Karnataka High Court
Bandi Prabhakar Rao vs K G Rajalakshmi on 1 August, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
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WP No. 16743 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 1ST DAY OF AUGUST, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION NO. 16743 OF 2025 (GM-CPC)
BETWEEN:
BANDI PRABHAKAR RAO
S/O LATE MR.B.R.BHASKAR RAO
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS
RESIDING AT APARTMENT NO.2026,
SOBHA SUNCREST,
KANAKAPURA ROAD
NEAR NICE ROAD JUNCTION
UTTARAHALLI HOBLI,
THALAGHATTAPURA
BENGALURU - 560 062.
...PETITIONER
Digitally signed
by NAGAVENI (BY SRI AJAY J. NANDALIKE, ADVOCATE)
Location: High
Court of AND:
Karnataka
1. K.G.RAJALAKSHMI
W/O ASHOK NAYAK,
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS,
RESIDING AT: G-4
MANASA BLOSSOM,
6TH CROSS, V V PURAM,
MYSURU - 570 002.
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WP No. 16743 of 2025
HC-KAR
2. KRISHNA MAHANKALI
S/O LATE VENKATA SURYANARAYANA,
AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS,
RESIDING AT: NO.1,
12TH MAIN, 3RD PHASE,
JP NAGARA,
BENGALURU - 560 078.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI SHOWRI H.R., ADVOCATE FOR C/R-1 & R-2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 29.04.2025 PASSED BY THE XIV
ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE BENGALURU (CCH-
28) ON APPLICATION FILED UNDER ORDER 1 RULE 10 (2) OF
CPC (IA NO. 4) IN P AND SC NO. 581/2023 (PRODUCED AS
ANNEXURE -A).
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court calling in question an order dated 29-04-2025 passed by the XIV Additional City Civil -3- NC: 2025:KHC:29906 WP No. 16743 of 2025 HC-KAR and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru on I.A.No.IV filed under Order 1 to Rule 10(2) of the CPC in P & SC No.581 of 2023.
2. Heard Sri Ajay J. Nandalike, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri H.R.Showri, learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2.
3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: -
3.1. The petitioner is said to be the cousin and sole legal heir of late Ms. Bandi Sujatha Jayadev, daughter of late Sri Jayadev B S and Mrs. B.R. Jayalakshmi. Late B.R. Jayalakshmi is said to be the aunt of the petitioner. Ms. Bandi Sujatha Jayadev is a retired bank employee. B.R. Jayadev who is the uncle of the petitioner died intestate on 19-10-2022 leaving behind his wife and daughter. It is the averment in the petition that last rites of B.R. Jayadev was performed by the petitioner.
Ms. Bandi Sujatha Jayadev who remained as Spinster throughout died intestate on 12-06-2023 leaving behind the petitioner as her sole legal heir. At the time of death of Ms. Bandi Sujatha Jayadev, the petitioner was said to be in Delhi as part of architectural team involved in national level project of -4- NC: 2025:KHC:29906 WP No. 16743 of 2025 HC-KAR building the new parliament building of India. In the month of September, 2023 the petitioner is said to have returned to Bengaluru and during his visit comes to know all the properties left behind by the deceased. It is then, the petitioner files a petition in P & SC 581 of 2023 seeking issuance of a succession certificate.
3.2. During the pendency of the petition, respondent No.2 files an application seeking to implead himself and respondent No.1 as proposed respondents claiming they are nominees and friends of the deceased Ms. Bandi Sujatha Jayadev, qua the accounts with the banks. The petitioner files his detailed objections to the application so filed, on the ground that the said respondents were not legal heirs and nominees and cannot claim right or interest to the estate of the deceased. The petitioner also files his written statement placing reliance upon judgment rendered by a coordinate Bench of this Court in R.F.A. No.100004 of 2025 on similar set of facts. The concerned Court allows the application, converts the petition into original suit and directs the petitioner to file an amended plaint arraigning the respondents as defendants. Aggrieved by -5- NC: 2025:KHC:29906 WP No. 16743 of 2025 HC-KAR the said order, the petitioner is before this Court in the subject petition.
3.3. Owing to the submissions made by the respondents proposed into the P & SC proceedings, this Court passed an order on 04-07-2025. No Will was found in any of the lockers in the Banks indicted by the respondents. Again on 21-07-2025 the respondents submitted that there are two other Banks in which lockers are available. Those lockers were directed to be opened before the parties to the lis and the Manager of the Bank. Again, the report of inspection of lockers is, no Will as contended by the respondents was found in the lockers. In that light the parties were heard.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the respondents are said to be nominees. Their claim is that they are nominees and also set up that they are beneficiaries of a Will from the hands of Ms. Bandi Sujatha Jayadev. The Will is nowhere found. What remains is whether an alleged nominee can claim any right over the property of the deceased.
