Telangana High Court
The Telangana State Southern Power ... vs Vidyut Ombudsman For The State Of ... on 10 December, 2024
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION No. 9257 OF 2021
AND
WRIT PETITION No. 29815 OF 2022
COMMON ORDER:
WRIT PETITION No. 9257 of 2021 This Writ Petition is filed aggrieved by the order dated 15.01.2021 in Appeal No. 17 of 2020-21 passed by the 1st Respondent - Vidyuth Ombudsman for the State of Telangana filed by the 2nd respondent - M/s Sri Sai Ram Ice Factory whereby and whereunder order dated 30.9.2020 in C.G.No.27 & 38 of 20-21 passed by Consumer Grievances Redressal Forum (CGRF), Saroor Nagar Circle, was set-aside.
2. The undisputed facts are that the 2nd respondent was provided with SC.No.562500810 under category LT-III industry with a connected load of 99HP. As per the tariff order for 2018-2019, tariff applicable for LT Industry is stipulated in Clause 7.16. The Tariff is applicable for supply of electricity to Low tension with a contracted Load of 56 KW/75 HP and below and the contracted load up to 75 KW/100 HP will be treated as LT, LT-III for industrial category and the HT Tariff is stipulated under clause 7.83 of Tariff order for 2018-2019. 2
It is the case of petitioners that in March and June, 2020, the 2nd respondent exceeded the maximum demand, hence, bills were raised under HT category for April, May, July and August, 2020, as per the tariff orders issued by the TSERC and also as per Clause 12.3.3.3. of General Terms and Conditions of Supply(GTCS). The 2nd respondent, aggrieved by the bills, which were issued under HT category for exceeding the maximum demand, filed a complaint before the CGRF in CG.No.27 & 28/20-21 Saroornagar Circle. However, the CGRF vide order dated 30.09.2020 dismissed the said complaint on merits holding that bills were rightly issued under HT category - I tariffs. Aggrieved by the said order, the 2nd respondent preferred Appeal No.17/2020-21, wherein the 1st respondent, by its order dated 15.01.2021, directed petitioners to take recourse to GTCS in undertaking change of category and take a decision following due process of law keeping in mind the material available on record and observations made in the order.
Petitioners' specific case is that the 1st respondent erred in holding that they have to take recourse to Clause 3.4.1 in re-categorizing the tariffs by issuing notice as stipulated in the said Clause, but billing has to be done as per HT category in case consumer crosses the maximum demand of 100 HP. 3 Further, it was contended that the 1st respondent should have taken note of the fact that Clause 3.4.1 is applicable to consumers, who have not exceeded the maximum demand where power supply has been utilized under different category other than the category under which supply was given. Petitioners further stated that the 1st respondent erred in observing that the appellants should take recourse to Clause 3.4.1 of GTCS while changing the category of the 2nd respondent, whereas Clause 3.4.1 of GTCS is applied for change of category for wrong usage of power i.e. if consumer obtains service connection under domestic category but utilizes the same for commercial purposes, in such case notice is required to be issued invoking Clause 3.4.1, consequently, the category has to be changed. The 1st respondent should have taken into consideration that Clause 12.3.3.3 deals with additional connected load detected in LT Services. The 1st respondent ought to have considered the fact that the 2nd respondent has exceeded the connected load and ought to have held that billing done invoking Clause 12.3.3.3 is correct and it was done applying HT-I category tariff rates from the consumption month in which the unauthorized load is detected till such unauthorized load is removed is justified.
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It was further contended in specific that the 2nd respondent who is having 99 HP has recorded RMD of 75.04 Kw i.e. 100.05 HP in March, 2020 and recorded RMD of 78.68 KVA i.e. 104.91 HP in July, hence, the billing was automatically done under HT tariff as per GTCS and as per the tariff order for 2018-
19. Lastly, it was contended that the 1st respondent set-aside the order dated 30.9.2020 of CGRT without considering the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003, Regulations and General Terms and Conditions of Supply.
3. Petitioners by way of I.A.No.2 of 2022, filed additional affidavit wherein they raised a crucial point challenging the very jurisdiction of the presiding officer of Vidyut Ombudsman to pass the impugned order. Their main contention is that the officer who was officiating as the Vidyut Ombudsman was not competent to discharge the said functions as per the Clauses of Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Establishment of Mechanism for Redressal of Grievances of the Consumer) Regulation, 2015 and the Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Establishment of mechanism for Redressal of Grievances of the consumers) Second Amendment Regulation, 2021, wherein Chapter -III specifies which are the category of persons who 5 shall be eligible to be appointed as Ombudsman. The relevant clause 3.6 is extracted hereunder.
