National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Prem Chandra Varshney vs Murarilal Sharma And Ors. on 12 September, 2007
Equivalent citations: IV(2007)CPJ229(NC)
ORDER
K.S. Gupta, J. (Presiding Member)
1. By this common order, we propose to decide at admission stage RP Nos. 2218 of 2007,2219 of 2007 and 2220 of 2007 which arise out of identical orders dated 30.3.2007 passed by Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission UP., Lucknow.
2. Sixteen decree holders including the respondents had filed execution application(s) for execution of the order dated 20.11.2001 passed by the State Commission. In execution proceedings, the petitioner had filed objections alleging that he resigned as Director of Glars Ice & Cold Storage Pvt. Limited sometime in February, 1994 and in the meeting of the Board of Directors dated 24.2.1994 his resignation was accepted. It was stated that as he had ceased to be the Director of Company, the amount as per the award dated 20.11.2001 could notbe realised from him. This objection was, however, overruled by the State Commission and Recovery Certificate for an amount of Rs. 6,79,327 was ordered to be issued against the petitioner in the name of District Collector, Agra.
3. Submission advanced by Mr. V.P. Sharma for the petitioner is that the execution application(s) filed on 21.11.2005 were barred by limitation as having been moved beyond 30 days of the passing of order dated20.11.2001; as provided under Clause (IV) of Regulation 14 (1) framed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short the Act). Award cannot be executed against the petitioner who is no more the Director of Company. Execution application(s) could not have been filed simultaneously under Sections 25 and 27 of the Act.
4. Clause IV of said Regulation 14(1) notified on 31.5.2005, read thus:
Subject to the provisions of Sections 15,19 and 24A, the period of limitation in the following matters shall be as follows:
(v) I....
(vi) ...
(vii) ...
(viii) The period of limitation for filing any application for which no period of limitation has been specified in the Act, the rules of these regulations shall be thirty days from the date of the cause of action or the date of knowledge.
5. To be only noted that under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation prescribed for filing execution of any decree or order of any Civil Court is 12 years. Plain reading of said Regulation 14(1) (iv) would show that it would not apply to execution proceedings. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 does not provide for any limitation period for filing execution application. Though, said Article is not applicable to Consumer Fora still clue can be taken therefrom that period of limitation for filing execution application before Consumer Fora cannot be 30 days from the date of passing of order sought to be executed. Thus, the execution application(s) filed on 21.11.2005 were not barred by time.
6. Coming to the second limb of argument, copy of the complaint in case No. 83 of 1994 is at pages 15 to 26. Copy of the order dated 20.11.2001 disposing of the said complaint Case No. 83 of 1994 along with some other complaints is at pages 27 to 49. Cause title of the said complaint would show that petitioner was sued as Managing Director of Glars Ice & Cold Storage Pvt. Limited. Discussion made on internal page No. 10 of the said order dated 20.11.2001 would show that the stand taken by the petitioner in regard to his having ceased to be the Managing Director of Company in 1994 was disbelieved by the State Commission and award was made against OP No. 1. No appeal having been filed, the order dated 20.11.2001 has attained finality. In view of that order, the submission that the order cannot be executed against the petitioner deserves to be repelled being without any merit.
7. This brings us to the last limb of argument. There is no bar under the Act that execution application(s) cannot be simultaneously filed under Sections 25 and 27 of the Act. Execution application(s) were, thus, competent. There is no illegality or jurisdictional error in the order passed by the State Commission warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction under Section 21(b) of the Act. Revision petitions are, therefore, dismissed.