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5. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents would accept the fact that no Will is found, but would reserve their right to claim the property if any Will executed in accordance with law would emerge in future.
6. In the light of the aforesaid facts and submissions, it is clear that no Will has been discovered in any of the lockers jointly inspected. Therefore, whether the respondents have any legal basis, in the absence of a Will, to contest the petition for issuance of succession certificate is to be considered. The contention of the respondents is solely based on being nominees. Therefore, whether a nominee can claim inheritance rights need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. Jurisprudence is replete as to the right of a nominee in comparison to the right of a person who has inherited the property. The Apex Court in the case of SARBATI DEVI v.
USHA DEVI1 has held as follows:
".... .... ....
5. We shall now proceed to analyse the provisions of Section 39 of the Act. The said section provides that a holder of a policy of life insurance on his own life may 1 (1984) 1 SCC 424 -7- NC: 2025:KHC:29906 WP No. 16743 of 2025 HC-KAR when effecting the policy or at any time before the policy matures for payment nominate the person or persons to whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of his death. If the nominee is a minor, the policy-holder may appoint any person to receive the money in the event of his death during the minority of the nominee. That means that if the policy-holder is alive when the policy matures for payment he alone will receive payment of the money due under the policy and not the nominee. Any such nomination may at any time before the policy matures for payment be cancelled or changed, but before such cancellation or change is notified to the insurer if he makes the payment bona fide to the nominee already registered with him, the insurer gets a valid discharge. Such power of cancellation of or effecting a change in the nomination implies that the nominee has no right to the amount during the lifetime of the assured. If the policy is transferred or assigned under Section 38 of the Act, the nomination automatically lapses. If the nominee or where there are nominees more than one all the nominees die before the policy matures for payment the money due under the policy is payable to the heirs or legal representatives or the holder of a succession certificate. It is not necessary to refer to sub- section (7) of Section 39 of the Act here. But the summary of the relevant provisions of Section 39 given above establishes clearly that the policy-holder continues to hold interest in the policy during his lifetime and the nominee acquires no sort of interest in the policy during the lifetime of the policy-holder. If that is so, on the death of the policy-holder the amount payable under the policy becomes part of his estate which is governed by the law of succession applicable to him. Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. There is no warrant for the position that Section 39 of the Act operates as a third kind of succession which is styled as a 'statutory testament' in para 16 of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Uma Sehgal case [AIR 1982 Del 36 : ILR (1981) 2 Del 315] . If Section 39 of the Act is contrasted with Section 38 of the Act which provides for transfer or assignment of the rights under a policy, the tenuous character of the right of a nominee would become more pronounced. It is difficult to hold that Section 39 of the Act was intended to act as a third mode of succession provided by the -8- NC: 2025:KHC:29906 WP No. 16743 of 2025 HC-KAR statute. The provision in sub-section (6) of Section 39 which says that the amount shall be payable to the nominee or nominees does not mean that the amount shall belong to the nominee or nominees. We have to bear in mind here the special care which law and judicial precedents take in the matter of execution and proof of wills which have the effect of diverting the estate from the ordinary course of intestate succession and that the rigour of the rules governing the testamentary succession is not relaxed even where wills are registered.
... .... ...
8. We have carefully gone through the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Uma Sehgal case [AIR 1982 Del 36 : ILR (1981) 2 Del 315] . In this case the High Court of Delhi clearly came to the conclusion that the nominee had no right in the lifetime of the assured to the amount payable under the policy and that his rights would spring up only on the death of the assured. The Delhi High Court having reached that conclusion did not proceed to examine the possibility of an existence of a conflict between the law of succession and the right of the nominee under Section 39 of the Act arising on the death of the assured and in that event which would prevail. We are of the view that the language of Section 39 of the Act is not capable of altering the course of succession under law. The second error committed by the Delhi High Court in this case is the reliance placed by it on the effect of the amendment of Section 60(1)(kb) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 providing that all moneys payable under a policy of insurance on the life of the judgment debtor shall be exempt from attachment by his creditors. The High Court equated a nominee to the heirs and legatees of the assured and proceeded to hold that the nominee succeeded to the estate with all 'plus and minus points'. We find it difficult to treat a nominee as being equivalent to an heir or legatee having regard to the clear provisions of Section 39 of the Act. The exemption of the moneys payable under a life insurance policy under the amended Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure instead of 'devaluing' the earlier decisions which upheld the right of a -9- NC: 2025:KHC:29906 WP No. 16743 of 2025 HC-KAR creditor of the estate of the assured to attach the amount payable under the life insurance policy recognises such a right in such creditor which he could have exercised but for the amendment. It is because it was attached the Code of Civil Procedure exempted it from attachment in furtherance of the policy of Parliament in making the amendment. The Delhi High Court has committed another error in appreciating the two decisions of the Madras High Court in KaruppaGounder v. Palaniamma [AIR 1963 Mad 245 at para 13 : (1963) 1 MLJ 86 : ILR (1963) Mad 434] and in B.M. Mundkur v. Life Insurance Corporation of India [AIR 1977 Mad 72 : 47 Com Cas 19 : (1977) 1 MLJ 59 : ILR (1975) 3 Mad 336] . The relevant part of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Uma Sehgal case [AIR 1982 Del 36 : ILR (1981) 2 Del 315] reads thus: (AIR p. 40, paras 10,
11) "10.
