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[Cites 18, Cited by 0]

Jharkhand High Court

Govardhandas Nanji Taunk vs Balram N. Taunk & Ors. on 25 April, 2012

                        APPEAL FROM ORIGINAL DECREE No. 863 of 1993 (R).
                                              ---
              Against the judgment dated 29th May, 1993 and decree signed on10th
              June, 1993 passed by Shri Mahendra Narayan Singh, 2nd Additional
              Subordinate Judge, Jamshedpur in Partition Suit No. 122 of 1990.

                                              ---

              Ravindra Taunk and others       ...       ...   ...    ...    ...     Appellant


                                              Versus


              Smt. Vasanti B. Taunk and others ...          ...    ...    ...     Respondents
                                              ---
              For the Appellants                  : M/s. P.K. Prasad, Senior Advocate,
                                                         Rahul Gupta and Ayush Aditya,
                                                         Advocate.
              For   the Respondents No. 1,2 and 4 : Mr. Lalit Kumar Lal, Advocate.
              For   the Respondent No. 3          : M/s. S.N. Das, Advocate.
              For   Respondents No. 5 to 9 & 12 : M/s. Indrajit Sinha, D.K.
                                                         Chakravorty, Rohit Roy and
                                                         Harjeet Singh, Advocate.
              For   the Respondents No. 10 & 16 : M/s. Manjul Prasad, Senior
                                                         Advocate and S.L. Agrawal,
                                                         Advocate.
                                            ---
                                         PRESENT
                           THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE POONAM SRIVASTAV
                                              ---
                     C.A.V. ON 19.04.2012.            PRONOUNCED ON 25.4.2012.
                                              ---
Poonam Srivastav, J. The instant appeal arises out of the judgment and decree dated
              29.5.1993

and 10.6.1993 respectively passed by Shri Mahendra Narayan Singh, 2nd additional Subordinate Judge, Jamshedpur in Partition Suit No. 122 of 1990.

2. The suit was filed for partition of the joint Hindu family properties which consists of 13 properties. The plaintiff instituted the suit on the ground that common ancestor of the parties Nanji Govindji Taunk died on 25th March, 1955 and all the aforesaid 13 properties are joint Hindu family property and, the plaintiff and defendants are co-sharers. The plaintiff claimed that the properties are liable to be partitioned. The plaintiff claimed following reliefs:-

(a) for a a preliminary decree for 1/7th share in the properties described in Schedule 'B';
(b) for appointment of a survey knowing pleader 2. commissioner to demarcate the plaintiff's 1/7th share in the said schedule "B" properties;
               (c)     for a final decree on the basis of the pleader
                       commissioner's report and allotment chart;
               (d)     for costs of the suit;
               (e)     for any other relief or reliefs to which the plaintiff may
                       be entitled under law and equity.
3. Nanji Govindji Taunk left behind his widow i.e. 2nd wife Jetu Bai and four sons from the wed lock and three sons from the wed lock of 1st wife Heji Bai, who predeceased her husband in the year 1920. The genealogical table of Late Nanji Govindji Taunk, at the time of institution of the partition suit is detailed below:--
NANJI GOVINDJI TAUNK (died on 25.03.1955) Heji Bai Jetu Bai (predeceased in 1920) (died on 05.06.1974)

3 sons 4 sons Ranchhod N.Taunk, Shyamji N. Taunk, Lakshman N. Taunk Govardhandas N. Taunk (died on 27.05.79) (Def. No. 4) (died on 11.10.73) (Plaintiff) * Ratilal R. Taunk - son * Girish L. Taunk - son * Balram N. Taunk (Def. No. 10) (Def. No. 5) (Def. No. 1) * Jayant R. Taunk - son * Nagilal L. Taunk - son * Nandlal N. Taunk (Def. No. 11) (Def. No. 6) (Def. No. 2) * Jayo - daughter * Nitin L. Taunk - son * Hansraj N. Taunk (Def. No. 12) (Def. No. 7) (Def. No. 3) * Must. Kokila - daughter * Must. Manjula - daughter (Def. No. 13) (Def. No. 8) * Pushpa - daughter * Hansa - daughter (Def. No. 14) (Def. No. 9) * Renu - daughter (Def. No. 15) * Raji Bai - widow (Def. No. 16)

4. All the brothers were arrayed as defendants in Title (Partition) Suit No.122 of 1990. The suit was decreed in respect of Item Nos. I, II, III and V holding that these properties i.e. Item No. I-Holding No. 70, Contractor's Area, Bistupur, Jamshedpur; Item No. III-Holding No. 105, Contractor's Area, Bistupur, Jamshedpur and Item No. V is No. 6, S.B. Shop Area, Bistupur, Jamshedpur are joint and, therefore, the plaintiffs and the defendants are all entitled for an equal share (1/7th share) in the said property. (So far the findings in respect of Property Nos. I, II, III and V are 3. concerned, there is no dispute between the present plaintiff-appellants and the defendant-respondents).

5. The suit was dismissed in respect of Property No. IV- Nalanda Hotel, S.B. Shop Area, Bistupur, Jamshedpur; Item No. VII All House Properties (one godown on "N" Road, West near Khalsa Club, P.S. Bistupur, Jamshedpur. Item No. VI-Natraj Building, Bistupur, Jamshedpur; Item No. VIII-TMG 10 and 11, Bistupur, Jamshedpur; Item No. IX-Godown at Northern Town, Bistupur, Jamshedpur; Item No. X-House at Khasmahal, Jugsalai, Jamshedpur; Item No. XI-Land measuring 2068 acres at Asanboni, Chandil; Item No. XII-Land measuring 1.02 acres at Pardih, Mango, Jamshedpur and Item No. XIII-Land measuring 65ft. x 45ft, Falidih, Raipur, M.P. were held as not joint family properties.

6. One written statement was filed on behalf of defendants no. 1, 2 and 4; two separate written statements were filed on behalf of defendant no. 3 and defendant no. 10. Defendants No. 5, 6 and 7 did not file their written statement and did not contest the suit. The plaint was amended after the entire evidence was recorded on 16th March, 1993 and the amendment was incorporated. Subsequent to the aforesaid amendment, defendants no. 10 and 16 and defendant nos. 1, 2 and 4 filed additional written statements.

7. Issues were framed on 6th May, 1991 and the suit proceeded on the basis of these pleadings.

After the suit was dismissed in respect of the properties other than Property Nos. I, II, III and V which were held to be the joint Hindu family property, the instant appeal was preferred. Defendants-respondents no. 5, 6 and 7 filed a counter claim in this Court on 14.10.2004 under Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was dismissed vide order dated 9th March, 2011 and the same was challenged in the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The contesting parties have informed that it is still pending. Previously, this Court postponed the hearing of the appeal on account of pendency of the Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. Subsequently, I. A. No. 1811of 2011 was preferred by the plaintiff- appellants wherein they made a prayer that the appellants want to withdraw the appeal in respect of Item No. VII. The appellants unequivocally stated in the interlocutory application that the findings arrived at by the court below were acceptable to him. This interlocutory application (I.A. No. 1811 of 2011) was challenged on behalf of the defendants-respondents no. 5, 6 and 7.

