U.Ramachandran vs The State Of Tamil Nadu on 22 December, 2011

[Cites 20, Cited by 0]

Madras High Court

U.Ramachandran vs The State Of Tamil Nadu on 22 December, 2011

Bench: D.Hariparanthaman

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 22.12.2011
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.HARIPARANTHAMAN
W.P.NO.1643 OF 2011
M.P.NOS.1 AND 2 OF 2011

1.U.Ramachandran
Son of Ulagappan
President
Mandapam Union President's Association
Nagachi, Uchipuli Post,
Ramanathapuram Taluk and District.

2.Ramanathapuram Bar Association (Regd.)
Represented by its Secretary
S.Arshad Hussein ... Petitioners

Versus

1.The State of Tamil Nadu
Rep. by its Secretary to the Government
Law Department
Fort St. George, Chennai 600 009.

2.High Court of Judicature at Madras
Represented by its Registrar (General)
High Court Buildings
I Floor, Chennai 600 104.

3.The District Collector
Ramanathapuram District,
Ramanathapuram. ... Respondents

PRAYER: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issuance of Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to call for the records on the file of the 2nd respondent in its proceedings ROC No.379-C/2008/G/Judn No:VI(1)/262/2010 dated 17.06.2010 published in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette No.26, dated 07.07.2010 and quash the same as illegal, incompetent and without jurisdiction and to further forbear the respondents from transferring the Mandapam Firka from Ramanathapuram Taluk and attaching with Rameswaram Taluk.

For Petitioner : Mr.V.Lakshminarayanan
For Respondents 1&3 : Mr.V.Subbiah
Special Government Pleader
For Respondent 2 : Mr.P.K.Rajagopal

O R D E R

The petitioners have filed this writ petition seeking to quash the proceedings dated 17.06.2010 of the second respondent relating to realignment of civil jurisdiction, by detaching Mandapam Firka of Ramanathapuram Taluk, under the jurisdiction of District Munsif Court, Ramanathapuram and attaching the same under the jurisdiction of District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate Court, Rameswaram and the publication of the aforesaid proceedings in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 07.07.2010.

2.The first petitioner is the President of Mandapam Union President's Association, a registered body consisting of President, Secretary and other Office Bearers of the Panchayat Units in Mandapam Union. The second petitioner is the Ramanathapuram Bar Association and the Advocates practicing in various Courts within the District jurisdiction of Ramanathapuram are its Members.

3.The petitioners have made the following objections for realignment of jurisdiction:

(a) Realignment is based on the revenue classification namely Firka and instead it should be based on the villages.

(b) The impugned realignment is opposed to the rule found in the High Court's Circular No.1792 of 1879 in Volume II, Chapter II, the Civil Rules of practice and circular orders of the High Court of Judicature at Madras.

According to the petitioners, before effecting any realignment in the Civil Jurisdiction, a report from the District Collector shall be obtained and the same shall be forwarded to the second respondent for its consideration, as per Circular No.1792 of 1879.

(d) The impugned realignment have made the litigant public to travel a long distance.

4.The second respondent filed a counter affidavit refuting the allegations made by the petitioners. It is stated that the Circular No.1792 of 1879 does not make it incumbent upon the District Judge to call for suggestions, even if the Chief Executive Officer of a District does not offer the same. It is also stated that there is no requirement to hear the public, prior to redistribution of local jurisdiction of Civil Courts. It is further stated that there was a request from the Advocate Association, Rameswaram to redraw the civil jurisdiction of the Munsif Courts concerned, by attaching the civil jurisdiction of Mandapam Firka with the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate Court, Rameswaram. Based on the same, the Principal District Judge, Ramanathapuram was requested to send detailed remarks along with statistical report on the subject. Pursuant to the same, the Principal District Judge, Ramanathapuram sent remarks stating that the criminal cases arising from Dhanuskodi to Mandapam are tried in the Court of the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Rameswaram and that it would be easy for the litigant public of Mandapam Firka to approach the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Rameswaram for filing civil suits. It is stated that in the said circumstances, the Principal District Judge, Ramanathapuram was also directed to send a draft notification and accordingly, he sent a draft notification that was submitted before the Honourable Portfolio Judge and the Honourable then Acting Chief Justice for approval and the approved notification under Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act, 1873 was published by the second respondent in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary issue No.26 under Part VI Section 1 dated 07.07.2010. Thus, the second respondent has sought for dismissal of the writ petition.

