Delhi District Court
Smt. Prabha Kiran vs Smt. Nirmala Devi on 23 March, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. SUMIT DALAL
JOINT REGISTRAR (JUDICIAL):
HIGH COURT OF DELHI : NEW DELHI
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024
CNR: DLSW01-011969-2024
SMT. PRABHA KIRAN
W/o Shri. Krishan Kanhiya
R/o RZ-9E, K-31A,
Puran Nagar, Street - 7D/2
Palam Colony, New Delhi-110045
....APPELLANT
VERSUS
SMT. NIRMALA DEVI (SENIOR CITIZEN)
w/o Shri Hari Om
R/o H. No. 261,
Puran Nagar, Street - 7D/2
Palam Colony, New Delhi-110045.
....RESPONDENT
Date of institution of the suit : 11.12.2024
Final Arguments Heard on : 15.10.2025
Date of Judgment : 23.03.2026
JUDGMENT
The arguments in the present case were heard by the undersigned while the undersigned was posted as District Judge - 04, South West District, Dwarka. Vide transfer order no. 08/D-3/Gaz.IA/DHC/2026 dated 06.02.2026, the undersigned was transferred as Joint Registrar (Judicial) in the Hon'ble Delhi High Court and is presently presiding over JR Court No. 7. Vide the Note 2 appended to the said order, the undersigned has duly RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 1 of 63 notified the present case to the Ld. Principal District & Sessions Judge, South West District, Dwarka.
INTRODUCTION
1. By way of the present appeal preferred under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the appellant/defendant No. 2 has assailed the judgment and decree dated 25.10.2024 passed by the Ld. ASCJ-cum-JSCC-cum-Guardian Judge, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi in CS SCJ No. 427019/2016 titled Smt. Nirmala Devi v. Krishan Kanhiya & Anr., whereby the suit instituted by the respondent/plaintiff for mandatory injunction, permanent injunction and damages came to be partly decreed. Vide the impugned judgment, the Ld. Trial Court granted reliefs of mandatory and permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants, but declined the prayer for damages/mesne profits.
PLAINTIFF'S CASE BEFORE THE LD. TRIAL COURT
2. The case of the plaintiff before the Ld. Trial Court, in brief, was that she is a senior citizen and the absolute and sole owner of property bearing No. RZ-9E, K-31A, Puran Nagar, Street-7D/2, Palam Colony, New Delhi, measuring about 97 sq. yards, forming part of Khasra No. 69/10/02, situated in the area of Village Palam, Delhi. It was pleaded that the said property had been purchased in her name on 27.07.1982 from Smt. Chameli Devi through documents such as GPA, Agreement, Affidavit and Receipt, out of her own funds and the funds of her husband. It was further averred RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 2 of 63 that after acquisition of the property, construction thereon was raised from time to time from the income of her husband, who was a retired government servant drawing pension, and also from her own earnings from stitching/tailoring work.
3. It was the plaintiff's further case that defendant No. 1 is her son and defendant No. 2 is her daughter-in-law, being the wife of defendant No. 1. According to the plaintiff, after their marriage, both defendants sought her permission to stay in the suit property temporarily for a short period and purely on licence basis as permissive users. Owing to the close family relationship, she allowed them to reside in the property. The plaintiff asserted that the defendants had assured her that as soon as they found suitable rented accommodation, they would shift therefrom. However, instead of vacating the premises, the defendants allegedly began asserting themselves in the property and started harbouring an intention to usurp the same.
4. The plaintiff further alleged that with the passage of time the conduct of the defendants, particularly defendant No. 2, became hostile and intolerable. It was pleaded that defendant No. 2 used to quarrel frequently with the plaintiff and her husband on petty issues, abused them, harassed them mentally, physically and financially, and even threatened them with dire consequences. A specific incident dated 12.04.2016 was pleaded, wherein defendant No. 2 allegedly assaulted the plaintiff in the kitchen by catching her hair and hitting her head against the wall and window, causing RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 3 of 63 injuries for which she had to be medically treated. It was also pleaded that complaints were made to the police authorities and that a criminal complaint under Sections 200 Cr.P.C. and 156(3) Cr.P.C. had also been filed by the plaintiff.
5. The plaintiff further averred that she and her husband were under constant threat from defendant No. 2 and her relatives, and that the behaviour of the defendants compelled them to disown and disinherit both defendants as well as their child by way of a public notice published in a newspaper dated 18.04.2016. According to the plaintiff, the defendants had no right, title or interest in the suit property and their possession was only that of permissive users, which became unlawful once the permission was withdrawn.
