Karnataka High Court
Vimalavva Alias Vinodavva vs Smt. Yellavva And Ors. on 13 March, 2003
Equivalent citations: AIR2003KANT313, 2003(3)KARLJ424, AIR 2003 KARNATAKA 313, 2003 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 1474, (2003) 3 KANT LJ 424, (2003) 3 KCCR 1783
Author: Manjula Chellur
Bench: Manjula Chellur
ORDER Manjula Chellur, J.
1. This revision petition is filed challenging the orders of the Trial Court in Election Petition No. 1 of 2000 on the file of the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) and II Additional Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ranebennur, dated 10-10-2002.
2. The petitioner herein is the successful candidate in the Gram Panchayat election of Kamadod, which was held on 27-2-2000. There were two seats to be elected in the village of Ennihosalli, one from General and another from S.T. group reserved for woman. The contesting candidate (opposition) i.e., petitioner before the Trial Court and respondents 4 and 5 represented reserved seat for woman in S.T. group. In the election, the petitioner before this Court was declared as successful candidate. Aggrieved by the same Smt. Yellawa, the 1st respondent herein filed the election petition contending that both herself and the petitioner hereunder got 206 votes, one extra vote given to the petitioner herein was an invalid vote and the concerned authorities were wrong in taking into consideration such vote. The other ground of challenge was that there was corrupt practice as contemplated under Sub-section (iii) of Section 22 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, as the petitioner hereunder used the national symbol i.e., the ballot paper, Ex. P. 3 contained the pictures of national party leaders and also national party symbol. Evidence was let in only by the 1st respondent herein. Three documents were marked.
3. On perusal of the entire records, it is noticed that the petitioner hereunder did not lead any evidence on her behalf. However, the learned Judge accepted both contentions of the petitioner before the Trial Court and allowed the petition, setting aside the election of the petitioner herein to the membership of Ennihosalli Village of Kamadod Gram Panchayat. Aggrieved by the same the present revision petition is filed.
4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the learned Judge was wrong in holding that the petitioner herein adopted the corrupt practice by publishing Ex. P., 3, because such publishing of pictures of political leaders do not amount to corrupt practice. According to him, it is not at all a national symbol. The other limb of the argument is that the 1st respondent hereunder never gave the details and the description of the invalid vote. Therefore, the learned Judge was wrong in accepting the case of the petitioner based on her oral evidence.
Section 22, Sub-section (iii) reads as under:
"The appeal by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his religion, race, caste, community or language or the use of, or appeal to religious symbols or the use of or appeal to national symbols, such as the national flag or the national emblem, for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of that candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate".
5. This section refers to the use of national symbols, such as national flag or national emblem. The learned Judge without going into the details like what the national flag and national emblem is, has straightaway came to the conclusion that the party symbols and party leaders pictures would mean national symbols. One has to refer to the exact meaning of the National Flag, National Emblem, National Anthem, National Calendar, National Flower, National Animal and National Bird. Some of the details of these were published by the Central Government, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, in a book called "India 1985--A Reference Annual". By reading this book, it is found from time to time the Government had published which are all considered as National Symbols. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also relies on two judgments of this Court in Sangappa Andanappa v. Shivamurthiswamy Siddappalyaswamy, AIR 1961 Mys. 106. This was with reference to Representation of the People Act and this Court in a Division Bench held what actual corrupt practice would mean at para 52, which reads as under:
"52. Further, there is another reason why that charge should fail insofar as it related to the use of the pictures of Mahatma Gandhi. The case of the respondent was that the use of the picture of Mahatma Gandhi amounted to an appeal to a national symbol or its use. In Miscellaneous Appeal No. 163 of 1959 this Court expressed the view that the picture of Mahatma Gandhi was not a national symbol. With that view, we respectfully agree. Nor did Mr. Karanth contest the correctness of that position.