5.Heard the submissions made on either side. The learned counsel for the second respondent has produced the entire records for perusal.

6.The learned counsel for the petitioners has made his submissions based on the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. Besides, the learned counsel, on seeing the counter affidavit that the impugned notification was approved by the Honourable Portfolio Judge and the Honourable then Acting Chief Justice, has raised a legal issue that the impugned notification is contrary to Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act, 1873. According to him, "High Court" means "Full Court" and not the Portfolio Judge and the Chief Justice alone. That is, according to him, in this case, the Portfolio Judge and the Acting Chief Justice alone cannot constitute High Court. He also submits that the Full Court shall decide about the realignment of jurisdiction as per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act, 1873 read with Articles 216 and 235 of the Constitution of India.

7.The learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the First Bench judgment of this Court in THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND SPECIAL TAHSILDAR (LA) AND OTHERS VS. R.MANICKAMMAL AND OTHERS in W.A.Nos.186 to 189 of 2001 etc., batch (decided on 12.02.2002) and the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in JOINT ACTION COMMITTEE OF AIRLINES PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF INDIA AND OTHERS VS. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION AND OTHERS [2011 (5) SCC 435] for the proposition that if an authority has to exercise power under a statute, the same authority shall exercise the power and nobody else. Since the Full Court failed to approve the impugned notification, the impugned notification has to be set aside.

8.The learned counsel for the petitioner also relies on the Full Bench judgment of this Court in THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS, REP. BY THE REGISTRAR VS. T.S.SANKARANARAYANAN [1997 (III) CTC 1] in support of his submissions.

9.The learned counsel for the second respondent submits that no rules are framed under Articles 225 and 235 of the Constitution of India. However, the Full Court, in its meetings held on 12.07.1993 and 19.07.1993 resolved to adopt a new scheme of procedure for submission of Administrative Files to the Honourable Chief Justice and other Honourable Judges, in accordance with the distribution of work of High Court (excluding matters purely relating to the office of the High Court). According to the learned counsel for the second respondent, as per the aforesaid new scheme devised by the Full Court, the Honourable Chief Justice is authorised to decide about the realignment of Munsif Courts jurisdiction. He has produced a copy of the said scheme evolved by the Full Court. In the said scheme, he has relied on serial number 8 authorising the Honourable Chief Justice to act on "all residuary subjects not allocated to the Committee of Judges or any individual Judge", in support of his submissions.

10.The learned counsel for the second respondent relies on the following judgments in support of his contentions:

(i)Full Bench judgment of this Court in THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS VS. T.S.SANKARANARAYANAN [1997 (III) CTC 1]

(ii)Judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS VS. R.PERACHI AND OTHERS in Civil Appeal No.7936 of 2011 (decided on 19.09.2011).

11.The learned counsel for the second respondent further submits that the Principal District Judge, Ramanathapuram, recommended for realignment of civil jurisdiction, by detaching Mandapam Firka, from Munsif Court, Ramanathapuram and for attaching the same with the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate Court, Rameswaram, taking into account various factors. The learned counsel further submits that various correspondence took place between the second respondent and the Principal District Judge, Ramanathapuram, wherein the second respondent sought various details and the Principal District Judge, Ramanathapuram submitted his recommendations and statistical details were provided by the Principal District Judge, Ramanathapuram, in support of his recommendations. He also submits that while the distance between Rameswaram and Mandapam is 18 kms, the distance between Ramanathapuram and Mandapam is 38 kms. He further submits that the Firka is the basis for determining the jurisdiction in all over Tamil Nadu and if individual villages are taken for determination of jurisdiction, that would cause chaos. It is submitted that the statistical details, as disclosed in the file, would justify the impugned notification that was issued in the interest of the litigant public.

12.I have considered the submissions made on either side and perused the entire materials available on record.

13.The following issues arises for consideration:

(i)Whether the High Court's Circular No.1792 of 1879 contemplates calling for a report from the District Collector, by the second respondent, before realignment of jurisdiction of Munsif Courts?

