Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Prof. Sri Sandeep, Osmania University vs D. Laxmi And Another on 5 October, 1999
Equivalent citations: 1999(6)ALD791, 1999(6)ALT686
Author: P. Venkatrama Reddi
Bench: P. Venkatarama Reddi
ORDER P. Venkatrama Reddi, J.
1. This Appeal under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act arises out of the order of the learned single Judge in CC No.211 of 1999 dated 8-3-1999. That Contempt Case was filed alleging that the appellant herein violated the order of this Court in WP No.5266 of 1998 dated 27-4-1998. In WP No.5266 of 1998 dated 27-4-1998, the respondents herein prayed for a writ directing the appellant to permit them to appear for the entrance test for B.Ed., (Vocational Course in Education) Entrance Test, 1998-99. They also challenged the action of the 2nd respondent in the writ petition (District Educational Officer, Hyderabad) in refusing to forward their applications to the appellant herein on the ground that the writ petitioners' appointments were not against sanctioned posts and they were not approved by him. Pending the writ petition, interim orders were granted by this Court to receive the applications of the writ petitioners without insisting on the counter-signature of the DEO. The writ petitioners then appeared for the entrance test. Further interim orders were granted on 15-5-1998 to declare their results in the entrance test. The main writ petition was disposed of on 24-7-1998 "in terms of the judgment in Writ Petition No.1642 of 1994 and batch dated 13-9-1995".
2. Let us notice what was held in WP No. 1642 of 1994 and batch. In those cases, the learned Judge held that the temporary or ad hoc unqualified teachers working in a recognised Institution on consolidated pay or otherwise are entitled to seek admission for B.Ed. (VCE) Course and the DEO cannot refuse the counter-signatures on the service certificates. In the operative part of the judgment, the following directions were given:
"...Hence, 1 direct the Director to take action to publish the results of the petitioners after obtaining report from the District Educational Officer with regard to the eligibility of the petitioners, for seeking admission into B.Ed. (VCE) course and after satisfying himself that the petitioners fulfilled all other conditions for writing the final examinations."
3. "The DEO is directed to verify the records of the Management as well as the periodical inspection reports and submit a report to the Director of Vocational Courses, Osmania University, whether the petitioners worked in the institution recognised by the Government for a period of two years as on the date of notification and whether the petitioners were actually working on the date of notification, but not on any other aspect; (2) The Director should take action to publish the results of the petitioners after obtaining the report from the DEO with regard to the eligibility of the petitioners for seeking admission into B.Ed. (VCE) and after satisfying himself that the petitioners fulfil all other conditions for writing final examinations". After disposal of Writ Petition No.5266 of 1998, the respondents herein approached the District Educational Officer for counter-signature on the service certificates on 29-8-1998. The DEO in turn directed the Deputy Inspector of School to submit a report whether the petitioners have been working for three years. As no action was taken by the DEO till the last week of October, 1998, the respondents filed CC No.1689 of 1998 on 26-10-1998 for non-implementation of the order passed in Writ Petition No.5266 of 1998. According to the chronological events furnished by the counsel for the respondents, the Contempt Case was admitted on 28-10-1998. By that date, according to the learned Counsel for the respondents, admissions were closed. However, the learned Counsel for the appellant submits that admissions were actually closed on 28-12-1998, i.e., two months later. While so, on 20-11-1998, the DEO sent the service certificates with counter-signatures to the University authorities. By that time, the first phase of the course was over on 21-1-1999. The first contact programme classes were conducted during the period 1-11-1998 to 18-11-1998.
4. The Contempt Case No. 1689 of 1998 was closed on 21-1-1999. As regards the first respondent in the Contempt Case (appellant herein) the learned Judge specifically observed that the allegations in the Contempt Case did not disclose that he disobeyed the orders ofthe Court. Hence, the Contempt Case as far as first respondent (appellant) is concerned, was dismissed. As regards the 2nd respondent (DEO., Hyderabad) who is not a party to the present Contempt Case, the learned Judge did not consider it necessary to proceed against him under the Contempt of Courts Act in view of the fact that the service certificates were counter-signed and forwarded to the University on 23-11-1998. The Contempt Case was closed against the DEO.
5. The present Contempt Case No.211 of 1999 out of which the appeal arises was filed once again in February, 1999 to punish the appellant herein (who was the first respondent in the earlier Contempt Case) for the alleged violation of the order of the Court in WP No.5266 of 1998.
6. Let us now briefly refer to the order in the Contempt Case No.211 of 1999. In the opening para, the learned Judge assumed that there was a direction in WP No.5266 of 1998 to admit the respondents herein in B.Ed, (vocation course) for the year 1998-99. We have already referred to the directions given in the judgment dated 13-9-1995 in WP No.1642 of 1994 etc., which was followed in WP No.5266 of 1998. In that judgment, as far as Director of Vocational Courses (appellant) is concerned, the direction was to publish the results after obtaining the report from DEO with regard to the eligibility of the applicants. Thus, there was no direction to the appellant to admit the respondents into B.Ed. vocational course. The direction given was quite different. Proceeding further, the learned Judge found fault with the appellant herein in not admitting the respondents on the ground that the admissions were closed and the first contact programme was almost over by the time service certificates were sent by the DEO. The learned single Judge also commented against the unhelpful attitude of the appellant as a result of which the respondents failed to get admission into the first contact programme. Finally, the learned single Judge held that the appellant "committed a clear Contempt of Court". In the last para of the impugned order, the learned Judge observed as follows:
"Keeping the fact that the respondent came adverse notice for the first time, though I held that he committed contempt, I am leaving him off wilh a warning with a hope and trust that it will have its own effect on him in future. As the Contemnor is present in the Court, he is given 234 hours time to admit the petitioners in the course".
