Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand Through Planning ... vs Bandana Rajak on 17 July, 2017
Equivalent citations: 2018 (1) AJR 360, (2018) 1 JCR 391 (JHA), (2019) 1 CIVLJ 100, 2018 (188) AIC (SOC) 17 (JHA)
Author: D.N.Patel
Bench: Ratnaker Bhengra, D.N.Patel
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Civil Review No. 19 of 2017
1. The State of Jharkhand, through Planning and Monitoring
Division, Jamshedpur, Swarnarekha Multipurpose Project, Vikash
Bhawan, P.O. and P.S.-Adityapur, District-Seraikella-Kharsawan
2. Principal Secretary, Planning and Monitoring Division,
Jamshedpur, Swarnarekha Multipurpose Project, Vikash Bhawan,
P.O. and P.S.-Adityapur, District Seraikella-Kharsawan
3. The Deputy Commissioner, Seraikella-Kharsawan, P.O. and
P.S.-Seraikella, District-Seraikella-Kharsawan
4. The Director, Planning and Monitoring Division, Jamshedpur,
Swarnareha Multipurpose Project, Vikash Bhawan, P.O. and P.S.-
Adityapur, District Seraikella-Kharsawan
5. Executive Engineer, Planning and Monitoring Division,
Jamshedpur, Dam Project at Swarnarekha Bhawan, Adityapur, P.O.
and P.S. Gamharia, District Seraikella-Kharsawan
... ... Respondents/Petitioners
Versus
Bandana Rajak D/o Late Anil Chandra Rajak, resident of village-Dulmi,
P.O.-Dulmi, P.S.-Dulmi, P.S.-Nimdih, District Seraikella-Kharsawan
... ... Appellant/Opposite Party
------
CORAM: HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RATNAKER BHENGRA
-----
For the Petitioners: M/s Kumar Sundaram
For the Respondents: M/s Prasenjit Mahato
-----
th
05/Dated 17 July, 2017
Per D.N. Patel, J.
1. This Civil Review has been preferred for review of the judgment and
order dated 5th December, 2016 delivered by this court in L.P.A. No. 532 of
2016, whereby the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the respondent was
allowed and the compassionate appointment was given to the respondent
herein (original appellant), who is the daughter of the deceased employee.
2. Respondent herein was not married on the date of death of her
father, i.e. on 11th July, 2011 (who died in harness). Later on, her
application for compassionate appointment remained pending with the
Government for a considerable time and thereafter, she got married. No
sooner did she got married the State authorities became active and her
application for appointment on compassionate ground was dismissed by
the Government in view of the fact that now she is married.
This ground was not accepted by this Court while deciding the
Letters Patent Appeal and now this civil review application has been
preferred mainly for the reason that the respondent herein has not
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acquired her 10th standard educational certificate as mandated by the
circular dated 2nd September, 2011, which is at Annexure 10 to the memo
of this Civil Review.
3. Having heard counsel appearing for both sides and looking to the
facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that father of this
respondent died in harness on 11thJuly, 2011. Immediately the respondent
applied for appointment on compassionate ground being legal heir of her
father and being unmarried and dependent upon her father as on the date
of death of her father.
4. Said application for compassionate appointment was not decided
and later on, the respondent got married, but, no sooner did she got
married, the appellant State took a stand that she cannot be appointed on
compassionate basis as she has ceased to be a dependant.
5. A writ petition was preferred by the respondent, being W.P.(S) No.
1189 of 2014, which was dismissed vide judgment and order dated 5th
August, 2016, against which L.P.A. No. 532 of 2016 was preferred, which
was allowed by this Court vide order dated 5th December, 2016.
6. The plea which is taken by the appellant State in this civil review
application was never raised either before the learned Single Judge in the
writ petition or during the course of hearing of the Letters Patent Appeal.
Reasons for rejection of compassionate appointment cannot be added, by
the way of affidavit nor any reason can now be added. Reasons given in
the inpugned order, before the writ court was under challenge. Now that
order or those reasons, cannot be modified as per decision of Hon'ble the
Supreme Court in MOHINDER SINGH GILL AND ANOTHER Versus THE
CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER, NEW DELHI AND OTHERS
reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405, Para No. 8 of which is quoted hereunder:
"8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a
statutory functionary makes and order based on certain grounds, its
validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be
supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise.
Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to
Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds
later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of
Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji:
Public order, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority
cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the
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officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or
what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are
meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and
conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed
objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.
Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older."
(Emphasis supplied)
7. It further appears that in Paragraph No.s 5 (v), (vi) and (vii) of the
judgment dated 5th December, 2016 passed in L.P.A. No. 532 of 2016, it
has been observed that the circular dated 5th October, 1991 was
applicable in the facts of the present case and the Circular dated 1 st
December, 2015 as well as the Circular dated 2nd September, 2011
relating to minimum education qualification for appointment on Class IV
post have been issued after the date of death of the father of the
respondent. Father of the respondent expired on 11th July, 2011 and the
rights of the parties is to be adjudicated as on the date of death of the
father of the respondent.