In order to constitute a national symbol, the symbol must be something exponential or emblematic of the nation and it cannot be seriously asserted that the picture of Mahatma Gandhi is a national symbol so tested. Mr. Karanth, therefore, did not ask us to hold that, any display of the picture of Mahatma Gandhi either in the processions or in the dramatic performances, to which we have already referred, constituted either an appeal to a national symbol or its use and it, therefore, becomes unnecessary for us to pursue the discussion further".
6. This Court has held that picture of Mahatma Gandhi is not a national symbol. It was further said in order to constitute a national symbol it must always refer to exponential or emblematic of the nation. As such, therefore, their Lordship held that display of picture of Mahatma Gandhi either in the processions or in the dramatic performances cannot appeal to play as national symbol. In the case of Shankaragouda v. Sirur Veerabhadrappa, 1961 Mys. L.J. 107 : AIR 1968 Mys. 81 same view was taken at paragraph 6, it was held as under:
"6. The Tribunal has next considered the use of the photo of Mahatma Gandhi and national symbols and the distribution of handbills, pamphlets, etc., containing an appeal to the religious sentiments of the electors. These are matters of corrupt practice falling under Sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the Act. The use of the photo of Mahatma Gandhi in processions conducted for election propaganda, has been spoken to by P.Ws. 4 and 52; the use of Mahatma Gandhi's bust on the stage of the drama 'Dattuputra', in such a way as to make it appear that Mahatma Gandhi was asking that votes should be given to the Congress candidates, has been spoken to by P.Ws. 6 and 69. The use of handbills containing amongst other things the photograph of Mahatma Gandhi has been spoken to by P.Ws. 27, 32, 38 and 46. The alleged use of Mahatma Gandhi's bust on the stage of drama 'Dattuputra' has been denied by R.W. 12.
The evidence pertaining to the alleged use of Mahatma Gandhi's photo or statuette or bust, will be relevant for the purpose of Sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the Act, only if it is shown that they are national symbols. The Tribunal, in para 81 of its order, noticed the fact that though in Desai Basawaraj v. Dasankop Hasansab, (1953)4 Ele. L.R. 380 it had been held that Mahatma Gandhi's photo was a national symbol, more recent decision had taken the view that it was not a national symbol. But, the Tribunal did not reach any definite conclusion on the question as to whether the photo and the bust were national symbols. The Tribunal contented itself merely with the observation that Mahatma Gandhi's photo had been made use of in a very subtle way and that such use was objectionable; it has now been contended on behalf of the appellant that Mahatma Gandhi's photo and the bust alleged to have been used for election propaganda purposes, are not national symbols and that their use, even if true, would not be a corrupt practice.
In support of his contention, the learned Advocate for the appellant has relied on two decisions of the Allahabad High Court; one of them is in Karan Singh v. Jamuna Singh, and the other is Ghayar Ali Khan v. Keshav Gupta, . His Lordship Bhargava, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court in Karan Singh's case, supra, has given elaborate reasons for taking the view that a portrait of Mahatma Gandhi cannot be considered to be a national symbol. At page 430 this is what his Lordship says:
"There is also another significant aspect which needs to be examined. The question is as to how a symbol becomes a national symbol. Learned Counsels for the parties, when called upon to address us on this point, could only draw our attention to the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly which, by a resolution dated the 22nd of July, 1949 adopted the national flag. The national flag became a national symbol by a resolution of the Constituent Assembly which had the supreme power to lay down the Constitution of India".
In the same page, a little earlier; this is what his Lordship has stated:
"The national flag is thus a national symbol because, wherever it exists, it at once gives an idea that, in some form or the other, the Indian Nation is also present or represented there. The same cannot be said with regard to a portrait of Mahatma Gandhi. People may keep his portrait because they revere him or have a great regard for him and treat him as the father of the nation who alone brought independence of this country. By keeping his portrait, however, it cannot be said that there is any intention to signify that the Indian Nation as such is present or represented where the portrait happens to be. It appears to us, therefore, that it is not possible to hold that a portrait of Mahatma Gandhi is a national symbol in the sense that it represents the Indian Nation ....".