(ii)Whether a public hearing shall be held before realignment of jurisdiction of Munsif Courts?

(iii)Whether the second respondent is correct in taking "Firka" as the Unit for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on the Munsif Courts and whether the impugned notification could cause inconvenience to the litigant public?

(v)Whether the impugned notification was approved as per the scheme devised by the Full Court in its meeting held on 12.07.1993 and 19.07.1993.

ISSUE NO.1

14.The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the High Court's Circular No.1792 of 1879 in support of his submission that the High Court shall obtain a report from the District Collector, before effecting any change in the jurisdiction of Munsif Courts. The contents of the High Court's Circular No.1792 of 1879, as found in para 8 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, is extracted hereunder:

"The District Judge is the officer to whom primarily, the High Court looks to propose such arrangements as may be effectual, secure the administration of Civil Justice with due regard to the Convenience of the public and by whose advice the court would be greatly influenced in recommending to the Government any alternation of existing arrangements. The District Judge should undoubtedly accept from the Chief Executive Officer of a District any suggestions which the latter may consider it decidable to make for a redistribution of the areas of civil jurisdiction and should forward such suggestion to the High Court with an intimation that he assents to or dissents from them and for reasons stated. It is obviously more convenient that the collector's suggestions should be sent to the high court not directly but through the channel of the District Judge in order that the court may have the benefit of the District Judges Local knowledge and experience dealing with them."

The aforesaid Circular contemplates that "the convenience of public" is the guiding factor in deciding the administration of civil justice. The Circular also states that the High Court shall primarily look into the recommendations of the District Judge relating to the arrangements relating to the administration of civil justice. At this juncture, it is relevant to extract the recommendations of the Principal District Judge, Ramanathapuram. which reads as follows:

"I submit that as on date 27 Original Suits and 8 Execution Petitions are pending on the file of District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate Court, Rameswaram.

Further I submit that as of now 498 Original Suits, 118 Execution Petition, 28 R.C. OPs and 12 Small Causes suit, are pending in District Munsif Court, Ramanathapuram, out of which 69 Original Suit, 4 Execution Petitions pending before the District Munsif Court, Ramanathapuram in the Mandapam jurisdiction. The details of case particulars in revenue firka of jurisdiction are also submitted herewith.

Further I submit that the Criminal cases are functioning in the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate Court, Rameswaram for the territorial jurisdiction of Thanuskodi to Mandapam. Mandapam is situated near Rameswaram and distance between Rameswaram and Mandapam is about 15 K.M., and it is very easy for the litigant public to approach Rameswaram Court for filing civil suits. Therefore if the Hon'ble High Court Madras deems fit, the civil cases of the Mandapam jurisdiction may kindly be considered to attach with the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate Court, Rameswaram for the benefit of the Mandapam people's and for early disposal of the civil cases."

15.The aforesaid Circular does not contemplate that the High Court shall obtain a report from the District Collector relating to redistribution of areas of civil jurisdiction. If the District Collector gives any suggestion, that could be considered by the High Court and the District Collector is to forward suggestions, if any, through the District Judge and the District Judge has to give his opinion on the suggestions of the District Collector. The emphasis is given to the views of the District Judge. Therefore, I am of the view that the learned counsel for the second respondent is correct in his submission that the Circular does not make it incumbent upon the District Judge to call for suggestions, even if the District Collector, does not offer the same. Thus, issue no.1 is decided in favour of the second respondent.

ISSUE NO. 2

16.Though the learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that before ordering for redistribution of areas relating to Munsif Courts, public hearing shall be held, he is not able to state the basis on which, he has sought for public hearing. Neither Circular No.1792 of 1879 nor the resolution of the Full Court in its meeting held on 12.07.1993 and 19.07.1993 provide for any public hearing. Therefore, there is no requirement to have a public hearing before ordering redistribution of areas to the Munsif Courts. Accordingly, issue no.2 is also decided in favour of the second respondent.

