Delhi District Court
Jyoti Sharma vs Suresh Chandra Sharma And Ors on 21 September, 2024
CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022
IN THE COURT OF Ms. MANU GOEL KHARB:
SPECIAL JUDGE (NDPS)-02 SOUTH-WEST DISTRICT
DWARKA COURTS:NEW DELHI
Criminal Appeal No. 71/2022
In the Matter of :
Smt. Jyoti Sharma
W/o Sh. Paras Sharma
D/o Sh. Suresh Sharma
R/o C4C/316, Janakpuri,
New Delhi-110058 ....Appellant
Versus
1. Sh. Suresh Chandra Sharma
2. Smt. Shashi Prabha Sharma
W/o Sh. Suresh Chandra Sharma
3. Sh. Saurabh Sharma
4. Sh. Paras Sharma
both S/o Sh. Suresh Chandra Sharma
All R/o C4B/327-A, Janakpuri,
New Delhi-110058 ....Respondents
Date of Institution of the Appeal : 22.03.2022
Date of Arguments : 17.09.2024
Date of Judgment : 21.09.2024
JUDGMENT:
1. Vide this order, I shall dispose of the present criminal appeal under Section 29 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 filed by the appellant Jyoti Sharma against the impugned order dated 17.02.2022 passed by the court of Ld. MM (Mahila Court)-05, whereby the Ld. Trial Court has dismissed the application filed by the appellant under Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 1 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 Section 12 of PWDV Act on the ground of maintainability.
2. Brief facts leading to the filing of present petition are that marriage between the appellant and respondent no. 4 Paras Sharma took place on 06.03.2018 and they both started residing at C4C/316 Janakpuri, New Delhi owned by Respondent no.1 (hereinafter referred to as the matrimonial home of the appellant). It is alleged that respondents no. 1 to 3 were residing in a different property bearing no. C4B/327A, Janakpuri, New Delhi and simultaneously, respondents no. 1 to 3 also occupied the first floor of House no. C4C/316 where they used to daily spend some time and same is under the lock and key of Respondents 1 to 3. It is alleged that the respondents 1 to 3 used to harass the complainant on account of dowry demands and pressurize her to convince her father for purchasing a flat for Respondent no. 4. Complainant has narrated various incidents of harassment upon her by the respondents and sexual advances made towards her by respondent no. 1. It is stated that when the demand of respondents for another flat was not met by father of the complainant, then, respondent no. 1 in a malafide manner filed complaint before the District Magistrate under The Maintenance & Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 seeking eviction of the appellant and respondent no. 4 from her matrimonial home i.e. C4C/316. Thereafter, Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 2 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 appellant filed an application u/s 12 read with Section 19 of the DV Act before the Ld. MM Mahila Court.
3. Vide order dated 02.11.2020, Ld. MM fixed the matter for arguments on maintainability of petition under Section 12 of DV Act. In the meanwhile, Ld. District Magistrate vide order dated 22.01.2021 gave directions for eviction of the appellant and respondent no. 4 from H. No. C4C/316. Pursuant to the said order, appellant filed an urgent application before the court of Ld. MM seeking ex-parte relief and consequently, Ld. MM vide interim order dated 19.07.2021 stayed the eviction order of Ld. District Magistrate and issued summons to respondents no. 2 and 3 in the DV Act and notice of the urgent application filed by the appellant was also sent to the respondents.
4. Respondents appeared before the court but in the meanwhile, appellant had already filed an appeal against the order of Ld. DM before the Appellate Authority/ Divisional Commissioner who vide order dated 15.09.2021, partially modified the order of Ld. District Magistrate and the order was set aside qua the appellant only and was upheld in respect to the eviction of her husband i.e. Respondent no. 4.
5. Thereafter, upon an application, under Section 25 (2) of D.V. Act for alteration or modification of the order, Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 3 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 Ld. MM vide order dated 11.11.2021, modified the order dated 19.07.2021 by restricting the applicability of the stay order only to the appellant and not with respect to her husband and Ld. MM-05 relisted the matter for arguments on the maintainability of the petition.