8. Shri Indrajit Sinha, Advocate on behalf of respondent nos. 5, 6 and 7, vehemently argued that he has a right to challenge withdrawal of the 4. appeal in respect of one property which apparently is collusive. Shri Indrajit Sinha brought to my notice an order passed by this Court in I.A. No. 165 of 2005 dated 5th May, 2005 where the parties were injuncted from alienating the property during the pendency of this appeal. This order was passed during the pendency of the cross objection. Since the cross objection has been rejected and the special leave petition is pending, the subsequent I. A. at the instance of of the plaintiffs was moved in collusion with respondent no. 1,only with a view to deprive defendant nos. 4, 5 and 6 from the property and to circumvent the order of injunction granted by this Court. They claimed that they have a share in the property and further assertion of Mr. Indrajit Sinha is that though no written statement was filed on their behalf, but he has a right to advance his argument and challenge the judgment under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Emphasis on behalf of respondents no. 5, 6 and 7 is that this is a partition suit and, therefore, all the parties are plaintiffs and have an equal claim and share in the properties. Thus, in view of Order XXIII Rule 1 (5), it clearly prohibits abandonment of part of claim under sub-rule (1) or to withdraw part of the claim without the consent of the other plaintiffs (partners of the partition suit). Learned counsel has also stressed that though defendants no. 5, 6 and 7 failed to prefer a written statement as well as their counter claim is rejected, the said defendants cannot be deprived to contest the appeal under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

9. Learned counsel has relied on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Chandramohan Ramchandra Patil and others vs. Bapu Koyappa Patil and others 2003 SCC 552. Paragraph 13 of the observation of the Apex Court is quoted below:--

"In a suit for partition, plaintiff and defendants are parties of equal status. If the right of partition has been recognised and upheld by the court, merely because only some of the plaintiffs have appealed and not all, the court was not powerless. It could invoke provisions of Order 41 of Rule 4 read with Order 41 of Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The object of Order 41 of Rule 4 is to enable one of the parties to a suit to obtain relief in appeal when the decree appealed from proceeds on a ground common to him and others. The court in such an appeal may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the parties who are in the same interest as the appellant".

10. This is in support of the contention that the withdrawal by the plaintiff at this stage of appeal which arises out of a partition suit smacks of fraud and with an ulterior motive to deprive the defendants from their share. It is also submitted that this Court has a right to examine these aspects before the plaintiff-appellants is permitted to withdraw part of the relief claimed in the suit so far it relates to property no. VII. Further argument is that in a partition suit, all the defendants-plaintiffs have equal rights; and, therefore, in the instant case, the suit cannot be 5. withdrawn without consent of all the parties.

11. Shri P.K. Prasad, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Ayush Aditya, Advocate argued that if this contention of learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents no. 5, 6 and 7 is accepted, then Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure will never be applicable in any partition suit whatsoever.

12. After hearing the respective counsel at length, I have also noticed that injunction was granted during the time when cross-objection was pending. Respondent No. 1 was also restrained from alienating the property. Subsequently this cross-objection was rejected firstly because no written statement was filed and secondly it was preferred at a very belated stage. The appellants' counsel requested to await the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the pending S.L.P. on the cross-objection and thereafter proceed with the final hearing.

13. Shri Indrajit Sinha gave statement on the basis of instruction of his client that he will not press S.L.P. before the Apex Court in case he is permitted to participate in the appeal and contest the appeal within the four corners and ambit of Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Respondents No. 5, 6 and 7 were arrayed as defendants before the trial court and they are also parties. Admittedly they also have an equal share in the property being descendants of the common ancestor. It goes without saying that the power of the court under Order XLI Rule 33 is inherent and a decree and order can be made not withstanding that the appeal is only to a part of the decree and in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection. Evidently Mr. Indrajit Sinha has stated that he will not press S.L.P., therefore, this appeal can be heard without awaiting the result of the Apex Court. Respondents No. 5, 6 and 7 are, therefore, permitted to advance their argument regarding the properties in question including Property No. VII irrespective of the fact that the plaintiff wants to withdraw his claim over the said property. This Court while disposing of I.A. No. 168 of 2005 was also satisfied that respondent no.1 or any of the party cannot be allowed to alienate the property during the pendency of the appeal and, therefore, an order of status quo was passed. This Court while deciding the instant appeal has to ensure substantial justice and, therefore, the interlocutory application moved at the behest of the plaintiff for withdrawal of his claim over Property No. VII, even if allowed, respondents no. 5, 6 and 7 are entitled to raise their objection within the ambit of Order XLI Rule 33 C.P.C. The share and claim of the respective parties shall, therefore, be examined 6. subsequently while deciding different properties at a later stage. The plaintiff shall, however, make no claim over the property no. VII. His I.A. stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

14. The plaint case as pleaded by the plaintiff-appellants is that all the parties to the suit are Hindus and are governed by the Hindu Succession Act. The common ancestor Late Govindji Kanji Taunk had two sons, namely, Kachraj Govindji Taunk and Nanji Govindji Taunk. There was amicable partition between the two brothers and they had separate earning, residence and there was a severance of joint status. The suit was instituted for partitioning the property of Nanji Govindji Taunk and his heirs and legal representatives. The genealogical chart has already been detailed above. The assertion in paragraph 7 of the plaint is that Nanji Govindji had a large business out of his own income. Several immovable properties and pucca houses were constructed and he also left large number of movable properties in the shape of business of different variety. The properties were acquired in his own name and some in the name of the members of his joint family. In paragraph 12 of the plaint, it is submitted that with effect from 1.1.1958, all the brothers except Ranchhod decided to start a contract business in the name and style of "Nanji Govindji & Sons". During continuation of the said firm, some land at Asanboni and Pardih situated at National Highway No. 33 was purchased. Six brothers also purchased some land for Orchard and cultivation purpose in the name of joint family members, namely, Rajendra Shyamji and Govardhan Das Nanji, the plaintiff in the name of Nanji Govindji & Sons. Thus the total land measuring about 21.70 acres was purchased with an understanding that all the six brothers will enjoy the fruits of the said property. It is further pleaded that about ten years before the suit was instituted, Shyamji Nanji was put incharge of the land to manage the same on behalf of the joint family but since last five years till the day the suit was instituted, usu fructs of the land was not being shared. The joint family also purchased Plot No. 65 in Khasmahal area and constructed a bungalow in the year 1965. Further contention is that the joint family acquired the land at "N" Town, Jamshedpur and also at "N" Road, Bistupur near Khalsa Club for godown purposes in the intervening period commencing from 1962 to 1968. In paragraph 15, the contention raised on behalf of the plaintiff is that the contract and other business used to be run in partnership in different names and joint family members were partners of the said partnership business. In paragraph 17, the plaintiff has pleaded that during the period 1978-1979, the three brothers suggested to reduce the number of partners in all the three 7. firms for the purpose of income tax facility but no actual division took place; only the returns were filed in different names with different partners. Defendant No. 4 is alleged to have made a wrongful gain. The plaintiff was deliberately segregated from all the business and he was only concerned with the business Taunk Trading Co. and Taunk Brothers which is being carried out from a rented premises. The allegation in paragraph 19 of the plaint is that all the other five brothers claimed that there is already a partition between the brothers and, therefore, this led to institution of the suit being Title (Partition) Suit No. 122 of 1990.