8. The application for compassionate appointment of the respondent
was rejected only on the ground that as soon as she got married, she
ceased to be a dependant.
This fact was not accepted by this Court mainly for the reason that
as on the date of death of father of the respondent, i.e. on 11th July, 2011,
respondent was not married and was dependent upon her father. This fact
has remained unchallenged even in this Civil Review and the circulars
issued subsequent to the death of the father of the respondent are not
helpful to the applicants in the facts of the present case.
9. It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of
Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aibam Pishak Sharma reported in AIR 1979
SCC 1047 in Paragraph 3 as under :
"3.The Judicial Commissioner gave two reasons for reviewing his
predecessor's order. The first was that his predecessor had overlooked
two important documents Exs. A-1 and A-3 which showed that the
respondents were in possession of the sites even in the year 1948-49 and
that the grants must have been made even by then. The second was that
there was a patent illegality in permitting the appellant to question, in a
single writ petition, settlement made in favour of different respondents.
We are afraid that neither of the reasons mentioned by the learned
Judicial Commissioner constitutes a ground for review. It is true as
observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab there is
nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from
exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary
jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and
palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the
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exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on
the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the
exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person
seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the
order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on
any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the
decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court
of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers
which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors
committed by the subordinate court."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Meera
Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 170, in
Para 8, 9 and 15 held as under :
"8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an
appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47,
Rule 1, CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court
under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to
the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma
v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., has
made the following pertinent observations: (SCC p. 390, para 3)
"It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of
Punjab, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the
High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every
Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct
grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits
to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be
exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence
which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of
the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time
when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or
error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised
on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that
the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a
court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate
power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors
committed by the subordinate court."
9. Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned judgment, the
Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed that they were
entertaining the review petition only on the ground of error apparent on
the face of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is
concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of
record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the
record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on
points where there may conceivably be two opinions. We may usefully
refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan
Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale wherein, K.C.
Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the following observations
in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record:
An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process
of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two
opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of
the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it
can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and
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complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of
certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the
superior court to issue such a writ.
15. In our view the aforesaid approach of the Division Bench dealing
with the review proceedings clearly shows that it has overstepped its
jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC by merely styling the reasoning
adopted by the earlier Division Bench as suffering from a patent error. It
would not become a patent error or error apparent in view of the settled
legal position indicated by us earlier. In substance, the Review Bench has
reappreciated the entire evidence, sat almost as court of appeal and has
reversed the findings reached by the earlier Division Bench. Even if the
earlier Division Bench's findings regarding C.S. Plot No. 74 were found
to be erroneous, it would be no ground for reviewing the same, as that
would be the function of an appellate court. Learned counsel for the
respondent was not in a position to point out how the reasoning adopted
and conclusion reached by the Review Bench can be supported within the
narrow and limited scope of Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. Right or wrong, the
earlier Division Bench judgment had become final so far as the High
Court was concerned. It could not have been reviewed by reconsidering
the entire evidence with a view to finding out the alleged apparent error
for justifying the invocation of review powers. Only on that short ground,
therefore, this appeal is required to be allowed. The final decision dated
8-7-1986of the Division Bench dismissing the appeal from Appellate Decree No. 569 of 1973 insofar as C.S. Plot No. 74 is concerned as well as the review judgment dated 5-9-1984 in connection with the very same plot, i.e., C.S. Plot No. 74, are set aside and the earlier judgment of the High Court dated 3-8-1978 allowing the second appeal regarding suit Plot No. 74 is restored. The appeal is accordingly allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
(Emphasis supplied)
11. It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Parsion Devi and Ors. v. Sumitri Devi and Ors., reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715, in Para 7 to 9 held as under :
"7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. (SCR at p. 186) this Court opined:
"What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an 'error apparent on the face of the record'). The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an 'error apparent on the face of the record', for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by 'error apparent'. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error."
(emphasis ours)
8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma this Court once again held that review proceedings -6- are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise"."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 78, in Para 13 to 18 held as under :
"13. In order to appreciate the scope of a review, Section 114 CPC has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the court since it merely states that it "may make such order thereon as it thinks fit". The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason". The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order 47 which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection. This Court in Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. held as follows: (SCR p.
186) "[T]here is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by 'error apparent'. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. ... where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out."
14. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury it was held that:
"8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47 Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court, in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. has made the following pertinent observations:-7-
'It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found, it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.' " (SCC pp. 172-73, para 8)
15. A perusal of Order 47 Rule 1 shows that review of a judgment or an order could be sought: (a) from the discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant; (b) such important matter or evidence could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and (c) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason.
16. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma this Court held that there are definite limits to the exercise of power of review. In that case, an application under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the Code was filed which was allowed and the order passed by the Judicial Commissioner was set aside and the writ petition was dismissed. On an appeal to this Court it was held as under: (SCC p. 390, para 3) "It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."