ISSUE NO. 3

17.For the purpose of revenue administration, the State is divided into Districts; Districts are divided into Taluks and Taluks are divided into Firkas, which contains Villages. The jurisdiction of Munsif Court that is at issue is decided based on the Firka. This is adopted for all the Munsif Courts in the State. In my view, that could be the rational basis in deciding the jurisdiction.

18.The District Munsif Court, Ramanathapuram has jurisdiction over the following Firkas, after the impugned notification:-

i)Perungulam

ii)Ramanathapuram

iii)Thirupulani

iv)Devipattinam

v)Thiru Utirakosamangai

vi)Keelakarai

19.The District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate Court, Rameswaram has jurisdiction over the following Firkas:

i)Pampan

ii)Rameswaram

iii)Mandapam

20.While the distance between Mandapam and Rameswaram is 18 kms, the distance between Mandapam and Ramanathapuram is 38 kms. This is not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Every Firka contains Villages. Individual Villages could not be chosen for deciding the jurisdiction. The Headquarters of Firka shall be the criteria. The headquarters of Mandapam Firka is Mandapam and Mandapam is admittedly nearer to Rameswaram.

21.Furthermore, I have perused the voluminous files produced by the second respondent relating to this matter. The files shows lot of correspondence between the Principal District Judge, Ramanathapuram and the second respondent. The Principal District Judge, Ramanathapuram also obtained reports from the District Munsif, Rameswaram and District Munsif, Ramanathapuram. The pending civil cases in both the Munsif Courts at Rameswaram and Ramanathapuram are given and various minute details are also provided by the Principal District Judge, Ramanathapuram. While there are more than 500 Original Suits pending at any point of time before the District Munsif Court, Ramanathapuram, only 30 Original Suits are pending in District Munsif Court, Rameswaram. Furthermore, Mandapam Firka alone has 68 Original Suits that are pending before the District Munsif Court, Ramanathapuram. Due to realignment, only those 68 suits could be transferred. I have not dealt with other civil matters, because those are all very very small in number. Therefore, I am of the view that the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners has no force. From the statistics that are available in the files, I do not find any infirmity in the decision of the second respondent to redistribute the areas that would ultimately, help the litigant public. There is nothing wrong in taking Firka as the basis for determining the basis for Munsif Courts. Thus, issue no.3 is also decided in favour of the second respondent.

ISSUE NO.4

22.The learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously argued that since the matter relating to redistribution of areas to Munsif Courts was not decided by the High Court, as per Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act, the impugned notification is invalid. Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act is extracted hereunder:

"11.Local jurisdiction of District Munsifs The High Court shall fix, and may from time to time modify, the local jurisdiction of District Munsifs."

23.The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that "High Court" as per Article 216 of the Constitution of India is the Honourable Chief Justice and other Honourable Judges of the High Court. The learned counsel also submits that the overall control of District Courts and the Courts subordinate thereto, including various matters, shall vest with the High Court and therefore, the decision of the then Honourable Acting Chief Justice and the Honourable Portfolio Judge is not suffice.

24.The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the First Bench judgment of this Court in THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND SPECIAL TAHSILDAR (LA) AND OTHERS VS. R.MANICKAMMAL AND OTHERS in W.A.Nos.186 to 189 of 2001 etc., batch (decided on 12.02.2002) and the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in JOINT ACTION COMMITTEE OF AIRLINES PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF INDIA AND OTHERS VS. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION AND OTHERS [2011 (5) SCC 435] for the proposition that when the statute / constitution provides a particular authority to do a particular act, that authority alone shall do the same and nobody else. In this regard, the relevant passage from the First Bench judgment of this Court referred to above is extracted hereunder:

".... It is well settled law that when the Legislature did not name any other authority for the exercise of powers and names only a particular authority, only that particular authority has to exercise the power and nobody else."