15. Defendant Nos. 5 to 9 and 11 to 15 did not appear and file a written statement. Defendants No. 1, 2 and 4, 3, 10 and 16 had contested the suit by filing three written statement. As already stated above, one written statement on behalf of defendants no. 1, 2 and 4 was jointly filed. Defendants No. 3 filed a separate written statement and also adopted the stand taken by defendants no. 1, 2 and 4. Defendant Nos. 10 and 16 preferred a separate written statement after the plaint was amended on 12.5.1993. An additional written statement was preferred by defendants no. 10 and 16 and defendant nos 1, 2 and 4. The amendment was made in paragraph 9 to the effect that Item Nos. I to V and VIII of Schedule B properties were acquired by Nanji Govindji Taunk during his life time between the year 1927 to 1948. Item Nos. 4 and 8 of the said schedule were acquired by Nanji Govindji Taunk in the name of his son Shyamji N. Taunk for the benefit of the joint family in the year 1939 and 1948 respectively. The properties described as Item Nos. 6, 7 and 9 to 13 were acquired from the joint family fund/ properties of Nanji Govindji Taunk and thus the Hindu undivided family of Nanji Govindji Taunk is still in existence and there has been no partition of the properties between the coparceners of the said Hindu undivided family. Each brother is entitled to 1/5th share of all the properties.

16. The plaintiff has examined altogether two witnesses. P.W. 1 is the plaintiff himself and P.W. 2 is J.B. Makwa. The exhibits detailed below are the documents relied upon by the plaintiff:-

(i) Exts. 1, 1/A and 1/B are the three notices of the plaintiff dated 23.08. 1984, 12.09.1984 and 01.09. 1990 respectively.

(ii) Exts. 2 to 2/O are the registration receipts of the Post and Telegraph Department.

(iii) Exts. 3 to 3/M are the acknowledgement receipts.

      (iv)    Ext. 4 is a registered envelop.
      (v)     Ext. 5 is the registered sale deed no. 4370 dated 14.07.1965

executed by vendor Dilip Kumar Aikhat in favour of Nanji 8. Govindji & Sons.

(vi) Ext. 6 is the certified copy of ledger of Union Bank of India pertaining to the month of July 1960.

(vii) Ext. 7 is a certificate dated 15.05.1991 issued by the aforesaid bank.

(viii) Ext. 8 is a certificate of the Post and Telegraph department.

(ix) Exts. 9 and 9/A are assessments of income tax pertaining to the year 1982-83 and 1981-82.

(x) Ext. 10 is page nos. 17 to 23 of a written roll of Nanji Govindji.

(xi) Ext. 11 is a letter dated 23.12.1980.

(xii) Exts. 13 to 13/D are the 5 nos. of slips in respect of mutation.

17. The contesting defendants have also examined eight witnesses, namely, Nanalal Taunk (D.W. 1), Chitranjan Mandal (D.W. 2), Sahdeo Pandey (D.W. 3), Raj Govind Singh (D.W. 4), Nagin Taunk (D.W. 5), Hemant Taunk (D.W. 6), Suresh Sharma (D.W. 7) and Ratilal Taunk (D.W.

8), out of whom D.W. 1 is defendant no. 2 and D.W. 8 is defendant no.10. D.Ws. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 are totally formal witnesses. D.W. 7 is Manager of Nalanda Hotel. The contesting defendants have exhibited the following documents:-

(i) Exts. A and A/1 are the two unregistered documents of mutual settlement dated 31.07.1980 and 14.03.1976 respectively.
(ii) Exts. B and B/1 are the letters dated 5.6.1980 and 1.1.1984 addressed to Shyamji and his other brothers by Govardhandas Taunk respectively.
(iii) Ext. C is an unregistered dissolution of partnership deed dated 31st October, 1978.
(iv) Exts. D to D/3 are four unregistered agreements all dated 1st November, 1978.
(v) Ext. E is a receipt dated 13.02.1956 issued by Ranchhod Nanji Taunk and Exts. E/1 to E/4 are the four receipts dated 13.02. 1956 issued by Navyug Uddyog.
(vi) Exts. F and F/1 are two deeds of mutual agreement dated 17.03.1976.

(vii) Ext. G is an application made for obtaining certificate u/s 230 (1) of the Income Tax Act.

(viii) Exts. H to H/12 are various signatures.

(ix) Ext. I is the Income Tax Assessment Order dated 4.4.1957.

      (x)     Ext. J is a register of sale deed.
      (xi)    Ext. K is a partnership agreement.
                                        9.


(xii) Ext. L is a certificate issued by Govardhandas Nanji Taunk;

Ext. L/1 is a certificate issued by Nalanda Hotel; and Ext. L/2 is a certificate issued by Taunk Brothers.

(xiii) Exts. M and M/1 are the two documents pertaining to the assessment year 1981-82.

(xiv) Ext. N is an unregistered deed of partnership dated 30th October, 1973 and Ext. N/1 is a partnership deed dated 1st April, 1979.

(xv) Exts. O to O/7 are the documents pertaining to Income Tax assessment.

(xvi) Ext. P is a notice of dissolution of partnership and its reconstitution.

(xvii) Exts. Q to Q/3 are four unregistered deeds of relinquishment. (xviii) Exts. R and R/1 are two certificates issued by the Income Tax department in respect of payment of income tax.

(xix) Exts. S and S/1 are two Demand Notices U/S 156 of the Income Tax Act.

18. The following issues were framed by the learned court below:-

(1) Is the suit maintainable in its present form? (2) Is the suit barred by limitation?
(3) Is the suit barred under the Specific Relief Act? (4) Has the plaintiff any cause of action against defendant no. 10?
(5) Is the plaint liable to be rejected for failure of the plaintiff to plead material facts and particulars? (6) Is the suit barred by principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence?
(7) Which properties of Schedule 'B' of the plaintiff were acquired by Nanji Govindji Taunk in his own name or were acquired by heirs in the name of members of joint family?
(8) Is the suit barred for acquiescence?
(9) To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled?

19. I have gone through the pleadings, oral and documentary evidences, the respective arguments of the counsel. The questions formulated for decision in the instant appeal are as follow:--

(i) If the claim of the plaintiff that the entire property mentioned in Schedule B of the plaint are joint property and continues as joint even today and partnership business was acquired from the joint Hindu family nucleus and, therefore, 10. the business including partnership firm are liable to be distributed amongst all the six brothers?
(ii) If the plaintiff has discharged his onus by means of the oral and documentary evidence to substantiate the aforesaid questions and thereby entitled for a share in all the properties?

20. The plaintiff and all the defendants have not disputed regarding Property Nos. (I), (II), (III) and (V). All the parties to the suit/appeal agreed that the aforesaid properties were purchased by their common ancestor and, therefore, each one of them have equal share in the aforesaid properties. The trial court has also recorded its finding that admittedly Item No. (I) was acquired in the year 1927; Item No. (II) in February, 1945; Item No. (III) in January, 1931 and Item No. (V) in June, 1938. I am in complete agreement with the findings of the trial court in respect of the aforesaid properties in respect of Item Nos. I, II, III and V. There is no controversy between the respective parties and, therefore, I need not record any finding so far these properties are concerned. The judgment and decree of the court below are confirmed in respect of Item Nos. I, II, III and V.