3.6: The following categories of persons shall be eligible to be appointed as Ombudsman:
(i) A Retired District Judge
(ii) A retired secretary (Law) to a State Government or
(iii) Any person who has held the position of a member or
chairperson of any statutory quasi-judicial body at the state level for at least three years.
According to petitioners, the present Ombudsman is already employed with TSERC and does not have the qualification stipulated in Clause 3.6 of Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Establishment of Mechanism for Redressal of Grievances of the Consumer) Regulation, 2015, as such the impugned order shall have to be treated as non-est in law and is liable to be quashed.
4. Per contra, the contention of the 2nd respondent is that petitioners are not entitled to claim HT Tariff Rate from LT- III Category consumer merely based on the exceeding Maximum Demand more specifically without complying with Clause 3.4.1. Further, petitioners have remedy of Appeal against the impugned order before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL), hence, Writ Petition is not maintainable. The 1st respondent passed the order following the due procedure laid down by the Hon'ble TSERC from Clause Nos.3.23 to 3.34 of 6 Regulation No.3 of 2015. The 1st respondent is an authority which has the mandate of commission under sub-section (6) of Section 42 of the 2003 Act and has passed the well-reasoned order considering the record and submissions of both the parties. As per Clause 3.38 of Regulation 3 of 2015, TSSPDCL has to comply with the order of Hon'ble Vidyut Ombudsman with implementation within 15 days from the date of receipt of the order. As per clause 3.39 non-implementation of the order impugned is deemed to be a violation of Regulations and appropriate action is liable to be taken by the Hon'ble TSERC under Section 142 of the Act. As per Clause 12.3.3.3 of GTCS, dated 06.01.2006, maximum limit of contracted demand is 75 HP/56 Kw applicable for LT-III category. However, in the Tariff order dated 27.03.2018 issued by TSERC, it had enhanced the contracted limit to 75 Kw/100 HP, hence the tariff order is applicable. The action of Petitioner No.4 based on Clause 12.3.3.3 of GTCS duly ignoring Clause 7.16 of Tariff Order dated 27.3.2018 is not correct and is illegal. Petitioners misinterpreted Clause 12.3.3.3 of GTCS which has no application to the matter in issue.
Further, it was contended that petitioner No.4 is not entitled or authorised to claim HT tariff rate from LT-III category 7 consumers merely based on the recorded maximum demand (RMD). Petitioners cannot affect the change in category of the consumer on monthly basis and based on the RMD and when the premise of the consumer is the same. Petitioners (TSSPDCL) cannot act unilaterally by effecting change of the category of supply without issuing any notice against the 2nd respondent and by not providing any opportunity of hearing to the 2nd respondent, the said act of petitioners is illegal, contrary to law and in violation of principles of natural justice.
5. Heard Learned Senior Counsel Sri. Vidya Sagar on behalf of Sri R. Vinod Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for petitioners and learned counsel Sri Yogeshwar Raj Saxene on behalf of the 2nd respondent.
6. Before dealing with the issue on merits, this Court finds it to be apposite to decide the issue raised by the petitioners relating to jurisdiction of the officer who was officiating as Ombudsman more particularly when the competency of said officer to pass orders/Award is under challenge. Further, this court also feels that the conclusion on jurisdiction would ultimately decide whether to touch upon the merits of the case or not.
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7. As per Clause 3.6 of the Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Establishment of Mechanism for Redressal of Grievances of the Consumer) Regulations, 2015 (for short, '2015 Regulations') and the Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Establishment of mechanism for Redressal of Grievances of the consumers) Second Amendment Regulations, 2021 (for short, '2021 Regulations'), only a retired District Judge, a retired Secretary (Law) to a State Government or any person who held the position of a member or chairperson of any statutory quasi - judicial body at the State level for at least three years. At this stage, this Court finds it appropriate to refer some of the important judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court dealing with the issue on hand:
The Constitution Bench in The United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen 1 in paragraph 15 observed as under:
" 15. The final contention that the sittings in the interval constituted only an irregularity in the proceedings cannot again be accepted because, in the fist place, an objection was raised about the sitting of the two members as the Tribunal. That objection, where it was raised by the applts, or the other party, is immaterial. The objection having been overruled, no question of acquiescence or estoppel arises. Nor can consent give a Ct. jurisdiction if a condition which goes to the root of the jurisdiction has not been performed or fulfilled. No appearance or 1 AIR (38) 1951 SC 230 9 consent can give a jurisdiction to a Ct. of limited jurisdiction which it does not possess. In our opinion, the position here clearly is that the responsibility to work and decide being the joint responsibility of all the three members, if proceedings are conducted and discussions on several general issues took place in the presence of only two, folld. by an award made by three, the question goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and is not a matter of irregularity in the conduct of those proceedings. The absence of a condition necessary to found the jurisdiction to make the award or give a decision deprives the award or decision of any conclusive effect. The distinction clearly is between the jurisdiction to decide matters and the ambit of the matters to be heard by a Tribunal having jurisdiction to deal with the same. In the second case, the question of acquiescence or irregularity may be considered and overlooked. When however the question is of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to make the award under the circumstances summarized above, no question of acquiescence or consent can affect the decision."
