Himachal Pradesh High Court
Dadahu vs Virender Singh on 5 September, 2022
Author: Ajay Mohan Goel
Bench: Ajay Mohan Goel
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH,
.
SHIMLA
ON THE 5th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2022
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY MOHAN GOEL
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.558 of 2019
Between:
VIRENDER SINGH ALIAS
VEERU SON OF LATE SHRI
RAMSA RAM, RESIDENT OF
VILLAGE KHUD (KHUD
DRABIL), P.O. JARAG, TEHSIL
DADAHU, DISTRICT
SIRMAUR, H.P., AGED ABOUT
40 YEARS.
....APPELLANT.
(BY MR. H.R. JHINGTA, ADVOCATE)
AND
STATE OF HIMACHAL
PRADESH.
....RESPONDENT.
(M/S SUMESH RAJ, DINESH THAKUR, SANJEEV SOOD,
ADDITIONAL ADVOCATES GENERAL, WITH MR. AMIT
KUMAR DHUMAL, DEPUTY ADVOCATE GENERAL)
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
Reserved on: 24.08.2022.
This appeal coming on for orders this day, the Court passed the following:
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2
JUDGMENT
.
By way of this appeal, the appellant has challenged judgment dated 27.06.2019, passed by the Court of learned Special Jude, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P., in Sessions Trial No.26ST/7 of 2017, titled State of Himachal Pradesh Versus Virender Singh alias Veeru, in terms whereof the appellant has been convicted for commission of offence punishable under Section 4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (hereinafter to be referred as 'POCSO') Act, 2012, read with Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be referred as 'IPC'). The appellant has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years and also to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/ and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further imprisonment for a period of one year under Section 4 of POCSO Act read with Section 376 of IPC.
2. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of the present appeal are as under: The appellant was sent on trial for commission of offences punishable under Sections 363, 366A, 376 of IPC and Section 4 of POCSO Act, on the allegations that on the fateful date i.e. on 12.01.2015, he kidnapped the prosecutrix, who was a minor aged sixteen years, out of the lawful guardianship of her parents without their consent at Village Katari, Post Office Koti Bonch, District Sirmaur, H.P., to force her to have illicit intercourse with the ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 3 appellant and thereafter, from 12.01.2015 to 12.12.2016, at village .
Khud and Ronhat, the appellant committed penetrative sexual assault/rape with the prosecutrix. The Child Welfare Committee, Sirmaur, H.P. came to know that a minor girl, i.e. the prosecutrix, has given birth to a child in a hospital at Dadahu. Inquiry revealed that date of birth of the prosecutrix was 12.11.1999 and she was enticed by Virender, i.e. the present appellant, who was already married and was having four children. Accordingly, the Child Welfare Committee sent a report to Superintendent of Police, Sirmaur, dated 23.09.2016, Ext.PW12/A. Superintendent of Police sent the complaint for inquiry to Police Station, Shillai. Thereafter, PW17 SI Dula Ram went to Ronhat to investigate the matter on 12.12.2016 and therein complainant Thenjo Devi got recorded her statement Ext.PW1/A, in which she stated that she was having seven children, i.e. four sons and three daughters. The prosecutrix left the school after 9 th standard and she used to work in the house.
In the month of January, during festival season, when the complainant had gone to fetch water in the morning hour of the day and the prosecutrix was at home cooking food, on her return prosecutrix was found missing. The complainant made inquiries and the same revealed that the prosecutrix was taken by the accused in a vehicle. On that very day, the brother of the accused, namely, Jagdish, telephonically informed the son of the complainant that ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 4 prosecutrix was with the accused in his house. Though, the .
complainant asked the accused on many occasions telephonically to sent back the prosecutrix to the complainant as the prosecutrix was a minor, but accused refused to do so. At that time, husband of the complainant was ill, who later on died. According to the complainant, the accused was a driver who used to ply the vehicle of the Chairman (Mast Ram) of their village and used to visit their house frequently. As per the complainant, the accused had kidnapped her daughter by inducing her on the pretext of marriage and some time back, the prosecutrix had delivered a child.