21. Mr. Manjul Prasad, learned senior counsel, has addressed on behalf of respondents no. 10 and 16. Respondent No. 10 (Ratilal R. Taunk) is son of Late Ranchhod N. Taunk and respondent no. 16 Raji Bai widow of Late Ranchhod N. Taunk. Ranchhod N. Taunk is one of the sons of Nanji Govindji Taunk from his first wife Heji Bai. Ranchhod N. Taunk died on 27.5.1979 leaving behind his widow Raji Bai, two sons and four daughters, defendants no. 10 to 16. The claim of respondents no. 10 and 16 is only in respect of Item No. VI, beside the properties held to be joint Hindu family property which is a house property known as "Natraj Mansion". This is one of the properties described in Schedule B of the plaint. The entire case of respondents no. 10 and 16 rests on the additional written statement which was filed subsequent to the amendment in the plaint. The plaintiff has though included this property no. VI in Schedule B claiming this also to be a joint family property and share of all other parties. It is contended that Ranchhod N. Taunk had separated during the life time of his father. The additional written statement on behalf of defendant nos. 10 and 16 also proceeds on an assertion that 'Natraj Mansion' is built on a lease hold land. this was never a joint family property. It is for this reason that this property is not assessed under the income tax and wealth tax of Nanji Govindji Taunk HUF. It is asserted that land was taken by means of a registered lease 11. deed (Ext. K/1) and four persons i.e. Minoo Rustamji Patel, Ratilal R.Taunk (defendant no. 10), second wife Raji Bai (defendant no. 16) and Homi Home Patel had obtained lease from M/s. TISCO Limited pursuant to an agreement dated 1st July, 1961 (Ext. X). The terms and conditions are incorporated in the registerd lease deed. The building Natraj Mansion was constructed by a separate fund and separate earnings long after the death of Nanji Govindji Taunk. Ranchhod N. Taunk father of defendant no. 10 Ratilal R. Taunk had disassociated himself from the family in the year 1954 and he was never associated with any of the partnership firm. The claim of partition on behalf of these defendant-respondents is only in respect of the properties acquired by Nanji Govindji Taunk himself before his death. The further contention of Mr. Manjul Prasad that the plaintiff did not controvert the assertions of defendant nos. 10 and 16 nor disputed any document, therefore, it amounts to implied admission. Defendant No. 10 Ratilal R. Taunk appeared as a witness and was examined as P.W. 8 and the plaintiff also does not dispute the claim of respondents no. 10 and 16.

22. A number of exhibits have been produced to substantiate the investment by Ranchhod N. Taunk and also that none of the parties to the suit have claimed any right or interest in Property No. VI. The judgment of the trial court in respect of property no. VI is hereby confirmed. The plaintiff has not been able to substantiate that Natraj Mansion is qua from the nucleus of the joint Hindu family and so far the claim of the plaintiff is rejected in respect of Property No. VI.

23. The plaintiff has asserted in respect of Item No. XIII which is a land measuring 65ft x 45ft situated at Faldih, Raipur (M.P.). In paragraph 27-A of the plaint, it is pleaded that the property was purchased while in jointness and this land was purchased in the name of Dilip N. Taunk son of Nana Lal Taunk-defendant no. 2 and the plaintiff has got 1/7th share . Defendant No. 2 filed additional written statement stating that the property was acquired in the name of Dilip N. Taunk who is not a party to the suit and it was also purchased from the individual separate fund. and it has no concern whatsoever with the joint family property. The findings recorded by the trial court that since he is not impleaded as a party, therefore, the claim of the plaintiff cannot be considered and it was rejected. I am in complete agreement with the finding of the trial court, so far Item No. XIII is concerned and it does not require any reconsideration. Hence I confirm the judgment and decree in respect of Item No. XIII.

24. Item No. IV (Nalanda Hotel) situate at S.B. Shop Area, Bistupur in 12. the town of Jamshedpur is claimed by defendant no. 3 (Hansraj N. Taunk). Defendant No. 3 has claimed Item No. IV to be his exclusive property after reconstitution of the firm Shyamji N. Taunk. The argument on behalf of the appellant is that Item No. IV has been admittedly acquired by the common ancestor Nanji Govindji Taunk from his own funds in the name of his son Shyamji N. Taunk (defendant no. 4). Defendant No. 4 has not appeared as a witness in support of his case. M/s. Nalanda Hotel, a registered partnership firm was constituted only on 30.10.1973 by Ext. N. Later on Shyamji N. Taunk (defendant no. 4) by a registered sale deed dated 12.3.1974 (Ext. J) sold the said property in favour of M/s. Nalanda Hotel. It was admitted by D.W. 1 in para 33 that Item No. IV, M/s. Nalanda Hotel belonged to the joint family. The defendants have claimed that by virtue of reconstitution of partnership deed from time to time, one or other partners retired and ultimately Item No. IV (Nalanda Hotel) remained the exclusive business of defendant no. 3.

25. The learned court below has recorded its findings on the basis of Exts. 9 and 9/A, which are Income Tax and Wealth Tax returns for the assessment years 1981-82 and 1982-83 and the conclusion in the judgment is that Item No. IV was not mentioned as property belonging to HUF in the said document. Therefore, this goes to prove that the partition cannot be claimed in respect of Item No. IV.

26. Mr. S.N. Das, Advocate has also submitted that the plaintiff never challenged the transfer (Ext. J) and reconstitution of the firm "Nalanda Hotel" (Ext. N/1 dated 1st April, 1979) and the validity of the transfer was, in fact, not disputed but the plaintiff has only claimed in the year 1990 that the property belongs to undivided joint family property. This claim has been staked after a lapse of 17 years, whereas, limitation under article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1063 is only for three years and, therefore, the claim in respect of Item No. IV of Schedule B is barred by limitation.

27. The emphatic submission by Mr. P.K. Prasad is that transfer by co- parcerner (defendant no.4-Shyamji N. Taunk), without the consent of the other coparceners is void. In the case of Thamma Venkata Subbamma vs. Thamma Rattamma and others [1987 (3) SCC 294], the Apex Court ruled that if in a joint Hindu family, one brother and brother's sons and daughters constitute a HUF, a gift of the donner of undivided coparcenary interest to his brother amounts to relinquishment or renuniciation of his share in favour of other coparceners and the Apex Court held that such a relinquishment to be valid. In that judgment, Article 264 from Mulla's Hindu Law, fifteenth edition at page 357, it was clearly stated that such 13. renunciation is not invalid even if certain conditions are laid down. The only embargo is renunciation or relinquishment must of course be genuine. Therefore, assuming the argument of Mr. P.K. Prasad to be correct that these transfers were only for the income tax purposes then the onus was on the plaintiff himself to establish that it was not genuine. In the circumstances, this decision is of no help to the plaintiff.

28. The assertion of the plaintiff's counsel regarding the question of limitation is also negated as in a partition suit, there is no question that a claim of share in a HUF can be said to be either barred by limitation or for want of any declaration within the limitation period. The findings by the trial court regarding Item No. IV is recorded in paragraphs 38 to 48 of the judgment. Various documents have been taken into consideration and also the pleadings on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 15 and 16. I have also gone through the specific assertion on behalf of the plaintiff and also schedule of the plaint. Paragraph 30 which is the relief clause clearly mentions house property. A separate written statement was submitted by D.W. 3-Hansraj N. Taunk. The pleading on behalf of the defendant is specific that the sale deed was executed in the year 1974. I have also specifically examined the statement of P.W. 1. The claim of the plaintiff that there will be a presumption of jointness cannot be accepted specially since the plaintiff has already been paid the amount of Rs. 1,07,784. 85 Paise by cheque No. 110585 dated 31.7.1980 of Union Bank of India. The plaint is absolutely silent regarding this payment though the plaintiff has tried to negate these aspects in his statement. I have perused the findings of the trial court and there is no reason for disagreeing with the said findings. It is also admitted by the plaintiff that initially he was a partner in the firm having 11 per cent share and the payment by cheque has been accepted by the court below and, therefore, I do not find any reason to set aside the said finding.