6. It was then pleaded that the plaintiff got a legal notice dated 26.04.2016 issued to both defendants, thereby terminating their licence and calling upon them to hand over peaceful vacant possession of the suit property within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice. The notice also called upon the defendants to pay damages for unauthorized use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 8,000/- per month besides water and electricity charges in the event of failure to vacate. It was the plaintiff's case that though the notice was served and a reply was sent by defendant No. 2, the defendants did not vacate the property. Rather, according to the plaintiff, defendant No. 2 started using more portions of the suit property after receipt of the notice. On this basis, the plaintiff asserted that the licence stood terminated with effect from the midnight of 13.05.2016 RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 4 of 63 and that the defendants' occupation thereafter became illegal and unauthorized.
7. On the aforesaid averments, the plaintiff prayed before the Ld. Trial Court for a decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendants to hand over peaceful vacant possession of the suit premises as shown in red in the site plan; for a decree of permanent injunction restraining them from parting with possession or creating third-party interest therein; and for a decree of damages at the rate of Rs. 8,000/- per month from 13.05.2016 till handing over possession, along with other consequential reliefs.
DEFENDANT NO. 1'S DEFENCE BEFORE THE LD. TRIAL COURT
8. In his written statement before the Ld. Trial Court, defendant No. 1 primarily contested the suit on the ground that it was not maintainable against him, as he was no longer residing in the suit property. His specific case was that after disputes arose between him and defendant No. 2, and after service of the legal notice issued by the plaintiff, he had vacated the suit premises in or around April, 2016. On that basis, he pleaded that he was neither a necessary nor a proper party to the suit and that no cause of action survived against him.
9. Defendant No. 1 further stated that defendant No. 2 is his wife, but that from the very inception of marriage their relationship had remained strained and discordant. According to RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 5 of 63 him, defendant No. 2 had misbehaved not only with him but also with his parents, and he alleged that she had even assaulted his mother on 12.04.2016. He referred to the criminal complaint instituted by the plaintiff against defendant No. 2 under Sections 156(3) and 200 Cr.P.C., and also stated that after the said incident his parents had disowned and disinherited both him and defendant No. 2 and had published the same in a newspaper. He further pleaded that though he had made efforts for reconciliation and had requested defendant No. 2 to join him elsewhere, she refused to do so and instead initiated proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act against him, the plaintiff and other family members. He also stated that he had filed a divorce petition against defendant No. 2.
10. On merits, defendant No. 1 did not set up any claim of ownership or right, title or interest in the suit property in his favour. Rather, while replying to the plaint, he admitted in substance that after marriage he and defendant No. 2 had sought permission from the plaintiff to reside in the suit property temporarily as permissive users. His stand, however, was that after receipt of the notice he had already vacated the premises and, therefore, no relief of possession or damages could be granted against him. He specifically denied that he was continuing in possession of the suit property or that he had any intention to misappropriate the same.
11. Defendant No. 1 also denied liability for damages or occupation charges, contending that since he had vacated the premises, he could not be made liable for any amount claimed by the RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 6 of 63 plaintiff. He further took the plea that the suit had not been properly valued, that the court fee paid was insufficient, that the plaint suffered from defects of verification and affidavit, and that the plaintiff had not approached the Court with clean hands. He, therefore, prayed that the suit be dismissed as against him with costs.
DEFENDANT NO. 2'S DEFENCE BEFORE THE LD. TRIAL COURT
12. In her written statement before the Ld. Trial Court, defendant No. 2 contested the suit in toto and took the stand that the same was not maintainable and had been filed in collusion between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 with the object of ousting her from her matrimonial home. Her case was that she is the legally wedded wife of defendant No. 1, that her marriage was solemnized on 29.04.2005, and that since the date of marriage she has been residing in the suit property as her matrimonial home/shared household along with her husband and other family members.
13. Defendant No. 2 alleged that from the very inception of marriage she was subjected to cruelty, harassment and humiliation by the plaintiff, her husband, and other family members for bringing insufficient dowry. She pleaded that repeated demands were made for a four-wheeler and other articles, that she was taunted, beaten and maltreated on numerous occasions, and that her jewellery/stridhan had also been taken away. She further alleged that she had suffered serious physical violence during her matrimonial RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 7 of 63 life, including an incident during pregnancy, and that because of the conduct of the plaintiff and her family she had to lodge several complaints with the police and other authorities from time to time. She also asserted that she had initiated proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and had filed maintenance proceedings against defendant No. 1.
