishikesh Tripathi, Shashwat Tripathi Counsel for Respondent(s) : Rishabh Agarwal Court No. - 35 HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
Heard Sri Rishikesh Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Atul Dayal, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Sri Rishabh Agarwal, for the respondent.
2. The present petition arises out of proceedings initiated under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 19721 in relation to a shop situated in District Jhansi. The petitioners have assailed the order dated 19.12.2025 passed by the appellate court in Rent Control Appeal No. 30 of 2018, whereby the review application filed by the respondent-landlord has been allowed, the earlier appellate judgment dated 16.10.2025 has been recalled, and the appeal has been directed to be reheard.
3. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present proceedings are that the respondent-landlord instituted P.A. Case No. 79 of 2013 (Devendra Dhawan vs. Aftab Qureshi and others) on 22.10.2013 under Section 21(1)(a) of the U P Act No.13 of 1972 seeking release of the tenanted premises setting up the ground of bona fide requirement for his son. Upon notice, the petitioners-tenants entered appearance on 01.09.2014 and filed their written statement contesting the release application and disputing the alleged need set up by the respondent-landlord.
4. The Prescribed Authority, after considering the pleadings and material brought on record, allowed the release application by judgment and order dated 29.10.2018. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioners preferred Rent Control Appeal No. 30 of 2018 before the District Judge, Jhansi. The appellate court, by judgment dated 16.10.2025, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Prescribed Authority. While deciding the appeal, the appellate court framed points for determination and recorded findings, inter alia, regarding the maintainability of the release application.
5. Thereafter, the respondent-landlord moved a review application in the said appeal seeking recall of the appellate judgment dated 16.10.2025. The petitioners filed objections to the review application and also submitted written arguments on 19.12.2025 opposing the prayer for recall. However, the appellate court, by the impugned order dated 19.12.2025, allowed the review application, recalled its earlier judgment dated 16.10.2025, and directed rehearing of the appeal. Being aggrieved by the order dated 19.12.2025 passed in the review proceedings, Petitioners have approached this Court by means of the present petition.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has assailed the impugned order primarily on the ground that the appellate court has exercised a jurisdiction wholly alien to the statutory scheme governing proceedings under the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 by virtually undertaking a substantive review of its earlier judgment dated 16.10.2025 despite absence of any statutory provision conferring such power. It has been submitted that the power of review is not an inherent power and can be exercised only where specifically conferred by statute or by necessary implication. According to the petitioners, the appellate court, under the guise of exercising inherent powers, has effectively reopened and reconsidered the earlier adjudication on merits, which is legally impermissible.
7. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji2, wherein it was categorically held that the power of review is not an inherent power and must be conferred by law either expressly or by necessary implication. Learned counsel submits that the Court clearly observed that where the parent statute does not confer review jurisdiction, neither the authority nor its delegate can reopen or reconsider an earlier decision. It has therefore been argued that the appellate authority functioning under the U P Act No.13 of 1972 could not have recalled its earlier judgment in absence of statutory conferment of review power.
8. Reliance has further been placed upon Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania3, wherein the Supreme Court reiterated the settled proposition that unless the statute or rules expressly so permit, a review application against judicial or quasi-judicial orders is not maintainable. Learned counsel submits that the Court held that review jurisdiction is a creation of statute and any order passed in purported exercise of review powers without statutory sanction is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. Particular emphasis has been laid upon the observations that an authority cannot, under the garb of clarification, modification or correction, undertake reconsideration of the matter on merits in absence of statutory power of review.
9. The petitioners have also relied upon Pushpa Sareen v. State of U.P.4 to contend that the power of substantive review cannot be implied and must necessarily emanate from an enabling statutory provision. It has been argued that while the said judgment recognizes existence of a limited procedural review inhering in judicial and quasi-judicial authorities for rectifying defects such as absence of notice or violation of natural justice, the same simultaneously draws a clear distinction between procedural review and review on merits. Learned counsel submits that this Court in the aforesaid judgment expressly held that substantive review remains impermissible in absence of statutory conferment and only a limited procedural review is maintainable in exceptional situations involving procedural defects.
