Gujarat High Court
Thakorsaheb vs State on 2 August, 2011
Author: R.Tripathi
Bench: Ravi R.Tripathi
Gujarat High Court Case Information System
Print
SCA/13381/2007 20/ 20 JUDGMENT
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
SPECIAL
CIVIL APPLICATION No. 13381 of 2007
For
Approval and Signature:
HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE RAVI R.TRIPATHI
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1
Whether
Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
2
To
be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3
Whether
their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
4
Whether
this case involves a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order
made thereunder ?
5
Whether
it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
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THAKORSAHEB
SHRI TAKHATSINHJI JASVANTSINHJI THAKOR - Petitioner(s)
Versus
STATE
OF GUJARAT & 2 - Respondent(s)
=====================================================
Appearance
:
MR JITENDRA M PATEL for
Petitioner(s) : 1,
Ms. Jhaveri, AGP for Respondent(s) : 1,
MR
GIRISH K PATEL for Respondent(s) : 2,
RULE SERVED BY DS for
Respondent(s) :
3,
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CORAM
:
HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE RAVI R.TRIPATHI
Date
: 28/12/2010
ORAL
JUDGMENT
The matter is taken up at the request made by learned advocate Shri G.K. Patel for respondent No.2 who is stated to be more than 86 years' of age and he is not keeping good health.
Thakorsaheb Shri Takhatsinhji Jasvantsinhji Thakor is the petitioner, who is aggrieved by judgment and order dated 30th August, 2006 passed by the Hon'ble Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No.TEN.BA No.285 of 1997 whereby, the Tribunal refused to accede to the request of the applicant of remanding the matter. The operative part of the judgment and order of the Hon'ble Tribunal reads as under:
"In view of the above discussion even if the matter is remanded back to Mamlatdar & ALT directing the parties to remain present on specified date, no any other result other than arrived at by way of impugned orders is likely to reach or is likely to come and therefore in the opinion of this Tribunal Opponent No.2 (Gandabhai Ishwarbhai) should not be made to go through the torture of another round of litigation especially when main demand of the applicant to get the purchase price fixed under Section 32G of the Act appears to have been totally satisfied".
Learned advocate for the petitioner vehemently argued the matter. He submitted that his main contention is that the petitioner had never been given an opportunity of contending that respondent No.2 herein is not his tenant.
Learned advocate for the petitioner invited attention of the Court to page No.127 and submitted that order is passed under Section 32-G of Tenancy Act wherein it is stated that respondent No.2 herein is not the tenant.
4.1 Even if it is so stated in the order, it is too late in a day to contend this in light of the discussion which follows hereafter. This page No.127 is dated 21.8.1967. Father of the present petitioner died in 1968. Since then, the petitioner did not take any steps to see that page No.127 is implemented.
Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that land bearing block No.624 is wrongly included in the subsequent proceedings. He submitted that in the original proceedings under Section 32G of the Act - a copy of which is produced at Annexure-D, page-38, land bearing block No.622 was the only subject matter.
5.1 The contention was required to be raised before the appropriate authority at the appropriate time. This is not the stage wherein this contention can be taken care of. This Court is considering the legality and validity of the order passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT dated 13.9.1991, the order passed by Deputy Collector dated 19.2.1996 and finally the order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal dated 30.8.2006 and hence, the Court refuses to consider the aforesaid contention.
5.2 Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that in subsequent proceedings under Section 32G at page No.46, Annexure-G, the land bearing Survey No.624 was included and it continued right to the final order of Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, Annexure-A, page -27. The very fact that the land bearing survey No.624 was included in Ganot Case No. 759 of 1988, the petitioner ought to have taken this contention before the appropriate authority at the appropriate time.
5.3 Now when the order passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT travelled through the appropriate agency right upto Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, to raise this issue is nothing but to delay the matter further.
Learned advocate for the petitioner relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Patel Sureshbhai Jashbhai V/s. Patel Satabhai Mathurbhai reported in AIR 1983 SC 648. he invited attention of the Court to paragraph No. 7 of the judgment, which reads as under:
"7.