6. After hearing arguments, Ld. Trial Court vide detailed order dated 17.02.2022, dismissed the petition on the ground of maintainability after concluding that shared household is not made out between the parties.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL TAKEN BY THE APPELLANT
7. The appellant has assailed the order on the ground that Ld. MM without granting an opportunity to the appellant has erroneously dismissed the complaint at the very threshold. It is averred that Ld. MM has ignored the contents of appellant's amendment application and has come to an erroneous conclusion that this is not a case of shared household. It is further averred that Ld. MM vide order dated 19.07.2021 issued summons to respondents no. 2 and 3, however, vide impugned order dated 17.02.2022, it was held that the complaint is not maintainable and refused to issue summons and same would amount to a review of the order which is not permissible in law. Ld. Counsel has further submitted that the issue of maintainability has been decided only on the basis that the complainant is Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 4 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 residing at a separate house than the respondents and that there was no shared household between the parties, whereas the complainant has filed the present petition under Section 12 of D.V. Act to protect her right of residence in her matrimonial house. It is further averred that Ld. Trial Court has failed to consider and appreciate that it is a well settled law that at the stage of issuance of summons, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record and the court only has to see whether a prima facie case is made out or not.
GROUNDS OF REBUTTAL BY RESPONDENT NO. 1 to 3
8. Respondents no. 1 to 3 appeared before the court and filed written reply wherein they have denied all the allegations leveled against them. It is further stated by the ld. Counsel that the respondents had filed an appeal against the orders dated 15.09.2021 of the Appellate Authority/Divisional Commissioner before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and vide order dated 25.04.2023, High Court has confirmed the order of eviction of the appellant and her husband i.e. R-4 from the house bearing no. C4C/316. It is further stated that there is no illegality in the order passed by Ld. MM as the proceedings under PWDV Act are not criminal in nature and the issue of maintainability can be raised by the party and decided by the court at any stage of trial.
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9. I have heard the arguments addressed by the ld.
counsel for appellant/wife as well as ld. counsel for the respondents and gone through the written submission filed on record by the parties as well as the judgments relied upon by the counsels. I have also gone through the record of Trial Court and other material on record.
10. The two important questions which have been raised and are to be answered in the present revision petition are :
(i) Whether the Magistrate has the power to dismiss the case on the ground of maintainability after summons have been once issued to the respondents.
(ii) Whether shared household is made out in the present case or not.
11. The answer to the first question, that whether Magistrate has the power to dismiss the case on the ground of maintainability after summons have been once issued to the respondents i.e. whether the magistrate has the power to recall his own order, would depend whether the proceedings under the DV Act are civil or crimial in nature.
12. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence (PWDV) Act is a beneficial piece of legislation and as per the statement of objects and reasons, the aim of this Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 6 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 Act is to provide a remedy under the civil law with the intention to preserve the family and at the same time, to provide protection to the victims from domestic violence. Section 2(a) of DV Act defines an "aggrieved person" to mean a woman who is, or has been, in a "domestic relationship" with the "respondent" who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent.
13. In the case of Vijaya Bhaskar Vs. Suganya Devi (2010) SCC Online Mad 5446, it was held :
"12. The term 'civil law' twice used therein is not an empty formality and that would exemplify and demonstrate, display and convey that the proceedings at the first instance should be civil in nature. The legislators were conscious of the fact that all of a sudden if criminal law is enforced on the husband and his relatives, certainly that might boomerang and have deliterious effect in the matrimonial relationship between the husband and wife. The object of the Act is that the victim lady should be enabled by law to live in the matrimonial family atmosphere in her husband/in-laws' house. It is not the intention of the said enactment to enable the lady to get snapped once and for all her relationship with her husband or the husband's family and for that, civil law and civil remedies are most efficacious and appropriate and keeping that in mind alone in the Act, the initiation of action is given the trappings of civil proceedings which the authorities including the Magistrate responsible to enforce the said Act should not loose sight of."