25.Likewise, paras 26, 27 and 28 of the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in JOINT ACTION COMMITTEE OF AIRLINES PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF INDIA AND OTHERS VS. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION AND OTHERS [2011 (5) SCC 435] are extracted hereunder:

"26.The contention was raised before the High Court that the Circular dated 29.5.2008 has been issued by the authority having no competence, thus cannot be enforced. It is a settled legal proposition that the authority which has been conferred with the competence under the statute alone can pass the order. No other person, even a superior authority, can interfere with the functioning of the Statutory Authority. In a democratic set up like ours, persons occupying key positions are not supposed to mortgage their discretion, volition and decision making authority and be prepared to give way to carry out commands having no sanctity in law. Thus, if any decision is taken by a statutory authority at the behest or on suggestion of a person who has no statutory role to play, the same would be patently illegal. (Vide: The Purtabpur Co., Ltd. v. Cane Commissioner of Bihar & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 1896; Chandrika Jha v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 322; Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 2524; and Manohar Lal (D) by L.Rs.v.Ugrasen (D) by L.Rs. & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 2210).

27.Similar view has been re-iterated by this Court in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16; Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 1159; and Pancham Chand & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 1888, observing that an authority vested with the power to act under the statute alone should exercise its discretion following the procedure prescribed therein and interference on the part of any authority upon whom the statute does not confer any jurisdiction, is wholly unwarranted in law. It violates the Constitutional scheme.

28.In view of the above, the legal position emerges that the authority who has been vested with the power to exercise its discretion alone can pass the order. Even senior official cannot provide for any guideline or direction to the authority under the statute to act in a particular manner. "

26.There is no quarrel over the aforesaid proposition. I am in full agreement with the learned counsel for the petitioners that as per the Scheme of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act and the Constitutional Scheme, the High Court, that is, the Full Court shall decide the matter relating to local jurisdiction of District Munsifs. It is for the Full Court to decide as to what are all the matters that could be placed before it for consideration and what are all the matters that could be decided by the Committee of Judges and by the Honourable Chief Justice.

27.The learned counsel for the second respondent has relied on the resolution of the Full Court in its meetings held on 12.07.1993 and 19.07.1993 evolving a scheme for submission of administrative files to the Honourable Chief Justice and the other Honourable Judges of this Court. The resolution provides that what are all the matters that should go before the Full Court and what are all the matters that should go before the Honourable Chief Justice. The resolution also provides for formation of Administrative Committees. While the learned counsel for the second respondent relies on serial number 8 in the matters for which the Honourable Chief Justice shall decide on his own, the learned counsel for the petitioners relies on serial number 8 relating to the matters that should go before the Full Court. In this regard, the following portion from the Full Court resolution dated 12.07.1993 and 19.07.1993 referred to above is extracted hereunder:

S. No Subjects Full Court, Chief Justice, Committee of Judges or Individual Judges Order in which files have to be submitted 1 2 3 4 MATTERS WHICH SHOULD GO BEFORE THE FULL COURT 1 Direct recruitment of District Judges and recommendations to Government regarding promotions as District Judges.

Promotions, confirmation reversions and premature retirement of all Judicial Officers.

Consideration of Final reports of Disciplinary Enquiries in respect of Judicial Officers and taking decisions as to punishment and further action thereon.

General Policy matters.

Matters which the Chief Justice considers to be of importance.

Matters which the Chief Justice places before the Full Court at the request of any Judge /s 7 Annual General transfers of Judicial Officers.

Constitution and abolition of Courts.

Full Court

1.Hon'ble Chief Justice

2.Full Court

1.Hon'ble Chief Justice

2.Full Court

1.Hon'ble Chief Justice

2.Full Court

1.Hon'ble Chief Justice

2.Full Court CHIEF JUSTICE 1 General supervision, coordination and control of all Administrative work of the High Court.

Distribution and redistribution of Administrative work among the Hon'ble Judges 3 Constitution of Administrative Committee of Judge / s 4 Constitution of any Special Committee of Judges to examine any specified matter or matters.

Making substitute arrangement during the absence of any Judge or Judges or during vacation of Courts.

Settling the general policy and procedure for audit of accounts of subordinate Courts and programme for such audit.

Taking decision in emergency if any on all matters.

All residuary subjects not allocated to the Committee of Judges or any individual Judge.

Hon'ble Chief Justice Hon'ble Chief Justice

28.In my view, both the learned counsels are not correct. While serial number 8 in the matters that should go before the Full Court, that is heavily relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners states that the Full Court shall decide about the Constitution and abolition of Courts.

29.In this case, admittedly the issue is not the construction / abolition of Courts.