7. In the affidavit filed in support of the Contempt Case, the complaint made by the respondents was that the appellant herein did not admit them into programme though the service certificate was forwarded by the DEO on 23-11-1998. We find it difficult to understand how the appellant could have offered admission at that stage when not only admissions were closed and even the programme was at its concluding stage. In the chronological events that the learned Counsel for the petitioners has mentioned, the first contact programme classes were conducted from 1-11-1998 to 18-11-1998. The learned single Judge also noted this fact in paragraph 4 of the impugned order. It is not merely a case of the admissions being practically closed, even the course was practically over at that stage i.e., by 23-11-1998, when the DEO sent the Certificates. The question of offering admissions to the respondents did not therefore arise. The more important aspect, as pointed out in the beginning itself, there was no direction in the judgment in Writ Petition No.5266 of 1998 to admit the writ petitioners to the first contact programme. The direction was to publish the results after obtaining the reports from the DEO with regard to the eligibility of the writ petitioners. Non-publication of the results is not the subject-matter of contempt alleged against the appellant. When there was no direction to admit the writ petitioners into the first year contact programme, we fail to understand how the appellant can be found guilty of contempt. The proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act are quasi-criminal in nature. The charge of contempt cannot be held to have been made out by a process of inference or by applying some analogy. The third important aspect which missed the notice of the learned Judge is that the appellant was once absolved of the charge of the contempt. On the same set of facts, another proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act cannot be initiated against him. If the earlier contempt case was dismissed on the ground that there were no specific allegations against the appellant, it is not open to the respondents to come forward with another contempt case by improving on their pleadings.
8. For all these reasons, we find no basis for holding the appellant guilty of Contempt of Court and then administering a warning on the supposition that the appellant violated the Court's order in Writ Petition No.5266 of 1998.
9. An objection was taken as to the maintainability of appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. The Supreme Court's decision in D.J. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal, 1988 (3) SCC 26 and a decision of Division Bench of this Court in T. Vasantha Lakshmi v. Principal, APSWR School, 1992 (2) APLJ 77 are relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents. Those were the cases in which the 'contemnor' was exonerated by holding that there was no contempt. The Supreme Court held that the aggrieved party under Section 19(1) can only be the contemnor who has been punished for contempt of Court. Their Lordships observed in Para 8:
"As has been noticed earlier, an appeal will lie under Section 19(1) of the Act only when the High Court makes an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent and, in our opinion rightly, that the High Court exercises its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution when it imposes a punishment for contempt. When the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemnor, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is difficult to say that the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution."
10, Here is a case in which the appellant was in fact found guilty of Contempt of Court. As far as the punishment is concerned, the learned Judge took a lenient view. Instead of sentencing the appellant to imprisonment or payment of fine; the learned Judge administered a warning to the appellant In such a situation, it cannot but be said that the High Court passed the order in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Punishment need not necessarily be in the form of imprisonment or fine. Finding a party guilty of contempt of Court and following it up by admonition or warning or award of exemplary costs or the like is an instance of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction to punish the respondents for contempt. The amplitude of the expression "jurisdiction to punish for contempt" in our view, cannot be unduly restricted so as to confine it only to cases of imprisonment and for imposition of fines. The words employed in Section 12 are:
"A Contempt of Court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rs.2,000/- or with both."
The words "may be punished" are important. The maximum extent which the Court can go for punishing a person for contempt is indicated therein. It does not mean that if any thing short of it is done after finding a person guilty of contempt. The High Court exercises jurisdiction otherwise than the jurisdiction vested in it under Article 215 of the Constitution read with provisions of the Contempt of Court Act. The very fact that a party is found guilty of committing contempt of Court carries with it a stigma which might even affect his service prospects.
11. Having regard to all these considerations, we are inclined to take the view that in holding the appellant herein guilty of contempt and administering a warning to him, the learned single Judge exercised the jurisdiction vested in the High Court to punish the party for contempt. Therefore, the ratio of the decisions cited supra has no application and the dicta laid down therein should be confined to the fact-situation obtaining in those cases viz., exoneration of the party arraigned for contempt and the appeal presented against such order by the party who made the charge of contempt.
12. The next question is whether we should interfere with the directions issued by the learned single Judge to admit the respondents to the Course immediately. Obviously, the learned single Judge wanted to rectify the injustice done to the writ petitioners by reason of laxity on the part ofthe DEO in forwarding the certificate within time, while keeping the spirit of the judgment in view. We are informed that pursuant to the direction given by the learned Judge, the respondents have already been admitted into the second phase of the contact course which took place in May, 1999. The respondents have not only completed the course, but also took the examination. Their results are not yet announced. While we do not want to deny the benefits of the second contact course which the respondents have undergone, at the same time, we are inclined to think that they should not be allowed to by-pass the first phase of contact course and get undue benefit which might have qualitative impact on the training course which they have undergone. We therefore direct that the respondents shall be given intimation and offered admission whenever the first phase of contact course is resumed in future and on completion of the course with requisite attendance, their results shall be declared and if they have failed, they must must be allowed to take the next examination. The Contempt Appeal is disposed of accordingly.