Madras High Court
D. Jayabalakrishnan vs Tamil Nadu Water Supply And Drainage ... on 2 January, 1996
Equivalent citations: (1996)ILLJ877MAD, (1996)IMLJ367
Author: A.R. Lakshmanan
Bench: A.R. Lakshmanan
ORDER A.R. Lakshmanan, J.
1. By consent of both parties, the main writ petition itself is taken up for final hearing.
2. The petitioner has filed the above writ petition to call for the records of the respondent in Memo No. ENT/116545/HO95 dated November 28, 1995 and to quash the same.
3. Since this is a matter covered by the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Bhagwan Shukla v. Union of India & Ors. 1994 II CLR 645 the main writ petition itself is taken up for final hearing.
4. The subject matter of challenge in this writ petition is the proceedings dated November 28, 1995 ordering recovery of one days' salary payment to the petitioner for November 1995. According to the petitioner, the impugned order clearly exhibits the mala fide intention on the part of the respondent since he has not imposed any pay-cut in respect of certain other persons, namely, Thiru V.A. Varadan, Assistant Secretary, Thiru R. Gopalan, Draughting Officer attached to the Chambers of Managing Director, Thiru N. Bauliah, Law Officer, Thiru P. Rajmarthandam, Deputy Law Officer and Thiru Denadayalan, Assistant of Legal Cell who attended this Court on November 15, 1995 to assist the counsel for the respondent - Board and Thiru G. Lakshmanan, an office-bearer of the TWAD Board Administrative Staff Association (who was also impleaded as a party in a Writ Petition that came up for hearing on November 15, 1995), who attended this Court to assist the Counsel. According to the petitioner, the impugned memo has been issued with an oblique motive to punish him. It is also urged that the impugned memo is in gross violation of the principles of natural justice since it not only results in the recovery of one day salary but also ends in the deduction of one day service which will not count for increment, pension, etc. According to the petitioner, in matters like this, the minimum principle of natural justice would require that hearing should have been given to the petitioner before the impugned order was passed. The petitioner has further stated that the impugned Memo is liable to be set aside since the Board's Circular No. 116/TWAD/HO/ENT/95 dated Oct. 31, 1995 does not stipulate that attending Court will amount to 'unauthorised absence', and that, as ordered in that Circular, "the Staff Members should record the time when they enter the office (after 10.00 A.M.) and whenever they leave out for official purpose or otherwise (upto 5.45 P.M.)." The only requirement is that they should make necessary entries in the Movement Register. Hence, the petitioner would submit that his absence of Nov. 15, 1995 is not an 'unauthorised absence' since he made necessary entries in the Movement Register while leaving the office and returning to the office. The purpose was also rightly noted as 'To attend Court.'
5. The Movement Register was also produced before Court and I have perused the same. The purpose is shown as 'To attend Court'. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that his absence was 'for the purpose of attending Court' and there was no dislocation of any official work has to be sustained. The impugned order, as rightly pointed out by the petitioner (who appears in person), has been passed without affording him an opportunity of hearing. The respondent has straightaway passed the impugned order, characterising his absence on November 15, 1995 as 'unauthorised' one, and has directed deduction of one day salary from the pay and allowances of the petitioner. The Supreme Court has deprecated the said practice being followed by persons in Authority. I am of the view that the petitioner has obviously been visited with civil consequences. He has not been granted any opportunity to show cause as to why one day salary should not be deducted. He was not even put on notice before his one day salary was deducted. The impugned order was made behind his back, without following any procedure known to law. There has been flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice and the petitioner has been made to suffer financial loss without being heard. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in 1995 II LLJ 726 (supra), "fair play in action warrants that no such order which has the effect of an employee suffering civil consequences should be passed without putting the employee concerned to notice and giving him a hearing in the matter." Since that was not done in the instant case, the impugned order in this writ petition cannot be sustained and I have no hesitation in setting aside the order, and remitting the matter to the Authority concerned to follow the proper procedure and then proceed further. The writ petition is ordered accordingly. No costs.