Telangana High Court
Smt.K.Manjusree,Rr Dist vs H.C.Of Ap,Registrarvgl,Hyd,Anot on 4 December, 2018
Author: V.Ramasubramanian
Bench: V Ramasubramanian
* HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN
AND
HON'BLE Ms. JUSTICE J.UMA DEVI
+ Writ Petition No.19807 of 2013
% Date: 04-12-2018
# Smt. K.Manjusree W/o Krishna Murthy, Aged 55 years,
Occ: Former District and Sessions Judge,
R/o Plot No.122A, C.S.R. Residency, M.L.A. Colony,
Road No.12, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad-500 034
... Petitioner
Vs.
$ 1. The High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad
for the State of Telangana and the State of A.P.,
Rep. by its Registrar (Vigilance), Hyderabad
2. The State of A.P. & State of Telangana,
Rep. by its Chief Secretaries,
Secretariat, Hyderabad
... Respondents
! Counsel for Petitioner: Mr. D.V. Sitharam Murthy, Senior
Counsel, representing
Mr. K.Satyananarayana Murthy
Counsel for Respondents 1&2: Mr. S.Sri Ram, S.C. for High Court
< Gist:
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. AIR 1974 SC 2192
2. (1999) 2 SCC 21
3. (2002) 1 SCC 520
4. (200) 5 SCC 152
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W.P.No.19807 of 2013
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN
AND
HON'BLE Ms. JUSTICE J.UMA DEVI
Writ Petition No.19807 of 2013
Order: (per V.Ramasubramanian, J.)
Aggrieved by an order of discharge from probation,
a Judicial Officer has come up with the above writ petition.
2. Heard Mr. D.V. Sitharam Murthy, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the petitioner and Mr. S.Sri Ram, learned Standing
Counsel for the Registry.
3. As destiny would have it, the petitioner has been made to
play the role of a lawyer, the litigant and a Judge, alternatively in the
past more than a decade. After a prolonged legal battle on an issue
of principle as to whether a minimum qualifying mark can be
prescribed in the viva voce, when the notification did not stipulate so,
the petitioner was appointed as a District Judge (Entry Level) by the
method of direct recruitment on 24-10-2008. She was initially posted
as the III Additional District and Sessions Judge in Kadapa District.
From 01-12-2008 to 31-01-2009, she underwent basic judicial
training in the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Academy.
4. While working as II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge,
Hyderabad, the petitioner pronounced judgment in a criminal case in
S.C.No.310 of 2009 on 12-07-2010, finding two accused guilty of an
offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, but sentenced
both of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten
years. When the accused filed an appeal and sought enlargement
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W.P.No.19807 of 2013
on bail, a Division Bench of this Court directed the Registry by its
order dated 02-8-2010, to place the copy of the judgment before the
Administrative Committee. The order passed by the Division Bench
on 02-8-2010 in Crl.M.P.No.1386 of 2010 in Crl.A.No.905 of 2010
reads as follows:
"When the petitioner/2nd appellant is found guilty for the offence
punishable under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC, though minimum sentence
prescribed under Sec.302 IPC is death or imprisonment for life and also
fine, sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for a period of 10 years by
the II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad appears to be
in total ignorance of law.
We do not see any ground to enlarge the petitioner/ A-2 on bail.
The Registry is directed to place the judgment under appeal
before the Administrative Committee."
5. After discreet enquiries that revealed that the petitioner was
not dictating judgments, but having the judgments prepared through
her Personal Assistant, the High Court directed the explanation of
the petitioner to be called for. Accordingly, a Memo dated 12-8-2010
was issued calling upon the petitioner to offer an explanation both
about her judgment in S.C.No.310 of 2009 and about the allegation
that she was not dictating judgments. In fact, the Memo dated
12-8-2010 not merely called for an explanation from the petitioner
but also called upon the petitioner to send the shorthand note books
of the Personal Assistant, along with the draft orders/judgments
dictated on that date.
6. The petitioner submitted an explanation on 27-08-2010,
enclosing certain documents including the draft judgment in
S.C.No.310 of 2009.