14. It is also held in the judgment of Vijay Bhaskar (supra) that the respondents appearing before the court Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 7 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 in cases filed under D.V. Act are not to be treated as accused and hence, the Magistrate should not issue summons under Section 67 Cr.P.C. by treating them as accused. Relevant para reads as :
"9. A mere reading of Section 13 of the said Act would amply make the point clear that at the initial stage, the Magistrate was not justified in treating the respondents in this case as accused and as such, hereafter relating to applications under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, the Magistrate should not issue summons under Section 61 Cr.P.C. treating the respondents as accused. What is contemplated under Section13 of the Act is a notice specifying the date etc., The endeavour should be on the part of the officer concerned is to deal with the matter gently and treating the respondents in a gentle manner and that should not be lost sight of. Unless the appearance of the respondents are absolutely necessary on a particular date, they should not be simply harassed by compelling them to appear as though they are offenders. The Magistrate should not loose sight of the fact that so long as the case is anterior to the protection order being passed, they should be treated only as respondents. However, after the order under Section 18 of the Act is passed and if there is violation, then the proceedings might get changed and become criminal proceedings. As such, the Magistrates hereafter would scrupulously adhere to the mandates contained in the Act itself."
15. Section 12 of the D.V. Act gives a right to the aggrieved person or the Protection Officer to present an application before the Magistrate for one or more reliefs under the act. The various reliefs that a Magistrate can grant are set out in Chapter IV of the Act which can be broadly categorized as Protection Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 8 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 orders, Residence orders, Monetary orders, Custody orders and compensatory reliefs which are enlisted under Section 18 to 22 of the Act. All the reliefs as mentioned above, are designed to provide a civil remedy to the aggrieved person for immediate redressal of her grievance.
16. While deciding any application for relief under Chapter IV of the Act, the proceedings before the Magistrate are civil proceedings. Out of all the reliefs mentioned above, whenever there is a breach of the protection order granted under Section 18 of the act, it amounts to commission of a cognizable and non bailable offence under Section 31 and 32 of the Act.
17. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kunapareddy v.
Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari, (2016) 11 SCC 774 observed that all of the reliefs contemplated under Chapter IV of the D.V Act are civil in nature and it was opined as under:
"13. Procedure for obtaining order of reliefs is stipulated in Chapter IV of the DV Act which comprises Section 12 to 29. Under Section 12 an application can be made to the Magistrate by the aggrieved person or Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person. The Magistrate is empowered, under Section 18, to pass protection order. Section 19 of the DV Act authorises the Magistrate to pass residence order which may include restraining the respondent from dispossessing or disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person or directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household or even restraining the Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 9 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 respondent or his relatives from entering the portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides, etc. Monetary reliefs which can be granted by the Magistrate under Section 20 of the DV Act includes giving of the relief in respect of the loss of earnings, the medical expenses, the loss caused due to destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved person and the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any. Custody can be decided by the Magistrate which was granted under Section 21 of the DV Act. Section 22 empowers the Magistrate to grant compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the domestic violence committed by the appellant. All the aforesaid reliefs that can be granted by the Magistrate are of civil nature. Section 23 vests the Magistrate with the power to grant interim ex parte orders. It is, thus, clear that various kinds of reliefs which can be obtained by the aggrieved person are of civil nature. At the same time, when there is a breach of such orders passed by the Magistrate, Section 31 terms such a breach to be a punishable offence."
18. The scheme of the act itself shows that the proceedings under Chapter IV would be civil proceedings which would assume the character of criminal proceedings only in case of a violation of the protection order while trying the offence under Section 31 which falls under Chapter V of the Act. Hence, it is clear that merely because a Magistrate may try an offence u/s 31 of the Act for breach of protection order does not render proceeding under Chapter IV of the Act as one before a Criminal Court.
Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 10 of 23CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022
19. Judgment rendered by Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of Dr. P. Pathmanathan Vs. Tmt. V. Monica is a beautiful read. It has discussed in detail the various aspects of civil and criminal procedural law vis-a-vis the PWDV Act and after a comprehensive discussion o of various judgments delivered in that area, the following directions were made :
"52 ................
i. An application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, is not a complaint under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. Consequently, the procedure set out in Section 190(1)(a) & 200 to 204, Cr.P.C as regards cases instituted on a complaint has no application to a proceeding under the D.V Act. The Magistrate cannot, therefore, treat an application under the D.V Act as though it is a complaint case under the Cr.P.C.
ii. An application under Section 12 of the Act shall be as set out in Form II of the D.V Rules, 2006, or as nearly as possible thereto. In case interim ex-parte orders are sought for by the aggrieved person under Section 23(2) of the Act, an affidavit, as contemplated under Form III, shall be sworn to.
iii. The Magistrate shall not issue a summon under Section 61, Cr.P.C to a respondent(s) in a proceeding under Chapter IV of the D.V Act. Instead, the Magistrate shall issue a notice for appearance which shall be as set out in Form VII appended to the D.V Rules, 2006. Service of such notice shall be in the manner prescribed under Section 13 of the Act and Rule 12 (2) of the D.V Rules, and shall be accompanied by a copy of the petition and affidavit, if any.
iv. Personal appearance of the respondent(s) shall not be ordinarily insisted upon, if the parties are effectively represented through a counsel. Form VII of the D.V Rules, makes it clear that the parties can appear before Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 11 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 the Magistrate either in person or through a duly authorized counsel. In all cases, the personal appearance of relatives and other third parties to the domestic relationship shall be insisted only upon compelling reasons being shown. (See Siladitya Basak v State of West Bengal (2009 SCC Online Cal 1903).
v. If the respondent(s) does not appear either in person or through a counsel in answer to a notice under Section 13, the Magistrate may proceed to determine the application ex-parte.
vi. It is not mandatory for the Magistrate to issue notices to all parties arrayed as respondents in an application under Section 12 of the Act. As pointed out by this Court in Vijaya Baskar (cited supra), there should be some application of mind on the part of the Magistrate in deciding the respondents upon whom notices should be issued. In all cases involving relatives and other third parties to the matrimonial relationship, the Magistrate must set out reasons that have impelled them to issue notice to such parties. To a large extent, this would curtail the pernicious practice of roping in all and sundry into the proceedings before the Magistrate.
vii. As there is no issuance of process as contemplated under Section 204, Cr.P.C in a proceeding under the D.V Act, the principle laid down in Adalat Prasad v Rooplal Jindal (2004 7 SCC 338) that a process, under Section 204, Cr.P.C, once issued cannot be reviewed or recalled, will not apply to a proceeding under the D.V Act. Consequently, it would be open to an aggrieved respondent(s) to approach the Magistrate and raise the issue of maintainability and other preliminary issues. Issues like the existence of a shared household/domestic relationship etc., which form the jurisdictional basis for entertaining an application under Section 12, can be determined as a preliminary issue, in appropriate cases. Any person aggrieved by such an order may also take recourse to an appeal under Section 29 of the D.V Act for effective redress (See V.K Vijayalekshmi Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 12 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 Amma v Bindu. V, (2010) 87 AIC 367). This would stem the deluge of petitions challenging the maintainability of an application under Section 12 of the D.V Act, at the threshold before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.
viii. Similarly, any party aggrieved may also take recourse to Section 25 which expressly authorises the Magistrate to alter, modify or revoke any order under the Act upon showing change of circumstances.
