Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
(Partha Ghosh vs Manish Jain on 23 May, 2025
Author: Kausik Chanda
Bench: Kausik Chanda
2025:CHC-AS:964
23.05.2025
Sl. No. 1
Ct. No.15
Suman
CRLCP 9 of 2025
The Court on its own Motion :
Re: Arunangshu Chakraborty
in
WPCRC 206 of 2023
in
WPA 22027 of 2022
Mr. Arunangshu Chakraborty
...alleged contemnor (In person)
Mr. Kishore Datta
....learned Advocate General
This Court initiated a proceeding under Section 14 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, against the contemnor, Mr.
Arunangshu Chakraborty, an advocate.
After hearing Mr. Chakraborty and the learned Advocate
General, I am of the view that the charges against Mr. Chakraborty
have been proved. I hold him guilty of the offence punishable under
Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and accordingly, I
sentence him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of four
days.
The facts leading to the punishment of Mr. Chakraborty must be
narrated from December 2, 2022, when a Division Bench of this
Court, in a contempt proceeding relating to the retirement age of an
"Accompanist" teacher of Rabindra Bharati University, made the
following observations against Mr. Chakraborty and the then
Registrar of Rabindra Bharati University:
"We are unable to accept the submission of Mr.
Chakraborty that the alleged contemnors are not duty
bound to obey the direction passed by this court since
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the Special Leave Petition was dismissed in limini. It was
the clear stand of Mr. Chakraborty that by reason of
dismissal of the Special Leave Petition, there is no
automatic affirmation of our order of which an
implementation has been sought for in the contempt
proceeding. In other words, the contention of the alleged
contemnors is despite dismissal of Special Leave Petition
and Review Petition by the Apex Court, the order of this
court does not attain finality and not required to be
implemented.
...
It was least expected from Mr. Chakraborty,
learned advocate representing the alleged contemnors to
advice the alleged contemnors not to comply with our
order, as such advice runs 3 counter to the basic tenets
of law. The majesty of law has suffered to which we
cannot turn our blind eyes. The order of the court has to
be obeyed and respected.
...
We hold that the alleged contemnors have violated
the order passed by us on December 15, 2020. However,
such violation may not be willful or deliberate, as we hold
that they have proceeded on the basis of the legal advice
detrimental to their interest and to their peril.
With a word of caution, we dispose of the contempt
application with the aforesaid directions. We record our
appreciation for the assistance of Mr. Soumendra Nath
Mookherjee, Senior Advocate, in deciding the
application."
(emphasis added)
This Court has been informed that the said Registrar has also
been dismissed from his service about a year ago by the University.
The Division Bench has been proved to be prophetic.
Mr. Chakraborty appeared before this Court in a contempt rule
hearing against the said Registrar in another matter (WPCRC 206 of
2023), relating to the retirement age of another "Accompanist"
teacher of the said University. This time also Mr. Chakraborty
represented the Registrar of the University.
In the course of the hearing of the contempt rule issued against
the Registrar of the University, the University filed an affidavit on
April 30, 2024, disclosing the following Facebook posts allegedly
made by Mr. Chakraborty:
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"1. Shubhra Kamal Should Chain His Goat Other
Wise His Goat May face Contempt. His Goat Thinks He Is
Above Constitution.
2. Justice Kaushik Chanda In Contempt
Proceedings Passing One After Another Illegal Order And
Also Threatening Advocate With Contempt Rule. Not
Afraid.
3. Tresspasser Shubhra Kamal May Educate His
BJP Poster Boy By Telling Executive Council Have No
Role In Court Cases Involving University.
4. Shubra Kamal And His Bafoon Junior Not Aware
That Availing Legal Remedy Aagainst Unfavourable Order
is Not Contempt.
5. Ex Chief Justice Gogoi Asked Subra Kamal's
Chamber Junior Why Want Elevation When You Erning
Huge From Central Government.
6. Shubhra Kamal Should Educate His Junior First
To Learn Contempt Act And Scope And Ambit Of Article
215. His Conduct is Itself Contumacious.
7. In Order To Inform The Society The Conduct Of
Justice Kaushik Chanda I Recorded Entire Abusive
Language He Made Against Advocate In Open Court.
8. Subra Kamal and his former junior enacted a
cheap drama in the name of contempt proceedings."