10. Placing reliance upon Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal5, learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that the Supreme Court itself recognized two distinct categories of review, namely procedural review and review on merits. It has been argued that the Court clearly held that while procedural review may be exercised to cure a procedural defect or inadvertent error committed under misapprehension, review on merits is impermissible unless specifically authorized by statute. According to the petitioners, the present case does not involve any procedural defect rather, the appellate court has effectively reopened the correctness of the earlier judgment itself, thereby entering into the prohibited field of substantive review.
11. The petitioners have additionally relied upon M/s. Bombay T.V. Centre v. Additional District and Sessions Judge, Dehradun6 to contend that grounds relating to alleged fraud, misrepresentation or erroneous appreciation of facts pertain to the merits of adjudication and cannot furnish a valid basis for recall or review in absence of statutory authority. It has been argued that this Court in the aforesaid decision specifically held that reopening an order on grounds touching the merits of the controversy amounts to review and is impermissible where no statutory review power exists.
12. The petitioners have further relied upon Reliance General Insurance Company Limited v. Kanika and Others7 to contend that while limited clarificatory or clerical corrections may be permissible under Sections 151 and 152 C.P.C., the Court cannot alter findings affecting substantive rights under the guise of clarification or correction. It has been submitted that the Supreme Court has clearly held that any exercise which alters substantive adjudication or affects rights of parties would in substance amount to review and must satisfy the strict requirements governing review jurisdiction.
13 On the strength of the aforesaid authorities, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the impugned order dated 19.12.2025 does not merely rectify a procedural irregularity but substantially reopens the earlier adjudication and directs rehearing of the appeal on merits. According to the petitioners, the appellate court has therefore exercised an impermissible substantive review in absence of any statutory conferment of such power and consequently the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside.
14. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has supported the impugned order and submitted that although the authorities functioning under the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 do not possess any substantive power of review akin to that contained under Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C., nevertheless such authorities retain limited inherent jurisdiction under Rule 22(f) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 19728 read with Section 151 C.P.C. to correct procedural errors, misconceptions, and manifest illegalities so as to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of Court. It has been contended that the exercise undertaken by the appellate court in the present case was not a rehearing of the matter on merits, but merely a procedural and corrective exercise undertaken to rectify an error which had occasioned failure of justice.
15. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the review court did not undertake any fresh adjudication on merits nor reassess the evidentiary material so as to substitute one possible view by another. It is submitted that the appellate court, while deciding Issue No. 1 in the judgment dated 16.10.2025, had itself taken note of the registered sale deed dated 13.02.1963 executed in favour of Smt. Sarla Devi, through whom the respondent-landlord derived title by testamentary succession. Despite recording the existence and date of the said registered sale deed, the appellate court proceeded to hold that the landlord was required to comply with the statutory requirement of six months notice under Section 21(1)(a) of U P Act No.13 of 1972.
16. It is urged that the review application merely pointed out that the finding so recorded suffered from a manifest misconception apparent from the record itself, inasmuch as the property admittedly stood purchased prior to 15.07.1972 i.e. the date of commencement of the U P Act No.13 of 1972, and, therefore, the statutory embargo regarding six months notice was not attracted at all. It is, thus, submitted that the exercise undertaken by the review court was confined to correction of a patent error arising from misapprehension of the existing record and was, therefore, within the limited ambit of procedural review and inherent jurisdiction recognised under Section 151 C.P.C. read with Rule 22(f) of the Rules, 1972.
17. In support of the aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd., wherein the distinction between a substantive review and a procedural review was recognized. Learned counsel submits that the Court held that while review on merits is not permissible in absence of statutory conferment, every Court or Tribunal possesses inherent jurisdiction to correct a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension or procedural defect in order to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice. Reliance has particularly been placed upon the observation that procedural review inheres in every Court or Tribunal ex debito justitiae and stands on a footing distinct from review on merits.