In KaruppaGounder v. Palaniamma [AIR 1963 Mad 245 at para 13 : (1963) 1 MLJ 86 : ILR (1963) Mad 434] , K had nominated his wife in the insurance policy. K died. It was held that in virtue of the nomination, the mother of K was not entitled to any portion of the insurance amount.
11. I am in respectful agreement with these views, because they accord with the law and reason. They are supported by Section 44(2) of the Act. It provides that the commission payable to an insurance agent shall after his death, continue to be payable to his heirs, but if the agent had nominated any person the commission shall be paid to the person so nominated. It cannot be contended that the nominee under Section 44 will receive the money not as owner but as an agent on behalf of someone else, vide B.M. Mundkur v. Life Insurance Corporation [AIR 1977 Mad 72 : 47 Com Cas 19 : (1977) 1 MLJ 59 : ILR (1975) 3 Mad 336] . Thus, the nominee excludes the legal heirs."
... .... ...
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12. Moreover there is one other strong circumstance in this case which dissuades us from taking a view contrary to the decisions of all other High Courts and accepting the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two recent judgments delivered in the year 1978 and in the year 1982. The Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere nomination effected under Section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their rights in the amount payable under a life insurance policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen to make any amendment to the Act. In such a situation unless there are strong and compelling reasons to hold that all these decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a different view. The reasons given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing. We, therefore, hold that the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Fauza Singh case [AIR 1978 Del 276] and in Uma Sehgal case [AIR 1982 Del 36: ILR (1981) 2 Del 315] do not lay down the law correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of Section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere nomination made under Section 39 of the Act does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them."
(Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court holds a mere nomination made does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest.
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NC: 2025:KHC:29906 WP No. 16743 of 2025 HC-KAR The Apex Court again in the case of SHAKTI YEZDANI v.
JAYANAND JAYANT SALGAONKAR2, has held as follows:
"... .... ...
43. Similarly, there are variations with respect to the word "vest" being present in some legislations (the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952) and absent in others (the Insurance Act, 1939, the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912). Looking at the dissimilarities and the fact that uniform definition is not available relating to the rights of "nominee" and/or whether such "nomination" bestows absolute ownership over nominees, it is only appropriate that the terms are considered as ordinarily understood by a reasonable person making nominations, with respect to their movable or immovable properties. A reasonable individual arranging for the disposition of his property is expected to undertake any such nomination, bearing in mind the interpretation on the effect of nomination, as given by courts consistently, for a number of years. The concept of nomination if interpreted by departing from the well-established manner would, in our view, cause major ramifications and create significant impact on disposition of properties left behind by deceased nominators.
... .... ...
46. In Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust [Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust, 1956 SCC OnLine SC 37 : AIR 1957 SC 344] the Supreme Court held that the term "vest" has a variety of meanings dependent on the context within which it operates : (AIR p. 350, para 11) "11. ... In this chapter occur Sections 45 to 48 which provide for the vesting of certain properties in the Trust. Section 45 lays down the conditions and the procedure according to which any 2 (2024) 4 SCC 642
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NC: 2025:KHC:29906 WP No. 16743 of 2025 HC-KAR building, street, square or other land vested in the Municipality or Notified Area Committee may become vested in a Trust. Similarly, Section 46 deals with the vesting in the Trust of properties like a street or a square as are not vested in a Municipality or Notified Area Committee. These sections, as also Sections 47 and 48 make provision for compensation and for empowering the Trust to deal with such property vested in it. The vesting of such property is only for the purpose of executing any improvement scheme which it has undertaken and not with a view to clothing it with complete title. As will presently appear, the term "vesting" has a variety of meaning which has to be gathered from the context in which it has been used. It may mean full ownership, or only possession for a particular purpose, or clothing the authority with power to deal with the property as the agent of another person or authority."