Mr. Chakraborty appeared online before this Court on April 30,
2024. In the order dated April 30, 2024, this Court observed that Mr.
Chakraborty made a mockery of the Court through his disrespectful
gestures and demeanour. Mr. Chakraborty was asked to personally
file an affidavit in response to the affidavits filed by the University,
clarifying his position.
When the matter was taken up for further hearing on May 10,
2024, Mr. Chakraborty filed his affidavit. He did not deny that the
aforesaid Facebook posts were made by him. On the contrary, he
questioned the jurisdiction of this Court in the following manner:
"4. The direction upon me in exercising
contempt jurisdiction by this Hon'ble Court to file
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affidavit regarding Face book Posting is without
jurisdiction on the sole ground that in exercising
contempt jurisdiction Court cannot club any
contumacious act, if any, of third party having no
relation to the instant case. If this Court feels Face
Book Posting is Contumacious court may initiate
separate proceeding in accordance with law."
From his affidavit, it further appeared for the first time before
the Court that he had surreptitiously, without taking permission from
this Court, recorded the proceedings of this Court.
This Court, in the said order dated May 10, 2024, prima facie
formed the opinion that Mr. Chakraborty, by such unauthorized
recording and disrespectful conduct towards this Court, had
committed contempt in the face of the Court. This Court expressed its
intent to proceed against Mr. Chakraborty under Section 14 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, by framing a formal charge on the
next date of hearing.
Thereafter, Mr. Chakraborty filed an application (CAN 1 of 2024)
seeking transfer of the contempt proceedings under Section 14 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, to another Hon'ble Judge of this
Court, invoking the ground of apprehended bias. This Court, by an
order dated April 22, 2025, rejected the said application and fixed
April 24, 2025, for framing the charges against Mr. Chakraborty.
On April 24, 2025, the Court framed the following charges
against Mr. Chakraborty and a suo motu contempt rule was issued
against him, intimating the charges as framed above to afford him an
opportunity to make his defence:
"That you, without taking permission from the
Court has surreptitiously recorded the proceedings
of this Court during hearing of a contempt
proceeding registered under WPCRC 206 of 2023
(Partha Ghosh -vs- Manish Jain, the Principal
Secretary, Department of Higher Education).
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2025:CHC-AS:964
Secondly, on April 30, 2024, when you appeared
through online in that matter, not only admitted to
recording of the proceedings of this Court but also
attempted to intimidate this Court by stating that
you had submitted the recording to the President of
India and the Chief Justice of India. You also
demonstrated the disrespectful gestures and
demeanour to this Court.
By your aforesaid conduct, you attempted to
undermine the authority of the Court and obstruct
the administration of justice. By your aforesaid
conduct, you have committed contempt of this
Court under Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971, an offence punishable under Section 12
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971."
When the matter was taken up for further hearing on May 22,
2025, Mr. Kishore Dutta, learned Advocate General, appeared in the
matter, and the hearing was adjourned till today.
Today, Mr. Kishore Dutta, learned Advocate General, has
submitted that the alleged act of the contemnor definitely constitutes
contempt of this Court, particularly when his act is coupled with an
attempt to defy the authority of the Court. He also submitted that he
had failed to persuade the contemnor to pray for an unconditional
apology to this Court. The learned Advocate General further
submitted that contempt under Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971, is not only an attack on the Judge concerned personally
but is also an attack on the institution itself.
This Court renders its sincere thanks to the learned Advocate
General for his assistance.
Mr. Chakraborty was afforded an opportunity of hearing to
defend himself. He has filed his affidavit today. He also made his oral
submissions for almost the entire first half of the day and cited the
following judgments in support of his arguments:
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2025:CHC-AS:964
Sl. No. Judgments Citation
1. S. Manisha Mukherjee v. 1985 Cri LJ 1224
Asoke Chaterjee
2. Shri Harish Chandra AIR 1986 Pat 65 (FB)
Mishra v. The Hon'ble
Mr. Justice S. Ali Ahmed
3. Arthur Branwell & (1993) 2 Cal LJ 182
Company Limited v.
Indian Fibers Limited
4. Supreme Court Bar (1998) 4 SCC 409
Association v. Union of
India
5. Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi (2001) 7 SCC530
Gulati
6. T. Sudhakar Prasad v. (2001) 1 SCC 516
Govt. Of A.P.
