Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rajpal Singh Nahar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 13 January, 2020
Author: Sanjay Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Dwivedi
1
W. P. No. 3676/ 2018
THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
PRINCIPAL SEAT AT JABALPUR
Writ Petition No. 3676/ 2018
Rajpal Singh Nahar
Versus
State of Madhya Pradesh & Others
Date of Order .01.2020
Bench Constituted Single Bench
Order delivered by Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay
Dwivedi
Whether approved for
reporting
Name of counsels for For Petitioner: Shri Jai Shukla,
parties Advocate.
For Respondents/State: Shri
Saurabh Sahni, Panel Lawyer.
Law laid down Significant Para Nos.
Reserved on : 26.09.2019
Delivered on : .01.2020
(O R D E R)
On the request of learned counsel for the parties and since pleadings are complete, the matter is heard finally.
2. By the instant petition, the petitioner is challenging the order dated 15.06.2016 (Annexure- P/5) passed by the District Education Officer, Sehore, 2 W. P. No. 3676/ 2018 terminating the services of the petitioner due to his conviction in a criminal case, so also the order dated 07.03.2017 (Annexure-P/9) by which an appeal preferred by the petitioner, was also dismissed.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the offences under which the petitioner has been convicted, do not fall within the definition of moral turpitude. He submits that even though in a list filed by him categorizing the offences which come under the definition of moral turpitude though the offences under Sections 148 and 149 of IPC, do fall within the said category, but still in view of the various decisions of this Court as well as the Supreme Court, the same cannot be considered to be of moral turpitude taking note of the role of the petitioner in the alleged crime, in which he has been convicted. He has placed reliance on various decisions of various Courts, they are - 2011(4) MPLJ 452 (R.P. Dwivedi Vs. SECL); 2011(2) MPLJ 267 (Shriram Sharma Vs. State of M.P. & Others); 2008 (3) SCC 273 (State of Madhya Pradesh and Others Vs. Hazarilal); 2000(2) Gauhati 3 W. P. No. 3676/ 2018 Law Reports 612 (Har Kumar Das Vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation & Ors.) and judgment passed in W.P. No.8645/2016 (Sita Ram Sharma Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others) and W.A. No.955/2018 (The State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Sita Ram Sharma) so also the judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.7011/2009 (The State Bank of India & Others Vs. P. Soupramaniane).
4. Per contra, learned Panel Lawyer for the respondents/State submits that as per the petitioner's own showing and the documents filed by him showing list of offences which do fall under the definition of moral turpitude since offences under Sections 148 and 149 of IPC come within the definition of moral turpitude, accordingly, the orders passed by the authority do not call for any interference because it is offence of moral turpitude and therefore, the petitioner has rightly been dismissed from service.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. To resolve the controversy involved in the 4 W. P. No. 3676/ 2018 case, certain facts required to be mentioned, are hereinbelow:-
That, the petitioner was initially appointed as a Govt. Teacher by order dated 28.02.1986 (Annexure-P/1) in Sehore and thereafter, the petitioner was discharging his services as such. A complaint was made against the petitioner and a criminal case was registered against him. However, the petitioner was granted anticipatory bail in the same, but he was convicted vide judgment dated 30.11.2015 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sehore, in Session Trial No.98/2011, whereby sentence of three years under Sections 148, 323/149, 325/149 of I.P.C. has been awarded against the petitioner.
Against the said judgment, a criminal appeal i.e. Cr.A. No.3335/2015 was preferred before the High Court and vide order dated 14.12.2015, the sentence was suspended by the High Court and bail has also been granted to him.
The complainant of the criminal case wrote a letter to respondent No.4 apprising him about 5 W. P. No. 3676/ 2018 the conviction of the petitioner, then show-cause notice was issued to him on 15.12.2015 asking him as to why punishment of dismissal from service shall not be inflicted upon him, when he has committed a misconduct by not informing the Department about the conviction.
The petitioner submitted his reply on 02.01.2016 stating that he had already informed the Headmaster of the School orally and then respondent No.4 passed an order under Rule 19(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 [hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules, 1966'] which was lateron modified and the District Education Officer, Sehore, thereafter on 15.06.2016 (Annexure-P/5), dismissed the petitioner from service.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed an appeal before the appellate authority against the said order, but nothing was done. Then, he filed a petition before High Court which was registered as W.P. No.18184/2016 and disposed of vide order dated 6 W. P. No. 3676/ 2018 04.11.2016 directing the appellate authority to decide the appeal taking note of the law laid-down in the case of Hazarilal (supra). The appellate authority, thereafter, dismissed the appeal vide order dated 07.03.2019 (Annexure-P/9), hence, this petition.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that in the facts and circumstances existing in the present case, the dismissal is not an automatic consequence, but the authority was under obligation to consider the nature of offence and if it is found that such offence does not involve moral turpitude, the punishment of dismissal cannot be inflicted.