(emphasis supplied)"
(Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court was following a judgment rendered in RAM CHANDER TALWAR v. DEVENDER KUMAR TALWAR3, wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:
".... .... ....
4. Sub-section (2) of Section 45-ZA, reads as follows:
"45-ZA. *** (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any disposition, whether testamentary or otherwise, in respect of such deposit, where a nomination made in the prescribed manner purports to confer on any person the right to receive the amount of deposit from the banking company, the nominee shall, on 3 (2010) 10 SCC 671
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NC: 2025:KHC:29906 WP No. 16743 of 2025 HC-KAR the death of the sole depositor or, as the case may be, on the death of all the depositors, become entitled to all the rights of the sole depositor or, as the case may be, of the depositors, in relation to such deposit to the exclusion of all other persons, unless the nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner."
(emphasis added)
5. Section 45-ZA(2) merely puts the nominee in the shoes of the depositor after his death and clothes him with the exclusive right to receive the money lying in the account. It gives him all the rights of the depositor so far as the depositor's account is concerned. But it by no stretch of imagination makes the nominee the owner of the money lying in the account. It needs to be remembered that the Banking Regulation Act is enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to banking. It is in no way concerned with the question of succession. All the monies receivable by the nominee by virtue of Section 45-ZA(2) would, therefore, form part of the estate of the deceased depositor and devolve according to the rule of succession to which the depositor may be governed.
6. We find that the High Court has rightly rejected the appellant's claim relying upon the decision of this Court in Vishin N. Khanchandani v. Vidya LachmandasKhanchandani [(2000) 6 SCC 724]. The provision under Section 6(1) of the Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959 is materially and substantially the same as the provision of Section 45-ZA(2) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and the decision in Vishin N. Khanchandani [(2000) 6 SCC 724] applies with full force to the facts of this case."
(Emphasis supplied)
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NC: 2025:KHC:29906 WP No. 16743 of 2025 HC-KAR A coordinate Bench in the case of LAXMIBAI v. SHRIKANT HANAMAPPA CHALAVADI4, following the afore-quoted judgments in the cases of SARBATI DEVI and RAM CHANDER TALWAR has held as follows:
".... .... ....
14. The claimants said to be wife and children of late Yamanappa Chalawadi, have filed the petition seeking issuance of Succession Certificate, under Section 372 of Indian Succession Act. It is their contention that Yamanappa Chalawadi was working as Assistant Teacher and he retired from his service on 31.05.2017. He died on 23.12.2020. At the time of his death, he was having bank accounts with respondent Nos.2 and 3 and was also having fixed deposits as mentioned above. Being the legal representatives of deceased Yamanappa Chalawadi, the petitioners are claiming Succession Certificate to receive the amount from respondent Nos.2 and 3.
15. In spite of issuance of notice to respondent No.1, he remained absent, who is the nominee for the fixed deposits with respondent Nos.2 and 3. The claim of the petitioners to get the Succession Certificate was rejected by the trial Court only on the ground that respondent No.1 is the nominee. Therefore, he is entitled to receive the fixed deposits held with respondent Nos.2 and 3 and that the petitioners are not having any title over the same.
16. Section 45-ZA of the Bank Regulation Act, 1949 reads as under;
"45ZA. Nomination for payment of depositors' money.--
(1) Where a deposit is held by a banking company to the credit of one or more persons, the depositor or, as the case may be, all the depositors together, 4 M.F.A.No.101529 of 2021 decided on 11-07-2023
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NC: 2025:KHC:29906 WP No. 16743 of 2025 HC-KAR may nominate, in the prescribed manner, one person to whom in the event of the death of the sole depositor or the death of all the depositors, the amount of deposit may be returned by the banking company.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any disposition, whether testamentary or otherwise, in respect of such deposit, where a nomination made in the prescribed manner purports to confer on any person the right to receive the amount of deposit from the banking company, the nominee shall, on the death of the sole depositor or, as the case may be, on the death of all the depositors, become entitled to all the rights of the sole depositor or, as the case may be, of the depositors, in relation to such deposit to the exclusion of all other persons, unless the nomination is varied or cancelled in the prescribed manner.
(3) Where the nominee is a minor, it shall be lawful for the depositor making the nomination to appoint in the prescribed manner any person to receive the amount of deposit in the event of his death during the minority of the nominee.
(4) Payment by a banking company in accordance with the provisions of this section shall constitute a full discharge to the banking company of its liability in respect of the deposit:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect the right or claim which any person may have against the person to whom any payment is made under this section."