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W.P.No.19807 of 2013
7. Thereafter, the petitioner was placed under suspension on
31-12-2010 and a charge memo was issued on 02-02-2011. The
petitioner submitted a written statement of defence on 24-3-2011.
Not satisfied with the written statement of defence, the High Court
ordered a regular departmental enquiry under Rule 20 of the Andhra
Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1991. A full-fledged enquiry followed and the Enquiry Officer
submitted a report on 28-12-2011.
8. But in the meantime, the cases of all officers who were
appointed directly along with the petitioner in October, 2008 by way
of direct recruitment and placed on probation, came up for
consideration on the administrative side, for confirmation of
probation. To enable the Hon'ble Committee of Judges to take a
decision, two judgments on the civil side and two judgments on the
criminal side of all the probationers were called for. After a perusal of
the same, the Administrative Committee of the High Court passed
a resolution on 13-02-2012 directing the declaration of successful
completion of probation of all others except the petitioner. By the
same resolution, the petitioner was directed to be discharged from
probation.
9. The resolution of the Administrative Committee was placed
before the Full Court. The Full Court by its resolution dated 27-02-
2012, approved the decision of the Administrative Committee. The
same was forwarded to the Government and thereafter the
Government passed G.O.Ms.No.56, Law Department, dated 07-6-
2013, discharging the petitioner from probation on payment of one
5 VRS, J & JUD, J
W.P.No.19807 of 2013
month's pay in lieu of one month's notice on the ground that she
could not successfully complete her probation. A consequential
order was issued by the High Court on 13-06-2013. It is against the
said order that the petitioner has come up with the above writ
petition.
10. As a matter of fact, before issuing G.O.Ms.No.56, dated
07-6-2013, the State Government sought a clarification from the
High Court, by the letter of the Law Secretary, dated 05-9-2012. One
of the two clarifications sought by the Government was as to
whether the proposed action of discharge of the officer from
probation in terms of Rule 11 of the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial
Service Rules, 2007 was an independent one or in continuation of
the disciplinary proceedings. By a reply dated 10-9-2012, the High
Court clarified to the Government that the recommendation
for the discharge of the petitioner from probation was an
independent one and not in continuation of the disciplinary
proceedings.
11. The main submissions of Mr. D.V. Seetharam Murthy,
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, are - (i) that the
petitioner is the 6th girl child among 7 girl children born to her
parents; (ii) that she is a gold medallist in LL.M.; (iii) that the charges
framed against her in the disciplinary proceedings formed the
foundation for the impugned order of discharge from probation; (iv)
that an order of discharge from probation, even if termed as a
discharge simpliciter without casting a stigma, will nonetheless be
punitive in nature, if charges were framed, enquiry conducted and
6 VRS, J & JUD, J
W.P.No.19807 of 2013
findings are recorded about the guilt of the delinquent; (v) that the
whole disciplinary proceedings proceeded on the basis of
statements made allegedly by the Personal Assistant, against whom
the petitioner had issued several Memos and who had therefore
become inimical to the petitioner; and (vi) that the mistake that
occurred in the judgment in S.C.No.310 of 2009, had already been
corrected in the draft judgment by the petitioner, but the same was
not carried out by the Personal Assistant, resulting in the Division
Bench of the High Court referring the matter to the Administrative
Committee and that all the hard work that the petitioner put in, had
been wiped out by the order of discharge passed after finding the
petitioner guilty of misconduct.
12. In response, it is contended by Mr. S. Sri Ram, learned
Standing Counsel for the Registry, that the charges framed in the
departmental enquiry never formed the foundation for the order of
discharge simpliciter and that the whole sequence of events that
happened on parallel lines would establish very clearly that the
impugned order of discharge was one passed simpliciter. In a lucid
manner, the learned Standing Counsel for the Registry explained as
to how without reference to the disciplinary proceedings, a note was
circulated to the Hon'ble Chief Justice on 15-12-2011 (even before
the Enquiry Officer submitted his report) for the declaration of
satisfactory completion of probation of the entire batch of officers to
which the petitioner belonged and as to how a decision was arrived
at by the Administrative Committee in its meeting held on 13-02-
2012. Relying upon the old adage that witnesses may lie but the
7 VRS, J & JUD, J
W.P.No.19807 of 2013
circumstances may not, the learned Standing Counsel for the
Registry pointed out that the disciplinary proceedings as well as the
action for confirmation of probation of all the officers of the batch,
proceeded on completely different planes. Therefore, the learned
Standing Counsel submitted that the petitioner cannot take
advantage of the disciplinary proceedings and project the same as
the foundation for a discharge simpliciter.
13. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner as well as
the learned Standing Counsel for the Registry relied upon several
decisions revolving around "motive" and "foundation". But all
decisions actually turned on the applicability of settled principles of
law to fact situations. Keeping this in mind, we shall first look at the
Rules.
14. Rule 9 (a) of the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service
Rules, 2007, prescribes that every person appointed to the category
of District Judges by direct recruitment, shall be on probation for a
period of two years from the date on which he joins duty. Clause (d)
of Rule 9 states that the period of probation or officiation may be
extended by the High Court by such period not exceeding the period
of probation.
15. Rule 10 speaks about declaration of satisfactory
completion of probation. Rule 11 speaks about discharge of
unsuitable probationers. Rule 11 reads as follows:
"11. Discharge of unsuitable probationers: If at the end of the period of
probation or the period of extended probation, the Appointing Authority
on the recommendation of the High Court, considers that the probationer
is not suitable to the post to which he has been appointed, may by order
8 VRS, J & JUD, J
W.P.No.19807 of 2013
discharge him from service after giving him one month's notice or one
month's pay in lieu thereof."
16. In view of the provisions of Rule 11, there is no
controversy as to the power of the High Court to discharge the
petitioner from probation, on the ground of unsuitability to the post.
17. Several cases have come up before the Apex Court on the
question of discharge of probationers by orders simplicitor, in the
backdrop of disciplinary proceedings either on the anvil or pending
at some stage. Some of them related to Judicial Service itself.
Therefore, we shall focus mainly on those decisions which arose out
of Judicial Service, but shall also take note of cases arising out of
other sevices.
18. In Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab1, the termination of
services of a few Judicial Officers in the Punjab Civil Services
(Judicial Branch) came up for consideration, before a Constitution
Bench of 7-Judges of the Supreme Court. But the Supreme Court
was concerned in that case with Rule 9 of Punjab Civil Services
(Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and Rule 7 (3) of Punjab Civil
Services (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951. Rule 9 of the Punishment
and Appeal Rules provided for an opportunity to the probationer to
show cause against the proposed termination. But Rule 7(3) of the
Punjab Civil Services (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951, empowered the
Governor on the recommendation of the High Court to dispense with
the services of the officer, if his work or conduct was reported by the
High Court to be unsatisfactory. After reiterating the law laid down in
1
AIR 1974 SC 2192
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W.P.No.19807 of 2013
Purshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (AIR 1958 SC 36), that
the termination of probation will not by itself be a punishment, the
Supreme Court in Samsher Singh noted the development of the
concepts of motive and foundation by Das, C.J., in Purshottam Lal
Dhingra. The Court noted in Samsher Singh that if a right exists
under a contract or Service Rules to terminate the services of
a probationer, the motive operating on the mind of the government
was wholly irrelevant. On the other hand, if the termination is
founded on misconduct, then it is a punishment. The Court
explained that the reason why motive is said to be irrelevant is that it
inheres in the state of mind which is not discernible.
19. Taking a survey of few decisions rendered earlier, the
Supreme Court, in Samsher Singh, culled out in paragraph-65 of its
decision, the principles that emanated from them. They can be
summarised as follows:
(i) The fact of holding an enquiry is not always conclusive, but
what is decisive is whether the order is really by way of punishment
(State of Orissa v. Ramnarain Das AIR 1961 SC 177);
(ii) If there is an enquiry, the facts and circumstances of the
case will be looked into in order to find out whether the order is one
of dismissal in substance (Madan Gopal v. State of Punjab AIR
1963 SC 531);
(iii) A preliminary inquiry to satisfy that there was reason to
dispense with the services of a temporary employee has been held
not to attract Article 311 of the Constitution of India (Champaklal G.