In such a situation an unadjudicated inferential determination of status cannot preclude an enquiry into the status which is a sine qua non for claiming the right in a subsequent proceeding between the parties. Therefore the failure of the landlord to question the sale being declared ineffective on account of the absence of the person to whom notice was sent and who defaulted would not either on the general principle of res judicata or principle analogous to constructive res judicata. preclude the landlord from challenging the status in the subsequent enquiry. There is only one situation which may preclude the enquiry is that if on receipt of notice the tenant did not appear and the landlord appeared and unequivocally admitted that the defaulting person was a tenant on the relevant date and on his failure to appear the sale should be declared ineffective, the landlord in subsequent proceeding under Section 32PP would be estopped from challenging the status of the applicant tenant. Such is not the case. Otherwise on a challenge by the landlord in a proceeding under Section 32PP the Tribunal will have to determine the jurisdictional facts that (i) the applicant was a tenant on April 1, 1957 and (ii) that the sale was declared ineffective under Section 32G. Therefore. the view of the Tribunal that in a proceeding under Section 32PP, the status of the applicant as a tenant is incontrovertible does not commend to us and is not correct".
6.1 This judgment is of no help to the petitioner as it is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. In the present case, the petitioner has not pursued his remedy with due diligence and with proper care. He has taken the things too lightly. He himself contended before the Authorities that respondent No.2 be treated as ' ordinary tenant' and by doing so petitioner be awarded 'price' '200 times' of the assessment of the land. This is nothing but a clear waiver of the right if any of the petitioner.
Learned advocate for the petitioner also relied upon a decision of this Court in case of Narayanprasad Haribhai Majmudar & Anr. V/s. Merubhai Rayabhai & Anr. reported in 1967(8) GLR 897. Learned advocate relied upon paragraph Nos.4 and 5 of the judgment which reads as under:
"4. Since considerable reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioners on the decision in Bhikhabhai v.J.V. Vyas (supra), it is necessary to point out at the outset that the decision of the Agircultural Lands Tribunal in this case was given on 8th March, 1960 at a point of time when the notification dated 9th July 1960 had not been issued by the State Government. This Court was, therefore, called upon to consider the question of jurisdiction of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal without this notification and the effect of this notification on the jurisdiction of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal did not fall for consideration. As a matter of fact the notification was not brought to the attention of the Court and rightly so, as on the facts of that case, it was irrelevant. On the position as it then stood without the notification, the Court held that the Agricultural Lands Tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide the question whether the second respondent was a tenant and it was immaterial that the officer was constituted the Agricultural Lands Tribunal was also a Mamlatdar having jurisdiction to decide that question sec.70(b). Speaking on behalf of the Court, I pointed out:
"The same person may occupy both the positions viz. , that of a Tribunal under sec.32G and that of a Mamlatdar under sec. 70(b), but, in one case he would be exercising the jurisdiction of a Tribunal under sec. 32G and in the order, he would be exercising the jurisdiction of a Mamlatdar under sec. 70(b). The two authorities would be entirely distinct and independent authorities possessing distinct and independent jurisdictions and it is no argument to say that merely because the same person might be constituting both the authorities, the order of one authority can be equated with the order of the other. The orders would be of the authorities and not of the individual person."
