Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Delhi
Thai Airways International Public Co. ... vs Asstt. Cit on 1 January, 2005
Equivalent citations: [2005]2SOT389(DELHI)
ORDER
S.C. Tiwari, A.M. These 28 appeals are cross appeals filed by the assessee as well as the revenue in relation to orders under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) in relation to financial years 1986-87 to 1991-92 and 1993-94. The assessee is in appeal before us mainly on the ground that it was not liable to deduct tax at source in respect of the payments in question and, therefore, the assessee has wrongly been visited by the consequences envisaged under sections 201(1) and 201(IA). Revenue is in appeal against the findings of the learned CIT(A) insofar as the learned CIT(A) has held in relation to certain payments that the assessee should not be treated as an assessee in default and visited by the consequences of the provisions of sections 201(1) and 201(1A).
2. Before proceeding to decide these appeals on merits, we would first deal with the plea of limitation raised by the learned counsel for the assessee before us. A cording to the assessee for the financial years 1986-87 to 1991-92 the orders under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) were passed on 5-6-1996 i.e., more than four years after the last day of the financial year. According to the learned counsel, although no time-limit to pass orders under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) has been prescribed in the statute, a reasonable time limit is required to be read in these provisions. The learned counsel pointed out that this issue had been considered by the Tribunal in a number of cases and it had been laid down that four years from the end of the financial year in question should be treated to be the maximum limit within which an order under section 201(1) or 201(1A) should be passed by the assessing officer. The learned counsel for the assessee has cited the following Tribunal decisions in support of his contention :
1. Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. IT0 (1996) 57 ITD 536 (Bom);
2. Sheraton International Inc. v. Dy. CIT (2003) 85 ITD 110 (Del);
3. Sahara Airlines Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2002) 83 ITD 11 (Del);
4. Asst. CIT v. Pepsi Foods Ltd. (2003) 129 Taxman 73 (Del-Trib);
5. Mitsubishi Corpn. v. Dy. CIT (2003) 85 ITD 414 (Del).
3. The learned counsel for the assessee has, therefore, urged that following above-mentioned orders of the Tribunal, we should declare orders both under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) for the financial yeas 1986-87 to 1991-92 as barred by limitation.
4. The learned Departmental Representative disputed these contentions of the assessee. He submitted, with respect that the decision rendered in Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. IT0 (1996) 57 ITD 536 (Bom.) and subsequent Tribunal decisions have not appreciated that no period of limitation has been prescribed by the legislature to pass an order under section 201 and, therefore, such order could be passed at any time. The learned Departmental Representative strongly relied upon the judgments of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in CIT v. Black wood Hodge (India) (P.) Ltd. (1971) 81 ITR 807 (Cal) and 139 ITR 439 (Cal) (sic). He pointed out that although the judgment of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of British Airways v. CIT (1992) 193 ITR 439 (Cal) had been cited in passing in the Tribunal decision in the case of Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. (supra), the basic reasoning and logic of the judgment of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court had been left unanswered.
5. The learned Departmental Representative argued that there was some confusion as to the limitation of time in view of the erstwhile provisions of section 231. That provision was interpreted by some courts as laying down in a time-limit. However, section 231 had been omitted from the statute book with effect from 1-4-1989. That was a clear manifestation of the intention of legislature that there should be no time-limit in respect of recovery of tax dues and application of the provisions such as sections 201(1) and 201(1A). The learned Departmental Representative strongly relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Kerala High Court in Secretary, Sultan Battery Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. CIT (2003) 261 ITR 364 (Ker) in support of his contention.
6. The learned Departmental Representative argued that it was a well-settled legal position that the authorities created adjudication of disputes arising under an enactment cannot read any foreign proposition into the statutory provisions of that enactment, more so when statutory provision is clear and unambiguous. In support of this contention, the learned Departmental Representative cited the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Tarulata Shyam v. CIT (1977) 108 ITR 345 (SC). The learned Departmental Representative also mentioned that in the decision in UP. State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. v. ITO (2002) 81 ITD 173 (Lucknow), the Tribunal acknowledged that there was no time-limit fixed for passing an order under sections 201(1) and 201(1A).