Shah v. Union of India AIR 1964 SC 1854);
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W.P.No.19807 of 2013
(iv) The substance of the order and not the form would be
decisive (K.H. Phadnis v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1971 SC 988);
and
(v) Where a departmental enquiry is contemplated, but an
enquiry is not in fact proceeded with, Article 311 of the Constitution
of India will not be attracted unless it can be shown that the order,
though unexceptionable in form, is made following a report based on
misconduct (State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk AIR 1971 SC 1011).
20. On facts, the Supreme Court found in Samsher Singh
that the High Court entrusted the task of conducting an enquiry
against the Judicial Officer, to the Director of Vigilance of the State
Government and thereafter accepted the report of the Enquiry
Officer and recommended the discharge of the officer from
probation. Therefore, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion in
Samsher Singh that the termination of services of one of the
officers, was clearly by way of punishment.
21. It may be of interest to note at this juncture that in a
separate but concurring judgment, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer noted
with sarcasm the shift from the factum of enquiry to the object of the
enquiry and the membranous distinctions evolved between an
enquiry merely to ascertain unsuitability and the one held to punish
the delinquent. Quoting from Dr. Tripathi, in his "Spotlights on
Constitutional Interpretation", where he questioned the so-called
"Freudian" frontiers of motive and foundation, Justice Krishna Iyer
observed that between unsuitability and misconduct "thin partitions
do their bounds divide". In his inimitable style, Justice Krishna Iyer in
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W.P.No.19807 of 2013
the penultimate paragraph, before concurring with the majority
opinion in Samsher Singh held that over the years, in the rulings of
the Court, the accent has shifted, the canons have varied and
predictability has proved difficult because the play of legal light and
shade has been baffling. But, nevertheless, the learned Judge
concurred with the conclusion reached by the majority.
22. In the context of the discharge of a probationer, working in
an Industrial Establishment, the Supreme Court considered this
question once again in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel
Tubes Majdoor Sabha. Taking the vexed question that he raised in
Samsher Singh to the next level, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer indicated
in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd that the anatomy of a dismissal order is
not a mystery, once it is agreed that substance, not semblance,
governs the decision. After holding that masters and servants cannot
be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissal, the
Court pointed out in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd that a termination,
effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and on
the consequent desirability of permitting the service of the
delinquent, it is a dismissal. Wherever there is a live nexus between
a misconduct and the termination of service, the conclusion is
dismissal, even if non-injurious terminology is used.
23. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the law that was
developed from Purshottam Lal Dhingra to Gujarat Steel Tubes,
alone got fine tuned in later cases. Hence, it may not be necessary
to multiply the decisions on the point, except two subsequent
decisions on which Mr. D.V. Sitharam Murthy, learned Senior
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W.P.No.19807 of 2013
Counsel, places reliance and one decision on which Mr. S. Sri Ram,
learned Standing Counsel for the Registry, places on reliance.
24. In Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries
Corporation Ltd.2 on which heavy reliance is placed by Mr. D.V.
Sitharam Murthy, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the
Court drew a distinction between an order of discharge simpliciter,
passed even before the commencement of the enquiry and an order
of discharge passed after holding of a departmental enquiry. In
Radhey Shyam Gupta, the Court took note of the difficulty
expressed in Samsher Singh about finding out what was motive
and what was foundation. But the Court noted that the said difficulty
was removed by the Supreme Court in its subsequent decision in
Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Majdoor Sabha
(1980) 2 SCC 593. After recording the observations of the Court in
paragraphs-53 and 54 of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd., the Court
recorded an opinion in paragraph-27 of its decision in Radhey
Shyam Gupta that if the master, after gathering some prima facie
facts does not really wish to go into their truth, but decides merely
not to continue a dubious employee, it will only be a case of motive.
But if he conducts an enquiry for the purpose of proving the
misconduct and the employee is not heard, it is a case where the
enquiry is the foundation.