In the subsequent decision in Ghayar Ali Khan's case, supra, the Allahabad High Court noticed the decision of the Election Tribunal in Desai Basawaraj's case, supra, but followed the view that had been taken in Karan Singh's case, supra. With very great respect, I find myself in agreement with the reasonings given by the Allahabad High Court in Karan Singh's case, supra and in my view, the portrait or the bust of Mahatma Gandhi cannot be considered to be a national symbol, for the purposes of Sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the Act. In this view of the matter, a discussion of the evidence in regard to the use of the photo and the bust becomes unnecessary as no corrupt practice will have been committed, even if the photo or bust had been used. (After discussing the evidence relating to the alleged use of national flag, the judgment proceeded:) The learned Advocate for the petitioner pointed out that the two pictures which are found in the two pamphlets Exs. P. 8 and P. 9 contain the words "Vande Mataram" in Devanagari letters and that the use of the said words in this manner, amounts to the use of the national symbol. I do not find any force in this contention. In D. Venkataramiah v. E. Narayana Gowda, 1959 Mys. LJ. 952 it has been held at pp. 955 and 956, that the singing of the national anthem is not the same as the use of national symbol. The use of the words "Vande Mataram" cannot have the effect of converting the two pictures in Exs. P. 8 and P. 9 into national symbols.
From what is stated by the Tribunal at para 87 of its order, it was inclined to the view that amongst other things, the appellant and his agents had committed the corrupt practice of the use of or appeal to religious symbols. It is strenuously contended on behalf of the appellant that the Tribunal was not justified in taking such a view when no allegation had been made at all, in the petition, about any use of or appeal to any religious symbol. It would appear that, what induced the Tribunal to take the view that there was use of or appeal to religious symbols, is the evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioner pertaining to the interpretation given by one Channappa Gouda Master, during his lectures, of the blocks printed in Exs. P. 8 and P. 9 (which are two pamphlets called 'Congress Mahatme' and 'Congress Padyavali).
Reference to Ex. P. 8 was made, for the first time, by the petitioner, only when the amendment was made as per the order of the Tribunal dated 2-9-1957, by the addition of para 3(b) to the petition schedule. It is alleged therein that the printed cover page of Ex. P. 8 bears a picture showing the portraits of Gandhi, Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel, they being described as "Brahma", "Vishnu" and "Rudra" respectively; that, all these are inserted in the letter "Om". It was alleged that in this printed block, there was also the picture of "Bharata Mata" with the words "Vande Mataram" with the Sun flag in the one hand and Star and Crescent in the other hand. On the top of the picture of "Bharata Mata", Lord Shiva's third eye was drawn over "Tripundra". It is also alleged therein that the "Lavani" of Ex. P. 8 was sung by one Phakeerappa and his group, at all the meetings. It is stressed by the learned Advocate for the appellant that in spite of this detailed description of the printed block on the cover page of Ex. P. 8, it had nowhere been specifically alleged that it was a religious symbol.
It is on this ground that it has been urged on behalf of the appellant that when there was no specific allegation of the use of or appeal to religious symbols, the Tribunal committed a serious error in finding that such a corrupt practice had been committed by the use of Exs. P. 8 and P. 9. P.Ws. 27, 32, 38 and 52 are the persons that have given evidence in respect of Exs. P. 8 and P. 9. The evidence of P.W. 27 was to the effect that about a week before the polling day, there was a meeting at Mudhol, at which copies of Exs. P. 8 and P. 9 were distributed and that Channappa Gouda Master explained the significance of the printed picture block found in Exs. P. 8 and P. 9; the witness admitted during his cross-examination that he did not attend the meeting; but, he stated that he was sitting on the pial of his house and that he heard the songs which were sung by Channappa Gouda Master.