Those observation clearly show that merely because the same person happens to be both the Agricultural Lands Tribunal and the Mamlatdar, it does not mean that while acting as the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, he can also exercise the jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar. The officer may be the same but the jurisdictions are distinct and independent and while exercising the jurisdiction of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, he cannot do that which is permissible to him only in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar. But a fundamental difference in the position is made by the notification dated 9th July 1960 for that notification invests the Agricultural Lands Tribunal with the jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar. The true effect of the notification is no longer a matter of doubt or debate for it is settled by the two unreported decision s of Divan J. to which I have already referred. In those cases Divan J. held that the aforesaid observations of mine in Bhikhabhai v. J.V. Vyas, can have no application after the issue of the notification since the notification has the effect of clothing the Agricultural Lands Tribunal with the powers of the Mamlatdar and after the issue of the notification of Agricultural Lands Tribunal can exercise negative the argument of the petitioners that the notification has merely the effect of conferring on the officer concerned the powers of a Mamlatdar so that the same officer would be constituting both the authorities, namely, the Agricultural Lands Tribunal and Mamlatdar and the case would be the same as in Bhikhabhai V/s. J.V. Vyas (supra). To quote the words of Divan J. in Special Civil Application No.1093 of 1963, the effect of the notification is:
".......and, therefore, after the notification of July 9, 1960, in all respects the Agricultural Lands Tribunal besides discharging its own function could also discharge the duties and functions of a Mamlatdar under the Act. The seperation of functions on the basis of which the decision in IV GLR 873 was given was that the Agricultural Lands Tribunal was not the Mamlatdar for the purposes of the Act even though it was possible in some instances that one and the same individual may be functioning as Agricultural Lands Tribunal as well as the Mamlatdar. By the operation of this notification the Agricultural Lands Tribunal also become the Mamlatdar and for all practical purposes it could decide those questions which were left to the determination of the Mamlatdar under Sec. 70 of the Act.... the Agricultural Lands Tribunal could decide all these questions which are to be decided by the Mamlatdar under the provisions of the Tenancy Act."
This decision of Divan J. in Special Civil Application No.1093 of 1963 was taken in appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court by its decision in Kuberbhai Dahyabhai V/s. The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, Civil Appeal No.365 of 1966, to which I have already referred, confirmed the view taken by the learned Judge. Dealing with the argument of the appellant that the Agricultural Lands Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with the question whether the appellant was or was not a tenant of the land, the Supreme Court observed:-
"Under sec. 32 only a 'tenant' is deemed to have purchased the land from his landlord on April 1, 1957. The Agricultural Lands Tribunal had therefore to determine in the first instance whether the claimant was a tenant in respect of the land. It is true that under Sec. 70 of the Act, jurisdiction to determine whether a person is a tenant or a protected tenant, is conferred upon the Mamlatdar, and that provision by implication excludes the jurisdiction of the other authorities to make an enquiry for the purposes of the Act into that question. But the State of Gujarat has by notification dated July 9, 1960 invested the officers designated to perform the duties of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under sec. 67 Of the Act, with power to perform the functions of a Mamlatdar under the Act within the areas over which they have jurisdiction. The order of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal is not therefore open to question on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The Supreme court held that the jurisdiction of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal to determine the question whether a person is a tenant or not was excluded by necessary implication by sec. 70(b) but the Notification dated 9th July, 1960 made a vital difference in the position and by reason of the Notification, the Agricultural Lands Tribunal was invested with jurisdiction to determine this question. The Notification was interprted by the Supreme Court as conferring power of Agricultural Lands Tribunal to discharge the functions of a Mamlatdar within the area over which it had jurisdiction. The view taken by Divan J. was thus confirmed by the Supreme Court and it must consequently be held that after the issue of the notification, the Agricultural Lands Tribunal was clothed with the powers of a Mamlatdar and the Agricultural Lands Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide all questions which could be decided by the Mamlatdar including the question whether a person is a tenant or a protected tenant or a permanent tenant under sec. 70(b).