7. On merits, the learned Departmental Representative argued that on the facts and in the circumstances of the appeals before us, no reasonable person would say that there was any unreasonable delay on the part of the assessing officer in passing the order under sections 201(1) and 201(1A). He pointed out that the assessee airline made various payments to its employees without deduction of tax at source. Furthermore in the salary certificate and certificate of deduction of tax at source in Form No. 16, the assessee omitted to mention those payments. As a result, the factum of payments in question and non-deduction of tax at source by the assessee was done behind the back of the department and those facts were kept away from the scrutiny of the department. In such circumstances, the assessing officer could proceed to initiated action under sections 201(1) and 201 (1A) only when the facts of the case came to his knowledge. No. fault could be found with the assessing officer for not taking action on the facts he did not know and was not allowed to do. The learned Departmental Representative pointed out that the first order for financial year 1992-93 was made by the assessing officer on 2-12-1994 soon after discovering the kind of payments being made by the assessee. During the course of proceedings before making orders under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) for financial year 1992-93, the learned assessing officer granted the assessee a plethora of opportunities of being heard, but the assessee by and large adopted a very non-cooperative attitude. As a result the assessing officer was forced to estimate the quantum of payments without deducting tax at source made by the assessee. After having made the orders for financial year 1992-93 on 2-12-1994, the assessing officer proceeded to take remedial action in respect of earlier financial years and orders for financial years 1986-87 to 1991-92 and 1993-94 were passed by the learned assessing officer on 5-6-1996. On those facts it could not be held that there was any unreasonable delay on the part of the assessing officer. In the absence of any statutory provisions and on the particular facts of the case, the orders could not be rendered inoperative on the lame plea of the assessee regarding inordinate delay.
8. The learned Departmental Representative vehemently argued that as far as orders under section 201(1A) were concerned, the same merely translated into action mandatory provisions of statute. The courts had held in a number of cases that levy of interest under section 201(1A) was compensatory in nature and, therefore, the expression "shall" in the statutory provision should be read "shall" only. In respect of these contentions, the learned DR relied upon the judgments in Bennet Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. Mrs. V.P. Damle Third ITO (1986) 157 ITR 812 (Bom); British Airways v. CIT (supra); CIT v. Dhanalakshmy Wvg. Works (2000) 245 ITR 13 (Ker) and above all the judgments of jurisdictional High Court in CIT v. Prem Nath Motors (P) Ltd. (2002) 253 ITR 705 (Del).
9. In reply the learned counsel for the assessee argued that it was cardinal principle of law that all actions prejudicial to a person should be initiated and completed within time. He argued that insofar as the judgments of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court relied upon by the learned Departmental Representative were concerned, the same had already been considered by the Tribunal in the case of Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. (supra) as well as Mitsubishi Corpn.'s case (supra).
10. The learned counsel for the assessee argued that judicial authorities must fix some reasonable time-limit in the absence of a statutory time-limit. It was not a new concept. In tax matters it dated back to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in CIT v. Narsee Nagsee & Co. (1960) 40 ITR 307 (SC). He pointed out that the judgment in CIT v. Narsee Nagsee & Co. (1960) 40 ITR 307 (SC) has once again been reiterated in a very recent judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. British India Corpn. Ltd. (2004) 268 ITD 481 (SC). The judgment of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT v. Back wood Hodge (India) (P) Ltd. (1971) 81 ITR 807 (Cal) was no longer a good law because in the judgment in ITO v. Delhi Development Authority (2001) 252 ITR 772 (SC) Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that an order under section 201 is an assessment order. In relation to the judgment of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of British Airways (supra), the learned counsel pointed out that Hon'ble High Court did not consider the question of limitation. As to the decision of the Lucknow Tribunal in U.P. State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. v. ITO (2002) 81 ITR 173 (Luck), the learned counsel argued that in that case it was held that there was no chargeable tax. The learned counsel pointed out that it should not be lost sight of that after all the liability raised by the provisions of sections 201(1) and 201(1A) is vicarious liability. In law the tax liability was fixed on the payee and not the payer. As far as the payer was concerned, it was only a vicarious liability.