This witness was a clerk in the office of the petitioner and I have already stated in the previous para, for the reasons given therein, that it would be unsafe to place reliance on the evidence of this witness; for the very same reasons, I am not satisfied either that this meeting at Mudhol took place or that Channappa Gouda Master interpreted the printed picture blocks in Exs. P. 8 and P. 9, in the manner spoken to by this witness. That this witness could not really have listened to any speech made by Channappa Gouda Master in regard to the interpretation of the said printed block, is also clear from one other circumstance. The 'Urigannu' or the scorching eye, according to Hindu belief, is located in the forehead of Lord Shiva, who according to Hindu Mythology is the Destroyer. Vishnu is the Preserver.
It is not anybody's case that Channappa Gouda Master had ever interpreted the "Urigannu" depicted in Exs. P. 8 and P. 9, as having been that of Vishnu. But, this witness who claims to have listened to the speech of Channappa Gouda Master, states that the 'Urigannu' is that of Vishnu; this is one more circumstance which throws considerable doubt about his having listened to any speech of Channappa Gouda Master in regard to the interpretation of this printed picture block. P.W. 32 who has a printing press at Gadag and who is the printer of Ex. P. 8, has explained the significance of this picture. He has stated that the interpretation given by him of this picture, is based upon the interpretation given by Channappa Gouda Master at a meeting in Gadag.
It is not disputed that Gadag is not in the constituency from which the petitioner and the appellant had stood for election. The evidence of P.W. 32 does not establish the interpretation of this block in that manner, by Channappa Gouda Master to the electors of the constituency from which the present party had stood for election. The evidence of P.W. 38 is to the effect that four copies of Ex. P. 8 were given to four persons. He has admitted in the course of his cross-examination that after reading one page in Ex. P. 8 he gave up, as he could not understand. As contended on behalf of the appellant, the evidence of this witness does not establish appeal to any religious symbol. The evidence of P.W. 52 is to the effect that he has read Ex. P. 8 and similar pamphlets and handbills, I am not satisfied that his evidence is such as to establish appeal to religious symbols. There is also one other aspect which requires to be considered. Not only has there not been any allegation in the petition or the schedule that the printed picture blocks in Exs. P. 8 and P, 9 were religious symbols, but it has also not been shown that they actually represent any religious symbol.
It has not been made out that any religion or the followers of any religion have a religious symbol just like the picture printed in Exs. P. 8 and P. 9. It was pointed out that a Crescent and a Star were visible in this picture and that the Crescent and Star are the symbols of the Muslim religion. But it has to be pointed out that the Crescent and the Star are not shown separately, by themselves; they are shown in a particular setting. The Crescent and the Star as seen in the picture, have got to be taken together with the other items which form their background in the picture. When the "Tripundra" and the "Urigannu" also form part of the background, it cannot be said that the Crescent and the Star, in that setting, could properly represent the religious symbols of the Muslims. Similarly, the "Urigannu" which is shown not as being in the forehead of Eswara but in an entirely different setting, cannot be said to represent any religious symbol of the Hindus. It has not been shown that the picture of the 'Bharatha Matha' is the symbol of any religion.
The pictures of Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel, though described as Brahma, Vishnu and Kudra, do not constitute any religious symbol. When this printed block is taken into consideration as a whole it does not represent any religious symbol; nor does any component part thereof, when viewed in the setting in which it is, be considered to be a religious symbol. On a consideration of all these aspects, I am satisfied that by the mere user of these pictures in Exs. P. 8 and P. 9, no appeal to or the use of any religious symbols, has been established.