5. But even if the Agricultural Lands Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the question whether the first respondent was a protected tenant or a permanent tenant, the petitioners contended that it was not competent to the Agricultural Lands Tribunal to decide this question unless a separate application was made to it under sec. 71. Sec.71 argued the petitioners, was mandatory in its terms and it provided clearly and specifically that, save as expressly provided by the Tenancy Act all inquiries and other proceedings before the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal shall be commenced by an application which shall contain the particulars set out in the section. The petitioners urged that the question whether the first respondent was a protected tenant or a permanent tenant could not, therefore, be determined by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal except upon an application made under Section 71. This contention is unsustainable and must be rejected. Sec. 71 undoubtedly requires that save as expressly provided by or under the Tenancy Act all inquiries and other proceedings before the Agricultural Lands Tribunal shall be commenced by an application and, therefore, unless there is some express provision to the contrary, any inquiry or other proceeding before the Agricultural Lands Tribunal must be commenced by an application. But when one turns to sec. 32G, one finds that the proceeding for determination of the purchase price under that section is to be initiated by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal itself and therefore, by reason of the excepting clause at the commencement of Sec. 71, such proceeding under sec. 32G is not required to be commenced before the Agricultural Lands Tribunal by an application under sec.71. Now in a proceeding validly commenced under sec.32G various questions may arise for the determination of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal and one of those questions would be whether a person is a tenant or a protected tenant or a permanent tenant. The Agricultural Lands Tribunal would then have to ask itself the question whether it has jurisdiction to determine such question. When the Agricultural Lands Tribunal asks itself this question in a case occurring after the issue of the notification dated 9th July, 1960, the answer would straightway be that it has jurisdiction to decide such question, and if it has jurisdiction to decide such question, it can certainly proceed to do so in the proceeding under sec. 32G which is pending before it. It is difficult to see why an application under sec.71 should be necessary for determination of the question whether a person is a protected tenant or permanent tenant when such question arise in a proceeding validly initiated under sec.32G. The Agricultural Lands Tribunal can decide such question for the purpose of disposing of the proceeding under sec.32G and sec.71 cannot possibly have application in such a case. It would indeed be absurd to suggest that for determination of every question arising under sec.32G, an application must be made to the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under sec.71. The applicability of sec.71 would undoubtedly have to be considered when a proceeding is initiated, all questions arising in the proceeding can be disposed by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal and no separate application under sec.71 would be necessary for the determination of such questions".
7.1 Having gone through the entire judgment and having considered the facts of the present case, this Court is of the opinion that this judgment is of no help to the petitioner.
It is too late in the day to raise this contention. The history of the litigation is prolonged one and from the record, it appears that for the reasons best known to the petitioner, he used to appear in some of the proceedings at his sweet will and in some of the proceedings, he has appeared through Power of Attorney and the Administrator of the 'Thakorsaheb of Utelia'. This is mentioned to put it on record that Administrator was not that of an individual but of the 'state'.
Learned senior advocate, Mr.A.J.Patel, appearing with Mr.G.K.Patel for respondent No.2 made available for perusal 2 (two) letters dated 13.7.1988 addressed to Tenancy Mamlatdar & Agricultural Tribunal (Sanand) by Mr.J.S.Vaghela who has described himself as Power of Attorney holder of 'Thakorsaheb of Utelia'. By necessary implication this Power of Attorney holder will be of 'Thakorsaheb' on the date of the letter i.e.13.7.1988. In the bottom part of the letter, he has described himself as Administrator and Power of Attorney of 'Thakorsaheb of Utelia'. The only inference which can be drawn by the contents of these two letters and the aforesaid description is that he is authorized by the present (that is on the date of the letter) Thakorsaheb and he is the Administrator of the 'State' in question.
These two letters are referred to by the Hon'ble Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in paragraph No.6 of the judgment and order. The relevant part reads as under:
".........now it may be noted that when Mamlatdar & ALT proceeded under Section 32G of the Act there appear to be one letter dated 13.7.1988 written by Administrator and Power of Attorney and present applicant, namely, J.S.Vaghela, stating that Gandabhai Ishwarbhai I.e. present opponent No.2 is in present petition, is to be considered as ordinary tenant and therefore, the price should be fixed under Section 32G of the Act i.e. two hundred times of the assessment. Another letter in the said proceedings by the same Power of Attorney dated 13.7.1988 (incidentally both the letters are of even date) at page No.35 is on record in the case filed by Mamlatdar & ALT agitating the same contentions......." (emphasis supplied).
This is only to show that the Tribunal has rightly appreciated the contents of these letters and the contentions of the present petitioner in light of the said contents.
11.1 It will be appropriate to reproduce entire para-6 of the judgment and order so that it may not be said that Court has appreciated the judgment and order in piecemeal and has not taken into consideration the judgment and order as a whole.