29. Argument of Mr. P.K. Prasad regarding Item No. IV Nalanda Hotel was purchased by Nanji Govindji Taunk, the common ancestor, from his own funds in the name of his son Shyamji N. Taunk. Nanji Govindji Taunk died on 25.3.1955. On his death, the said property will devolve upon all his seven sons. Shyamji N. Taunk-defendant no. 4, along with his six brothers will have 1/7th share each. Transfer by a Karta binds all the coparceners only if the transfer is for a legal necessity. There is no pleading of legal necessity in the written statement of defendants no. 1,2 and 4 and written statement of defendant no. 3. Mulla's Hindu Law clearly provides that the onus of proving legal necessity lies upon the purchaser. In the absence of a legal necessity, the sale deed (Ext. J) dated 14. 12.3.1974 will therefore, be void. Neither the vendor Shyamji N. Taunk, defendant no. 4 nor the subsequent claimant Hansraj N Taunk, defendant no. 3 have appeared as a witness in support of the sale transaction to support its validity of the sale evidenced by Ext. J dated 12.3.1974.

30. The amount of Rs. 1,07,748.85 Paise, alleged to have been paid, was only a book transfer and the same amount was returned by the plaintiff Govardhandas Nanji Taunk which is proved by Exts. 6 and 7 which shows that a total sum of Rs. 1, 54, 408.66 Paise which includes the book value transfer in respect of Item No. IV. At any rate, admittedly Item No. IV was acquired by common ancestor Nanji Govindji Taunk and , therefore, at best his son Shyamji N. Taunk will have 1/7th share. Sale (Ext. J) cannot be valid beyond 1/7th share of defendant no. 4. Rest brothers will accordingly inherit 1/7th share each. This assertion on behalf of the plaintiff is far fetched. The argument on the question of 'Legal necessity' amounts to carving out an altogether new case. The plaintiff instituted the suit on the ground that all the properties of the Taunk family is purchased by a Hindu Joint Family nucleus and, therefore, each son has equal share. This is disputed by the brothers on the ground that separate business commenced in the different name and style and from the independent sources. The partners are also different, thus the plaintiff is bound to prove its plaint assertion and not to derive arguments from the defendants' defence.

31. Learned counsel on behalf of respondent no. 3 has stressed that Nanji Govindji Taunk died on 25.3.1953 and also that he had purchased Item No. IV in the name of Shyamji N. Taunk. The plaintiff was a partner of Nalanda Hotel having 11% share consisting of eight partners, each one of them having equal share only. Nitin L. Taunk had 12% share in the said partnership constituted on 30.10.1973 (Ext. N). It is also admitted fact that Shyamji Nanji Taunk Son of Late Nanji Govindji Taunk sold and transferred to M/s. Nalanda Hotel for a valuable consideration. The plaintiff, by means of a cheque, has received his entire share of the said firm and since then he is not concerned whatsoever in Item No. IV of Schedule B of the plaint. He has also stressed on the return of income tax and wealth tax where only Nanji Govindji Taunk (P.W. 1) shown as Hindu undivided family. Exts. 9 and 9/A are admitted documents and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot challenge the finding of the trial court in the instant appeal. The decisions cited by the appellants have no application whatsoever. In case there is a disputed title, which cannot be decided in partition suit and, therefore, the judgment of the trial court that Item No. IV is not from nucleus of HUF is correct and calls for no interference.

15.

32. The submission on behalf of the plaintiff in respect of Item No. VIII, Plot No. TMG 10 and 11 measuring 10977 sq. ft. (Navyug Udyog). According to the plaintiff, this property was also acquired by the common ancestor Nanji Govindji Taunk in the name of Shyamji N. Taunk-defendant no. 4 in the year 1948. In the written statement of defendants no. 1, 2 and 4 at paragraph 30, the defendants have contended that this property was acquired by Shyamji N. Taunk and made construction thereon.

33. The submission on behalf of the plaintiff is that in a suit for partition, possession of one co-sharer is possession of another co-sharer. There is no case of exclusion or ouster pleaded by the defendants. There is no case of previous partition. As such even if defendant no. 4 is in possession, in law, it amounts to possession of all the co-sharers. In item No. VIII, defendant no.2-D.W. 2 Nanalal N. Taunk is a defendant where he claims to carry on business of Navyug Udyog. Exts. E/1 to E/4 shows payment of rent by Navyug Udyog to Shyamji N. Taunk-defendant no. 4. These exhibits are from May, 1990 to December, 1990 which is evident that when dispute amongst the parties was going on since March, 1979; and ultimately suit was filed on 30.10.1990 after giving a legal notice. Legal notice had already been given on 12.9.1984 (Ext. 1). Therefore, Exts. E/1 to E/4 were totally unreliable and appears to have been created. Ext. 9 (Income Tax Return for the Assessment year 1982-83) and Ext. 9/A (Wealth Tax Return for the Assessment year 1981-82) have been filed by Nanji Govindji Taunk (HUF). Therefore, these documents show that HUF continued to exist all throughout. The plaintiff (P.W. 1) as well as defendant no. 2(D.W. 1) have admitted that the firms were constituted and reconstituted right from 1954 onward only for the purposes of tax. This contention on behalf of the plaintiff is a bald assertion and cannot be accepted on the face of it.

34. So far as Item Nos. 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are concerned, the plaintiff has pleaded in para 9 of the plaint that these properties were acquired out of the joint property funds/property of Nanji Govindji Taunk and the HUF of Nanji Govindji Taunk is still existing.

35. Further submission on behalf of the plaintiff is that on perusal of Ext. K, it appears that the parties were carrying on joint family business in the name and style of M/s. Nanji Govindji & Sons, Govardhan Brothers and Taunk Brothers. These three family businesses were converted into partnership by Ext/ K with effect from 3.11.1954. Clause 1 of Ext. K takes within its sweep, the different businesses of contract business, jewelery business, hardware business, ready made garments business, radio business etc. Clause 9 prohibits any partner from transferring any 16. property or any interest of any partner. Thus by Ext. K, the joint family business i.e. M/s. Nanji Govindji & Sons, Govardhan Brothers and Taunk Brothers got converted into partnerships which stand admitted by D.W. 1, Nandlal N. Taunk in para-64. This partnership continued to exist and was dissolved by a deed of dissolution dated 31.10. 1978 (Ext. C). This Ext. C shows that on 31.10.10978, the three joint family businesses which had been converted into partnership by Ext. K was again agreed to be divided between the partners. At the relevant time, M/s. Nanji Govindji & Sons was allotted to defendant no.4-Shyamji N. Taunk and Girish N. Taunk son of Lakshaman N. Taunk. similarly M/s. Taunk Brothers was allotted to 4th and 5th partners i.e. Balram N Taunk-defendant no. 1 and Nanalal N. Taunk-defendant no. 2 whereas M/s. Taunk Trading Company was allotted to 3rd and 6th partners i.e. Govardhandas N. Taunk, the plaintiff and Hansraj N. Taunk, defendant no. 3. In Ext. C it has been provided that with effect from 1.11.1978 i.e. (from the very next day), these new partnerships as per allotment in Ext. C shall come into existence. Accordingly, on 1.11.1978, Ext. D was executed by all the six parties agreeing to bifurcate their joint family businesses which was converted into partnership businesses by Ext. K. Immediately on the same day, i.e. on 1.1.1978, three more agreements were executed by the parties as per the allotment which has been marked as Ext. D (with respect to M/s. Nanji Govindji & Sons); Ext. D/1 (with respect to M/s. Taunk Brothers) and Ext. D/2 (with respect to M/s. Taunk Trading Co.) and Ext. D/3 (with respect to Nanji Govindji & sons).