8. As per the petitioner, the conviction was only under Sections 148, 323/149 and 325/149 of the I.P.C., but the same do not involve any moral turpitude and in view of the law laid-down by the Supreme Court in the case of Hazarilal (supra) and also in other cases, on which he has placed reliance, the order of dismissal is illegal and deserves to be quashed.
9. The respondents/State have filed the reply taking stand therein that as per the settled principle of 7 W. P. No. 3676/ 2018 law, the conviction is followed by dismissal. The respondents have further contended that as per the provisions of Rule 19(1) of the Rules, 1966, dismissal of the petitioner is proper because he has been convicted in a criminal case that too under the offences which fall within the definition of moral turpitude. The respondents have relied upon a decision reported in 1996 MPLJ 507 parties being R.N. Gupta & Another Vs. Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwavidyalaya, Jabalpur.
10. Learned Panel Lawyer for the respondents/State has placed reliance upon the stand taken in their reply and has also opposed the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner.
11. Considering the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties and as per the available facts, the core question emerges for adjudication is, whether the offences committed by the petitioner fall within the definition of moral turpitude and whether every conviction warrants dismissal of an employee. 8 W. P. No. 3676/ 2018
12. In view of the judgment passed by the trial Court in a criminal case in which the petitioner has been convicted, it is clear that there was a civil dispute between the rival parties and criminal offence was registered against both the parties. The allegation was made against the petitioner that he has assaulted Nannulal on head by means of sword. However, in Paragraph-55 of its judgment, the trial Court has found that as per the available material and the case of the prosecution, Nannulal did not suffer any serious injury and no case for assaulting Nannulal grievously was found proved, therefore, the accused including the petitioner were acquitted for offence under Section 307 r/s 149 of I.P.C., but, they have been convicted because a case of unlawful assembly armed with sticks and rods has been found proved against them and as such, conviction was made under Sections 148, 323 r/s 149 and 325 r/s 149 of I.P.C.
13. Admittedly, it is found that the petitioner and other accused persons have no criminal past. Considering the nature of offence and the reason for 9 W. P. No. 3676/ 2018 committing the crime, it is clear that the offence committed by the petitioner does not fall within the definition of moral turpitude taking note of the description made by the Supreme Court about moral turpitude and after elaborate discussion, it is clarified as to in what manner, the offence committed can be termed as an offence of moral turpitude, I am also of the opinion that the present case does not fall within the definition of moral turpitude. The observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of P. Souaparamaniane (supra), is reproduced as under:-
"7. Moral Turpitude' as defined in the Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.) is as follows:
"The Act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in the private and social duties which man owes to his follow man, or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man."
"implies something immoral in itself regardless of it being punishable by law"; "restricted to the gravest offences, consisting of felonies, infamous crimes, and those that are malum in se and disclose a depraved mind."
According to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 'Moral Turpitude' is:
"An act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man."
Burton Legal Thesaurus defines 'Moral Turpitude' as:
10W. P. No. 3676/ 2018
"Bad faith, bad repute, corruption, defilement, delinquency, discredit, dishonor, shame, guilt, knavery, misdoing, perversion, shame, ice, wrong."
8. There is no doubt that there is an obligation on the Management of the Bank to discontinue the services of an employee who has been convicted by a criminal court for an offence involving moral turpitude. Though every offence is a crime against the society, discontinuance from service according to the Banking Regulation Act can be only for committing an offence involving moral turpitude. Acts which disclose depravity and wickedness of character can be categorized as offences involving moral turpitude. Whether an offence involves moral turpitude or not depends upon the facts and the circumstances of the case. Ordinarily, the tests that can be applied for judging an offence involving moral turpitude are:
a) Whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience or society in general;
b) Whether the motive which led to the
act was a base one, and
c) Whether on account of the act
having been committed the perpetrators could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society.
The other important factors that are to be kept in mind to conclude that an offence involves moral turpitude are :- the person who commits the offence; the person against whom it is committed; the manner and circumstances in which it is alleged to have been committed; and the values of the society. According to the National Incident- Based Reporting System (NIBRS), a crime data collection system used in the United States of America, each offence belongs to one of the three categories which are: crimes against persons, crimes against property, and crimes against society. Crimes against persons include murder, rape, and assault where the victims are always individuals. The object of crimes against property, for example, robbery and burglary is to obtain money, property, or some other benefits. Crimes against society for example gambling, prostitution, and drug violations, represent society's prohibition against engaging in certain types of activities. Conviction of any alien of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law in the United States of America. To qualify as a crime involving moral 11 W. P. No. 3676/ 2018 turpitude for such purpose, it requires both reprehensible conduct and scienter, whether with specific intent, deliberateness, willfulness or recklessness.