"This tribunal would have remanded the matter back to lower Court by quashing and setting aside the impugned orders but looking to the facts and history of this case it can be a futile exercise in coming to this conclusion one has to go to the entire case history initiated in the year 1983 initially the proceedings started in the year 1983 by tenancy case No.50/83. Therein by order dated 27.1.84 Mamlatdar & ALT was pleased to hold that the case is required to be conducted under the provisions of the Bombay Talukdari Abolition Act and not under the Tenancy Act. The present applicant himself was aggrieved by this and he preferred appeal No.397/84 it was dismissed and the same was remanded back to learned Dy. Collector by this tribunal as stated earlier. I have called for the record of revision application No.TEN.B.A.190/87 from the record wherein looking to the memo of revision it is a specific case of the present applicant before this tribunal that the limitation to proceed under section 5(1) of the Talukdari Tenure Abolition Act has expired and therefore when the Mamlatdar & ALT conducted the tenancy case No.50/83, it was required to proceed with under section 32G of the Act. Inference can safely be drawn that under the provisions of Talukdari Tenure Abolition Act the Talukdar is entitled to get the compensation at the rate of five times of the assessment whereas under section 32G of the Act the price of the land can be determined up to 200 times revenue assessment and that is what the applicant has insisted in memo of revision No.190/87 that Mamlatdar & ALT ought to have proceeded under Section 32G of the Act. Now, it may be noted again that when Mamlatdar & ALT proceeded under Section 32G of the Act there appear to be one letter dated 13.7.88 written by Administrator and power of attorney of present applicant namely; J.S.Vaghela stating that Gandabhai Ishwarbhai i.e. present opponent No.2 is to be considered as ordinary tenant and therefore the price should be fixed under Section 32G of the Act i.e. two hundred times of assessment. Another letter in the said proceedings by the same Power of Attorney holder dated 13.7.88 at p.35 is on record in the case filed of Mamlatdar & ALT agitating the same contentions. Now if we peruse the provisions of Section 32P and 32PP of the Act, the tenant is given option of re-purchase and purchase price is to be fixed keeping in view the provisions of Section 32H read with section 63A of the Act and therefore the purchase price is fixed at Rs.2112. The assessment of both suit lands is totally Rs.11-10 paise and therefore undisputedly it transpires that purchase price is fixed two hundred times of the assessment of land revenue and therefore now grievance of the applicant does not survive".
The annexures placed in this matter, typed copy of the documents do not make a meaningful reading. Learned advocate, Mr.A.J. Patel, for respondent No.2 placed re-typed documents to which Mr.J.M.Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner has no objection. On perusal of these annexures, it will be clear that the petitioner seems to be still under an impression that, 'he is still a monarch and everything must happen as per his command'. It is clear from the record that he has chosen for no reason, 'to appear in some proceedings' and similarly 'not to appear in some of the proceedings before the Authority'. This may be as a part of ignorance of law on his part but ignorance of law is no excuse and therefore, the Authorities has to decide the matter in accordance with law on the basis of the papers available before them. The proceedings before the Revenue Tribunal in which the judgment and order under challenge is delivered are Revenue Application being TEN.BA No.285 of 1997. Necessarily what is challenged in this revision application is the order passed by the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms), Ahmedabad in Revision No.465 of 1992 which is at page No.31 of the petition. This order of Deputy Collector in Revision Application No.465 of 1992 was against the order passed by Mamlatdar & ALT in Ganot Case No.73 of 1991 dated 13.9.1991 is at page No.34.
12.1 Ganot Case No.73 of 1991 arises from an order passed in Ganot Case No.759 of 1988 and 764 of 1988 dated 18.6.1988, a copy of which is produced at page No.46. Incidentally in Ganot Case No.759 of 1988 and 764 of 1988, the title shows that land owner 'Utelia Thakor Shri Jashvantsinhji Sursinhji' about which the learned advocate for the petitioner vehemently submitted that he expired in the year 1968 and therefore, this order was a nullity.