It can, thus, be seen that the Apex Court clearly held that neither consent nor acquiescence can give jurisdiction to a Court, if it does not possess so. It has further been held that absence of a condition necessary to have the jurisdiction deprives the award or decision of any conclusive effect.
In Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Brothers 2, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:
" A jurisdictional fact is one on existence or non-existence of which depends assumption or refusal to assume jurisdiction by a Court, tribunal or an authority, which is a fact which must exist before a Court can properly assume jurisdiction of a particular case. Mistake of fact is relation to jurisdiction is an error of jurisdictional fact. No statutory authority or tribunal can assume jurisdiction in respect of subject-2
(1992) 1 SCC 534 10 matter which the statute does not confer on it and if by deciding erroneously the fact on which jurisdiction depends the Court or tribunal exercises the jurisdiction then the order is vitiated. Error of jurisdictional fact renders the order ultra vires and bad."
Further it is to be noted, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan 3 which held that if an order is passed without jurisdiction, it is nullity. Paragraph 6 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder:--
6. The answer to these contentions must depend on what the position in law is when a court entertains a suit or an appeal over which it has no jurisdiction, and what the effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is on that position. It isa fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was coram non judice, and that its judgment and decree would be nullities. The question is what is the effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act on this position.
In T.R. Dinakaran v. The Revenue Divisional Officer 4, while dealing with the powers conferred by the statute 3 AIR 1954 SC 340 4 2012(3) CTC 823 11 to a person to exercise jurisdiction, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held as under:
" 15. From the reading of the above said provisions under the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Act, 1993 and the Rules made thereunder, it could be seen that the Tashildar is the competent authority under Section 10 for modifications of the relevant entries in the Patta Pass Book and such modifications are also possible only under the following circumstances, namely, (i) by reason of the death of any person; or (ii) by reason of the transfer of interest in the land; or (3) by reason of any other subsequent change in circumstances. Therefore, the Tashildar is empowered to make modification of entry in the Patta Pass Book only under those three circumstances as referred above. Even for making such modification based on application filed by the person, the Tashildar is bound to give reasonable opportunity to the parties concerned to make their representations either orally or in writing. Thereafter, the Tashildar shall pass an order accordingly, and also make such consequential changes in the Patta Pass Book as appears to be necessary for giving effect to his order. If the Tashildar decides that there is no necessity for effecting any modification, he shall reject the application seeking for modification.
16. Section 12 of the said Act contemplates an appeal against an order made by the Tashildar under the said Act. Rule 14 of the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Rules, 1997, states that the Revenue Divisional Officer is the appellate authority to hear the appeal to be preferred under Section 12. Section 13 contemplates further revision to the Revenue Divisional Officer either on the application of a party or in his own motion.
17. From the discussion of the above provisions relating to the powers conferred on the Revenue Authorities, it could be seen that the Revenue Divisional Officer, namely, the first respondent herein can exercise the power only as an appellate authority under Section 12 that too as against an order passed by the Tashildar either under section 10 or any other provision under the said Act. From the perusal of the impugned order passed by the first respondent dated 24.07.2006, it is 12 seen that the first respondent has not passed the order as an appellate authority by exercising his power under Section 12. On the other hand, he has passed the order only as an original authority pursuant to a representation given before District Collector by the respondents. It is needless to say that neither District Collector nor the respondents herein can confer the power on the first respondent, which is otherwise not available to him under the Tamil Nadu Patta Pass Book Act, 1983. Though the learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent has argued that the order passed by the first respondent has to be treated only as an appellate order, a very reading of the order passed by the first respondent would show that the same was not passed against any order passed by the Tashildar and on the other hand, the first respondent had exercised the power as the original authority by taking the role of the Tashildar while such power was not conferred by statute. Therefore, it could be seen that the power exercised by the first respondent in passing the impugned order is not conferred under the Act and consequently, the same is the one passed without jurisdiction.