18. The respondents have further relied upon Pushpa Sand v. R.C.E.O./City Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar9 to contend that where an authority has failed to decide the controversy on merits owing to misconception of law or erroneous assumption regarding its jurisdiction, it is open to such authority to recall its order and reconsider the matter in exercise of powers under Rule 22 (f). It has been argued that this Court in the aforesaid decision recognized that although review of an order passed on merits may not be permissible, recall of an order occasioned by misconception or failure to exercise jurisdiction is legally maintainable. Learned counsel submits that the said judgment further recognizes that even where technical objections regarding review jurisdiction may exist, this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, may decline interference if setting aside the impugned order would revive an otherwise illegal or erroneous order.
19. Reliance has also been placed upon Pt. Chet Ram Sharma v. Ist Additional District Judge10, wherein this Court, after considering Section 34 of the Act and Rule 22(f) of the Rules, held that although no specific power of review is conferred upon appellate authorities functioning under the U P Act No.13 of 1972, such authorities nevertheless retain inherent powers analogous to Section 151 C.P.C. to pass appropriate orders in the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of Court. Learned counsel submits that the aforesaid decision specifically recognizes that Section 151 C.P.C. embodies the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to act ex debito justitiae where circumstances so require.
20. The respondents have further drawn attention to the observations made in the aforesaid judgment that where an order has been passed on grounds which neither arose from pleadings nor were argued by the parties, the authority would be justified in recalling such order so that a litigant does not suffer on account of an inadvertent error committed by the Court itself. It has been argued that the appellate court in the present case has similarly exercised corrective jurisdiction to rectify an error arising from misconception and therefore the impugned exercise cannot be treated as an impermissible review on merits.
21. Reliance has additionally been placed upon Sidh Nath Tripathi (Dr.) v. IInd Additional District Judge11 to contend that where an order has been passed under misconception or by overlooking material aspects on record, the Court is competent to correct such mistake. According to the respondents, the impugned order merely seeks to remedy such misconception and therefore falls within the permissible ambit of inherent procedural jurisdiction.
22. The respondents have also relied upon Sita Ram Sikhaula v. Prescribed Authority12, wherein this Court upheld exercise of inherent jurisdiction by the Prescribed Authority to set aside an unlawful compromise decree after noticing manifest illegalities apparent from the record. Learned counsel submits that the aforesaid judgment recognizes that where an authority notices illegality apparent on the face of record, it possesses inherent power to rectify the same and that no litigant should suffer because of a mistake committed by the Court. It has been urged that the present case also involves correction of an error which had materially affected the adjudicatory process and therefore the appellate court rightly exercised its inherent jurisdiction.
23. Further reliance has been placed upon Swaran Singh Chauhan v. Rent Control and Eviction Authorities13 to contend that although a review application in the strict sense contemplated under Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C. is not maintainable before authorities under the U P Act No.13 of 1972, nevertheless Rule 22(1) read with Rule 22(f) expressly acknowledges the inherent powers of such authorities analogous to Section 151 C.P.C. Learned counsel submits that this Court in the aforesaid decision categorically held that where an order has been passed under misconception, by ignoring material facts on record, or in a manner causing manifest injustice or abuse of process, the authority is competent to correct such error in exercise of inherent jurisdiction and such exercise would not amount to substantive review of the earlier order.
24. It has thus been contended on behalf of the respondents that the impugned order merely restores the appeal for rehearing so as to ensure proper adjudication after rectifying the procedural misconception noticed by the appellate court and does not finally re-adjudicate the controversy on merits. According to the respondents, the exercise undertaken by the appellate court is therefore procedural and corrective in nature and falls squarely within the ambit of inherent jurisdiction preserved under Rule 22(f) read with Section 151 C.P.C. Consequently, it has been submitted that no interference is warranted by this Court in exercise of its supervisiory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
25. In light of the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, the principal issue which arises for consideration is whether, in absence of any express statutory provision conferring power of review, the authority concerned could exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Rule 22(f) read with Section 151 C.P.C. to recall its earlier order for correcting a procedural illegality or misconception, and whether such exercise amounts to a permissible procedural review or an impermissible substantive review on merits.