36. Thus execution of the deed of dissolution on 31.10.1978 (Ext. C) and execution of four agreements (Ext. D series) on the very next day i.e. 1.11.1978 itself goes to establish that these were only meant for creation of different partnership firms for the purposes of avoiding tax liability and for increasing the income of the business which has been admitted in para 64 by D.W. 1. Ext. F dated 14.3.1976 whereby agricultural land of Asanbani were transferred to defendant no. 4 and Ext. F/1 dated 14.3.1976 and Item No. X-Khas Mahal Plot No. 65 belonging to the firm were transferred to the plaintiff-appellant. All these documents are unregistered and have been created only for avoiding liability of tax so as to increase the income of the family. Thus all the properties i.e. Item Nos. VI to XIII having been acquired during continuance of the joint family business by Ext. K in the shape of partnership will definitely be joint family properties and will be available for partition.

37. The argument and contention on behalf of the plaintiff in nut shell is that there is a presumption in a Hindu family that property is joint and 17. a sufficient nucleus for acquisition of the property is established. Further submission is that the evidence of the witnesses proceed on an assumption that common ancestor Nanji Govindji Taunk had a flourishing business of his own and was able to constitute a nucleus which led to acquisition of a number of properties and the partnership firm claimed by the defendants to be exclusive of the respective partners cannot be accepted for the reason that these firms were constituted from the nucleus of the joint family; there is no proof about separate and exclusive earning of the respective partners and, according to paragraph 233 of Mulla's Hindu Law, Eighteenth Edition, the onus is on the person to establish that certain property is not from joint nucleus, who claims that the property was acquired from the personal earnings. Paragraph 233 of Mulla's Hindu Law Eighteenth edition at page 232 is quoted below:-

"233. PRESUMPTION AS TO COPARCENARY AND SELF-
ACQUIRED PROPERTY (1) Presumption that a joint family continues joint.__Generally speaking, the normal state of every Hindu family is joint. Presumably every such family is joint in food, worship and estate. In the absence of proof of division, such is the legal presumption. In other words, given a joint Hindu family, the presumption is, until the contrary is proved, the family continues joint. The presumption of union is the greatest in the case of father and sons."

38. For want of necessary proof, the statement of the witnesses cannot be accepted. Great emphasis is on the question of legal necessity; or in absence of any legal necessity contended by the defendants, sale by Karta, in the instant case, is void and thus was unable to discharge the onus of substantiating that the sale was made for a legal necessity. Reliance has been placed on a number of decisions viz., AIR 1981 Allahabad 335; AIR (34) 1947 Privy Council 189;AIR 1954 SC 379; AIR 1965 SC 289; AIR 1969 SC 1076.

39. On the basis of a decision of the Apex Court in Srinivas Krishnarao Kango vs. Narayan Devji Kango and other (AIR 1954 SC 379), learned counsel has submitted that proof of existence of a joint family though does not lead to presumption that property held by any member of the family is joint and the burden rests upon any one asserting, but when it is established that the family possessed some joint property from its nature and a relative value may have formed a nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired, the burden shifts on the party alleging self acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family property. While ruling this, reliance was placed on a decision of the Privy Council in Appalaswami vs. 18. Suryanarayanamurti and others (AIR (34) 1947 Privy Council 189). Reliance has also been placed in the case of K.V. Narayanaswami Iyer vs. K.V. Ramakrishna Iyer and others (AIR 1965 SC 289). Emphasis is on the proposition by the Apex Court that the legal position is well settled that if, in fact, on the date of acquisition of the property, the joint family has sufficient nucleus for acquiring the property in the name of any member of the joint family should be presumed to be acquired out of the family funds and, therefore, to form part of the HUF unless a contrary is shown. Another decision cited by Mr. P.K. Prasad is Mudigowda vs. Ramchandra (AIR 1969 SC 1976). Paragraph 5 of the judgment is quoted hereinbelow:-

" It is now well established that an agreement between all the coparceners is not essential to the disruption of the joint family status, but a definite and unambiguous indication of intention by one member to separate himself from the family and to enjoy his share in severalty will amount in law to a division of status. It is immaterial in such a case whether the other members assent or not. Once the decision is unequivocally expressed, and clearly intimated to his co-sharers, the right of the coparcener to obtain and possess the share to which he admittedly is entitled, is unimpeachable.
If, however, the expression of intention is a mere pretence or a sham, there is in the eye of law no separation in the joint family status".

40. The decision in the case of Appalaswami (Supra), it is categorically held that the principle laid down is proof of existence of a joint family does not lead to the presumption that the property held by any member of the family is joint; the burden rests upon any one asserting that any item of property is joint to establish this fact, but where it is established that the family possessed some joint property which from its nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired, the burden shifts to the party alleging self acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired with the aid of the joint family property.

41. Thus the assertion on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant on the basis of the aforesaid decisions as well as during course of argument, the repeated emphasis of the learned counsel that there was no partition whatsoever and all the properties including the business are an outcome of joint family nucleus. There is sufficient proof of the fact that the father of the plaintiff had sufficient means to acquire the property and the creation of the partnership firm are from the joint nucleus and, therefore, the claim of the defendants should not be accepted. Thus the judgment of the trial court is repeatedly criticised.

42. Once again the arguments are controverted by Mr. L.K. Lal, appearing on behalf of defendants no. 1, 2 and 4 i.e. the substituted heirs of respondent no. 1 and substituted heirs of respondent no. 4 and respondent no.2 as well. Accepting the finding of the court below 19. regarding Property Nos. I, II, III and V being joint and liable for partition, he has raised his objection in respect of Property Nos. VII, VIII, IX, X, XI and XII. These properties were acquired by the firm Nanji Govindji & Sons and it is not a joint family business. Section 14 of the Partnership Act provides that the property of the firm is subject to a contract between the partners which includes all property, right and interest, originally brought into the stock of the firm or acquired by purchase or otherwise by or for the firm or for the purpose in course of business of the firm. In case, there is any objection that the property was not purchased by the firm Nanji Govindji & Sons, it can only be decided in a separate proceedings and cannot be a subject matter of a partition suit. His submission in respect of Item No. VIII purchased in the name of defendant no. 4 is that it was defendant no. 4 alone who managed the property. It can only be said that till Nanji Govindji Taunk was alive, the properties purchased by him can be said to be joint but subsequent to his death, any assertion on the part of the plaintiff cannot be accepted. He has placed paragraph 228 of Mulla's Hindu Law sixteenth Edition at page 253 which is quoted below:--

"228. Property jointly acquired.--(1) Where property has been acquired in business by persons constituting a joint Hindu family by their joint labour, the question arises whether the property so acquired is joint family property, or whether it is merely the joint property of the joint acquirers, or whether it is ordinary partnership property. If it is a joint family property, the male issue of the acquirers take an interest in it by birth. If it is the joint property of the acquirers, it will pass by survivorship, but the sale issue of the acquirers do not take interest in it by birth. If it is partnership property, it is governed by the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, so that the share of each of; the joint acquirers will pass on his death to his heirs, andk not by survivorship."