11. As to our question as to form where the Tribunal could derived an authority to lay down a time-limit when there was no time-limit prescribed by the statute, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Government of India v. Citadel Fine Pharmaceuticals (1990) 184 ITR 467 (SC).
12. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. The learned counsel for the assessee has relied upon the following Tribunal decisions :
n Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO (1996) 57 ITD 536 (Bom) n Sheraton International Inc. v. Dy. CIT (2003) 85 ITD 110 (Del) n Sahara Airlines Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2002) 83 ITD 11 (Del) n Asstt. CIT Pepsi Foods Ltd. (2003) 129 Taxman 73 (Del-Trib) n Mitsubishi Corpn. v. Dy. CIT (2003) 85 ITD 414 (Del)
13. On the strength of these Tribunal decisions the learned counsel has sought to argue that since the orders under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) in the case of the assessee for financial years 1986-87 to 1991-92 have been made on 5-6-1996 i.e., four years after the last day of the financial year, the orders were required to be quashed as already barred by limitation when they were passed.
14. It is well settled legal position that a judgment is an authority only for what it actually decides, as pointed out by Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Letham (1901) AC 495 (HL). It is, therefore, essential to carefully ascertain as to whether there is really any assistance or harm to the case of the litigant from the earlier decided cases. The first, decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the assessee is that of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in the case of Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO (supra). In that case the assessee did deduct tax at source from payments on account of interest and paid the same to the credit of Central Government. There was, however, some delay in the deposit of tax to the account of Government for assessment years 1978-89 to 1986-87. The assessing officer passed orders on 21-5-1990 levying interest under section 201(1A) of the Act. The assessee argued before the learned CIT(A) that the assessing officer was not justified in charging interest after such a long lapse of time even if there were not limits provided in the provisions of section 201(1A). Being unsuccessful before the learned CIT(A), Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. case (supra) filed further appeal before the Tribunal.
15. While passing order on the facts as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Hon'ble Tribunal noted that as per the judgments of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. CIT (1992) 193 ITR 457 (Cal) and in the case of British Airways v. CIT (supra) levy of interest under section 201(1A) was not barred by limitation. However, the Hon'ble Tribunal preferred to rely upon the judgment of Kerala High Court in the case of K. Iswara Bhatt v. CIT (1993) 200 ITD 238 (Ker) wherein it was held as follows :
lt is trite law that statutory powers must be exercised bona fide, reasonably, without negligence and for the purpose for which they were conferred."
Hon'ble Tribunal also referred to the judgment of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., wherein the Hon'ble High Court had held that the sur-tax assessment completed within less than two years cannot be said to be an unreasonable period. The Hon'ble Tribunal noticed that the assessee had filed returns of TDS under section 206 for all the years involved. The delay in the payments ranged from less than one month to three months and in few cases six to 12 months. However, the assessing officer woke up to the question of levy of interest in relation to delay of payment after lapse of 5 to 10 years. On consideration of the matter we find it difficult to accept that by this decision the Tribunal have laid down as a rule that in every case where an order under sections 201(1) or 201(1A) is passed beyond the period of 4 years from the end of the financial year, the same should be annulled as having been made after the same had become time barred. For one thing the Hon'ble Tribunal found that in the two judgments of Calcutta High Court a contrary view had been taken. However, the Tribunal decided to rely upon some other authorities (not directly related to provisions of section 201(1) or 201(1A) in view of the very strong facts of the case i.e., the assessing officer levying interest after lapse of 5 to 10 years in respect of delay of one to 3 months and in few cases six to 12 months in making payments when all the relevant facts were available to the assessing officer all the while.