7. Pallavi Sheth v. (2001) 7 SCC 549
Custodian
8. Leila David v. State of (2009) 10 SCC 337
Maharashtra
9. Swapnil Tripathi v. (2018) 10 SCC 639
Supreme Court of India
10. Chhitij Kishore Sharma 2018 (2) U.D., 299
v. Mr. Justice Lok Pal
Singh
11. Chief Election (2021) 9 SCC 770
Commissioner of India v.
M.R. Vijayabhaskar
12. Mehmood Parcha v. (2023) 16 SCC 90
Central Administrative
Tribunal
13. Gostho Behari Das v. 2023 SCC OnLine SC
Dipak Kumar Sanyal 889
14. Admiral D.K Joshi, the Civil Appeal No. 5014
Hon'ble Lieutinant of 2023
Governor, Andaman and
Nicobar Islands v.
Andaman Sarvajanik
Nirman Vibhag Mazdoor
Sangh
15. State of Uttar Pradesh v. (2024) 3 SCC 1
Association of Retired
Supreme Court and High
Court Judges at
Allahabad
16. S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. 2024 SCC OnLine SC
Lingamaiah 1764
17. Wikimedia Foundation 2025 SCC OnLine SC
INC v. ANI Media Private 1115
Limited
7
2025:CHC-AS:964
Significantly, there is not even a single line in his said affidavit
filed today tendering any apology for his alleged contumacious acts.
Mr. Chakraborty does not deny the first charge. He only denies
the second charge by submitting that he never demonstrated any
disrespectful demeanour toward this Court. It is argued that
recording of court proceedings cannot be a contemptuous act. He has
further submitted that he forwarded the recordings to the Chief
Justice and the President of India in accordance with the report of the
"Committee on In-House Procedure" as adopted by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court.
It is further argued that court proceedings are conducted in an
open court and, nowadays, proceedings are even livestreamed.
Therefore, if anyone records court proceedings, no exception can be
taken.
It is further submitted that the present proceeding is barred by
limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
In support of his submissions, Mr. Chakraborty has relied upon
the judgments set out above.
Before delving into the merits of the defence as offered by Mr.
Chakraborty, to appreciate the scope and spirit of Section 14 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, I would like to quote the relevant
paragraphs from the judgment of the Supreme Court reported at
(2020) 16 SCC 687 (National Lawyers Campaign for Judicial
Transparency & Reforms v. Union of India).
"11. When contempt is committed in the face of the Court,
the Judges' hands are not tied behind their backs. The majesty
of this Court as well as the administration of justice both
demand that contemptuous behaviour of this kind be dealt with
sternly. An early judgment of this Court in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi
v. S. Teja Singh [Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. S. Teja Singh, (1953) 2
8
2025:CHC-AS:964
SCC 571 : 1954 SCR 454 : AIR 1954 SC 186 : 1954 Cri LJ 460]
proceeded cautiously, but made it clear that where a Judge is
personally attacked, it would be proper for the Judge to deal
with the matter himself, in cases of contempt in the face of the
Court. This Court stated the law thus: (SCR pp. 464-65: AIR p.
190, para 26)
"26. We wish, however, to add that though we have
no power to order a transfer in an original petition of this
kind we consider it desirable on general principles of
justice that a Judge who has been personally attacked
should not as far as possible hear a contempt matter
which, to that extent, concerns him personally. It is
otherwise when the attack is not directed against him
personally. We do not lay down any general rule because
there may be cases where that is impossible, as for
example in a court where there is only one Judge or two
and both are attacked. Other cases may also arise where it
is more convenient and proper for the Judge to deal with the
matter himself, as for example in a contempt 'in facie
curiae'.
All we can say is that this must be left to the good
sense of the Judges themselves who, we are confident, will
comfort themselves with that dispassionate dignity and
decorum which befits their high office and will bear in
mind the oft quoted maxim that justice must not only be
done but must be seen to be done by all concerned and
most particularly by an accused person who should always
be given, as far as that is humanly possible, a feeling of
confidence that he will receive a fair, just and impartial
trial by Judges who have no personal interest or concern in
his case."