Prima-facie, the submission is required to be accepted and that order shall be treated to be non est in the eye of law as it is against dead person, but then, in the facts of the present case, it is not required to be so done, because later on in the proceedings the present petitioner appeared through 'Administrator and Power of Attorney of Thakorsaheb of Utelia' as is clear from these two letters dated 13.7.1988. The 'subject' mentioned in these two letters refers to these two case numbers i.e. ALT NC/Case No.759 of 1988, Village: Sela, Tal. Sanand, date of hearing 5.7.1988 reply under Section 32-G. Similarly, in another letter subject mentioned is ALT NC/ Case No.764/1988 Village: Sela, Tal. Sanand. After having written these two letters in 1988 and not taking contention that, 'the title is wrong' is suggestive of the fact that petitioner was selective in the matter of taking contention. He appeared in those proceedings through, 'Administrator and Power of Attorney holder Thakorsaheb of Utelia' (as stated herein above when it is so titled, it is to be presumed that he is an Administrator and Power of Attorney of the Thakorsaheb of Utelia on the date of writing of letter i.e. petitioner, because in 1988, it was the petitioner who was 'Thakorsaheb of Utelia' as his father had already expired in 1968) therefore, the contentions of the petitioner that, all these proceedings were conducted against the dead person and therefore they are non est in the eye of law and therefore, they had gone against the petitioner and they should be quashed and set aside, cannot be accepted.
It was in Tenancy Case No.759 of 1988 and 764 of 1988 that the price was to be fixed but that was not fixed, and later on the sale was declared ineffective and it was ordered that proceedings under Section 32P(2c) be undertaken. It is, thereafter, that in Tenancy Case No.8892 of 1989, a copy of which is produced at page No.59 Annexure-H, the price came to be fixed and this price was fixed as per the demand made by the petitioner herein, by the aforesaid two letters dated 13.7.1988.
14.1 It is submitted by learned senior advocate Shri A.J. Patel for respondent No.2 that this amount was paid by his client in support of which, he has produced xerox copy of Chalan which is not disputed by learned advocate Mr.J.M.Patel for the petitioner. After this amount was paid, Deputy Collector, to satisfy himself, ordered an inquiry which was registered as 'Ganot Case No.73 of 1991' and, in that, the Mamlatdar recorded the findings on all the three questions which were to be inquired by him, under the order of the Deputy Collector. The questions were :
Whether the Scheduled Caste person of the village are willing to purchase this land;
The lands stated to be, 'holding of Gandabhai' are held by him in what capacity and whether by taking into consideration the land in question his economic holding exceeds 8 Acres.
Whether amount of Rs.2112/- paid or not.
All these three question are answered by Mamlatdar and ALT.
Mamlatdar & ALT has recorded that, (i)persons belonging to Scheduled Caste are not willing to purchase the land held by Gandabhai, (ii) even if the land in question is taken into consideration, it does not exceed the economic holding of 8 Acres and (iii) amount of Rs.2112 is paid by Gandabhai.
Learned senior advocate for respondent No.2 submitted that this order was under Section 32P. This order was required to be challenged by the petitioner under the provisions of sub-section 9 of Section 32P. In absence of any challenge under sub-section 11 of Section 32-P, the order has become final. Despite that, the matter was taken again in revision by filing Revision Application No.465 of 1992 before the revisional authority who upheld the order passed by Mamlatdar & ALT dated 13.9.1991 and it is against that order, the present petition is filed.
From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the petitioner is pursuing the matter only with a view to see that some extra monetary benefits are extracted. It is human tendency to get more and more monetary benefits. One always tries to get extra monetary benefit even out of a 'dead case'. That being so, taking a lenient view in the matter, the Court restrains itself from 'dismissing the petition with costs'.
The Court is of the opinion that the order passed by Hon'ble Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No.TEN BA No.285 of 1997 and for that reason the order passed by Deputy Collector dated 19.2.1996, the order passed by Mamlatdar & ALT in Ganot Case No.73 of 1991 dated 13.4.1991 and even prior orders thereto are not found fault with. Hence, petition fails and it is dismissed. Rule discharged. No order as to costs.
(RAVI R.TRIPATHI, J.) (ashish) Top