In Karnal Improvement Trust v. Prakashwanti 5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that acquiescence does not confer jurisdiction and an erroneous interpretation equally should not be perpetuated and perpetrated defeating legislative animation. A similar view has been taken in U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd. v. Indure Pvt. Ltd. 6.
In S. Sethuraman v. R. Venkataraman 7, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that if jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, it cannot clothe the authority to exercise 5 (1995) 5 SCC 159 6 AIR 1996 SC 1373 7 AIR 2007 SC 2499 13 the same in an illegal manner. The above authority has been referred to and relied on by the Apex Court recently in Collector, Dist. Gwalior v. Cine Exhibitors P. Ltd 8.
8. In the light of the above settled legal position, it is imperative to see whether the Ombudsman, who has to officiate in the post as per Clause 3.6 of 2015 Regulations is having requisite eligibility criteria or not as the said clause has clearly spelt out the pre-requisite conditions to hold the post i.e. he should be either a retired District Judge, a retired secretary (Law) to a State Government or any person who held the position of a member or chairperson of any statutory quasi - judicial body at the state level for at least three years. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the officer/Ombudsman is not the person appointed from the above said categories. On the contrary, the said officer is only Joint Director(Law) who has been given First Additional Charge and he does not fall under any of the categories as mentioned in Clause 3.6.
9. Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent has mainly thrust his contention that since petitioners subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of Vidyut Ombudsman/1st respondent, now they cannot challenge or raise objection with 8 AIR 2012 SC 1239 14 regard jurisdiction or otherwise of Vidyut Ombudsman to pass the impugned order. In this regard, learned counsel relied upon the following decisions.
i) Kedar Shashikant Deshpande v. Bhor Municipal Council 9
ii) Adani Gas Limited v. Union of India 10
iii) Kishore Samrite v. State of Uttar Pradesh 11
iv) Chief Conservator of Forests, Govt. of AP v. Collector 12
v) V.A. Shabeer vs. P.A. Niamathula 13 In Kedar Shashikant Deshpande's case, the issue was totally different for the reason that though the contention that Additional Collector is not having jurisdiction to entertain and decide disqualification petition, was raised from the record, it got divulged that Section 13(3) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 contemplates statutory delegation in favour of Additional Collector. Therefore, the facts of this case are not applicable to the present case as in the instant case, the Ombudsman could not satisfy the very categories mentioned in Clause 3.6 which is a pre-condition to become an Ombudsman.
In Adani Gas Limited's case, the issue before Hon'ble Apex Court was with respect to "deemed authorisation" 9
(2011) 2 SCC 654 10 (2022) 5 SCC 210 11 (2013) 2 SCC 398 12 (2003) 3 SCC 472 13 (2008) 10 SCC 295 15 under the proviso to S.16 of Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006 and further, the said deemed authorisation Clause under proviso to Section 16 is further subjected to other provisions of Chapter IV, including Section
17. In that case, the Board granted provisional authorisation to Adani's CGD network in Ahmedabad City and Dascroi area, excluding 18 CNG stations of HPCL, subject to certain conditions. The disputed areas were excluded from this provisional authorisation. Under protest, Adani accepted grant of authorisation on 09.12.2013, despite certain areas being excluded. On 01.10.2015, the Board invited bids for development of CGD networks in those disputed areas in Ahmedabad. Adani submitted its application-cum-bid documents in respect of those areas. In those circumstances, exclusion of those areas from authorisation granted to it came to be challenged. Therefore, this judgment relied upon by the 2nd respondent is completely different and not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the said case, the issue is with respect to the power of High Court in calling for records in a writ petition and furthermore, the issue involved therein was with respect to a writ of Habeas Corpus as such there is no nexus between the facts of that case to the one in the present case.16
In Chief Conservator of Forests, Govt. of AP case, the issue was whether Chief Conservator of Forests as the appellant/petitioner in the writ petition/appeal is a mere mis- description for the State of Andhra Pradesh or whether it is a case of non-joinder of the State of Andhra Pradesh as necessary party. Therefore, facts of this case are also completely different and not applicable to the facts of the present case.
In V.A. Shabeer's case, the issue is that the elected candidate challenged the High Court decision of declaring election as void on two counts i.e., 1) appellant had not made subscribed the oath or affirmation before a person authorised by the State Election Commission and thereby, he was not qualified for being chosen to fill the seat in the Panchayat, and 2) appellant had not delivered nomination papers to the Returning Officer or to the Assistant Returning Officer duly authorised by the Returning Officer who had authority to receive the same. Therefore, this case is also entirely different from the present case and the same is not applicable to the case on hand.