3. On the basis of the statement of the complainant, FIR PW16/A was registered against the accused under Sections 363, 366A of IPC, as also Section 4 of POCSO Act, in Police Station, Shillai, District Sirmaur, H.P. After completion of investigation, the report was submitted before learned Trial Court and on consideration, charge under Sections 363, 336A, 376 of IPC and Section 4 of POCSO Act was put against the accused, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
4. To prove its case, the prosecution examined seventeen witnesses. In the statement of the accused, which was recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he denied the case of the prosecution and took the defence that the prosecutrix fell in love with him and came to his house when she was nineteen ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 5 years old and developed physical relations with him as per her will.
.
According to him, the child as well as prosecutrix were looked after well by him and the prosecutrix was having no complaint. A false complaint was filed by the Child Helpline Officials to disturb his life.
The accused also examined one witness in support of his defence.
5. The following points were framed by the learned Trial Court for determination of the case: "1) Whether the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that on 12.1.2015, at about 10 A.M. At village Katari, P.O. Koti Bonch, P.S. Shillai, accused kidnapped minor prosecutrix out of lawful guardianship of her parents without their consent, as alleged?
2) Whether the prosecution has also been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that on the aforesaid date, time and place, accused kidnapped prosecutrix, who was minor below the age of 16 years, out of lawful guardianship of her parents without their consent, in order to force her to have illicit intercourse with him, as alleged?
3) Whether the prosecution has also been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that during the period from 12.1.2015 to 12.12.2016 at village Khud and Ronhat, accused committed rape with prosecutrix, a minor below the age of 16 years, as alleged?
4) Whether the prosecution has also been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that during the period from 12.1.2015 to 2.12.2016 at village Khud and Ronhat, ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 6 accused committed penetrative sexual assault with minor .
prosecutrix, as alleged?
5) Final Order."
6. The findings, which were returned on the said points by the learned Trial Court are as under: "Point No.1 : No. Point No.2 : No. Point No.3 : Yes.
Point No.5 : Yes.
Final Order : The accused is acquitted for Commission of offences under Sections 363, 366A of Indian Penal Code, but he is convicted and sentenced for committing offence under Section 4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act read with Section 376 of Indian Penal Code, as per operative part of the judgment."
7. In terms of judgment dated 27.06.2019, passed by the learned Special Judge, Sirmaur, District at Nahan, H.P., the accused was acquitted for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 363, 366A of IPC, but he was convicted for the commission of offence punishable under Section 4 of POCSO Act read with Section 376 of IPC. Accordingly, the accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/ and in default of payment of fine, to ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 7 undergo further imprisonment for a period of one year under Section .
4 of the POCSO Act read with Section 376 of IPC. The judgment of conviction has been challenged by the accused/convict.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, in terms whereof the petitioner has been convicted for the commission of offence punishable under Section 4 of the POCSO Act and Section 376 of IPC is not sustainable in the eyes of law, for the reason that learned Court below erred in not relying upon the testimony of the mother of the prosecutrix as also the prosecutrix and other prosecution witnesses with regard to the age of the prosecutrix as on the date of incident. Learned counsel argued that the findings which have been recorded by the learned Trial Court are erroneous on the issue that the prosecutrix falls within in the definition of "child" in terms of Section 2 (1) (d) of POCSO Act. Learned counsel argued that the judgment of the learned Trial Court on this issue was based on mere presumption and assumption which was not sustainable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel also argued that the prosecution had failed to prove the basis on which the date of birth of the prosecutrix was recorded in the records of the Panchayat as well as in his school record and this important aspect of the matter was ignored by the learned Trial Court, which renders the judgment passed by it to be bad in law. Learned counsel further argued that the judgment of ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 8 conviction was, therefore, liable to be set aside and the appellant .
was entitled to be honourably acquitted. No other point was urged.
9. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General, while supporting the judgment of conviction passed by the learned Trial Court, argued that the judgment is a reasoned judgment and the findings returned therein are borne out from the record of the case and the same call for no interference. Learned Additional Advocate General argued that the contentions which have been raised by learned counsel for the appellant have no relevance as far as adjudication of the case is concerned, for the reason that the evidence on record demonstrates that the prosecution duly proved the factum of the prosecutrix being minor at the relevant time and the appellant in the course of crossexamination did not dispute this fact at all. Learned Additional Advocate General further argued that the evidence which was placed on record by the prosecution was from the official record of the Panchayat as well as the school record of the prosecutrix and there being no element of doubt with regard to the veracity of the said record, the well reasoned judgment passed by the learned Court below called for no interference. Accordingly, he prayed that the appeal be dismissed.
10. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to take note of the fact that during the pendency of the proceedings, the appellant filed an application, i.e. Cr.MP 1662 of 2021, which is also being ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 9 disposed of today itself, in terms whereof, the factum of the .
prosecutrix conducting marriage in the meanwhile was sought to be brought on record alongwith the factum that there was none in the family of the appellant to look after his ailing wife. The application is being disposed of by observing that the averments made therein have been taken note by the Court, but as this Court is concerned with the legality of the judgment under challenge, therefore, the averments made therein and the documents appended therewith primarily have no nexus with the adjudication of the issue raised in the appeal.
11. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and have also heard learned Additional Advocate General. I have gone through the judgment passed by the learned Court below as also the record of the case at length.
12. As mentioned hereinabove, five points were framed by the learned Trial Court for the purpose of adjudication of the trial and though the appellant was acquitted for commission of the offences punishable under Section 363 and 366A of IPC, but he was convicted for commission of offence punishable under Section 4 of POCSO Act and 376 of IPC.
13. Learned Trial Court held that Ext.PB, the report of Assistant Director, DNA Division, State Forensic Science Laboratory, Junga, concluded that the prosecutrix was the biological mother of ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 10 the baby and the accused was the biological father of the baby.
.
Learned Court, held that this landed corroboration to the version of the prosecutrix that it was the accused who had subjected her to sexual intercourse while she was in his company, making her testimony to this effect reliable and worthy of credence. Learned Trial Court also held that though the defence plea of the accused was that he was falsely implicated in the case, but a perusal of the statement of the prosecutrix and other witnesses examined by the prosecution demonstrated that none was having any motive including the prosecutrix to falsely implicate the accused in the instant case. It held that evidence clearly demonstrated that the accused used to visit the house of the prosecutrix and she was in love with the accused and she remained in the company of the accused from 13.01.2015 upto 13.12.2016 out of her own free volition. It further held that in such circumstances, the prosecutrix could not be held to be having any motive to implicate the accused falsely in the case. On these basis, learned Trial Court held that the defence plea of accused that he was innocent and falsely implicated could not be established.
14. While addressing the contention of the defence that the prosecutrix had remained silent for a considerable time that she was subjected to sexual intercourse committed with her by the accused and this demonstrated that the prosecutrix was a consenting party ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 11 to sexual intercourse, if any, committed with her by the accused, .
learned Trial Court held that the said stand of the defence was misconceived, for the reason that as the prosecutrix on the date of occurrence was below sixteen years of age and thus, she was falling with the definition of term "child" as contained in Section 2 (1) (d) of POCSO Act and therefore, the consent of the prosecutrix, if any, was immaterial as Section 3 of POCSO Act, which defines "penetrated sexual assault" nowhere exonerates the accused who had committed sexual intercourse with a child with the consent of the child.
Learned Trial Court also held that subjecting a child to sexual intercourse whether with the consent of child or without amounts to "penetrated sexual assault" within the definition as contained in Section 3 of POCSO Act and the same also amounted to "rape" as defined in Section 375 of IPC.