ix. In Kunapareddy (cited supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the order of a Magistrate purportedly exercising powers under Order VI, Rule 17 of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "C.P.C."), to permit the amendment of an application under Section 12 of the D.V Act. Taking a cue therefrom, it would be open to any of the respondent(s), at any stage of the proceeding, to apply to the Magistrate to have their names deleted from the array of respondents if they have been improperly joined as parties. For this purpose, the Magistrate can draw sustenance from the power under Order I Rule 10(2) of the C.P.C. A judicious use of this power would ensure that the proceedings under the D.V Act do not generate into a weapon of harassment and would prevent the process of Court from being abused by joining all and sundry as parties to the lis.
x. The Magistrates must take note that the practice of mechanically issuing notices to the respondents named in the application has been deprecated by this Court nearly a decade ago in Vijaya Baskar (cited supra). Precedents are meant to be followed and not forgotten, and the Magistrates would, therefore, do well to examine the applications at the threshold and confine the inquiry only to those persons whose presence before it is proper and necessary for the grant of reliefs under Chapter IV of the D.V Act.
xi. ......................."Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 13 of 23
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20. In view of the above, it is clear that a petition/application under Section 12 of PWDV Act is not the same as a complaint filed under Section 2 (d) of Cr.P.C., and as such a notice for appearance of the respondents as set out in Form VII of D.V. rules is given. Further, the principle laid down in Adalat Prasad Vs Roop Lal Jindal that a process, once issued under Section 204 of Cr.P.C., cannot be reviewed or recalled, will not apply to a proceeding under a DV act.
21. In the present case also, Ld. MM had issued summons to the respondents vide order dated 19.07.2021 and subsequently the matter was again listed for arguments on maintainability. In view of the above discussion and the judgments relied upon as above, there is no iota of doubt that the Court can determine the preliminary issues like the issue of maintainability at any stage and same would not amount to a review or recall of the order by Ld. MM as the proceedings are civil in nature. So, to that extent there is no illegality or perversity in the order of Ld. MM and deserves to be upheld as the question of maintainability is a question of law and can be agitated by a party and can be decided by the Court at any stage.
22. Now the second question for consideration is that whether there was shared household between the parties Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 14 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 or not. In this context, it is argued by learned counsel for the appellant that after her marriage with respondent No. 4, the appellant started residing at C4C/316 Janakpuri and her in-laws i.e. respondent no.1 and 2 used to regularly visit the 1st floor of the said house and the 1st Floor was under the lock and key of the said respondents. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent no. 1 and 2 stated that Ld. MM has passed a well reasoned order and has rightly observed that the parties have not remained in shared household at any point of time after the marriage of the appellant.
23. I have gone through the impugned order dated 17.02.2022. It is observed by the Ld. Trial Court that the complainant is having cordial relations with her husband i.e. respondent no. 4 and she is not claiming any relief against the respondent no. 4. Ld. Trial Court relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the cases of Aarti Sharma Vs. Ganga Saran and Vinay Verma Vs. Kanika Pasricha and held that the complainant, who is the daughter-in-law of respondent no. 2 and 3 cannot be permitted to misuse her right provided under the act to take possession of the property belonging to the respondents.
24. In the present case we are faced with a situation where the right of the daughter-in-law to reside in her matrimonial house is pitted against the rights of her Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 15 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 parents-in-law to whom the said property belongs. On one hand, we have a complainant who came into this house as the legally wedded wife of respondent no. 4 and is residing in the said house since her marriage in 2018 and on the other hand, we have before us, respondents who are the owners of the matrimonial house and are claiming back their own property on account of failure of their son to maintain them.