25. After so holding in paragraph-27, the Court in Radhey
Shyam Gupta analysed the decisions in - (i) State of U.P. v. Ram
Chandra Trivedi (1976) 4 SCC 52, (ii) State of Maharashtra v.
2
(1999) 2 SCC 21
13 VRS, J & JUD, J
W.P.No.19807 of 2013
Veerappa R. Saboji (1979) 4 SCC 466, (iii) Anoop Jaiswal v.
Government of India (1984) 2 SCC 369, (iv) State of Punjab v.
Sukh Raj Bahadur AIR 1968 SC 1089, (v) Nepal Singh v. State of
U.P. (1980) 3 SCC 288, (vi) State of U.P. v. Kaushal Kishore
Shukla (1991) 1 SCC 691, (vii) Commissioner, Food and Civil
Supplies v. Prakash Chandra Saxena (1994) 5 SCC 177.
Thereafter, the Court gave its conclusion in paragraph-34 of the
report in Radhey Shyam Gupta as follows:
"34. But in cases where the termination is preceded by an enquiry and
evidence is received and findings as to misconduct of a definitive nature
are arrived at behind the back of the officer and where on the basis of
such a report, the termination order is issued, such an order will be
violative of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the purpose of
the enquiry is to find out the truth of the allegations with a view to punish
him and not merely to gather evidence for a future regular departmental
enquiry. In such cases, the termination is to be treated as based or
founded upon misconduct and will be punitive. These are obviously not
cases where the employer feels that there is a mere cloud against the
employee's conduct but are cases where the employer has virtually
accepted the definitive and clear findings of the enquiry officer, which are
all arrived at behind the back of the employee - even though such
acceptance of findings is not recorded in the order of termination. That is
why the misconduct is the foundation and not merely the motive in such
cases."
26. Therefore, the contention of Mr. D.V. Sitharam Murthy,
learned Senior Counsel, is that the ratio laid down in Radhey
Shyam Gupta applies in all fours to the case on hand. This is due to
the fact that the petitioner was placed under suspension on 31-12-
2010, a charge memo was issued on 02-02-2011, an enquiry was
held and the Enquiry Officer submitted a report on 28-12-2011.
Therefore, it is contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the
decision of the Administrative Committee dated 13-02-2012 and the
14 VRS, J & JUD, J
W.P.No.19807 of 2013
approval given to the same by the Full Court on 27-02-2012, had as
their foundation, the misconduct alleged against the petitioner.
27. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner,
the tests laid down in Radhey Shyam Gupta, were also reiterated in
Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical
Sciences3. Paragraphs-18 to 21 of the said decision relied upon by
the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner read as follows:
"18. But the law does not rest there. In Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab
(1974) 2 SCC 831 the courts were asked to look behind the form of the
order to find out whether the termination was in substance punitive. So
when a full-scale inquiry is held against a probationer or a temporary
appointee and he is found guilty, an order terminating his services for
this reason has been seen as punitive and bad. It is this search for the
"substance" behind the "form" of the order of punishment which has led
to some apparently conflicting decisions.
19. Thus some courts have upheld an order of termination of a
probationer's services on the ground that the enquiry held prior to the
termination was preliminary and yet other courts have struck down as
illegal a similarly worded termination order because an inquiry had been
held. Courts continue to struggle with semantically indistinguishable
concepts like "motive" and "foundation"; and terminations founded on a
probationer's misconduct have been held to be illegal while terminations
motivated by the probationer's misconduct have been upheld. The
decisions are legion and it is an impossible task to find a clear path
through the jungle of precedents.
20. As observed by Alagiriswami, J. in S.P. Vasudeva v. State of
Haryana (1976) 1 SCC 236, at p. 240: (SCC para 5)
"After all no government servant, a probationer or temporary, will be
discharged or reverted, arbitrarily, without any rhyme or reason. If the
reason is to be fathomed in all cases of discharge or reversion, it will be
difficult to distinguish as to which action is discharge or reversion
simpliciter and which is by way of punishment. The whole position in law
is rather confusing."