(emphasis supplied)
12. In Leila David v. State of Maharashtra [Leila David v.
State of Maharashtra, (2009) 4 SCC 578 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri)
530] , two learned Judges differed on whether contempt in the
face of the Court can be dealt with summarily, without any need
of issuing notice to the contemnors, and whether punishment
can be inflicted upon them there and then. Pasayat, J. held that
this is, indeed, the duty of the Court. Ganguly, J. differed. A
three-Judge Bench of this Court, in Leila David (6) v. State of
Maharashtra [Leila David (6) v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 10
SCC 337 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 311] , settled the law, making it
clear that Pasayat, J.'s view was the correct view in law. This
Court held: [Leila David (6) case [Leila David (6) v. State of
Maharashtra, (2009) 10 SCC 337 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 311] , SCC
pp. 345-46, paras 28-30 & 35]
"28. As far as the suo motu proceedings for contempt
are concerned, we are of the view that Arijit Pasayat, J.
was well within his jurisdiction in passing a summary order, having regard to the provisions of Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution of India. Although, Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, lays down the procedure to be followed in cases of criminal contempt in 9 2025:CHC-AS:964 the face of the court, it does not preclude the court from taking recourse to summary proceedings when a deliberate and wilful contumacious incident takes place in front of their eyes and the public at large, including Senior Law Officers, such as the Attorney General for India who was then the Solicitor General of India.
29. While, as pointed out by Ganguly, J., it is a statutory requirement and a salutary principle that a person should not be condemned unheard, particularly in a case relating to contempt of court involving a summary procedure, and should be given an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him/her, there are exceptional circumstances in which such a procedure may be discarded as being redundant.
30. The incident which took place in the courtroom presided over by Pasayat, J. was within the confines of the courtroom and was witnessed by a large number of people and the throwing of the footwear was also admitted by Dr Sarita Parikh, who without expressing any regret for her conduct stood by what she had done and was supported by the other contemnors. In the light of such admission, the summary procedure followed by Pasayat, J. cannot be faulted.
* * *
35. Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act no doubt contemplates issuance of notice and an opportunity to the contemnors to answer the charges in the notice to satisfy the principles of natural justice. However, where an incident of the instant nature takes place within the presence and sight of the learned Judges, the same amounts to contempt in the face of the Court and is required to be dealt with at the time of the incident itself. This is necessary for the dignity and majesty of the courts to be maintained. When an object, such as a footwear, is thrown at the Presiding Officer in a court proceeding, the object is not to merely scandalise or humiliate the Judge, but to scandalise the institution itself and thereby lower its dignity in the eyes of the public."
13.Leila David (6) [Leila David (6) v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 10 SCC 337 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 311] has been followed in Ram Niranjan Roy v. State of Bihar [Ram Niranjan Roy v. State of Bihar, (2014) 12 SCC 11 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 623] thus: (Ram Niranjan Roy case [Ram Niranjan Roy v. State of Bihar, (2014) 12 SCC 11 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 623] , SCC pp. 19-20, para 16) "16. Thus, when contempt is committed in the face of the High Court or the Supreme Court to scandalise or humiliate the Judge, instant action may be necessary. If the courts do not deal with such contempt with strong hand, that may result in scandalising the institution thereby lowering its dignity in the eyes of the public. The courts exist for the people. The courts cherish the faith reposed in them by people. To prevent erosion of that faith, contempt committed in the face of the court need a 10 2025:CHC-AS:964 strict treatment. The appellant, as observed by the High Court was not remorseful. He did not file any affidavit tendering apology nor did he orally tell the High Court that he was remorseful and he wanted to tender apology. Even in this Court he has not tendered apology. Therefore, since the contempt was gross and it was committed in the face of the High Court, the learned Judges had to take immediate action to maintain honour and dignity of the High Court. There was no question of giving the appellant any opportunity to make his defence. This submission of the appellant must, therefore, be rejected."
Mr. Chakraborty does not deny the charge of recording the court proceedings. He could not have denied it either. In his affidavit filed before this Court on May 10, 2024, he overtly asserts that he recorded the court proceedings and submitted the same to the "Chief Justice." In his Facebook postings as mentioned above, he also openly stated that he had recorded the court proceedings. I have already noted that in his affidavit filed on May 10, 2024, he did not deny that the Facebook postings were made by him. There is no further need to probe into the first charge framed against him.