26. Before examining the rival submissions on the scope of procedural and substantive review, it would be apposite to refer to the statutory framework governing the powers exercisable by the authorities constituted under the U P Act No.13 of 1972. In the present controversy, particular significance attaches to Rule 22(f) of the Rules framed under the Act read with Section 34(1)(g), which reads as follows:
22. Powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Section 34 (1) (g)]. [The District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate or Revising Authority shall, for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under the Act, shall have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No. V of 1908), when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely-
...
...
...
(f) the power referred to in Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No. V of 1908) to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned.
27. A careful examination of Rule 22(f) indicates that the authorities functioning under the U P Act No.13 of 1972 have been vested with certain powers analogous to those exercisable by a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Amongst such powers, clause (f) specifically incorporates the powers referred to under Sections 151 and 152 C.P.C. to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the authority concerned.
28. The incorporation of Sections 151 and 152 C.P.C. within the statutory framework assumes significance inasmuch as the Act itself does not contain any express provision conferring a substantive power of review akin to Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C. The scheme of Rule 22(f), therefore, reflects a legislative recognition of the inherent procedural powers exercisable by judicial and quasi-judicial authorities while conducting proceedings under the Act.
29. Section 151 C.P.C., as incorporated through Rule 22(f), does not create or confer jurisdiction in the strict sense but recognizes the existence of inherent powers necessary for administration of justice and for preserving the sanctity of judicial proceedings. Likewise, Section 152 C.P.C. contemplates correction of clerical or accidental errors arising from accidental slips or omissions. The expression employed in Rule 22(f), namely to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process, is couched in broad terms and bears directly upon the scope of inherent jurisdiction exercisable by authorities under the U P Act No.13 of 1972.
30. The statutory language of Rule 22(f) further indicates that the powers preserved thereunder are procedural and ancillary in nature and are intended to facilitate effective adjudication under the Act. The provision neither expressly incorporates Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C. nor employs the expression review. At the same time, the incorporation of Section 151 C.P.C. reflects legislative intent to preserve limited inherent jurisdiction enabling the authority to pass such orders as may be necessary in aid of justice and proper conduct of proceedings.
31. It is a settled principle of law that the power of review is not an inherent power. A substantive review, whereby an authority reconsiders, re-appreciates, or re-adjudicates the correctness of its earlier decision on merits, can be exercised only when such power is specifically conferred by statute or flows by necessary implication from the statutory scheme. In absence of such conferment, no Court or quasi-judicial authority can sit in appeal over its own judgment under the guise of review.
32. A substantive review ordinarily contemplates reconsideration of the merits of the controversy, reassessment of findings already recorded, or re-appreciation of the material forming basis of the earlier adjudication. Such power is analogous to the jurisdiction contemplated under Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C. and is purely statutory in nature.
33. On the other hand, procedural review stands on an altogether different footing. Procedural review is not directed towards reconsideration of the merits of the decision, but is confined to correction of procedural defects which may have vitiated the decision-making process itself. Such jurisdiction may be exercised where an order has been passed without notice to a party, in violation of principles of natural justice, under a mistaken assumption, or owing to some manifest procedural irregularity resulting in miscarriage of justice. The foundation of procedural review lies not in re-examination of the merits of the dispute, but in ensuring fairness of procedure and preventing abuse of the process of Court.
34. The aforesaid distinction was lucidly explained by the Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, wherein it was held that while a review on merits is impermissible in absence of statutory conferment, every Court or Tribunal possesses inherent power to recall an order passed under procedural misconception or in violation of natural justice in order to prevent abuse of its process. The Court clarified that procedural review inheres in every judicial or quasi-judicial authority ex debito justitiae, whereas substantive review must necessarily stem from statutory authorization.