25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has beautifully addressed the conflict between the Senior Citizens Act and the PWDV Act in the case of S. Vanitha Vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & ors. The Supreme Court did not deny the power of Maintenance Tribunal to pass eviction orders but laid down that the passing of such orders and the utilization of the powers should be incidental to enforcing the right of maintenance and protection of the senior citizens. The court further observed that overriding effect of the senior citizens act cannot be taken as to intentionally depriving an aggrieved woman from her shared household, as has been stipulated under the PWDV Act, in furtherance of which it was noted that :-
" 21. ............... Allowing the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to have an overriding force and effect in all situations, irrespective of competing entitlements of a woman to a right in a shared household within the meaning of the PWDV Act, 2005 would defeat the object and purpose which the Parliament sought to achieve in enacting the latter legislation. The law Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 16 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 protecting the interest of senior citizens is intended to ensure that they are not left destitute, or at the mercy of their children or relatives. Equally, the purpose of the PWDV Act, 2005 cannot be ignored by a sleight of statutory interpretation. Both sets of legislations have to be harmoniously construed. Hence the right of a woman to secure a residence order in respect of a shared household cannot be defeated by the simple expedient of securing an order of eviction by adopting the summary procedure under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007."
26. As already discussed above, the PWDV Act is a piece of beneficial legislation intended to provide a remedy for protection of civil rights of the complainant. One of the civil right which the PWDV Act intends to protect is the right of residence and the court can pass residence orders under Section 19 of the act which includes an order restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household without due process of law. To obtain the relief under the Act, complainant has to prima facie satisfy the court that:
(i) that she is an aggrieved person;
(ii) that she was subjected to domestic violence;
(iii) that domestic Violence was caused by the respondent;
(iv) that domestic Violence was caused in the shared house hold.
27. After the enactment of PWDV Act, the various reliefs available to the aggrieved woman under the Act have Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 17 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 been guaranteed and ensured by way of various pronouncements of the Hon'ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The intention of law has always been to provide a remedy to a woman who comes to the court to seek solace and at the same time does not want to break her family by filing criminal complaints.
28. As per the scheme of PWDV Act, for claiming relief under the Act, the complainant has to prima facie satisfy the Court that she is an aggrieved person who was in a domestic relationship with the respondent and was subjected to Domestic Violence in her shared household. In the landmark judgment of Prabha Tyagi Vs Kamlesh Verma, Criminal Appeal no. 511/2022 Hon'ble Supreme Court held that :-
"23.....The expression 'shared household' in relation to the definition of domestic relationship as per the definition in Section 2(s) means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household. The definition of shared household is thus an inclusive one".Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 18 of 23
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29. It was further observed in the case of Prabha Tyagi (supra) that the salutatory object of Section 17 is to confer a right on every woman in a domestic relationship to have a right to reside in the shared household. It further held that the expression 'shared household' cannot be restricted only to the household where a person aggrieved resides, or at any stage, resided in domestic relationship. A woman in a domestic relationship who is not aggrieved i.e. who has not been subjected to an act of domestic violence by the respondent also has a right to reside in a shared household irrespective of any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. Hon'ble Supreme Court observed :-
"30....Further, though, the expression 'shared household' is defined in the context of a household where the person aggrieved lives or has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with respondent, in the context of Sub-Section (1) of Section17, the said expression cannot be restricted only to a household where a person aggrieved resides or at any stage, resided in a domestic relationship. In other words, a woman in a domestic relationship who is not aggrieved, in the sense that who has not been subjected to an act of domestic violence by the respondent, has a right to reside in a shared household. Thus, a mother, daughter, sister, wife, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law or such other categories of women in a domestic relationship have the right to reside in a shared household de hors a right, title or beneficial interest in the same. Therefore, the right of residence of the aforesaid categories of women and such other categories of women in a domestic relationship is guaranteed under Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 19 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 Sub-Section (1) of Section 17 and she cannot be evicted, excluded or thrown out from such a household even in the absence of there being any form of domestic violence. By contrast, Sub-Section (2) of section 17 deals with a narrower right in as much as an aggrieved person who is inevitably a woman and who is subjected to domestic violence shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Thus, the expression 'right to reside in a shared household' has to be given an expansive interpretation, in respect of the aforesaid categories of women including a mother-in-law of a daughter-in-law and other categories of women referred to above who have the right to reside in a shared household."
