Delhi High Court
Bhagwan Dass And Ors. vs Kuldip Singh And Ors. on 10 January, 1992
Equivalent citations: AIR1992DELHI319, 48(1992)DLT546
JUDGMENT Usha Mehra, J.
(1) This order will dispose of an application filed by the defendant inter alia seeking the vacation of the ad interim injunction granting in favor of the plaintiff thereby restraining the defendants from withdrawing the amount of Rs. 3,00,000.00 from the Union Bank of India, Delhi Auchandi puce Road.
(2) In brief, the facts of the case are that the plaintiff Shri Bhagwan and others entered into an Agreement for sale of land bearing Khasra Nos. 21/15 (4-12), 21/16/1(2-00), 21/16/2(2-16), 21/17/1(2-08), 22/10(3-19), 22/11 (4-16) and 22/20(4-16) aggregating 25 bighas and 7 biswas situated in the revenue estate of village Auchandi, Delhi Union Territory, for a sum of Rs. 5,90,000.00 per acre. The plaintiff paid to the defendant a sum of Rs. 3,00,000.00 by way of advance cum part payment out of the total agreed sale price. The bargain was to be completed within 6 months. Defendants were to procure 'no objection certificate'. The defendant had assured the plaintiff that the land was free from all encumbrances. It is the allegation of the plaintiff that they were to complete the sale within the stipulated period but the defendants delayed in obtaining 'No Objection Certificate' for about a month or rather refused to procure 'No Objection Certificate' in respect of the suit land as a result of which the very essence of the contract was frustrated hence the plaintiff wanted the defendants to return the amount of Rs. 3,00.000.00 along with interest. Whereas according to defendant it is the plaintiff who with ulterior motive is neither getting the land registered in his name nor paying the amount. Defendants have already been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The application seeking 'no objection certificate' under the Delhi Land (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1975 required the signature of both the parties but the plaintiff refused to sign the same. On account of quashing of the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in November, 1980, the land in South Delhi has became available and therefore the plaintiff wants to frustrate the contract. Hence plaintiff should not allowed to take advantage of his own wrongs.
(3) It is in this background that the ad interim order passed by this Court be vacated because it is the defendant who has suffered at the bands of plaintiff and the interim order is very harsh on defendant. By this application, the defendants want's that the order to be vacated and he be permitted to encash the amount because according to him, there is no ban on the sale of the land situated in the villages where consolidation of operations are in progress. This is in pursuance to the Notification issued under Section 30 of the East Punjab Holding (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation Act), 1948. These sales are permitted after seeking permission of the Consolidation Officer under Section 30 of the said Act. Therefore, the defendants have approached the plaintiff repeatedly for getting the signatures on the application forms but it is in fact the plaintiff who had been avoiding the performance of the contract as a result of which the defendants have suffered.
(4) I have heard Mr. C.B. Verma, Counsel for the plaintiff and Mr. Rana Counsel for the defendant/applicant and perused the record. Admittedly, there was a notification of Consolidation but the sales are permitted after obtaining No Objection Certificate. The defendant has prime facia proved that he had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and even now ready to obtain the 'No Objection Certificate' but he needed the signatures of the plaintiff. It is. the plaintiff who has not been willing. This fact find support when the plaintiff refused to sign the application for obtaining 'No Objection Certificate'. This is also apparent from the proceedings dated 27th May, 1991. This shows that the defendant had been willing to perform his part of the contract. When the ex parte injunction was granted, these facts were not before the Court. In view of the fact that the defendant is even now ready to perform his part of the Contract, I see no reason why the ex parte injunction already granted should not be vacated. The plaintiff is entitled to have the land. It is only when the defendant fails to get it registered in the name of the plaintiff only then the plaintiff will be entitled to refund of the amount with interest. But here is a case where the defendant has brought on record the factum of his willingness ever since to transfer the land in the name of the plaintiff for which purpose he has also submitted the application to the plaintiff for signatures for obtaining 'no objection certificate'. I see no reason to stop the payment and I accordingly vacate the order already passed on 1st February, 1989. These observations will have no bearing on the merits of this case. Ex-parte injunction vacated.
(5) This application has been contested by Mr. S.K. Aggarwal, Counsel for the State as well a? by Mr. Tilak RaJ. Kohli, father of the deceased Ved Prakash, on the ground that the conspiracy was hatched by the petitioner in pursuance to which he supplied the scooter and that if this petitioner is allowed the bail there is every chance of tampering with the evidence.
(6) It is an admitted case of the prosecution that the involvement of the petitioner is based on the disclosure statement of the co-accused, Devender Kumar and his own disclosure statement that the petitioner arranged the scooter from Shyam Lal on 6.6.91. So far as eye witness Jitender Bhatia is concerned he has not disclosed either the colour of the scooter or the number of the scooter supplied by the petitioner. It is also an admitted case on record that the petitioner was not present at the spot where the incident took place. It is also admitted case on record that Devender Kumar, co-accused, who is alleged to have fired shots has already been granted bail on whose disclosure statement the present petitioner was involved. Therefore, without touching the merits of the case and taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances I order the release of the petitioner on his furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs. 20.000.00 with two sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court.