30.At this juncture, it is relevant to take note of the aforesaid Full Court decision relating to constitution of Administrative Committees and more particularly, the constitution of Administrative Committee No.4, which reads as follows:

"Administrative Committee No.4 (In regard to Constitution, Establishment, Abolition, Continuance and Revision of Jurisdiction of Civil, Criminal and other Courts, Strength of Staff of each Court and changes thereof).

5 Hon'ble Judges to be nominated by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice."

That is, the Administrative Committee No.4 shall decide about the Constitution, establishment, abolition and continuance and revision of jurisdiction of civil, criminal and other Courts, strength of staff of each Courts and changes there of. Five Honourable Judges have to be nominated as the members of the Administrative Committee No.4 by the Honourable Chief Justice, as per the resolution taken by the Full Court in its meetings held on 12.07.1993 and 19.07.1993.

31.That is, while the Full Court resolution provides that for constitution and abolition of Courts, approval of Full Court on the decision of Administrative Committee No.4 is a must, for redistribution of jurisdiction of Civil Courts, the decision of the Administrative Committee No.4 is sufficient.

32.As per the resolution of the Full Court, in certain matters, the decision of the Administrative Committee shall be placed before the Full Court. That is, the Administrative Committee No.4 that could decide on the constitution and abolition of the Courts shall place its decision before the Full Court for deliberations. But no such provision is made as far as revision of jurisdiction of Civil Courts is concerned. Hence, in the case of revision of jurisdiction of Civil Courts, the matter shall be decided by the Administrative Committee.

33.The resolution of the Full Court in its meeting held on 12.07.1993 and 19.07.1993 came up for consideration by the Full Bench of this Court in the judgment in T.S.SANKARANARAYANAN's case (cited supra), wherein, the Full Bench of this Court, after considering various decisions on the subject, has held that the Full Court can frame rules under Article 235 of the Constitution of India or it may also pass a resolution like in this case, to set out the matters that should be placed before the Full Court and the matters that could be decided by the Committee of Judges and the matters that could be decided by the Honourable Chief Justice. The Full Bench has referred to the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH VS. BATUK DEO PATIL TRIPATHI AND ANOTHER [1978 (3) S.C.R. 131] wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has upheld the compulsory retirement of a Subordinate Judge, by the Administrative Committee, taking note of the fact that the Full Court authorised the Administrative Committee to decide such matters. In this regard, para 26 of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in T.S.SANKARANARAYANAN's case (cited supra) is extracted hereunder:

"26. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal by special Leave and affirmed the minority judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. In the said judgment the apex Court has held thus:-

Yet another misconception may now be cleared. It is urged on behalf of the respondent by his learned counsel Shri Misra that under Article 216, 'High Court' means the entire body of Judges appointed to the Court and therefore, the control over the subordinate judiciary which is vested by Article 235 in the High Court must be exercised by the whole body of Judges. The thrust of the argument is that the High Court cannot delegate its functions or power to a Judge or a smaller body of Judges of the Court. This argument requires consideration of the question whether any delegation as such is involved in the process whereby a Judge or a Committee of Judges of the court, like the Administrative Committee in the instant case, is authorised by the whole court to act on behalf of the court.

For answering this question it is necessary in the first place to bear in mind that the power of control over the subordinate courts which is vested in the High Court comprises such numerous matters, often involving consideration of details of the minutest nature, that if the whole High Court is required to consider every one of those matters, the exercise of control instead of becoming effective will tend to cause delay and confusion in the administration of justice in the State. A construction which will frustrate the very object of the salient provisions contained in Article 235 ought, as far as possible, to be avoided. The control vested in the High Courts by that Article comprehends, according to our decisions, a large variety of matters like transfers, subsequent posting, leave, promotions other than initial promotions, imposition of minor penalties which do not fall within Article 311, decisions regarding compulsory retirements, recommendations for imposition of major penalties which fall within Article 311, entries in character rolls and so forth. If every Judge is to be associated personally and directly with the decision on every one of these matters, several important matter pertaining to the High Court's administrative affairs will pile into arrears like court arrears. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the control will be better and more effectively exercised if a smaller committee of Judges has the authority of the court to consider the manifold matters falling within the purview of Article 235. Bearing in mind therefore the nature of the power which that article confers on the High Courts, we are of the opinion that it is wrong to characterise as 'delegation' the process whereby the entire High Court authorises a Judge or some of the Judges of the Court to act on behalf of the whole Court. Such an authorisation effectuates the purpose of Article 235 and indeed without it the control vested in the High Court over the subordinate courts will tend gradually to become Tax and ineffective. Administrative functions are only a part, though an important part, of the High Courts' constitutional functions. Judicial functions, ought to occupy and do in fact consume the best part of Judge's time. For balancing these two fold functions it is inevitable that the administrative duties should be left to be discharged by some on behalf of all the Judges. Judicial functions brooke no such sharing of responsibilities by any instrumentality.