43. The assertion in the plaint in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 13 and 14 are regarding acquisition from the joint family nucleus. This is replied and controverted in the written statement that only those properties which were acquired during the life time of the father are joint and nothing beyond it. Learned counsel has pointed out that assertion of paragraph 9 of the plaint that the property was purchased from the joint family nucleus but the evidence is absolutely contrary to it and paragraphs 12, 15 and 16 of the statement of the plaintiff is that the firm acquired the property and was constituted in the year 1958. The common ancestor admittedly died in the year 1955 and also retired from the business in the year 1944. Thus the joint family property has got nothing to do with the acquisition by the firm Nanji Govindji & Sons. The rival contention between the defendants no. 2 and 4 vis-a-vis respondents no. 5 to 9 regarding creation of the partnership of Item No. VII which was purchased by Nanji Govindji & Sons. The plaintiff has surrendered his appeal regarding Item No. VII which has hotly been objected on behalf of respondents no. 5 to 9.

20.

44. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, appearing on behalf of these respondents, have tried to controvert the arguments regarding this property. During the course of the proceedings, injunction order was passed restraining respondent no. 1 or any other party from alienating this property or any other subject matter of the suit during the pendency of the appeal. In these circumstances, the objection has been raised by Mr. Indrajit Sinha and Mr. Rohit Roy , Advocate appearing on behalf of respondents no. 5 to 9 that the appellant has given up his claim in respect of Property No. VII only with a view to circumvent the interim order granted on 5.5.2005. The argument on behalf of the plaintiff, giving up his claim and assertions of Mr. L. K. Lal in respect of respondents no. 1, 2 and 4 that it is his exclusive property and the arguments on behalf of respondents no. 5 to 9 relating to the said property is apparently regarding the question that whether the conclusion arrived at by the trial court regarding exclusive ownership of respondents no. 1, 2 and 4 in exclusion of the other defendants and the plaintiff is beyond the pleadings and the relief claimed in the instant suit; the controversy raised at the behest of respondents no. 5 to 9 can only be examined within the ambit of Order XLI Rule 33 CPC by this Court. The case of the plaintiff as well as the defendants is that initially the properties shown as Item Nos. VII, VIII, IX, X, XI and XII were in the name of Nanji Govindji & Sons. The trial court dismissed the suit in respect of the aforesaid properties. The trial court has recorded its finding against the plaintiff but has gone further and recorded finding allocating shares and constituents of the partnership firm amongst the defendants and also vis-a-vis respective members of the family.

These findings are recorded on the basis of various deed of partnership firms. Thee are dissolution deeds, deeds of reconstitution etc. The objection of Mr. Indrajit Sinha appears to be well founded on the ground that these are unregistered deed and also without the consent of all the partners. Section 19 (2) (g) of the Partnership Act placesa statutory bar.

Apparently there was no such relief claimed in the suit for allocating the different shares in the partnership firm and also holding as to who are the partners of which firm and what is the basis or evidence to come to the said conclusion. In fact, the suit is preferred claiming that all the properties including his business and partnership firm are from the joint family nucleus and, therefore, they continued to be a joint family property and the relief claimed is for partition and allocating 1/7th share to each of the sons of Late Nanji Govindji Taunk. It is also to be noticed that 21. defendants no. 5 to 9 did not contest the suit nor file any written statement. The counter claim preferred in this appeal stands rejected and, therefore, the arguments available to respondents no. 5 and 9 is very limited but nothing constrains this Court to go into the questions of fact, pleadings, relief claimed and appraise the evidence on record. No doubt, running of several firms does not necessarily imply separation and no such inference can be drawn merely because there are a number of business under different names in existence or the claim that partnership firms were formed for better handing business or to keep it manageable or for various other reasons, it is well within the scope of the first appellate court to examine all these aspects.

45. Mulla's on Hindu Law 16th Edition states in para 222:-

"222. Incidents of separate or self-acquired property.-- A Hindu, even if he be joint, may possess separate property. Such property belongs exclusively to him. No other member of the coparcenary, not even his male issue, acquires any interest in it by birth. He may sell it (s), or he may make a gift of it, or bequeath it by will, to any person he likes
(t). It is not liable to partition (u), and, on his death intestate, it passes by succession to his heirs, and not by survivorship to the surviving coparceners (v)."

Therefore, it is settled law that there is no presumption that a family, because it is joint, possess joint property. When in a suit for partition a party claims that any particular item is joint family property, the burden of proving it rest on the shoulders of the person asserting it.

46. The properties mentioned Item Nos. VII, IX, X, XI and XII are , therefore, not required to be decided separately. The plaintiff's emphatic assertion is that the burden rests on the defendants to substantiate that the firms were from the own source of partners lies on the shoulder of the defendants since the plaintiff has pleaded that Nanji Govindji Taunk had a successful business from which several properties were purchased which are admittedly joint today and the trial court has accepted this contention without any objection. The firms constitute amongst the heirs of Late Nanji Govindji Taunk have not shown that the firms were constituted by their separate earning. The only inference that can be draw is that the property remained joint. The court below has categorically recorded its findings that certain properties such as Item Nos. I, II, III and V are joint purchased by Nanji Govindji Taunk. He had a lucrative business but so far the other properties are concerned, they were much after their father retired from his business. Thus this alone cannot prove and substantiate the appellant's claim that business and firms constituted much after his retirement was also from joint family. I do not agree with the submission on behalf of the plaintiff appellant.

47. I have carefully scrutinised the evidences and the plaint. The 22. plaintiff in paragraph 30 has prayed for a preliminary decree for 1/7th share in the properties described in Schedule B. Thereafter the consequential relief of appointment of survey knowing pleader commissioner to demarcate the share and for preparation of final decree. Schedule B mentions as many as XIII properties. Property No. I relates to house property situate on lease Holding No. 70, measuring 16,684 sq. ft. in Contractors' Area, P.S. Bistupur, Town Jamshedpur, District Singhbhum (East); Item No. II All that house properties situate on Lease Holding No. 117, area measuring 16,566 sq. ft. in Contractors' area, P.S. Bistupur, Town Jamshedpur, District Singhbhum (East) ; Item No. III. All that house properties on Lease No. 105, measuring 2,309 sq. ft. in Contractors' area, P.S. Bistupur, Town Jamshedpur, District Singhbhum (East); Item No. IV:

All that house properties situate (Nalanda Hotel) on Lease 3-SB Shop, measuring 3,964 sq. ft. in Main Road, P.S. Bistupur, Town Jamshedpur, District Singhbhum (East); Item No V: All that House Properties situate at Holding No. Nil, Lease No. 6-SB Shop, measuring 4,182 sq. ft. in P.S. Bistupur, Town Jamshedpur, District Singhbhum East; Item No. VI: Half of all that house properties (Natraj Building) situate on Holding No. Nil, Lease No. A, B, measuring 31,000 sq. ft. in P.S. Bistupur, Town Jamshedpur, District Singhbhum East; Item No. VII: All that House Properties situate (one Godown on "N" Road, West, Near Khalsa Club) measuring 9596 sq. ft. in P.S. Bistupur, Town Jamshedpur, District Singhbhum (East); Item No. VIII: All that house properties situate on Plot No. TMG 10 & 11, measuring 10,977 sq. ft. in P.S. Bistupur, Town Jamshedpur, District Singhbhum East; Item No. IX. All that house properties situate in 'N' Town, Godown at Northern Town, measuring 14,566 sq. ft. in P.S. Bistupur, Town Jamshedpur, District Singhbhum East; Item No. XI. All that piece and parcel of lands measuring a total area of 20.68 Acres situate in Mouza Asanboni, P.S. Chandil, District Singhbhum (W); Item No. XII. All that piece and parcel of land measuring a total area of 1.02 Acres in Mouza Paridih, P.S. Mango, District Singhbhum (East);

Item No. XIII. All that piece and parcel of land measuring 65" x45"

together with the building structures standing thereon bearing Khesra No. 258 at Faladih, District Raipur valued at Rs. 70,000/-.