9. There can be no manner of doubt about certain offences which can straightaway be termed as involving moral turpitude e.g. offences under the Prevention of Corruption of Act, NDPS Act, etc. The question that arises for our consideration in this case is whether an offence involving bodily injury can be categorized as a crime involving moral turpitude. In this case, we are concerned with an assault. It is very difficult to state that every assault is not an offence involving moral turpitude. A simple assault is different from an aggravated assault. All cases of assault or simple hurt cannot be categorized as crimes involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the use of a dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim may may result in an offence involving moral turpitude. In the instant case, there was no motive for the Respondent to cause the death of the victims. The criminal courts below found that the injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature. On an overall consideration of the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the crime committed by the Respondent does not involve moral turpitude. As the Respondent is not guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude, he is not liable to be discharged from service."
14. Further, the Division Bench in the case of Vikram Singh Yadav Vs. State of M.P. & Others passed in Writ Appeal No.305/2016 reported in 2016 SCC OnLine MP 11241, dealing with the offence committed under Section 307 of I.P.C., has observed that the offence of Section 307 is not a minor offence, but it is also observed that the disciplinary authority has been empowered to consider the circumstances of 12 W. P. No. 3676/ 2018 the case where any penalty is imposed on a Govt. servant on the ground of conviction, which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, but does not mean the punishment which has been imposed upon him, on the basis of which the order of dismissal must be passed.
15. Likewise, in the case of Hazarilal (supra), where a peon appointed in a middle school, was convicted under Section 323 r/s 34 of I.P.C. and was sentenced to undergo one month simple imprisonment, the Court has observed that his conviction was not proper because he was not convicted for any act involving moral turpitude, he was not punished with any heinous offence and it was found that the removal from service is an excessive punishment. The Supreme Court in the said case has also observed that- conviction in a criminal offence does not imply that dismissal must be imposed in every case. The disciplinary power must be exercised reasonably and fairly keeping in view the nature of offence and the sentence imposed.
13W. P. No. 3676/ 2018
16. Further, in the case of R.P. Dwivedi (supra), the Court has observed that though the conviction has been made under Sections 147, 149, 323/149 of I.P.C., it is not an offence of moral turpitude merely because the offence has been committed by any of the members of an unlawful assembly.
17. Here, in the case at hand, the petitioner has been convicted under Sections 148 and 149, because he was found to be one of the members of unlawful assembly. Accordingly, the offence committed by him cannot be said to be an offence of moral turpitude.
18. Moreover, in the case of Shriram Sharma (supra), the High Court has also observed that a mere conviction in a criminal case does not entail the dismissal of an employee. In the said case, an employee convicted under Section 323/34 of I.P.C. was terminated, therefore, the termination order was set- aside by the Court.
19. Likewise, in the case of Sita Ram Sharma (supra), the writ Court taking note of the law laid- down by the Supreme Court in the case of Hazarilal 14 W. P. No. 3676/ 2018 (supra) has also found that though the conviction was made under Sections 323 and 341 of I.P.C., but that does not mean that the dismissal of the employee is an automatic consequence. The authority had to consider and appreciate the facts of the case and finally the order of dismissal was set-aside by the writ Court. The said order was assailed before the Division Bench by the State by filing Writ Appeal No.955/2018, but the same stood dismissed by order dated 11.03.2019 affirming the judgment passed by the writ Court.
20. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that in the present case, since there was a property dispute between the parties; civil litigation was pending and the trial Court has finally observed that nobody suffered any serious injury, but merely because the petitioner was found to be a member of unlawful assembly; caused some injury to the other party and as such, was convicted under Sections 148, 149, 325 of I.P.C., the said offences, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, do not form part of the offences which fall within the definition of moral 15 W. P. No. 3676/ 2018 turpitude.
21. Accordingly, the orders passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority terminating the services of the petitioner, are hereby set-aside. The orders impugned dated 15.06.2016 (Annexure-P/5) and 07.03.2017 (Annexure-P/9) are hereby quashed.
22. Resultantly, the petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith.
(SANJAY DWIVEDI) JUDGE Prachi Digitally signed by PRACHI PANDEY Date: 2020.01.14 18:18:02 +05'30'