35. The distinction drawn in the aforesaid judgment assumes considerable significance in determining the true nature and scope of the jurisdiction exercised by a Court or Tribunal while entertaining an application seeking reconsideration of an earlier order. The Supreme Court expressly recognized that the expression review is not employed in a singular or uniform sense and that a clear conceptual distinction exists between a procedural review and a review on merits. In that context, the Court observed as follows:
Furthermore, different considerations arise on review. The expression review is used in the two distinct senses, namely (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record.
(emphasis added)
36. The aforesaid exposition makes it evident that the source, character and object of the two jurisdictions are fundamentally distinct. A review on merits contemplates re-examination of the correctness of conclusions already arrived at upon adjudication of rival claims and necessarily involves reconsideration of the substance of the controversy. Such exercise directly affects the finality attached to judicial determinations and, therefore, can be undertaken only where the statute expressly or by necessary implication confers such authority. In contradistinction, procedural review is not directed towards re-adjudication of the dispute itself, but is confined to rectifying a defect in the decision-making process which has resulted in a manifest procedural illegality, misconception, inadvertence, or denial of fair opportunity.
37. What is of particular relevance is that the Supreme Court did not treat procedural review as a species of appellate or substantive reconsideration. Rather, the same was recognized as an inherent jurisdiction inhering in every judicial and quasi-judicial authority to ensure that its own procedure does not occasion injustice. The emphasis of the Court was not upon correction of an erroneous conclusion on merits, but upon correction of the process through which such conclusion came to be recorded. Thus, where an order is shown to be a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by the authority itself, the jurisdiction exercised for correction thereof partakes the character of procedural review and not substantive review.
38. The principle laid down therein thus furnishes the controlling test for determining whether the jurisdiction exercised by the authority is truly procedural in nature or whether it amounts, in substance, to a review on merits. The inquiry, therefore, is not governed merely by the nomenclature of the application or the provision invoked, but by the real nature of the correction undertaken, the source of the error sought to be rectified, and the extent to which the authority re-enters into adjudication of the substantive controversy already decided.
39. The distinction between substantive review and procedural review was examined by this Court in Pushpa Sareen while considering the scope of review jurisdiction exercisable by authorities functioning under the rent control legislation. The Full Bench, after examining the principles laid down in Patel Narshi Thakershi and Grindlays Bank Ltd., expressly recognized the distinction between a substantive review on merits and a limited procedural review inhering in judicial and quasi-judicial authorities. It was observed that the power of substantive review is not an inherent power and cannot be assumed in absence of express statutory conferment or necessary implication. Simultaneously, it was clarified that where the error sought to be corrected arises from a procedural defect, inadvertent mistake, misconception, or violation affecting the fairness of the adjudicatory process itself, a limited procedural review may legitimately be exercised in exercise of inherent jurisdiction to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process.
40. Thus, the legal position which emerges from the aforesaid authorities is that the determinative test lies in the nature of the exercise undertaken by the authority. If the authority merely corrects a procedural defect affecting the fairness of adjudication, such exercise may legitimately fall within the ambit of procedural review or inherent jurisdiction. However, where the authority enters into reconsideration of the correctness of findings already rendered, reassesses the merits of the controversy, or recalls a judgment for fresh adjudication on grounds touching the substance of the dispute, the exercise ceases to be procedural and assumes the character of a substantive review, which cannot be undertaken in absence of statutory conferment of such power.
41. The following broad tests may, therefore, be culled out for determining whether the exercise undertaken by an authority constitutes a permissible procedural recall under its inherent jurisdiction, or an impermissible substantive review in absence of statutory conferment of review power:
(i) Nature of the defect corrected: Where the defect sought to be corrected pertains to the procedural framework of adjudication, including misconception of an admitted or undisputed factual position already borne out from the existing record, accidental omission, procedural irregularity, or an error attributable to the authority itself in the course of decision-making, the exercise may legitimately partake the character of procedural review; however, where the authority proceeds to reassess disputed findings upon re-appreciation of evidence or rival claims, the exercise enters the field of substantive review.