It is contended on behalf of the appellant, that before concluding that the corrupt practice under Sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the Act had been committed, the Tribunal had not carefully scrutinized the evidence to find out whether it had been established that there had been a systematic appeal to vote or to refrain from voting on grounds of caste, race, community or religion. The handbills which have been referred to by the learned Advocates, in this connection are Exs. P. 25, P. 26, P. 27, P. 29, P. 31 and P. 32. Of these, Exs. P. 25, P. 26 and P. 27 are appeals addressed specially to Muslim voters. Ex. P. 29 is an appeal by the President of the Hyderabad Pradesh Congress Committee and sets out the achievements and objects of the Congress. Ex. P. 31 has been published at Hubli by one Govardhan Rao, the Secretary of the Karnataka Pradesh Congress Election Committee. Ex. P. 32 is an appeal by the appellant and the Parliamentary Congress candidate Agadi Sanganna to the electors of Yelburga. It is not disputed before us that so far as Exs. P. 29 and P. 32 is concerned, they contain no appeal on grounds of caste, race, community or religion. So far as Ex. P. 31 is concerned, it is essentially a glorification of bullocks, the yoked bullocks being the symbol of the Congress.
The bullocks are praised as hardworking animals which are essential for the prosperity of the cultivator. It is not disputed on behalf of the petitioner that but for one sentence in it, Ex. P. 31 does not contain any appeal on grounds of caste, race, community or religion. It is pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that the sentence "Hindi" (original in Kannada--Ed.) in Ex. P. 31, is really an appeal to vote in favour of the Congress candidate, on grounds of caste or religion. It is pointed out that in a constituency where about 33 per cent of the voters were Shaivites and hold Nandi in reverence, this would amount to an appeal on grounds of caste or religion. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the appellant that when Ex. P. 31 is viewed as a whole, this one sentence would not amount to an appeal on the ground of caste or religion. It is also further contended on behalf of the appellant that, in any event, the evidence does not establish systematic appeal on the ground of caste, race, community or religion. It appears to me, that this one sentence in Ex. P. 31, does amount to an appeal on the ground of caste or religion.
But, at the same time, I find that there is considerable force in the contention on behalf of the appellant that the evidence in the case does not establish that there was systematic appeal through Ex. P. 31, on grounds of caste, race, community or religion. Ex. P. 31 was printed at Hubli; on the face of it, it does not show that it was intended to be used for this constituency. Ex. P. 31 had not been produced along with the petition; but it was only on 12-12-1957 that this was produced. The petitioner has admitted in the course of his evidence, that he got Ex. P. 31 only after the elections. P.W. 3 who states that he saw Guriah, Neelakantappa and others distributing Ex. P. 31 at Dyampur, was the agent for the Lok Sevak Sangha candidates, at Dyampur Polling Station. His evidence cannot be viewed as that of a disinterested person. He is unable to mention the number of houses at which this pamphlet was delivered. Guriah who has been examined as R.W. 9 and Neelakantappa who has been examined as R.W. 15, have not been confronted with Ex. P. 31, during their cross-examination.
The appellant has stated in the course of his evidence, that he had not seen Ex. P. 31 during election time and that he came to see it only after it was produced before the Tribunal. Nobody to whom Ex. P. 31 was distributed, has been examined. Apart from the interested and meagre evidence of P.W. 3 about the distribution at Dyampur, there is no evidence of Ex. P, 31 having been distributed elsewhere in the Constituency. Under these circumstances, the evidence of P.W. 3 is not such as to establish that there was such wide distribution of Ex. P. 31 as would justify as inference of systematic appeal to caste or religion, through Ex. P. 31.
So far as the appeal to Muslim voters are concerned, the Tribunal has placed reliance on the evidence of P.Ws. 14 and 17 for reaching the conclusion that at a meeting convened by the appellant's agents, Muslim voters were made to take oath on the Koran to the effect that they would vote for the appellant. P.W. 14 is a resident of Adur; his evidence about the Muslim voters having been made to take such oath, is clearly hearsay. He states that one Peer Sab told him that a meeting had been convened at which the Muslim voters had to take oath on the holy Koran that they would vote for the Congress. This Peer Sab has not been examined and as rightly contended on behalf of the appellant, the Tribunal ought not to have attached any importance to the hearsay evidence of P.W. 14, P.W. 17 who is a resident of Yelburga has, no doubt, stated that he was one of the persons who had been made to touch the Koran and promise that votes would be given for the Congress candidates.