There is no dispute that proceedings before the courts are normally conducted in open court to ensure accountability and transparency. This, however, does not mean that the obligation of the court to administer justice in open court permits anyone to record the court proceedings surreptitiously without permission. In this case, Mr. Chakraborty recorded the proceedings with ill intent and ulterior motive, which is evident from his subsequent actions following the recording. His motive was to interfere with the administration of justice.
112025:CHC-AS:964 The issue of unauthorised recording of court proceedings was dealt with by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the following words:
"46. However, before parting with the judgment, we must record our deep concern about one grave and disturbing feature. The hearing of this appeal had taken place on 1-3-1995 and it was heard from 2.45 p.m. to 4.45 p.m. and was kept for further hearing on 2-3-1995. On that day, at 4.00 p.m. Mr. N.D. Nanavati, learned Government Pleader had come to the Court on having received some information from his learned friend that Mr. Padival was tape-recording the proceedings. He raised his objection to the same since it was being done without the knowledge and permission of the Court. We asked Mr. Padival whether he was doing so and he stated that he had been recording the proceedings and that he had done so even before the learned single Judge. We inquired whether he has taken anybody's permission and he stated that he had not taken permission from anybody, neither from this Court nor from any other court. When we asked him the purpose for which he was tape-recording, he gave a reply that it was being recorded for the pleasure of enjoying his voice. When we inquired whether he had in the past tape-recorded such proceedings in any other court or in any case, he stated that he had done it only in this case. On the objection being raised, he immediately stopped the recording and sent away the tape-recorder. Though the court proceedings are open to public, the court proceedings are within the control and regulation of the Presiding Judge and if anyone wants to undertake this kind of tape- recording, he cannot do that without seeking the permission of the court and without disclosing the legitimate purpose for which the recording is made. There are serious dangers and potential mischiefs in secret tape-recording of the court proceedings. Since such tape-recording are easily manipulable and capable of being abused. If there is a legitimate purpose, the person can certainly make a written request to the Court disclosing the purpose and satisfying the Court about its legitimacy and the Court can take appropriate safeguard if the permission is to be granted. An safeguard can be that the master copy of the tape may be retained with the Court so as to prevent any tampering of manipulation. If the Court is not satisfied about the legitimacy and reasonableness of the request, the Court may reject that request. If after the Court refuses the permission or apprehending that the Court is likely to refuse permission, secret tape-recording is done, it is a serious breach of the Court discipline which would be fraught with many dangers to the administration of justice and 12 2025:CHC-AS:964 may amount to undue interference in the course of the proceedings of the Court and administration of justice. Since the High Court on the administrative side is a respondent in this matter, we in judicial self-restraint, leave this issue at this stage by expressing our strong disapproval to this kind of tape-recording in Court without the knowledge and permission of the Court."
In view of the above, it must be held that the said act of Mr. Chakraborty has constituted a contempt of this Court on its face.
With regard to the second charge, it is necessary to reproduce Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:
"14. Procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court.--(1) When it is alleged, or appears to the Supreme Court or the High Court upon its own view, that a person has been guilty of contempt committed in its presence or hearing, the Court may cause such person to be detained in custody, and, at any time before the rising of the Court, on the same day, or as early as possible thereafter, shall--
(a) cause him to be informed in writing of the contempt with which he is charged;
(b) afford him an opportunity to make his defence to the charge;
(c) after taking such evidence as may be necessary or as may be offered by such person and after hearing him, proceed, either forthwith or after adjournment, to determine the matter of the charge; and
(d) make such order for the punishment or discharge of such person as may be just.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where a person charged with contempt under that sub-section applies, whether orally or in writing, to have the charge against him tried by some Judge other than the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed, and the Court is of opinion that it is practicable to do so and that in the interests of proper administration of justice the application should be allowed, it shall cause the matter to be placed, together with a statement of the facts of the case, before the Chief Justice for such directions as he may think fit to issue as respects the trial thereof. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, in any trial of a person charged with contempt under sub-section (1) which is held, in pursuance of a direction given under sub-
section (2), by a Judge other than the Judge or Judges in 13 2025:CHC-AS:964 whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed, it shall not be necessary for the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed to appear as a witness and the statement placed before the Chief Justice under sub-section (2) shall be treated as evidence in the case.