(ii) Object of the exercise: Where the object of the exercise is confined to correcting a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by the authority itself, restoring procedural fairness, preventing abuse of process, or curing an inadvertent error affecting the legitimacy of adjudication, invocation of inherent jurisdiction may be permissible; however, where the object is to undertake a fresh determination of issues already adjudicated on merits independent of such misconception, the exercise assumes the nature of substantive review.
(iii) Extent of reconsideration involved: A limited reconsideration undertaken solely for rectifying a procedural defect, misconception arising from admitted record, or inadvertent error attributable to the authority itself, without entering into re-appreciation of disputed evidence or rival factual claims, may fall within the ambit of procedural review; however, where the authority undertakes reassessment of contested findings or substitutes one adjudicatory conclusion by another upon re-examination of merits, the exercise becomes substantive in character.
(iv) Consequence of Correction: Where the resultant order is directed towards removal of a procedural or foundational error arising from misconception of an admitted or undisputed factual position already existing on record, the exercise may continue to retain its procedural character notwithstanding that consequential restoration or rehearing becomes necessary thereafter; however, where the authority undertakes a fresh examination of disputed merits independent of such foundational error, the exercise would assume the nature of substantive review.
(v) Source of the error: An inadvertent error arising from the act of the authority itself, including proceeding upon a misconception regarding an admitted factual position, overlooking material already existing on record, or recording findings contrary to the undisputed record, may justify exercise of inherent jurisdiction ex debito justitiae; however, a mere assertion that another interpretation on facts or law is possible would not by itself furnish foundation for procedural review.
(vi) Affect on finality of concluded findings: Mere reopening of proceedings or restoration of the matter for lawful reconsideration does not by itself render the exercise a substantive review where the reopening is occasioned solely for correcting a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by the authority itself; however, where concluded findings are reopened for re-appreciation of merits or substitution of one adjudicatory view by another, the exercise would impinge upon finality and partake the character of substantive review.
(vii) Correction of the decision-making process or the decision itself: The determinative consideration is whether the authority is fundamentally correcting the decision-making process vitiated by misconception, inadvertence, or procedural error attributable to itself, or whether it is reassessing the correctness of the conclusion on merits; for correction of a manifest misconception arising from the existing record may legitimately fall within inherent jurisdiction, whereas substitution of one possible view by another upon reappraisal of merits would amount to substantive review.
(viii) Exercise ex debito justitiae: Inherent powers may legitimately be invoked ex debito justitiae where failure to intervene would perpetuate procedural injustice attributable to the authority itself or result in abuse of the process of the Court; however, such jurisdiction remains supplementary and cannot be utilised as a substitute for an appellate remedy or a substantive power of review not conferred by statute.
(ix) Existence or absence of statutory review jurisdiction: In absence of an express or necessarily implied statutory conferment of review jurisdiction, the authority cannot assume unto itself a substantive power to reopen and reconsider adjudicated issues on merits merely by invoking inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C. or analogous provisions, for inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised in a manner that defeats legislative limitations upon review.
(x) Substance over nomenclature: The true nature of the jurisdiction exercised must be determined not from the nomenclature employed in the application or the terminology used in the order, but from the real substance, purpose, scope, and effect of the exercise undertaken by the authority concerned.
42. The aforesaid principles are neither exhaustive nor capable of rigid application, for the distinction between a procedural review and a substantive review ultimately depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction exercised, the purpose sought to be achieved, and the effect produced by the impugned exercise. The enquiry, therefore, must not remain confined to the form or terminology employed by the authority, but must extend to the substance of the exercise actually undertaken. It is only upon application of the aforesaid tests to the facts and tenor of the impugned order that the Court may determine whether the authority merely corrected a procedural defect in aid of justice and to prevent abuse of process, or whether it in effect reopened and reconsidered the adjudication on merits in absence of statutory conferment of review jurisdiction.