(emphasis supplied)
17. Thus, bare reading of this Section discloses that nomination for payment of money belonging to the depositor in case of his death will enable the nominee to receive the same and give full discharge to the bank concerned. The proviso appended to Section makes it clear that nomination shall not effect the right or claim which any person may have against the person to whom any payment is made under the Section.
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18. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Chander Talwar and Another Vs. Devender Kumar Talwar and Others reported in (2010)10 SCC 671, considering the legal position of nomination for the deposits held in para No.5 as under;
"5. Section 45ZA(2) merely puts the nominee in the shoes of the depositor after his death and clothes him with the exclusive right to receive the money lying in the account. It gives him all the rights of the depositor so far as the depositor's account is concerned. But it by no stretch of imagination makes the nominee the owner of the money lying in the account . It needs to be remembered that the Banking Regulation Act is enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to banking. It is in no way concerned with the question of succession. All the monies receivable by the nominee by virtue of section 45 ZA(2) would, therefore, form part of the estate of the deceased depositor and devolve according to the rule of succession to which the depositor may be governed ."
(emphasis supplied)
19. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Sarbati Devi (supra) considering Section 39 of Life Insurance Act, 1938 and the decisions of various High Courts, held in para No.12 as under;
"12. Moreover there is one other strong circumstance in this case which dissuades us from taking a view contrary to the decisions of all other High Courts and accepting theview expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two recent judgments delivered in the year 1978 and in the year 1982. The Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere nomination effected under section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their rights in the amount payable under a life insurance policy . Yet Parliament has not chosen to make any amendment to the Act. In such a situation unless there are strong and compelling reasons to hold that all these decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a
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NC: 2025:KHC:29906 WP No. 16743 of 2025 HC-KAR different view. The reasons given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing. We, therefore, hold that the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Fauja Singh's case (supra) and in Mrs. Uma Sehgal's case (supra) do not lay down the law correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere nomination made under section 39 of the Act does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy, The amount; however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them."
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Thus the proposition of law is very well settled that nominee being the trustee will be entitled to receive the amount in deposit and give full discharge to the Bank concerned, but he cannot have the preferential right to claim the amount exclusively, to the exclusion of the legal representatives of the deceased as their right to succeed to the estate of the deceased in accordance with the rule of Succession with which they are governed is unaffected.
21. In the present case, there is no dispute that the petitioners are the wife and children of deceased Yamanappa Chalawadi. Even though respondent No.1 is the nominee named for the deposits held with respondent Nos.2 and 3, he has not chosen to dispute the claim of the petitioners. Under such circumstances, the petitioners are entitled for Succession Certificate for the purpose of receiving the amount in Savings Bank and Fixed Deposit account held with respondent Nos.2 and 3 to the exclusion of respondent No.1. If in case the prayer of the petitioners is rejected their that will drive them to go after respondent No.1- the nominee to get the monies which they are entitled under law and thus it will lead to multiplicity of proceedings.
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22. I have gone through the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. It has committed an error in holding that respondent No.1 being the nominee is entitled to receive the same and the petitioners being the legal heirs of late Yamanappa Chalawadi are not having any right over the same. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the impugned judgment and decree is liable to be set aside."
(Emphasis supplied) On a blend of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court and that of this Court in the afore-quoted judgments, what would un-mistakably emerge is, that by no stretch of imagination a nominee would become owner of either money lying in the account or the estate of the deceased or otherwise. The nominee has no right on the successor. The nomination merely gives a right to receive any money lying in the account or otherwise, but will not give a right to claim the amount or the property, as the case may be, which would clearly mean that inheritance stands on a higher pedestal than the nominee.
7. In the light of the claim of the proposed respondents being nominees, it would not in any way take away the right of the petitioner to receive succession certificate. The order of the
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NC: 2025:KHC:29906 WP No. 16743 of 2025 HC-KAR concerned Court which allows the application filed under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC permitting the respondents 1 and 2 to come on record on the strength of the nomination is, on the face of it, contrary to law. At this juncture, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that if the respondents come across a Will at any time in future, a Will executed in accordance with law, their right should not be taken away by the subject order. The learned counsel for the petitioner has no objection to reserve such a right, in the event they would come up with a Will.
8. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Writ petition is allowed.
(ii) The order dated 29-04-2025 passed by the XIV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru on I.A.No.4 in P & SC No.581 of 2023 stands quashed.
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(iii) The concerned Court is directed to take the proceedings further and conclude the same within an outer limit of 6 weeks.
(iv) The rights of the respondents stand reserved, in the event they would find a Will executed in their favour, in accordance with law, to initiate proceedings in accordance with law.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE BKP List No.: 1 Sl No.: 49