Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
State Of Rajasthan vs Nagji on 12 May, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2001CRILJ1045, 2000WLC(RAJ)UC739
ORDER Mohd. Yamin, J.
1. Nagji was prosecuted before Judicial Magistrate, Sarada District Udaipur for offence under Sections 21/25 of the Arms Act and has been acquitted, therefore, this leave to appeal. A notice was issued to the accused-respondent who has appeared through his counsel.
2. I have heard learned Public Prosecutor as well as learned counsel for the respondent.
3. Briefly stated, it is alleged that on 16-11-1998 accused-respondent was found possessing a muzzle loaded gun, licence of which had expired on 31-12-1996. Bherulal A.S.I. had gone on patrolling duty along with Shanti Lal Head Constable. When they reached in village Sarada accused is said to have been seen carrying a muzzle loaded gun. He was stopped and enquired as to whether he had any licence. The accused-respondent stated that the licence was lying at his residence. The same was obtained. The licence bearing No. 158/90 was valid only up to 31-12-1996. He did not deposit the arm at the police station after expiry of the licence, therefore, the arm was seized. A case under Section 21/25 of the Arms Act was registered and ultimately the accused was challaned. Plea of the accused respondent was recorded under Section 25, Cr.P.C. He claimed trial. Thereafter prosecution examined as many as five witnesses. Learned Magistrate, after hearing both the parties, acquitted the accused.
4. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the accused had committed an offence under Section 21/25 of Arms Act as he was possessing the licence which was not renewed and that the order of acquittal was bad in law.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the accused-respondent submitted that Section 21 of Arms Act, 1959 does not provide any separate punishment and it simply says that after expiry of licence arm should be deposited with the police station. He submitted that in case the prosecution has to challan a person for unlawful possession of an arm, then it has to obtain sanction from the District Magistrate to prosecute as envisaged under Section 39 of the Arms Act. The same has not been obtained, therefore, the order of acquittal of the accused-respondent was proper. To this, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the sanction of the District Magistrate is necessary only when prosecution is launched for offence under Section 3 of the Arms Act. The position comes to as follows :-
As per allegation of the prosecution accused had an arm with licence which was not renewed. Therefore, as per provisions of Arms Act the possession of an arm without licence became punishable under Section 3 of the Arms Act. Section 21 of the Arms Act does not provide any separate sentence and simply regulates the possession of arms. It provides that when possession of an arm becomes unlawful in consequence of expiration of the duration of the licence or of suspension or revocation of a licence, then the person possessing arm shall without unnecessary delay deposit the same either with the officer in charge of the nearest police station or subject to such conditions as may be prescribed with a licensed dealer. The accused-respondent having not done so was definitely in possession of an arm without licence. Therefore, when Section 21 of the Arms Act regulates the possession and it is only Section 3 which provides that no person shall acquire or have in his possession or carry any fire-arm unless he holds in this behalf a licence issued in accordance with the provisions of the Arms Act and the Rules made thereunder, then the accused-respondent had committed contravention of Section 3 of the Arms Act which was punishable under Section 25 only when a sanction is granted by the District Magistrate. The prosecution did not obtain any sanction from the District Magistrate and challaned the accused-respondent without it. The learned Magistrate gave a finding that the prosecution was not able to prove that the arm was in working condition. However, I am of very clear view that Section 21 of the Arms Act simply regulates possession and provides that when licence of an arm has expired the arm will be deposited to the authorities mentioned in the section. This section does not provide any punishment. The offence of possessing an arm without licence comes within Section 3 of the Arms Act which is punishable under Section 25 of the said Act for which sanction was necessary. The accused-respondent had submitted papers before the Magistrate that he got the licence renewed w.e.f. 1-1-1997 to 31-12-2004 and that was done on 2-2-1999.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the licence has been renewed by competent authorities till 31-12-2004 that was done on 2-2-1999 even when the prosecution was pending against the petitioner. I do not find that the approach of the trial Court was illegal and the conclusion arrived at by it was untenable. Hon'ble Supreme Court in (1998) 3 JT (SC) 742, Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, has held that in appeals against acquittal the appellate Court should first record conclusion that the approach of the trial Court was patently illegal and the conslusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. This judgment is based on Ramesh Babu Lal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 6 JT (SC) 79, in which the principles have been enunciated to set aside acquittals and it has been held that mere fact that a view other than the one taken by the trial Court can be legitimately arrived at by the appellate Court on reappraisal of the evidence cannot constitute a valid and sufficient ground to interfere with an order of acquittal unless it comes to the conclusion that entire approach of the trial Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. I may cite (1998) 2 JT (SC) 41, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mahar Singh (dead), in which Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that while reassessing the evidence the appellate Court should take the view which supports acquittal. There appears to be no ground to interfere in the finding of fact arrived at by learned Magistrate that on the date when arm was seized, it was not in serviceable condition.
7. Looking from any angle, there is no ground to interfere in the acquittal of the accused-repondent. Consequently, the leave to appeal is hereby dismissed.