43. Having considered the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material brought on record, this Court finds that the controversy involved in the present case essentially turns upon the true nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the appellate court while passing the impugned order dated 19.12.2025. The determinative question is not merely whether the authority possessed power of substantive review, but whether the exercise undertaken by it was, in fact, a substantive reconsideration on merits or a permissible procedural correction intended to rectify an apparent illegality affecting the adjudicatory process itself.
44. From a careful perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that the appellate court has not proceeded to re-adjudicate the controversy on merits nor has it recorded fresh findings reversing its earlier conclusions upon re-appreciation of evidence. The appellate court has merely recalled its earlier judgment dated 16.10.2025 and directed rehearing of the appeal upon noticing that certain aspects bearing upon the legality and correctness of the adjudication had not been properly considered. The exercise undertaken by the appellate court was thus essentially corrective in nature and intended to ensure that the proceedings receives adjudication in accordance with law after due consideration of all relevant aspects.
45. At this stage, it becomes necessary to notice the distinction between substantive review and procedural review. A substantive review necessarily involves reconsideration of the correctness of findings already recorded on merits. Such power is not inherent and must emanate from an express or necessarily implied statutory conferment, as contemplated under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C. In the absence of such conferment, no court or tribunal can assume unto itself a general power to reopen concluded adjudication merely because another view on facts or law may appear possible.
46. Procedural review, however, stands on a fundamentally different footing. It is rooted not in statutory conferment but in the inherent obligation of every court and tribunal to ensure that its own procedure does not occasion injustice. Thus, where an order has resulted from procedural misconception, inadvertent omission, absence of notice, clerical mistake, misunderstanding of admitted record, or any error attributable to the adjudicatory process itself, the authority may invoke its inherent jurisdiction ex debito justitiae to correct such defect and restore procedural legality. The object of such exercise is not to reconsider the merits of the controversy but to remove the procedural impediment which prevented lawful adjudication.
47. Section 151 C.P.C., which preserves the inherent powers of the Court to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process, operates in a field distinct from substantive review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C. What is prohibited in the absence of statutory conferment is a rehearing on merits through reassessment of evidence, rival claims, or legal findings. What remains permissible is correction of defects striking at the fairness, legality, or integrity of the decision-making process itself.
48. The distinction between these two jurisdictions has been judicially recognized in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, wherein it was explained that though a power of substantive review must arise from statute, every judicial or quasi-judicial authority nevertheless possesses inherent jurisdiction to correct procedural errors, misconceptions, or inadvertent mistakes attributable to the adjudicatory process itself. Procedural review inheres in every forumex debito justitiae and may legitimately be exercised where the earlier order suffers from procedural misconception or from a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by the authority itself.
49. The principle underlying such jurisdiction is founded upon the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, namely, that an act of the Court shall prejudice no person. A court or tribunal cannot be rendered powerless to correct an error arising due to its own inadvertence or misconception which, if permitted to stand, would perpetuate injustice and undermine confidence in the adjudicatory process. The inherent jurisdiction preserved under Section 151 C.P.C. and acknowledged under Rule 22(f) of the Rules exists precisely to enable the authority to remedy such situations where continuance of an order suffering from manifest misconception or procedural defect would itself amount to abuse of the process of the Court. Such jurisdiction is corrective rather than appellate in nature and is directed towards rectification of the decision-making process rather than substitution of one adjudicatory conclusion by another.
50. Tested on the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that the impugned order does not partake the character of a substantive review akin to jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C. The appellate court has not finally altered or substituted its earlier findings by undertaking a reappraisal of the controversy. It has merely recalled the earlier judgment itself for rehearing of the appeal so as to remove what it perceived to be a procedural infirmity which had occasioned failure of justice.