14. On the issue of title, defendant No. 2 denied that the suit property was the exclusive self-acquired property of the plaintiff. She pleaded that the property was "dada lai"/ancestral property and that all family members, including defendant No. 1, had contributed towards its construction and development. She, therefore, denied the plaintiff's plea that she was merely a permissive user or licensee in the property. Her categorical case was that the suit property was her matrimonial home/shared household and that, being the wife of the only son of the plaintiff, she had a legal right to reside therein.
15. Defendant No. 2 further denied the allegations that she had assaulted or misbehaved with the plaintiff in the manner alleged in the plaint. She claimed, on the contrary, that it was the plaintiff, her husband and defendant No. 1 who had made her life miserable and were now trying to throw her out of the house. She also alleged that the suit had been filed as a counterblast to the proceedings initiated by her under the Domestic Violence Act and other complaints lodged by her. According to her, the publication whereby RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 8 of 63 the plaintiff purported to disown and disinherit the defendants was part of the same design to evict her from the shared household.
16. Defendant No. 2 also challenged the legality of the notice dated 26.04.2016, pleading that the plaintiff had no authority in law to terminate her right of residence in the shared household through such notice. She took the position that the plaintiff could not seek possession of the property in the garb of a suit for injunction and that the suit was, in substance, one for possession which had not been properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction. She additionally raised an objection that the suit was hit by Section 11 CPC on account of the earlier proceedings and also contended that, in view of the matrimonial nature of the dispute, the Family Court had exclusive jurisdiction.
17. On these pleas, defendant No. 2 prayed that the suit be dismissed with costs, maintaining throughout that she had a right to continue residing in the suit property as her matrimonial home/shared household and that the plaintiff was not entitled to evict her or recover damages from her.
ISSUES FRAMED BEFORE THE LD. TRIAL COURT
18. Upon completion of pleadings and after considering the rival stands of the parties, the Ld. Trial Court, vide order dated 22.01.2019, framed the following issues for adjudication:
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 9 of 631. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of mandatory injunction in her favour and against the defendants, as prayed for? OPP
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of permanent injunction in her favour and against the defendants, as prayed for? OPP
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of damages in her favour and against the defendants, as prayed for? OPP
4. Relief.
19. It may also be noted that vide the same order dated 22.01.2019, defendant No. 1 was proceeded ex parte before the Ld. Trial Court.
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE BEFORE THE LD. TRIAL COURT
20. In support of her case, the plaintiff examined two witnesses before the Ld. Trial Court, namely: (i) herself as PW-1, Smt. Nirmala Devi, and (ii) her husband as PW-2, Sh. Hari Om.
21. PW-1, Smt. Nirmala Devi, tendered her evidence by way of affidavit, which was exhibited as Ex. PW-1/A. In her affidavit, she broadly reiterated the averments made in the plaint and deposed that she is the absolute owner of the suit property bearing No. RZ-9E, K-31A, Puran Nagar, Street-7D/2, Palam Colony, New Delhi, having purchased the same on 27.07.1982 from Smt. Chameli Devi through GPA, Agreement, Affidavit and Receipt. She further RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 10 of 63 deposed that the defendants, being her son and daughter-in-law, were permitted to reside in the suit property only on licence basis after their marriage, that their conduct subsequently became hostile, that defendant No. 2 had assaulted and harassed her, and that the licence of the defendants was terminated by legal notice dated 26.04.2016. She also deposed that despite service of notice, the defendants failed to vacate the premises, thereby rendering their occupation unauthorized.
22. In support of her testimony, PW-1 relied upon the following documents:
(i) photocopy of GPA, Deed of Agreement, Affidavit and Receipt dated 27.07.1982 as Ex. PW-1/1 (colly) (OSR);
(ii) photocopy of registered deed dated 28.02.2017 as Ex. PW-1/2 (OSR);
(iii) photocopy of Pension Payment Order of her husband, which was de-exhibited and marked as Mark A;
(iv) site plan as Ex. PW-1/4;
(v) complaint made to police authorities and copy of MLC as Ex.