30. Hon'ble Supreme Court has given a liberal and expansive interpretation to the term 'right to reside in shared household' and it is held that the expression cannot be restricted only to the actual residence but also to a residence wherein the woman acquires the right to reside due to her domestic relationship. It is further mentioned in the judgment that :
"32. ............This means if a woman in a domestic relationship is an aggrieved person and she is actually residing in the shared household, she cannot be evicted except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Similarly, a woman in a domestic relationship who is an aggrieved person cannot be excluded from her right to reside in the share house hold" would include not only actual residence but also constructive residence in the shared household i.e. right to reside therein which cannot be excluded vis-a- vis an aggrieved person except in accordance Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 20 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 with the procedure established by law. If a woman is sought to be evicted or excluded from the shared household she would be an aggrieved person in which event Sub-Section (2) of Section 17 would apply."
31. Adverting to the facts of the case in hand, the appellant was staying in house no. C4C/316 Janakpuri alongwith respondent no. 4 and so, the said house is the matrimonial house of the appellant (also her shared household). It is a matter of record that respondent no. 1 and 2 were residing at house no. C4B/327, Janakpuri and they approached the Tribunal under The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens, Act 2006 and they got an eviction order against the appellant from her matrimonial house i.e. C4C/316 which was also confirmed by the High Court of Delhi. While dealing with the issue of maintainability, Ld. Trial court has failed to properly deal with the aspect of 'shared household' as conceptualised in the judgment of Prabha Tyagi Vs Kamlesh Verma.
32. It is admitted by both the parties that the complainant was staying in property no. 316. It is alleged that respondents used to visit house no. 316 regularly despite staying at property No. 327. Believing the submissions of complainant to be true, if the respondents 1 to 3 were regularly visiting the house of the complainant, then it certainly amounts to regular Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 21 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 interference by the respondents in the house where the complainant resides. Complainant has categorically levelled allegations against the respondents, particularly against respondent no. 1. Moreover, it was also the case of the respondents before the tribunal that they used to visit the property no. C4C/316. At this stage, the trial court has to prima facie arrive at the satisfaction as to whether the complainant is aggrieved or not and if the finding is in affirmative, the aggrieved person is entitled to obtain any of the reliefs under Chapter IV including the right to reside in the shared household irrespective of the fact whether she has any right, title or interest in the property or not.
33. In the present case also, it is irrelevant whether the appellant is not living in the same house with the respondents or not, or whether she or her husband i.e. respondent no. 4 has any right, title or interest in property bearing no. C4C/316 Janakpuri as the right to reside of the appellant is independent of that right. Ld. Trial Court has decided the issue of maintainability only on the ground that no domestic violence took place against the complainant at the said house and that she is not claiming any relief against her husband but the order of the Ld. Trial Court has not taken into account the law related to domestic violence, domestic relationship and shared household as laid down in the judgment of Prabha Tyagi and Ld. Trial Court seems to Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 22 of 23 CA No. 71/2022 CNR No. DLSW01-002489-2022 have been swayed away by the fact that eviction order has been passed against the complainant under Senior Citizens Act. Further, the proceedings under Senior Citizens Act are summary proceedings and does not prevent the aggrieved to take resort to the PWDV Act for protection of her rights. In fact, Hon'ble Supreme Court has itself recognised the right of aggrieved woman under PWDV Act to reside in the shared household.
34. In light of the above discussion, matter is remanded back to the Ld. Trial Court to decide afresh the issue of maintainability. The present appeal is disposed off in aforesaid terms.
35. Trial court record be sent back to the Ld. Trial Court/Successor court alongwith a copy of this order.
36. Appeal file be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Pronounced in the open Court today MANU by Digitally signed MANU GOEL KHARB i.e. 21.09.2024 GOEL 2024.09.21 Date: KHARB 05:04:59 +0000 (Manu Goel Kharb) Special Judge (NDPS)-02, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi Jyoti Sharma Vs. Suresh Chandra Sharma Page 23 of 23