51. From the material brought on record, it transpires that while deciding Rent Control Appeal No. 30 of 2018 by judgment dated 16.10.2025, the appellate court had referred to the certified copy of the registered sale deed dated 13.02.1963 executed in favour of Smt. Sarla Devi, through whom the respondent-landlord claimed successionary rights by virtue of testamentary devolution. The appellate court had also specifically noticed that the said document formed part of the original record and that the tenancy in question existed much prior to the institution of the release proceedings.
52. However, despite recording the existence, contents, and undisputed date of the aforesaid registered sale deed, the appellate court proceeded to hold that the respondent-landlord was mandatorily required to serve six months notice under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 prior to institution of the release application, treating non-compliance thereof as fatal to maintainability of the proceedings.
53. This Court finds substance in the submission advanced on behalf of the respondents that authorities functioning under the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 retain limited inherent jurisdiction under Rule 22(f) read with Section 151 C.P.C. to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process of Court. The exercise of such jurisdiction, where confined to rectification of procedural irregularity or misconception, cannot be equated with a substantive review of the earlier adjudication.
54. The review court, while considering the application moved under Section 151 C.P.C. read with Rule 22(f) of the Rules, examined the controversy from the limited perspective as to whether the earlier appellate judgment had proceeded upon a misconception apparent from the admitted record itself. In that context, the review court noticed that although the appellate court had already accepted and recorded the existence of the registered sale deed dated 13.02.1963, it nevertheless applied the statutory requirement of notice under the first proviso to Section 21 despite the admitted position that the property had been purchased through the said registered sale deed dated 13.02.1963, i.e., much prior to the enforcement of the U P Act No.13 of 1972. The review court accordingly held that the earlier appellate judgment had resulted in a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension, insofar as the statutory requirement of notice had been applied despite the foundational facts already borne out from the existing record indicating clear inapplicability of such requirement.
55. Significantly, the review court did not reopen any disputed factual controversy requiring adjudication upon competing evidence nor did it undertake reassessment of bona fide need, comparative hardship, or any other substantive issue arising in the release proceedings. The exercise remained confined to correction of the apparent misconception emerging from the admitted documentary record already noticed by the appellate court itself. No fresh adjudicatory exercise upon rival factual claims was undertaken, nor was one possible view substituted by another upon re-appreciation of evidence.
56. It further appears that the consequence of the impugned order dated 19.12.2025 is merely restoration of the appeal for rehearing in accordance with law and not final adjudication of substantive rights afresh. The petitioners continue to retain full opportunity to address the appellate court on all questions available to them in law during rehearing of the appeal and no irreversible prejudice is shown to have been occasioned merely by restoration of the proceedings.
57. In the considered view of this Court, the nature and scope of the jurisdiction exercised by the review court was corrective and procedural in character, and not a substantive review on merits. The interference was confined to removal of an apparent misconception arising from admitted material already existing on record and attributable to the adjudicatory process itself. The review court neither reassessed disputed questions of fact nor reopened the merits of the release proceedings for fresh determination upon re-appreciation of evidence. Such an exercise, directed towards securing the ends of justice and preventing continuation of an error attributable to the authority itself, squarely falls within the limited ambit of procedural review and inherent jurisdiction recognised under Section 151 C.P.C. read with Rule 22(f) of the Rules, and cannot be treated as an impermissible assumption of substantive review jurisdiction in the absence of statutory conferment.
58. Accordingly, for the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court finds no jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, or perversity in the impugned order dated 19.12.2025 passed by the appellate court in exercise of its inherent and procedural jurisdiction under Section 151 C.P.C. read with Rule 22(f) of the Rules. The impugned order merely restores the appeal for rehearing after correction of an apparent misconception attributable to the appellate court itself and does not amount to an impermissible substantive review on merits.
59. No case for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is, therefore, made out.
60. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
61. No order as to costs.
(Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.) May 07, 2026 RKK/-