PW-1/5 and Ex. PW-1/6 respectively;
(vi) copy of newspaper "Samachaar Jagat", which was de-exhibited and marked as Mark B;
(vii) copy of legal notice dated 26.04.2016 as Ex. PW-1/8 (colly) and postal receipts marked as Mark C; and
(viii) copy of reply to the legal notice as Ex. PW-1/9 (colly).RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 11 of 63
23. PW-1 was cross-examined on 18.10.2019 and 26.02.2021. During cross-examination, she reiterated that she had purchased the suit property for a consideration of Rs. 5,000/- around the year 1981-82 from her personal savings and denied the suggestion that the suit property was ancestral or had come to her by way of family settlement. However, certain material admissions were elicited from her. She admitted that there was only one kitchen in the house, though she clarified that groceries and cooking were separate. She further admitted that the averments in para 7 of her affidavit regarding the defendants having separated from the joint family and established a separate mess, and in para 8 regarding their shifting from the ground floor to the first floor, were incorrect. She also admitted that defendant No. 2 had been residing in the suit property continuously since her marriage. PW-1 further stated that her main grievance was against defendant No. 2 and not against defendant No. 1. At the same time, she maintained that defendant No. 2 was abusive and violent towards her, that the suit property was not ancestral, and that she had sought removal of defendant No. 2 after terminating the licence.
24. PW-2, Sh. Hari Om, the husband of the plaintiff, tendered his evidence by way of affidavit, exhibited as Ex. PW-2/1. He substantially supported and corroborated the case of the plaintiff. He deposed that his wife was the absolute and sole owner of the suit property, that the defendants had been permitted to reside therein as licensees after marriage, that defendant No. 2 had misbehaved with him and his wife, and that the defendants failed to vacate the RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 12 of 63 premises despite demands and notice. PW-2 relied upon the documents already exhibited through PW-1.
25. It is significant to note that PW-2 was not cross- examined by defendant No. 2 despite opportunity, while defendant No. 1 had already been proceeded ex parte. Accordingly, the testimony of PW-2 remained unrebutted and unchallenged on record.
26. After examining the aforesaid two witnesses, the plaintiff closed her evidence before the Ld. Trial Court on 05.03.2022.
DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE BEFORE THE LD. TRIAL COURT
27. In support of her defence, defendant No. 2 examined two witnesses before the Ld. Trial Court, namely: (i) herself as DW-1, Smt. Prabha Kiran, and (ii) DW-2, Sh. Shivom Verma. Defendant No. 1, having already been proceeded ex parte, did not lead any evidence.
28. DW-1, Smt. Prabha Kiran, tendered her evidence by way of affidavit, exhibited as Ex. DW-1/A. In her affidavit, she reiterated the stand taken in the written statement and deposed that the suit property was her matrimonial home/shared household, where she had been residing since her marriage with defendant No.
1. She alleged that she had been subjected to cruelty, harassment and dowry-related demands by defendant No. 1, the plaintiff and other RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 13 of 63 family members. She further deposed that she had filed proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and had also been granted protection/interim maintenance therein. She denied the plaintiff's ownership in absolute terms and asserted that the suit property did not exclusively belong to the plaintiff. In support of her case, she relied upon various documents, which were exhibited as Ex. DW-1/1, Ex. DW-1/3, Ex. DW-1/5, Ex. DW-1/7 to Ex. DW-1/12, besides certain documents marked as Mark A to Mark D.
29. DW-1 was cross-examined on 26.02.2024. In her cross-examination, she stated that her husband was not presently residing with her and that he was residing separately in government accommodation in IARI/Pusa Campus, as told by him. She further stated that she had tried to live with her husband in Pusa in the year 2017 and again in the year 2021, but claimed that she could not stay there permanently. She admitted that her husband had obtained a government job in January, 2013. She also admitted that the suit property was already constructed when she came there after marriage. Though she asserted that the suit property was ancestral, she stated in cross-examination that the property had been purchased by Nirmala Devi from the sale consideration of certain ancestral properties. She also admitted that maintenance at the rate of Rs. 14,000/- per month had been awarded in her favour and in favour of her daughter against her husband. She denied the plaintiff's suggestion that the suit property had been purchased by the plaintiff RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 14 of 63 from her own earnings or tailoring work, and maintained that the property was her matrimonial home.