..........

We have pointed out above that the amplitude of the power conferred by Article 235, the imperative need that the High Courts must be enabled to transact their administrative business more conveniently and on awareness of the realities of the situation, particularly of the practical difficulties involved in a consideration by the whole court, even by circulation, of every day to day matter pertaining to control over the District and subordinate Courts, lead to the conclusion that by rules framed under Article 235 of the Constitution the High Court ought to be conceded the power to authorise an Administrative Judge or an Administrative Committee of Judges to act on behalf of the Court. Accordingly, we uphold the minority judgment of the Full Bench that Rule 1 of Chapter III of the 1952 Rules framed by the Allahabad High Court is within the framework of Article 235. The recommendation made by the Administrative Committee that the respondent should be compulsorily retired cannot therefore be said to suffer from any legal or constitutional infirmity." (Italics supplied)"

34.The Full Bench of this Court has also considered the other judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court namely THE REGISTRAR, HIGH COURT OF MADRAS VS. R.RAJIAH [AIR 1988 SC 1386] and held that the incidental observation of the Supreme Court in R.Rajiah's case (cited supra) that the Honourable Chief Justice can appoint a Review Committee or Administrative Committee, cannot be understood as overruling the categorical pronouncement of the Constitution Bench that the Honourable Chief Justice, shall be authorised in this regard by the Full Court. In this regard, paras 28 and 29 of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in T.S.SANKARANARAYANAN's case (cited supra) are extracted hereunder:

"28. The Supreme Court in the case of The Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rajiah, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1386, in paragraph 23, has stated thus:-

"In regard to the case of the other respondent, namely, K. Rajeswaran, the High Court took the view that the constitution of the Review Committee by the Chief Justice and not by the Full Court was illegal. We are unable to accept the view of the High Court. We fail to understand why the Chief Justice cannot appoint a Review Committee or an Administrative Committee. But in one respect the High Court is, in our opinion, correct, namely, that the decision of the Review Committee should have been placed before a meeting of the Judges. In the case of the respondent, K. Rajeswaran, the decision and recommendation of the Review Committee was not placed before the Full Court meeting. Nor is there any material to show that the same was circulated to the Judges. In that sense, the recommendation of the Review Committee was not strictly legal."

In the said Judgment the Supreme Court has referred to the Constitution Bench Judgment in Tripathi's case, 1978 (3) S.C.R.131. While dealing on the facts and circumstances of the case on merits, the Supreme Court incidentally observed, "We fail to understand why the Chief Justice cannot appoint a Review Committee or an Administrative Committee."

29.The Division Bench of this Court in Sankaranarayanan's case, 1994 W.L.R. 484 the very respondent herein, in paragraph 11, referring to Rajiah's case, , has stated thus:-

"We have taken pains to show that the very question that is argued before us was in fact, posed by the Constitution Bench for decision and they have rendered a decision. If one makes a reference to the portions underlined by us in the passages quoted from the above said Supreme Court judgment, one can easily deduce that a smaller body of judges can be appointed only by the Full Court and not by the Chief Justice alone. It is in this context that we have to see whether the observations of the Supreme Court in Rajiah's case, , could be understood as overruling the above categorical interpretation, and exposition of the matter in which the smaller body of Judges should be appointed, by the Constitution Bench in Tripathy's case. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the latter judgment of the Supreme Court presided over by two Hon'ble Judges in Rajiah's case, did not over rule the said proposition, distinctly laid down by the Constitution Bench. One other circumstance which impels us to take the above decision is provided by another judgment of the Supreme Court in Krishna Kumar v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 SC 1782."