17. The judgment in Aribam case has been followed in Meera Bhanja. In that case, it has been reiterated that an error apparent on the face of the record for acquiring jurisdiction to review must be such an error which may strike one on a mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning. The following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale were also noted: (AIR p. 137) "An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of -8- the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ." (SCR pp. 901-02)
18. It is also pertinent to mention the observations of this Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi. Relying upon the judgments in Aribam and Meera Bhanja it was observed as under: (SCC p. 719, para 9) "9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be 'reheard and corrected'. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Haryana State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Mawasi and Ors., reported in (2012) 7 SCC 200, in Para 26 to 30 and 32 to 35 held as under :
26. At this stage it will be apposite to observe that the power of review is a creature of the statute and no court or quasi-judicial body or administrative authority can review its judgment or order or decision unless it is legally empowered to do so. Article 137 empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The rules framed by this Court under that article lay down that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which reads as under:
Order 47 Rule 1:
"1. Application for review of judgment.--(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved--
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the appellate court the case of which he applies for the review.-9-
Explanation.--The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment."
27. The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in several cases. We shall notice some of them. In S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, this Court referred to the judgments in Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai and Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing and observed:
(S. Nagaraj case, SCC pp. 619-20, para 19) "19. Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice.
In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered: (Rajunder Narain Rae case, MIA p. 216) '... nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, errors have been introduced, these courts possess, by common law, the same power which the courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in. ... The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have, however, gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects, in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies.' Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under:
'It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.' Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order -10- 40 had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, 'for any other sufficient reason' in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of court. The court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice."
28. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, the three-Judge Bench referred to the provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, which was similar to Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and observed: (AIR p. 538, para 32) "32. ... It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein.
It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, ( ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) for any other sufficient reason.
It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words 'any other sufficient reason' must mean 'a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule'. (See Chhajju Ram v. Neki.) This conclusion was reiterated by the Judicial Committee in Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v. Parath Nath and was adopted by our Federal Court in Hari Sankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter, FC at pp. 110-11. The learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal recognises the aforesaid limitations and submits that his case comes within the ground of 'mistake or error apparent on the face of the record' or some ground analogous thereto."
29. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., another three- Judge Bench reiterated that the power of review is not analogous to the appellate power and observed: (AIR p. 1377, para 11) "11. ... A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out."
30. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the High Court can review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and proceeded to observe: (SCC p. 390, para 3) -11- "3. ... But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."
32. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, the Court observed: (SCC p. 719, para 9) "9. ... An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC ... A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'."
33. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India, R.P. Sethi, J., who concurred with S. Saghir Ahmad, J., summarised the scope of the power of review in the following words: (SCC p. 251, para 56) "56. ... Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised."
34. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, the Court observed: (SCC p. 82, para 13) "13. ... The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing 'on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason'. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict."
35. In State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, the Court considered the question whether a Tribunal established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can review its decision, referred to Section 22(3) of that Act, some of the judicial precedents and observed: (SCC p. 633, paras 21-22) "21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground -12- for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier.
22. The term 'mistake or error apparent' by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision."
(Emphasis supplied)
14. In view of the aforesaid decisions and also, looking to the fact that as on the date of death of father of the respondent, i.e. on 11th July, 2011 the respondent was entitled to get compassionate appointment as per Circular dated 5th October, 1991 and taking into consideration reasoning given in paragraph 5 (v), (vi) and (vii) of the judgment dated 5th December, 2016 passed in L.P.A. No. 532 of 2016, there is no substance in this civil review application and the same is, accordingly dismissed.
15. Counsel appearing for the applicant has relied upon the decision in STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS versus ARVINDKUMAR T. TIWARI AND ANOTHER reported in (2012) 9 SCC 545, which is not applicable here looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case.
(a) Father of the respondent expired on 11th July, 2011 and on that date neither the circular of the year 2011 nor that of the year 2015 was in force. As on the date of death of father of the respondent she was unmarried and was dependent on her father and therefore, in this case circular issued in the year 1991 as stated in Paragraph No. 5 (vi) of the judgment in Letters Patent Appeal No. 532 of 2016 shall be applicable and as per the said circular she is eligible to be appointed on compassionate ground.
(b) Application preferred by the respondent after the death of her father was not decided and therefore, writ petition was preferred by the respondent. During pendency of her application, circulars were issued changing the minimum qualification for the -13- appointment of Class IV employees and the same is not applicable to the case of the respondent for the reason that her father died on 11th July, 2011, i.e. prior to the date of issuance of these circulars and the case of the respondent has to be considered keeping in view the fact that she was a dependant as on the date of death of her father.
These peculiar facts of the present case make it different from the case which has been referred to in the reported decision as mentioned by the counsel appearing for the applicant and the ratio decidendi is not applicable in the facts of the present case.
16. This civil review application is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.
(D.N.Patel, A.C.J.) (Ratnaker Bhengra, J.) s.m.