30. DW-2, Sh. Shivom Verma, tendered his evidence by way of affidavit, exhibited as Ex. DW-2/A. He described himself as the younger brother of late Sh. Hari Om, the husband of the plaintiff. In his affidavit, he sought to support the plea that the suit property was not the self-acquired property of the plaintiff. He deposed that the family had ancestral properties at WZ-154, Palam Village and WZ-72, Chhotiyal, Palam Village, and that in lieu of the share of late Hari Om Rohilla in those ancestral properties, a portion of plot No. RZ-9E-K-31, Puran Nagar, Palam Colony, New Delhi was given to him/plaintiff's side. He further deposed that late Hari Om Rohilla had utilised the money received from sale of ancestral property for construction of the suit property and that the plaintiff had no independent source of income and was only a housewife.
31. DW-2 was cross-examined on 18.07.2024. In his cross-examination, he stated that he had read the affidavit before signing it and admitted his signatures thereon. He also stated that he had retired from the Indian Air Force on 31.07.2010. Except a bare assertion that the disputed property related to WZ-72, Mohalla Chhotiyal, Palam Village, no documentary material was produced by him in support of the alleged ancestral nature of the suit property or the alleged family arrangement.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 15 of 6332. After examining the aforesaid witnesses, defendant No. 2 closed her evidence before the Ld. Trial Court on 21.09.2024.
IMPUGNED JUDGMENT OF THE LD. TRIAL COURT
33. Vide judgment and decree dated 25.10.2024, the Ld. ASCJ-cum-JSCC-cum-Guardian Judge, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi partly decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff for mandatory injunction, permanent injunction and damages.
34. While deciding Issue No. 1 relating to mandatory injunction, the Ld. Trial Court held that the plaintiff had successfully proved her ownership over the suit property on the strength of documents Ex. PW-1/1 (GPA, Agreement, Affidavit and Receipt dated 27.07.1982) and Ex. PW-1/2 (registered deed dated 28.02.2017). The Ld. Trial Court further held that defendant No. 2 had failed to place on record any family settlement or other convincing material to establish that the suit property was ancestral or that the plaintiff was not its exclusive owner. The Ld. Trial Court also took note of the testimony of DW-1 that her husband/defendant No. 1 was residing separately in government accommodation at Pusa Campus and observed that the defendants had failed to prove any right in the suit property. It further held that the plaintiff had validly terminated the leave/licence of the defendants through legal notice Ex. PW-1/8. On these findings, Issue No. 1 was decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants, and the defendants were RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 16 of 63 directed to hand over possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff.
35. In relation to Issue No. 2 concerning permanent injunction, the Ld. Trial Court substantially reiterated its findings on ownership and possession. It held that the plaintiff had proved her title and possession over the suit property and that the defendants had failed to establish any legal right therein. Consequently, the Ld. Trial Court decreed the relief of permanent injunction and restrained the defendants from parting with possession of the suit property or creating any third-party interest therein.
36. As regards Issue No. 3 pertaining to damages, however, the Ld. Trial Court declined the said relief. It observed that although the plaintiff had proved her ownership, she had failed to establish the exact nature and extent of the liability for damages. The Ld. Trial Court noted that defendant No. 2 was the wife of defendant No. 1 and could not be treated as a stranger to the family, that she had been residing in the suit property since her marriage in 2005, and that the parties were sharing the same kitchen, though they might have been using separate commodities. The Ld. Trial Court also observed that the plaintiff had not led any evidence to prove that the prevailing rental or occupation charges in the locality were Rs. 8,000/- per month for a property of similar nature. On that reasoning, Issue No. 3 was decided against the plaintiff.
37. Resultantly, the Ld. Trial Court partly decreed the suit by granting the reliefs of mandatory injunction and permanent RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 17 of 63 injunction in favour of the plaintiff, while rejecting the prayer for damages/mesne profits. Costs of the suit were also awarded in favour of the plaintiff.
APPEAL AND THE SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS
38. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 25.10.2024, the present appeal under Section 96 CPC has been preferred by appellant/defendant No. 2 assailing the findings of the Ld. Trial Court on Issues No. 1 and 2, whereby the suit was decreed for mandatory injunction and permanent injunction in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. The appellant has, in substance, contended that the impugned judgment is contrary to the pleadings, evidence and settled legal position governing the right of residence of a daughter- in-law in a shared household.