10. At this juncture, it is also apposite to address the major contention of the 2nd respondent that petitioners having subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the 1st respondent, 17 now cannot challenge the impugned order and participation of petitioners and allowing the 1st respondent to pass impugned order amounts to waiver and acquiescence, hence, petitioners are forbidden from challenging the impugned order.
11. This contention of the 2nd respondent cannot be accepted as the same is contrary to the settled principle of law i.e. if jurisdiction itself is not conferred or does not possess, then, despite the acquiescence, orders passed would be nullity in the eye of law. In this connection, it is relevant to refer to the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relating to exercise of jurisdiction and acquiescence in respect thereof. In Hakam Singh v. Gammon India Limited 14, it was held, at paragraph 4, that parties cannot, by agreement, confer jurisdiction on a Court that does not possess jurisdiction. Similarly, in Md. Army Welfare Housing Organisation v. Sumangal Services (P) Ltd. 15, it was held at paragraph 40 as under:
" 40. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that the said order was passed on consent of the parties. For all intent and purport, Sumangal could not have consented to grant of such a prayer which would virtually put a final seal over the disputes. We have here to before quoted the purported order dated 1-9-1997 which ex facie demonstrates that the arbitrator assumed jurisdiction to pass the said interim order at the behest of AWHO. Furthermore, as noticed herein before, Sumangal 14 (1971) 1 SCC 286 15 (2004) 9 SCC 619 18 filed a review application which was also dismissed in the manner noticed herein before. The said interim order was, thus, not passed with the consent of the parties. If the learned arbitrator has no jurisdiction to pass an interim order, even by consent no such jurisdiction could be conferred. [See United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Workmen, [AIR 1951 SC 230 : 53 Bom LR 958] and Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. [(1971) 1 SCC 286 : AIR 1971 SC 740]"
12. Likewise, in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. Dlf Universal Ltd. 16, the Hon'ble Supreme Court differentiated between cases wherein the Court or authority has jurisdiction over the subject matter, but there may be pecuniary or territorial requirements with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction. In such cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if parties acquiesce in exercise of jurisdiction by participating in proceedings, they cannot subsequently question the jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the court or authority does not have subject matter jurisdiction under the relevant statute, jurisdiction cannot be conferred through acquiescence or even express consent. In this regard, paragraphs 30 and 32 of the said judgment are significant and read as under:
" 30. We are unable to uphold the contention. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary 16 (2005) 7 SCC 791 19 jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject-matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject-
matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is a nullity.
32. In Bahrein Petroleum Co., [(1966) 1 SCR 461 : AIR 1966 SC 634] this Court also held that neither consent nor waiver nor acquiescence can confer jurisdiction upon a court, otherwise incompetent to try the suit. It is well settled and needs no authority that "where a court takes upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction it does not possess, its decision amounts to nothing". A decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction is non est and its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a coram non judice."
13. In Shahabad Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. V. Spl. Secretary to Government of Haryana Corpn. 17, it was held in paragraph 27 that the order of the State Government was without jurisdiction and is a coram non judice.
14. On examining the aforementioned judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is evident that the presiding officer of the 1st respondent herein, namely, Sri Nagaraj Nagaram does 17 (2006) 12 SCC 404 20 not have jurisdiction under the 2015 Regulations to act as Vidyut Ombudsman since he does not carry eligibility criteria as mentioned in Clause No.3.6 which is sin-qua non to hold the post of Ombudsman in order to discharge the functions in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 42 of the Act. In view of the fact that there is complete lack of jurisdiction and the principles laid down in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi's case (supra) are squarely applicable and this would be a case where neither acquiescence nor consent can confer jurisdiction, this Court is of the considered opinion that the order impugned is nullity in the eye of law.
15. In the result, this Writ Petition is allowed and order dated 15.01.2021 in Appeal No.17 of 2020-21 on the file of the 1st respondent is set aside as the same is without jurisdiction. No costs.
W.P. No.29815 of 2022
16. This Writ Petition is filed questioning the order dated 05.05.2022 in Appeal No. 38 of 2020-21 passed by the 1st respondent - Vidyut Ombudsman for the State of Telangana.
17. In view of the conclusion arrived at in Writ Petition No. 9257 of 2021 that the 1st respondent Vidyut Ombudsman lacks jurisdiction, this Writ Petition is also allowed setting aside 21 the order dated 5.5.2022 in Appeal No.38 of 202-21 passed by the 1st respondent. No costs.
18. Miscellaneous Applications, if any shall stand closed.
19. Consequently, miscellaneous Applications, if any shall stand closed.
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NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J 10th December 2024 ksld