21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in
substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to
the termination there was (a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into
allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated
in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has
3
(2002) 1 SCC 520
15 VRS, J & JUD, J
W.P.No.19807 of 2013
been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order.
Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has
been upheld."
28. From paragraph 21 of the decision in Pavanendra
Narayan Verma, extracted above, it could be seen that in cases (i)
where a full-fledged enquiry is conducted (ii) into allegations of
misconduct and (iii) the same culminates in a finding of guilt, then
the order is held to be punitive. On the contrary, even if any one of
the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld.
According to the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, all these
three requirements indicated in paragraph 21 of the decision in
Pavanendra Narayan Verma are present in this case and that
therefore, the misconduct formed the foundation for the order of
discharge.
29. On a cursory glance, one may be tempted to think that all
the three factors indicated in paragraph 21 of the decision in
Pavanendra Narayan Verma are present in this case. There was
actually a full-fledged enquiry. The enquiry was into serious
allegations of misconduct and there was an enquiry report dated
28-12-2011. But the question is whether the presence of all the
above three factors would make the impugned order vulnerable or
not.
30. Before finding an answer to this question, we must keep in
mind a crucial distinction between all other services and judicial
service. Under Article 235 of the Constitution, the control over
District Courts and the Courts subordinate thereto is vested in the
16 VRS, J & JUD, J
W.P.No.19807 of 2013
High Court. The High Court is construed to mean the Full Court.
Therefore, unlike in all other services where the disciplinary authority
vests on a single individual, the disciplinary control vests with the
Full Court of the High Court in the case of judicial service. In all
disciplinary matters as well as matters relating to the confirmation of
probation or discharge of a probationer, a decision is first taken by
an Administrative Committee also known as the First Committee and
the same is placed before the Full Court for its consideration.
Therefore, the command structure is not unitary. It is in this context
that the subtle difference sought to be drawn by Mr. S. Sri Ram,
learned standing counsel for the Registry between two different
tracks in which the matters went, assumes significance.
31. Though a charge memo was issued on 02-02-2011 and an
enquiry followed and the Enquiry Officer submitted a report on 28-
12-2011, a note was circulated to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice on
15-12-2011 even before the submission of the enquiry report, for
considering the cases of all the officers in the batch to which the
petitioner belonged, for confirmation of probation. In the note
submitted on 15-12-2011, it was made clear that all the 10 officers
including the writ petitioner herein were called upon to produce two
judgments on the civil side and two judgments on the criminal side
for assessment. The judgments were also placed. Apart from this, a
separate paragraph was devoted to the writ petitioner, in the note
placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice on 15-12-2011. This
paragraph reads as follows:
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W.P.No.19807 of 2013
"It is further submitted that except Smt. K. Manjusree (Sl.No.7) there are
not departmental enquiries pending against the above said officers. The
High Court initiated disciplinary proceedings against Smt. K. Manjusree
and also placed her under suspension in public interest vide High Court's
proceedings dated 02-01-2011 and enquiry report is awaited from the
Hon'ble Enquiring Judge."
32. On the note put up on 15-12-2011, for the declaration of
satisfactory completion of all the 10 directly recruited District and
Sessions Judges, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice made an
endorsement "A.C.".
33. Thereafter, the cases of all the 10 District Judges including
the petitioner was placed before the Administrative Committee for
consideration of the question of declaration of satisfactory
completion of probation, in a meeting held on 13-02-2012. The
agenda note for the meeting would show that the question of
declaration of probation of all the 10 officers was placed as Subject
No.19. The Agenda Item No.19 and the resolution passed therein
are extracted as follows:
Subject No.19:
PUBLIC SERVICES - District and Sessions Judges - Declaration of
probation of certain Direct Recruit District and Sessions Judges subject to
finalization of seniority between them - Two judgments on Civil side and
two judgments on Criminal side are called for and received from the 10
Direct Recruit District and Sessions Judges Regarding (Deferred in the
Administrative Committee of Hon'ble Judges in the Meeting held on 30-01-
2012)
.