48. It is thus evident that the relief claimed in suit is only to the house property even if the amendment on 12.5.1993, paragraph 9 was amended but not the relief clause. It is thus clear that no relief or claim regarding the partnership firm which was admittedly constituted after the common ancestor retired from the family business is pleaded. It is admitted by the plaintiff in his statement that Nanji Govindji Taunk retired 23. from the business in the year 1944. Thereafter the properties acquired by him during his life time continued to be joint family property but thereafter the firm Nanji Govindji & Sons was constituted at a very late stage and thus no presumption can be drawn whether these business were commenced from the joint family nucleus.

49. In view of the aforesaid settled principles of law, it is to be tested that whether Property Nos. VII to XII, which are in fact not house properties but are partnership business can be said to be joint Hindu family property. The admitted position is that the father of the original plaintiff acquired certain movable and immovable properties and engaged in several construction and Hardwares business. The firms Nanji Govindji & Sons was a firm floated constituting six brothers as partners, seventh son Ranchhod N. Taunk had separated during the life time of his father. Gobardhan Brothers and Taunk Brothers were also constituted by six partners. Since certain difference arose in the year 1954, the family business carried on in the name of three firms was partitioned and a deed was executed on 29.10.1954. The firm Nanji Govindji & Sons was a partnership firms under the provision of Indian Partnership Act, 1932 and was constituted with the aid of separate capital. The terms and conditions are duly recorded in the deed marked as Ext. K which is dated 3.11.1954. It is thus clear that these firms could not be the subject matter of the partition suit since it is not a joint Hindu family property. The plaintiff has neither pleaded nor proved by evidence that the income of the firm blended with joint Hindu family property. On the contrary, prior to the institution of the suit, a notice was given by the defendants to the plaintiff for partition of joint family property which is marked as Exts. 1, 1/ a, 1/b, and 1/c and asked for partition in the immovable property. These properties marked as item nos. I. II, III and V, this is not disputed by any of the parties to the suit or this appeal.

I uphold and confirm the judgment of the trial court. The remaining properties other than shown as Item Nos. I, II, III and V are not joint family property and not acquired from HUF funds. The partners/sons of Nandji Govindji Taunk acquired from their independent income. Once it is concluded that there was a disruption of joint family, then merely saying that HUF continues is not sufficient. Admittedly one brother Ranchhod N. Taunk separated long back and has his independent earning, the conclusion is definitely that the joint family disintegrated.

The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kalyani vs. Narayanan [1980 Suppl SCC 298 (Para 28)] wherein it has been held as under:

24.
"28. Once disruption of joint family status takes place as Lord Westbury puts it in Appovier's case, it covers both a division of right and vision of property. If a document clearly shows the division of rights and status its legal construction and effect cannot be altered by evidence of subsequent conduct of parties."
 

50. In view of what has been stated above and also on a close perusal of the evidence and the pleadings, the submission of Mr. P.K. Prasad that besides the properties number shown as Item Nos, I, II, III and V held to be acquisition of a joint Hindu family, it cannot be accepted that the remaining properties are also joint family acquisition. Admittedly, there is no dispute regarding Property Nos. VI and XIII. If there is no separation, Ranchhod N. Taunk should also have constituted as member of the family business commenced at a later date. The trial court khas recorded a finding that Property No. VI Natraj Mansion shown in schedule B in the relief clause of the plaint is exclusive property of Ranchhod N. Taunk and his heirs. Similarly the property shown at Item No. 13 situate at Raipur (M.P.) belongs to Dilip N. Taunk who was not even arrayed as party to the suit and all the remaining parties to the suit and appeal have not objected to the said assertion and, therefore, I am in complete agreement with the said finding.

51. The argument on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant that there is a presumption of property being joint and acquired from a Hindu joint family nucleus has not been established and proved by the appellant, hence not sustainable. The firm Nanji Govindji & Sons was constituted consisting of six partners. The two other firms, namely, Govardhan Brothers and Taunk Brothers were also constituted and the obvious conclusion is that the capital was partitioned and a deed of partition was executed on29.10.1954 wherein it was also agreed that immovable properties by Nanji Govindji Taunk would be left joint. Business in the name and style of Nanji Govindji Taunk has two branches, namely Govardhan Brothers and Taunk Brothers. The firm Nanji Govindji & Sons was established under the provision of Indian Partnership Act, 1932 with the aid of divided and separated capital. The terms and conditions of the partnership were duly recorded in an Indenture of partnership dated 3.11.1954 marked as Ext. K; perusal of the same establishes that on and from 29th October, 1954, partnership was separated from the joint Hindu family and, therefore, any acquisition or profit made by the firm was exclusive property of the firm and the disposal thereof would strictly have to be in terms of sections 14 and 15 of the Partnership Act.

52. The findings of the trial court regarding respective shares and contract in the partnership firms, its constitution and reconstitution etc., 25 was neither pleaded in the plaint nor relief was claimed, but the plaintiff has asked for 1/7th share in each of the property. Therefore, in my view, the findings arrived at by the trial court deciding and allocating the different partnership firm to the respective defendants is a finding which is beyond the pleadings and the relief claimed in the plaint. The suit was by the plaintiff claiming 1/7th share in all the properties. In my view, no decree could have been passed in respect of the business which are admittedly partnership business and cannot be termed to be the H.U.F. properties as claimed in the relief clause. Thus, in my view, the findings of the court below regarding the remaining properties cannot be upheld. The respective shares and the claim in the partnership firm can be contested in a separate suit in accordance with the Partnership Act but not in the appeal. The validity of certain partnership deeds which are unregistered and also challenged by Mr. Indrajit Sinha cannot be adjudicated in this appeal as it is not the relief claimed in the instant suit. The findings recorded by the trial court is beyond the pleading, any evidence read by the trial court is not within the frame of the pleadings of the suit and cannot be taken into consideration. Hence this part of the judgment is set at naught. However, no findings regarding share can be assessed in this appeal. The parties shall continue with the present constitution of the firms till the respective claims are decided in a suit under the Partnership Act, 1932.

53. In these circumstances, it is, therefore, concluded that:

(i) The decision of the court below regarding property nos.

I, II, III and V being joint and acquired by common ancestor in that capacity is upheld and each of the sons of Nanji Govindji Taunk are entitled for 1/7th share.

(ii) Item No. VI is an exclusive property of Late Ranchhod N. Taunk and at present is the exclusive property of respondent nos. 10 and 16 and no other family member has a share in it.

(iii) Property No. XIII is also not partiable and does not constitute Hindu Undivided Family Property.

(iv) The plaintiff has not been able to substantiate that the partnership business shown in Schedule B are acquisition of HUF nucleus and, therefore, he has also a share in the said property and the suit and appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

26.

54. In the result, this appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed in terms of the findings recorded above. No order as to costs.

(Poonam Srivastav, J.) Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi.

The 25th April, 2012.

AKS/AFR/Cp.3.