39. The principal challenge of the appellant is that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that she had been residing in the suit property since her marriage in the year 2005 and that the suit property constituted her matrimonial home/shared household. It has been urged that the husband of the appellant had admittedly shifted to separate government accommodation in the year 2016, but that circumstance did not extinguish the appellant's right of residence in the suit premises. According to the appellant, the suit was filed by the respondent in collusion with her son, i.e. the husband of the appellant, only with a view to evict the appellant from the shared household after matrimonial disputes arose between the spouses. The appellant has also contended that she had already instituted RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 18 of 63 proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and had obtained a protection order dated 17.05.2016 restraining her dispossession except through due process of law; hence, according to her, the civil suit was a counterblast to those proceedings and the impugned decree is inconsistent with the earlier order passed in the DV proceedings.
40. A further grievance raised in appeal is that the respondent/plaintiff allegedly concealed the pendency and effect of the DV proceedings and did not candidly disclose the earlier protection order while prosecuting the civil suit. The appellant has also alleged that the respondent deliberately impleaded defendant No. 1 despite being aware that he was no longer residing in the suit property, and that the decree for possession passed against both defendants is therefore defective, vague and not capable of proper execution. It is also argued that the Ld. Trial Court did not clearly identify the exact portion in occupation of the appellant and ignored her case that she was occupying only a defined portion of the property.
41. On the issue of title, the appellant has disputed the exclusive ownership of the respondent/plaintiff over the suit property. In the memorandum of appeal, it has been argued that the Ld. Trial Court erred in accepting the plaintiff's ownership claim without proper scrutiny and without adequately considering the defence that the suit property was not the exclusive self-acquired property of the plaintiff in the manner pleaded by her. In this context, RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 19 of 63 the appellant has referred to the revenue record pertaining to Khasra No. 69/10/2 and has contended that the vendor's title and the genuineness of the plaintiff's documents were not sufficiently verified. It is also the appellant's case that she had sought to produce a Patwari/Tehsildar witness in support of her contention, but the true character of the property was not properly appreciated by the Ld. Trial Court.
42. The appellant has additionally urged that the impugned judgment suffers from non-consideration of material defence evidence and from failure to appreciate the legal protection available to her under Section 17 of the DV Act. It has been argued that, even assuming the plaintiff to be the owner, the appellant could not have been directed to vacate the suit premises without due regard to her statutory right of residence in the shared household. The appeal also contains a challenge to the finding regarding defendant No. 1, on the ground that no decree of eviction could have been effectively passed against a person who was not residing in the suit property. On these and allied pleas, the appellant has prayed for setting aside of the impugned judgment and decree.
REPLY AND THE SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS
43. The appeal has been opposed by the respondent/plaintiff, who has supported the impugned judgment and decree by contending that the same are based on proper appreciation of the pleadings and evidence led before the Ld. Trial Court. It has been urged on behalf of the respondent that the suit property is her RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 20 of 63 self-acquired property, having been purchased in her name, and that the appellant failed to produce any cogent documentary evidence to substantiate her plea that the property was ancestral, joint family property, or acquired through any family settlement. According to the respondent, the Ld. Trial Court rightly held that the appellant had failed to prove any right, title or interest in the suit property and that the respondent had established a superior title thereto.
44. It has further been argued on behalf of the respondent that the occupation of the defendants in the suit property was purely permissive in nature and arose only because of the close familial relationship between the parties. The respondent has contended that after the marriage of defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2, they were allowed to stay in the suit property only as permissive users/licensees and that, owing to the subsequent conduct of the appellant, the licence was validly terminated through legal notice dated 26.04.2016. According to the respondent, despite service of the said notice and reply thereto by defendant No. 2, the suit property was not vacated, thereby entitling the respondent to seek possession through due process of law.
45. The respondent has also contended that the appellant cannot claim an indefeasible right to remain in occupation of the suit property merely by describing the same as a matrimonial home or shared household. It has been argued that though the appellant may claim a limited right of residence under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, such right is not a right of RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 21 of 63 ownership and cannot override the proprietary rights of the true owner. According to the respondent, the civil suit instituted by her was itself a lawful recourse and amounted to following due process of law, and therefore the decree of possession cannot be faulted merely because the appellant had earlier obtained a protection order against dispossession except in accordance with law.