It is seen from the note made by the Tribunal towards the end of the depositions of P.Ws. 14 and 17, that objection had been taken on behalf of the appellant to the effect that the incident of giving promise by touching the Koran had not been mentioned anywhere in the petition. It is not disputed before us by the petitioner's learned Advocate, that it is not alleged either in the petition or in the petition schedule that Muslim voters had been made to take oath on the Koran. When there was no such allegation at all, the Tribunal was clearly in error in having placed any reliance on the evidence of P.Ws. 14 and 17. Under these circumstances, the evidence of P.Ws. 14 and 17 in regard to this matter, is not entitled to acceptance.
So far as Exs. P. 25, P. 26 and P. 27 are concerned, they are no doubt appeals to Muslim electors. Ex. P. 25 is an appeal by a number of Muslims, consequent on a meeting under the Presidentship of one Imam Saheb Nabi Saheb Bannikatti. But there is nothing in Ex. P. 25 which can be said to be an appeal on grounds of caste, race, community or religion. Ex. P. 26 is an appeal by Moulana Hifizur Rahman of the Jameyat-ul-Ulema Hind. This is an appeal on the ground of the policy pursued by Sri Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru; it is also an appeal in the cause of service to the nation. Again, there is nothing in Ex. P. 26 which can be stated to be an appeal on the ground of caste, race, community or religion. Similarly in the case of Ex. P. 27 which we got translated and read out to us; this is really an appeal in the name of the nation. The mere circumstance that an appeal may happen to be by Muslims or that it may happen to be addressed to Muslims, does not by itself make it an appeal on grounds of caste, race, community or religion.
After giving a careful thought to the matter, I am satisfied that the alleged corrupt practices under Sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the Act, have not been established".
7. There is one more Act, known "Emblems and Names" (Prevention of Improper Use) Act, 1950. This Act was enacted to prevent the improper use of certain emblems and names for professional and commercial purposes.
Section 3 of the Act reads as under:
"Prohibition of improper use of certain emblems and names.--Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no person shall, except in such cases and under such conditions as may be prescribed by the Central Government, use, or continue to use, for the purpose of any trade, business, calling or profession, or in the title or any patent, or in any trademark or design, any name or emblem specified in the Schedule or any colourable imitation thereof without the previous permission of the Central Government or of such officer of Government as may be authorised in this behalf by the Central Government".
8. In the Schedule to this Act, they have given different items saying they cannot be used for professional or commercial purposes by general public. We find this at Item No. 9-A of the Schedule. The name or pictorial representation of (Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj or) Mahatma Gandhi (or Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru) (Shrimati Indira Gandhi,) or the Prime Minister of India) cannot be used for professional and commercial purposes. This is altogether a different enactment. What is prohibited under this Act has been specified in the Schedule. It cannot be equated with the national symbols. Even otherwise as stated above the book published by Government of India do not specify the pictures of national party leaders or the national party symbols as national symbols. The concerned authority has to declare what is national symbol. In the book published as "India 1985" none of the pictures of the national leaders referred to at Ex. P. 3 or none of the party symbols published at Ex. P. 3 are shown as national symbols. In other words the exhibiting of such pictures or symbols mentioned at Ex. P. 3 is not an appeal on the ground of national symbols. Therefore, Ex. P. 3 do not come within the purview of corrupt practice under Sub-section (iii) of Section 22.
9. So far as the other ground on which the petition of the 1st respondent was allowed, the learned Judge without giving any reasoning has come to the conclusion that they were wrong in taking into consideration the invalid vote. He does not even refer to number or details of invalid vote. The serial number was also not given. Under those circumstances, the Trial Court was not correct in allowing the election petition by setting aside the election of the membership of the petitioner herein.
10. Accordingly, the petition is allowed, by setting aside the order in Election Petition No. 1 of 2000 holding that the election of the present petitioner is valid to the membership of Ennihosalli Village, Kamadod Gram Panchayat.