15. With regard to the determination of the age of the prosecutrix that she was a minor, learned Trial Court held that in her statement the prosecutrix (PW2) had stated that she had studied upto 9th standard and that accused used to ply the vehicle of Mast Ram and used to visit their house also. He used to talk with the prosecutrix and had disclosed that he wanted to marry her. On 13.01.2015, when her mother had gone to fetch water, accused came to her house and asked her to accompany him in a vehicle and thereafter, they went in that vehicle upto Gumra and thereafter, to ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 12 the house of the accused on a motor cycle. The prosecutrix stated .
that she came to know that accused was already married and he was having three children and his wife was also pregnant at that time, but none of the ladies was averse to their respective relations with the accused. According to the prosecutrix, she remained with the accused for three months at Khud Drabil. Thereafter, accused took a room on rent at Ronhat and the prosecutrix lived with the accused at Ronhat. She became pregnant at Ronhat and then they came to Khud Drabil, where she delivered the child at Dadahu hoslpital. Learned Trial Court held that the prosecutrix while appearing in the witness box as PW2, had stated that her age was eighteen years when she was examined in the Court on 28.08.2017 and her date of birth was 12.11.1999. In her crossexamination, she denied that her date of birth was 12.11.1996 or that her date of birth was wrongly recorded in the school record as 12.11.1999. The prosecutrix denied that she was concealing the true date of birth.
She also denied that she was over eighteen years of age when she had developed relations with the accused. Learned Trial Court held that the statement of the prosecutrix found corroboration from the date of birth certificate of the prosecutrix which was on record as Ext.PW6/A, which was duly proved by Secretary, Gram Panchayat Koti Bonch (PW6) Neeta Ram, in terms whereof the date of birth of the prosecutrix was 12.11.1999. Learned Court below held that in ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 13 his statement PW6 deposed that he had brought the original Parivar .
Register and Certificate Ext.PW6/A and abstract of Parivar Register Ext.PW6/B were correct as per the original record brought by him.
In the course of his crossexamination, this witness deposed that the copy of Parivar Register Ext.PW6/B was prepared in the year 2016 and he also admitted that the entries in the Parivar Register from serial No.1 to 13 were in the same hand. Learned Court also held that no suggestion was put to PW6 on behalf of the accused that the date of birth of the prosecutrix was wrongly recorded in Ext.PW6.A. Learned Court also held that PW8 Virender Sharma had proved the School Leaving Certificate of the prosecutrix Ext.PW8/B and in terms whereof also the date of birth of the prosecutrix was 12.11.1999. This witness deposed that he had issued the School Leaving Certificate on the request of the police and in his cross examination, he denied that the entry of the date of birth of the prosecutrix as 12.11.1999 was without any basis or that he had entered the same at the instance of the police. On the basis of these Exhibits, learned Court below held that it stood proved on record that the date of birth of the prosecutrix was 12.11.1999 and as she was below sixteen years of age on the date of occurrence of the alleged offence, she was falling within the definition of "child" as contained in Section 2 (1) (d) of the POCSO Act.
::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 1416. A perusal of the record demonstrates that the findings, .
so returned by the learned Trial Court are duly borne out from the record of the case. Statement of the prosecutrix (PW2) recorded on 28.08.2017 demonstrates that she deposed in the Court that she accompanied the accused from the house of the complainant on 13.01.2015 in a vehicle and thereafter, she stayed with the accused at Khud Drabil for three months alongwith the wife of the accused and his other three children. She also deposed that she as well as wife of the accused had not objected to their relations. After three months accused took one room at Ronhat and she used to live with him there. She got pregnant at Ronhat and they came to Khud Drabil and delivered the child at Dadahu hospital. Some persons from Child Helpline filed a complaint, on the basis of which the case was registered and statement of her mother was taken. From Shimla, accused took the prosecutrix to Haryana and after one month they came back to Khud Drabil, from where police recovered her and handed her over to her mother. She stated that her date of birth was 12.11.1999 and that accused was having cordial relations with her during her stay at Khud Drabil. In her crossexamination, she stated that she developed love relation with the accused while the accused was working at Ronhat and that she wanted to marry the accused. She also deposed that she left her house of her own sweet will with the accused and even after the delivery of their child, ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 15 the accused kept her and the child in good condition and maintained .
both of them. She stated that on account of this, she never made any complaint to her mother. She denied the suggestion that her date of birth was not 12.11.1999, but was 12.11.1996 or that she was concealing her date of birth.