16. The second case relied upon by the learned counsel for the assessee is that of Sahara Airlines Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (supra). On perusal of the order of the Tribunal, it is clear to us that that judgment is heavily upon the particular facts and circumstances of that that case. There is no similarity at all between the facts of Sahara Airlines Ltd.'s case (supra) and those in the appeals before us. After having decided the matter in favour of the assessee on the particular facts of the case, in passing, towards the end the Tribunal dealt with the assessee's plea of limitation in the following manner:-
"42. The last issue arising out of these appeals is whether the orders of assessing officer under section 201 of the Act were passed within the period of limitation. It has been admitted by the learned counsel for the assessee that no period of limitation is prescribed for passing of such orders but it was contended by him that such orders must be passed within the reasonable period. In this connection, he relied on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT v. Dunlop Rubber Co. (India) Ltd. (1980) 121 ITR 476 (Cal) and the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd v. IT0 (supra) wherein it has been held that period of 4 years is a reasonable and, therefore, any order passed after that period should be held to be invalid.
43. On the other hand, the learned Senior Departmental Representative has submitted that no period of limitation is provided under section 201(1) and no court can import anything into the statute. In this connection, he relied on various decisions as Dy. CIT v. Central Concrete & Allied Products Ltd. (1999) 236 ITR 595 (Cal.), Laxmandas Pranchand v. Union of India (1998) 234 ITR 261 (MP)/AIR 1990 SC 993 (sic). It was further submitted that the issue is covered directly by the decision of Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT v. Black Wood Hodge (India) (P.) Ltd. (1971) 81 ITR 807 (Cal) and, therefore, such orders cannot be quashed if the order is passed after four years.
44. Rival contentions of the parties have been considered carefully. No doubt, the decision of the Calcutta High Court relied upon by the learned Senior Departmental Representative helps the case of the revenue since it has been held that order under section 18(7) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 corresponding to section 201 of the Act can be passed at any time. However, the said decision is contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S.B. Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India AIR 1976 SC 1115 wherein it has been held that the revisional authority should initiate proceedings within the reasonable time even in the absence of a time-limit for initiation of revisional proceedings in the statute. Relying on this decision of the Supreme Court the Tribunal has held in the case of Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. (supra) that the orders under section 201 of the Act should be passed within a period of 4 years from the end of assessment year. Accordingly, we would pref er the decision of the Tribunal since it has been delivered after taking into consideration the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. Respectfully following the same it is held that order under section 201 of the Act must be passed within a period of 4 years from the end of the assessment year. In the present case all the orders have been passed on 10-5-2000. Four years from the end of assessment year means 5 years from the end of financial year. In the present case, the orders have been passed with reference to financial years. Therefore, it is held that the order under section 201 of the Act for the financial year 1994-95 was barred by limitation. Other orders for the financial years 1995-96 to 1998-99 are within the period of limitation. Accordingly, the order under section 201(1) for financial year 1994-95 is quashed while other orders are held to be passed within reasonable period."
17. It is, thus, seen that on the particular facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble Delhi Bench have in the case of Sahara Airlines Ltd. (supra) preferred to rely upon the decision of ITAT in the case of Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. (supra) though it was admitted that the issue was covered directly in favour of the assessee by the judgment of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT v. Blackwood Hodge (India) (P) Ltd. (supra). It was felt by the Bench that the judgment of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court was contrary to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.B. Gurbux Singh v. Union of India AIR 1976 SC 1115. However, the Hon'ble Tribunal did not notice another judgment of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of British Airways v. CIT (supra), which in turn is based upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raja Jagdish Pratap Sahi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1973) 88 ITR 443 (SC).
18. The third case relied upon by the learned counsel for the assessee is the decision of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench "D" in the case of Sheraton International Inc. v. Dy. CIT (supra). That judgment has been given by the Hon'ble Tribunal in the context of the provisions of section 142(1) read with section 144 and the issue has been decided in favour of the revenue. However, the learned counsel for the assessee has referred to the observations of the Bench at page 118 of the order, wherein only a reference has been made to certain judgments and it has been held that a notice should be issued within reasonable period. We do not find any assistance from this decision of the Tribunal to the proposition of the learned counsel for the assessee that in every case, where an order under section 201(1) or 201(1A) is not made within a period of f our years from the end of the financial year, such order should be treated as void on account of having been barred by limitation.