and we are in agreement with the same......... "

35.Applying the said principles, the Full Bench in T.S.SANKARANARAYANAN's case (cited supra), while dealing with the validity of the charge memo issued by the Administrative Committee, has held that the Administrative Committee constituted by the Honourable Chief Justice, as per the resolution taken by the Full Court in its meetings held on dated 12.07.1993 and 19.07.1993 is in terms of the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in TRIPATHI'S case (cited supra). In this regard, para 27 of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in T.S.SANKARANARAYANAN's case (cited supra) is extracted hereunder:

"27. In Tripathi's case, aforementioned decided by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, we see,

(i)The main question for consideration was whether a District Judge can be compulsorily retired from service on the opinion recorded by the administrative committee constituted under Rule 1 of Chapter III of the Rules of the Court, and this question was answered in the affirmative;

(ii)since the control over the subordinate Courts is vested institutionally in the High Courts by Article 235, the High Court, has therefore, the power under Article 235 itself to frame rules for regulating the manner in which the control vested in it may be exercised;'

(iii)No delegation as such is involved in the process whereby a Judge or committee of Judges of the Court, like the administrative committee is authorised by the whole court to act on behalf of it. The power of control over subordinate courts vested in the High Court comprises of numerous matters often involving consideration of minute details. If the whole High Court is required to consider every one of those matters the exercise of control instead of becoming effective will tend to cause delay and confusion in the administration of justice in the State. If every Judge is to be associated personally and directly with every one of the matters like transfers, subsequent postings, leave, promotions other than initial promotions, imposition of minor penalties which do not fall within Article 311, decisions regarding compulsory retirement, recommendations for imposition of major penalties which fall within Article 311, entries in character rules and so forth, several important matters pertaining to the High Court's administrative affairs will pile into arrears like court arrears. In fact the control will be better and more effectively exercised if a smaller committee of Judges has the authority of the Court to consider the manifold matters falling within the purview of Article 235. For balancing the two-fold functions, administrative and judicial, it is inevitable that the administrative duties should be left to be discharged by some on behalf of the Judges."

36.While applying the aforesaid principles and ratio laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in T.S.SANKARANARAYANAN's case (cited supra), I am of the considered view that the Administrative Committee No.4, that is constituted by the Honourable Chief Justice, is competent to decide about the revision of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. But the second respondent himself admitted that that issue was not decided by the Administrative Committee No.4 and on the other hand, the same was decided by the then Honourable Acting Chief Justice and the Portfolio Judge. Hence, the decision of redistribution of jurisdiction was not done in accordance with the resolution taken by the Full Court in its meetings held on 12.07.1993 and 19.07.1993 and the same is opposed to and in violation of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in T.S.Sankaranarayanan's case (cited supra). Therefore, the impugned notification is liable to be set aside. However, I am of the view that the same could not cause inconvenience to the litigant public of Mandapam Firka, who are now having the benefit of the Munsif Court at Rameswaram, pursuant to the impugned notification and therefore, status-quo shall be maintained until the matter is decided by the Administrative Committee No.4, as otherwise, the litigant public will be put to great loss.

37.In these circumstances, the second respondent Registrar General is directed to place the matter before the Honourable Chief Justice for appropriate orders for placing the matter relating to realignment of jurisdiction of Munsif Court at Rameswaram before the Administrative Committee No.4 as expeditiously as possible for its decision, and in any event, not later than thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the meantime, as stated above, status quo shall continue and the Mandapam Firka people shall approach the District Munsif Court, Rameswaram, till the decision is taken one way or other, by the Administrative Committee No.4.

38.The writ petition is disposed of with the above observation and direction. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.

22.12.2011 Index : Yes Internet : Yes TK To

1.The Secretary to the Government Government of Tamil Nadu Law Department Fort St. George, Chennai 600 009.

2.The Registrar General High Court of Judicature at Madras High Court Buildings I Floor, Chennai 600 104.

3.The District Collector Ramanathapuram District, Ramanathapuram.

D.HARIPARANTHAMAN, J.

TK W.P.NO.1643 OF 2011 22.12.2011

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