17. The statement of Neeta Ram is on record as PW6 and he deposed in the Court that he was posted as Panchayat Secretary in Gram Panchayat since February, 2017 and before him, Kirpa Ram was posted as Secretary of the Gram Panchayat. He stated that he recognized his writing and signatures and that he had brought the original Parivar Register Ext.PW6/A and abstract of Parivar Register Ext.PW6/B, were correct according to the record brought by him.
18. PW8 Viirender Sharma deposed in the Court that he was officiating as Incharge of admission/withdrawal and School Leaving Certificate of the school concerned and on the request of the police he had issued School Leaving Certificate of the prosecutrix Ext.PW8/B and he denied that the date of birth of the prosecutrix was not 12.11.1999 or that the entry thereof in the certificate was without any basis.
19. Now incidently, there is no crossexamination of the prosecutrix by the defence on the factum of the prosecutrix having fled away with him and her thereafter residing with the accused and giving birth to his child is concerned. Ext.PW6/A is the birth ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 16 certificate of the prosecutrix, issued on 18.01.2017, by Gram .
Panchayat Koti Bonch, Vikas Khand Shillai, District Sirmour, H.P., in terms whereof the date of birth of the prosecutrix was registered in the Panchayat record as 12.11.1999. Ext.PW6/B is the nakal of the Parivar Register, in which also the date of birth of the prosecutrix is mentioned as 12.11.1999. This nakal Parivar Register on r to has been duly issued by the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat concerned 18.01.2017. The School Leaving Certificate Ext.PW8/B, dated 18.02.2017, in terms whereof, her date of birth is registered therein was 12.11.1999.
20. In the background of the above narrated facts, this Court will now refer to the judgments which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant.
21. In C. Doddanarayana Reddy (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors.
Versus C. Jayarama Reddy (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors., Civil Appeal No.2165 of 2009, decided on 14.02.2020, Hon'ble Supreme Court while hearing an appeal arising out of a suit for partition and separate possession of the suit property, held that the entries contained in school register are relevant and admissible, but have no evidentiary value for the purpose of the proof of date of birth of the candidate unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth, is examined. In this judgment, Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon in its earlier judgment delivered in Madan Mohan Singh ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 17 and Ors. Versus Rajni Kant and Anr., (2010) 9 SCC 209, in which it .
was held that for determining the age of a person, best evidence is his or her parents, if it is supported by unimpeachable documents and in case the date of birth depicted in school register/certificate stands belied by the unimpeachable evidence or reliable person and contemporaneous documents like the Date of Birth Register of the
22.
r to Municipal Corporation, Government Hospitals/ Nursing Homes etc., the entry in the school register is to be discarded.
In State of Maharashtra Versus Gajanan Hemant Janardhan Wankhede, (2008) 8 Supreme Court Cases 38, there was an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, filed by the State of Maharashtra, assailing the judgment passed by the High Court of Bombay, in terms whereof the accused who was convicted by the learned Trial Court for commission of offence punishable under Sections 376, 363 and 366 of IPC, was acquitted by the High Court by holding that since the evidence of Doctor demonstrated that age of the girl was above fourteen years and below sixteen years with an error margin of one year, the School Leaving Certificate and the School Register were of no consequence. Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside said judgment of the High Court of Bombay by holding as under: "12. Undisputedly, the school records revealed the date of birth of the victim to be 4.6.1976. This was the position as indicated in the school leaving certificate (Exh.25) and ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 18 the school register. The High Court noted that in the .
school register the date of birth was indicated to be 4.6.1976. It also noticed that the father of the victim stated that the girl was 14 years old. The High Court held that the correct date of birth is not recorded and only the school leaving certificate indicated that the date of birth of the victim was 4.6.1976. The evidence of the witnesses indicated that the entry was made on the basis of the horoscope. The High Court held that since the horoscope was not produced the prosecution has failed to establish its case. No reason has been indicated by the High Court to discard the documentary evidence produced i.e. school leaving certificate and the school register.