RESOLUTION:
The probation of the officers, except Smt. K. Manju Sree, is declared as successfully completed. Services of Smt. K. Manju Sree be discharged on payment of one month's pay in lieu of notice since she is not suitable to the post to which she is appointed."
34. It may be seen from the subject placed before the Administrative Committee in its meeting on 13-02-2012 that there was no reference to the Enquiry Report received against the 18 VRS, J & JUD, J W.P.No.19807 of 2013 petitioner. The case of the petitioner appears to have been considered along with all her batch mates, in the normal route.
35. Therefore, it is clear that the decision to discharge the petitioner from probation was not taken by the Administrative Committee on 13-02-2012, on the basis of the enquiry report. On the contrary, it was taken on the basis of scrutiny of the judgments of the petitioner (irrespective of whether they were wholly authored by her or not). Hence, the two-track theory formulated by Mr. S. Sri Ram, learned standing counsel for the Registry appears to be correct. This theory is also fortified by the fact that the enquiries against Judicial Officers are dealt with by the Vigilance Section. But the question of declaration of probation is dealt with by the office of the Registrar General.
36. This is why the resolution passed by the Administrative Committee in its meeting held on 13-02-2012 was placed before the Full Court in its meeting held on 27-02-2012. After the Full Court approved the resolution of the Administrative Committee to discharge the petitioner from service, the Registrar General by a communication dated 03-03-2012 informed the Registrar (Vigilance) about the same. In the said letter, Subject No.7 placed for the consideration of the Full Court and the resolution passed by the Full Court were extracted. They read as follows:
"SUBJECT NO.7:
Minutes of Administrative Committee Meeting of the Hon'ble Judges held on 13.02.2012 with regard to discharge of Smt. K. Manjusree from service, on payment of one months pay in lieu of notice, under Rule 11 of the A.P. State Judicial Service Rules, 2007, since she is not suitable to 19 VRS, J & JUD, J W.P.No.19807 of 2013 the post to which she is appointed - For approval of the Full Court of Hon'ble Judges - Regarding.
RESOLUTION:
Since Smt. K. Manjusree has not successfully completed her probation period and she is not suitable to the post to which she is appointed, she is discharged from service on payment of one month's pay in lieu of notice under Rule 11 of the A.P. State Judicial Service Rules, 2007."
37. Therefore, it is clear that the report of the Enquiry Officer did not form part of the agenda placed either before the Administrative Committee or before the Full Court. The case of the petitioner was not segregated from that of other officers belonging to her batch. It is not the case of the petitioner that two judgments on the civil side and two judgments on the criminal side rendered by her were not called for. The case of the petitioner was considered both by the Administrative Committee and the Full Court along with the cases of other officers of her batch for declaration of satisfactory completion of probation. Therefore, it is clear that the disciplinary proceedings, on the facts of this case, never formed the foundation for the discharge of the petitioner from probation.
38. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. and others4 relied upon by Mr. S. Sri Ram, learned standing counsel for the Registry, the whole case law was based upon the peculiar facts of each individual case. In so far as the case on hand is concerned, it is clear from the minutes of the meeting of the Administrative Committee and the minutes of the Full Court that the decision to discharge the petitioner from probation was not taken on the basis of the allegations of misconduct or the 4 (200) 5 SCC 152 20 VRS, J & JUD, J W.P.No.19807 of 2013 report of the Enquiry Officer. Hence, the order of discharge cannot be termed as punitive in nature.
39. Therefore, in fine, we find no irregularities or illegalities in the impugned order of discharge, as disciplinary proceedings did not form its foundation and the discharge of the petitioner did not cast any stigma on her. Hence, the writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending, shall stand closed.
_______________________ V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J _____________ J.UMA DEVI, J Date: 04-12-2018 Ak/Ksn L.R. copy to be marked B.O./Ksn 21 VRS, J & JUD, J W.P.No.19807 of 2013 HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN AND HON'BLE Ms. JUSTICE J.UMA DEVI Writ Petition No.19807 of 2013 (per VRS, J.) 4th December, 2018.
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