19. Next authority cited by the learned counsel for the assessee is in the case of Mitsubishi Corpn. v. Dy. CIT (2003) 85 ITD 414 (Delhi). In that case the assessee had duly deducted TDS against payments of salaries to its Indian staff as well as Japanese staff. However, tax on salary paid to some Japanese staff in Japan was paid by the assessee on grossing up method. On receipt of return filed in Form No. 24, the Joint Commissioner informed the assessee by a letter that return had been verified and accepted. However, the Dy. CIT reopened the matter and rejected the grossing up method of assessee. Thereafter Dy. CIT worked out tax liability and interest liability under sections 201(1) and 201(1A). On these facts the Tribunal held that in view of express provisions of section 9(1)(ii) and Explanation thereof, it could not be said that assessee was under a bona fide belief that various allowances paid by it to its expatriate staff outside India were not liable to tax and consequently not liable to deduction of tax at source. However, following the decisions of the Tribunal in the case of Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. (supra) and Sahara Airlines Ltd.'s (supra), the Tribunal held that orders under section 201(1)/ 201(1A) pertaining to financial years 1988-89 to 1994-95 were time barred. Before doing so the Hon'ble Tribunal recorded submissions of the revenue in paragraph 36 in the following words :
"36. On the other hand, the learned CIT Departmental Representative has opposed such contention by arguing that no period of limitation has been prescribed by the legislature for passing order under section 201 and consequently, such order could be passed at any time. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of British Airways v. CIT (supra) and in the case of CIT v. Blackwood Hodge (India) (P) Ltd. (supra). She further submitted that section 231,which was interpreted by the courts as laying down a time-limit, has been omitted from the statute book from 1-4-1989. According to her, such omission shows the intention of the legislature that no time-limit is required. It was also submitted that it is a well settled legal position that nothing can be read into the provisions where such provisions are clear and unambiguous. Reliance was placed on Supreme Court as 254 ITR 154 and Smt. Tarulata Shyam v. CIT (1977) 108 ITR 345 (SC). It was alternatively submitted that period of 4 years should be counted from the end of the year in which necessary details were filed by the assessee. Since all the details were filed in 1998, the impugned order was in time. It was also submitted that the decision of the Tribunal relied upon by the assessee is distinguishable on facts."
20. It is seen by us that there is no dispute in the order of the Tribunal in the case of Mitsubishi Corpn. (supra) that in view of the judgments of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of British Airways v. CIT (supra) and in the case of CIT v. Blackwood Hodge (India) (P) Ltd. (supra), an order under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) cannot be rendered inoperative for the reason of any perceived delay in passing of those orders. However, the Tribunal have preferred to follow its own orders in the case of Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. (supra) and Sahara Airlines Ltd. (supra).
21. Finally, the learned counsel for the assessee has relied upon the decision of the ITAT, Delhi Bench "E", New Delhi dated 8-8-2002 in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. (supra). In that case the assessee vehemently disputed its liability to deduct tax at source. A number of arguments were made by the assessee in support of his contentions. The assessee's explanation was, however, rejected by the assessing officer and it was held that the provisions of section 195, as amended, had fastened liability to deduct tax at source at the time of credit of such income or at the time of payment, whichever was earlier. After detailed consideration of the matter, the Hon'ble Bench upheld the contention of the revenue that the assessee was required to deduct tax at source at the time of crediting the account of the payee in its books of accounts. The Tribunal, however, following the decision in the case of Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO (supra) held that as the order under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) had been made beyond the expiry of 4 years from the end of the financial year 1989-90, the same were required to be held as barred by limitation.