(4) Pending the determination of the charge, the Court may direct that a person charged with contempt under this section shall be detained in such custody as it may specify :
Provided that he shall be released on bail, if a bond for such sum of money as the Court thinks sufficient is executed with or without sureties conditioned that the person charged shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond and shall continue to so attend until otherwise directed by the Court :
Provided further that the Court may, if it thinks fit, instead of taking bail from such person, discharge him on his executing a bond without sureties for his attendance as aforesaid."
A plain reading of the said section reveals that a Judge's statement is treated as evidence in a trial conducted under the direction of sub-section (2). When the Judge personally tries the contemnor and has witnessed the contemnor's conduct, it is not always necessary for the allegations to be corroborated by additional evidence.
It is evident that the gesture and demeanour of Mr. Chakraborty were already recorded by this Court in the orders dated April 30, 2024, and May 10, 2024. His gesture and demeanour were also witnessed by two designated senior advocates of this Court, Mr. Piush Chaturvedi and Mr. Soumya Majumder, who appeared in the matter on behalf of the writ petitioner and the University, respectively, on the said date. Mr. Chakraborty and Mr. Majumder are both present before this Court today. It is not necessary to record in detail the gestures and demeanour displayed by Mr. Chakraborty when he appeared online on April 30, 2024. Suffice it to say that this Court, 14 2025:CHC-AS:964 on that date, duly noted the demeanour and gestures, by which he ridiculed this Court and attempted to subvert its authority.
Accordingly, I hold that the second charge against Mr. Chakraborty has also been proved.
To deal with Mr. Chakraborty's submission regarding limitation, it has already been noted that this Court observed the disrespectful behaviour of Mr. Chakraborty on April 30, 2024. This Court came to know about his unauthorised recording of court proceedings on May 10, 2024. The rule in this case was issued on April 24, 2025. Therefore, there is no substance in Mr. Chakraborty's submission that the present proceeding has been initiated beyond the stipulated period of one year as prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
There can be no quarrel with the propositions of law laid down in the judgments cited by Mr. Chakraborty. I, however, find no relevance of those judgments to the facts of the present case, as narrated above.
Before I part, I feel it necessary to place on record the conduct of Mr. Chakraborty, as noted by another Hon'ble Judge of this Court.
"The conduct of Mr. Chakraborty has always been aggressive bordering on rudeness, unnecessarily argumentative and disrespectful to the Court. Ironically, if any humiliation is caused by such behaviour, it has been caused to this Court and not to Mr. Chakraborty. The submissions made are mostly provocative in nature, unrelated to the matter at hand and lowers the dignity of the Court. Mr. Chakraborty's conduct has also been deprecated by his colleagues at the Bar. It is unfortunate that Mr. Chakraborty has lowered the high standards which are maintained by the Bar in this Court.
...........
It is unfortunate that a matter which could have simply been resolved by filing the original order with the red-markings, has instead been escalated to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court and the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India. It is also significant that the Affidavit filed by Mr. Chakraborty does not 15 2025:CHC-AS:964 contain any statement as to the status of original order with the red-markings. If the order was not available with Mr. Chakraborty, the said fact could simply have been stated and the matter would have been closed at that. This is certainly not the way a matter should be proceeded with for the true dissemination of justice. In casting aspersions on the Court for reasons best known to him, Mr. Chakraborty has done significant disservice not only to his client but also to the tradition of co-operation and assistance between the Bar and the Bench."
I have already noted the observations of the Division Bench against him at the start of this judgment.
Unfortunately, Mr. Chakraborty did not bother to internalise the lessons. This time, I have imposed a symbolic punishment upon Mr. Chakraborty with the expectation that he will henceforth conduct himself in a manner befitting the dignity and integrity of a member of the Bar, and that in pursuing his avocation as a lawyer, he will always show due respect towards Judges and the justice delivery system as a whole, as is expected of a member of the Bar.
Let the Sheriff take custody of Mr. Chakraborty to implement this order. He will be provided with the due medical care by the concerned authority.
Accordingly, CRLCP 9 of 2025 is disposed of. All parties shall act on the server copy of this order duly downloaded from the official website of this Court.
(Kausik Chanda, J.)