13. The Headmaster of the school also deposed and produced the records before the trial Court. The High Court held that the entry in the school register was not in the handwriting of the Headmaster and he could not have deposed about the date of birth. There was no basis for the High Court to conclude that the entry cannot be taken to be above suspicion. On the basis of the evidence of the Headmaster and the original school leaving certificate and the school register which were produced the High Court came to abrupt conclusion that normally for various reasons the guardians to understate the age of their children at the time of admission in the school. There was no material or basis for coming to this conclusion. The High Court in the absence of any evidence to the contrary should not have come to hold that the date of birth of the prosecutrix was not ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 19 established and the school leaving certificate and the .
school register are not conclusive.
14. Interestingly, no question was put to the victim in cross examination about the date of birth. The High Court also noted that no document was produced at the time of admission and a horoscope was purportedly produced. There is no requirement that at the time of admission documents are to be produced as regards the age of the student. Practically, there was no analysis of the evidence on record and abrupt conclusions, mostly based on surmises, were arrived at. The inevitable conclusion is that the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable, deserves to be set aside which we direct. The respondent shall surrender to custody to serve the remainder of the sentences."
23. In Satpal Singh Versus State of Haryana, 2010 CRI.L.J. 4283, Hon'ble Supreme Court after taking into consideration the law referred therein pertaining to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act was pleased to hold as under: "27. Thus, the law on the issue can be summerised that the entry made in the official record by an official or person authorised in performance of an official duty is admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act but the party may still ask the Court/Authority to examine its probative value. The authenticity of the entry would depend as on whose instruction/information such entry stood recorded and what was his source of information. Thus, entry in school register/certificate requires to be ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 20 proved in accordance with law. Standard of proof for the .
same remains as in any other civil and criminal case."
24. Now, in the background of the law which has been discussed hereinabove, if we again peruse the testimony of complainant, i.e. the mother of the prosecutrix, the same demonstrates that this witness categorically deposed in her examinationinchief that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of incident and there is no suggestion given to her in the cross examination that the prosecutrix was not a minor. Similarly, the examinationinchief of PW2 demonstrates that the prosecutrix clearly and categorically deposed in the Court that her date of birth was 12.11.1999 and in her crossexamination, she categorically denied the suggestion that she was concealing her true date of birth, which was 12.11.1996 and she reiterated that her date of birth was 12.11.1999, from where the defence was taking the date of birth of the prosecutrix to be 12.11.1996, is not evident from the record.
Further, perusal of the statement PW6 Neeta Ram, who exhibited the abstract of the Parivar Register and also the statement of PW8 Virender Sharma, who produced on record the School Leaving Certificate of the prosecutrix, demonstrates that there is no suggestion given to the said witnesses by the defence that the entry of date of birth of the prosecutrix in these documents was manipulated. In fact, there is no reason for the Court to disbelieve the entry of the date of birth as stands mentioned in the relevant ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 21 Exhibits, because defence has not been able to establish that entries .
in these Exhibits especially in the Family Register were incorporated after the registration of the FIR against the accused. Another fact which is relevant to be mentioned at this stage is that in this case, the initial initiation of the case was not at the behest of either the prosecutrix or her mother, but it was the Child Welfare Committee, Sirmour, District Sirmour, H.P., which put the process into motion after it came to know that a minor, i.e. the prosecutrix had given birth to a child in Dadahu hospital, District Sirmour, H.P. That being the case, this Court is of the considered view that there is no infirmity with the findings which have been returned by the learned Trial Court, holding that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of incident and the appellant has not been able to demonstrate that the findings which have been returned to this effect by the learned Trial Court are either perverse or not sustainable in the eyes of law. On the contrary, the findings which have been returned by the learned Trial Court to the effect that the prosecutrix was a minor, are duly substantiated from the evidence on record and it cannot be said that the learned Trial Court erred in relying upon Ext.PW6/A, i.e. the birth certificate of the prosecutrix and Ext.PW6/B, i.e. the nakal of the Parivar Register, for holding that the prosecutrix was a minor.
25. Accordingly, in view of the discussions made hereinabove, as this Court does not finds any merit in the present ::: Downloaded on - 24/12/2022 09:43:11 :::CIS 22 appeal, the same is dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous .
applications, if any.
(Ajay Mohan Goel)
Judge
September 05, 2022
(Rishi)
r to
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