22. On consideration of the matter, we are of the view that for the following reasons the plea of the assessee that the orders in his case under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) should be declared as void on account of having become barred by limitation should not be accepted :
(i) There is no doubt that the Hon'ble High Court have in the case of CIT v. Blackwood Hodge (India) (P) Ltd. (supra) and in the case of British Airways v. CIT (supra) clearly held that the argument of the assessee that the amount of tax deducted at source had become irrecoverable being barred by limitation cannot be sustained. In the various decisions relied upon by the learned counsel of the assessee, this proposition is not in dispute. However, on the facts of the cases before them, the Tribunal have held that the orders under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) having been made by the assessing officer after the expiry of 4 years from the end of the financial year, should be treated as having been made beyond a reasonable period and, therefore, for that reason should also be treated as barred by limitation. In this view of the matter, it can by no means be held that there is an infallible time-limit of four years from the end of the financial year in operation in respect of every order under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) made or to be made by the assessing officer.
(ii) Factual background in the appeals before us is vastly different and distinguishable from the facts of the cases relied upon by the assessee. We see considerable force in the contention of the learned Departmental Representative that there was no unreasonable delay on the part of the assessing officer. The assessee made certain payments to its employees on different counts but did not deduct tax at source. This fact was not highlighted by the assessee in certificate of tax deduction at source issued in Form No. 16. The assessing officer was thus left unaware of the facts relating to non-deduction of tax at source by the assessee. After the assessing officer became aware of the facts of the case, he acted promptly. The assessing officer cannot be defaulted for not having acted upon the facts that were not placed before him and which he could not have enquired into or obtained in the ordinary course. As against this, we find the facts in the case of Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. (supra) vastly different. In that case, every year the assessee filed returns of tax deducted at source under the provisions of section 206. The assessee filed the returns of income and subsequently proceedings took place before the CIT(A). All the relevant facts were before the assessing officer. However, the assessing officer made orders under section 201(1A) only on 21-5-1990 in relation to assessment years 1978-79 to 1986-87. There is clear finding of the Tribunal in the case of Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. (supra) that even if the assessing officer failed to scrutinize the short deduction of tax or delay in payment of the annual returns in the normal time, he could have done the same at the time of passing the assessment order or when he gave effect to the appellate order of the CIT(A). No such argument has been taken before us. Any failure or lapse on the part of the assessing officer has not even been alleged, left alone established. In these circumstances it is difficult to hold the impugned orders as barred by limitation. Reference in this respect is also invited to the order of the Tribunal in Lakshmi Gnaneswara Enterprises & Financiers v. ITO (2000) 72 ITD 295 (Hyd.).
(iii) There is no time-limit laid down under the provisions of Income Tax Act for orders under sections 201(1) and 201(1A). The Tribunal does not enjoy the same powers as Hon'ble Supreme Court under article 142 of the Constitution of India to pass such orders as deemed fit for doing complete justice in the matter before them. That being so, the extreme view as to the illegality of an order passed by the authority in the absence of statutory support should be taken only in rare cases where the authority acted in complete disregard of reasonability. We do not find any such circumstance existing in these appeals so as to warrant the action of annulment of the orders under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) made by the assessing officer.
23. In view of the discussion in the foregoing paragraphs, we reject the assessee's plea as to the orders being illegal on account of having been made beyond the time-limit in the eyes of law.
24. We shall now come to the merits of the orders under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) as disputed in these appeals by the assessee as well as revenue. During the course of hearing before us both the parties agreed that the issues involved and their respective arguments thereupon are the same as presented before us during the course of elaborate hearing in relation to assessee's appeals in TDS Appeal Nos. 50 and 51 (Del)/95 for financial year 1992-93. Accordingly our findings on various aspects of the matter and issues are the same. Following that order we hold that all the orders under section 201(1) made by the assessing officer should be cancelled. At the same time, levy of interest under section 201(1A) is upheld for each assessment year subject to re-computation in accordance with our directions contained in the order in the case of the assessee in TDS Appeal Nos. 50 and 51 (Del)/95.
25. In the result, while the assessee's appeals in relation to orders passed under section 201(1) are allowed; revenue's appeals in relation to orders under section 201(1) are dismissed. The appeals of both the assessee and the revenue in relation to orders under section 201(1A) shall be, for statistical purposes, treated as partly allowed.