46. In support of the impugned judgment, reliance has been placed on judicial precedents recognising that the right of residence of a daughter-in-law in a shared household is not absolute and that the rights of senior citizens and owners to reside peacefully in their own property are equally entitled to protection. It has been submitted that the judgments of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Smt. Dulli Biswas v. The Divisional Commissioner & Ors. in WP(C) No. 9915 of 2020, dated 25.01.2023 and in Vinay Varma v. Kanika Pasricha & Anr. 2019 (265) DLT 211 support the proposition that the rights under the Domestic Violence Act and the rights of the parents/in-laws as owners must be harmoniously construed, and that an aggrieved woman cannot insist on remaining in the same premises regardless of the title and the surrounding circumstances. It has further been argued that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satish Chandra Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja 2020 INSC 599 does not confer any ownership right upon the daughter-in-law and only protects her right of residence, which can be suitably balanced with the owner's rights through due process.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 22 of 6347. The respondent has additionally argued that the appeal is devoid of merit inasmuch as many of the objections raised by the appellant are either contrary to the record or legally untenable. It has been submitted that the plea regarding concealment of the DV proceedings does not render the civil suit non-maintainable, since the respondent, as owner, was entitled to seek possession before the competent civil court. It has also been urged that the objections concerning defendant No. 1 being no longer in possession or the decree being defective on that count do not dislodge the respondent's substantive entitlement to relief against the actual occupant, namely defendant No. 2. On these submissions, the respondent has prayed for dismissal of the appeal and for affirmance of the impugned judgment and decree.
POINTS OF DETERMINATION
48. The points of determination before this Court are as follows:
a. Whether the Ld. Trial Court correctly held that the suit property is the self-acquired property of the Plaintiff and that the Defendants failed to establish any right, title or interest therein on the basis of ancestral property or family settlement?
b. Whether the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendants was that of licensor and licensee, and whether the Ld. Trial Court rightly held that the licence stood validly terminated?RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 23 of 63
c. Whether the Defendant No. 2 has any independent right of residence in the suit property as a "shared household" under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and whether such right, if any, affects the Plaintiff's entitlement to seek eviction by way of mandatory injunction?
d. Whether the Ld. Trial Court was justified in granting a decree of mandatory injunction directing the Defendants to vacate the suit property?
e. Whether the impugned judgment and decree dated 25.10.2024 suffers from any illegality, perversity, or material irregularity warranting interference by this Appellate Court?
ISSUE WISE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS POINT OF DETERMINATION NO. 1 WHETHER THE LD. TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE SUIT PROPERTY IS THE SELF-ACQUIRED PROPERTY OF THE PLAINTIFF AND THAT THE DEFENDANTS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST THEREIN ON THE BASIS OF ANCESTRAL PROPERTY OR FAMILY SETTLEMENT?
49. This point goes to the very foundation of the rival claims. The case of the respondent/plaintiff is that the suit property was purchased in her name on 27.07.1982 from Smt. Chameli Devi through the documents Ex. PW-1/1 (colly), and that the same was later got registered vide document dated 28.02.2017, Ex. PW-1/2.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 24 of 63The appellant/defendant No. 2, on the other hand, has sought to defeat the plaintiff's claim by pleading that the property is "dada lai"/ancestral, or that it was constructed from joint family resources, or that it was purchased from the earnings of the husband of the plaintiff, or again that it was purchased in the plaintiff's name out of sale proceeds of ancestral properties. Thus, the first task of the Appellate Court is to determine whether the finding of the Ld. Trial Court on the character of the property calls for interference.
50. At the outset, it needs to be noticed that a plea that a property is ancestral, joint family property, or the outcome of a family settlement is not to be accepted on mere assertion. Such a plea must be specifically pleaded and cogently proved. A family settlement, in particular, is a positive case founded on definite facts:
who were the parties to it, what were the antecedent rights, what property fell to whose share, when the arrangement took place, and whether any contemporaneous conduct, document, mutation, revenue entry or other surrounding circumstance lends assurance to such plea. Bald oral assertions, particularly when mutually inconsistent, do not discharge that burden.
51. Tested on the above principle, the defence evidence falls considerably short.
52. The plaintiff as PW-1 entered the witness box and affirmed that the suit property was purchased in her name from Smt. Chameli Devi for a consideration of Rs. 5,000/-, and that construction was subsequently raised from the earnings of her RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 25 of 63 husband and from her tailoring work. She proved the set of acquisition documents as Ex. PW-1/1 (colly), the later registered deed as Ex. PW-1/2, and also placed on record the site plan and the notice terminating the defendants' licence. In cross-examination, she admitted that before shifting to the present property the family had been residing in an ancestral house in Village Palam and that the vendor Smt. Chameli Devi was her jethani. However, she categorically denied the suggestion that the suit property came to her by way of family settlement, or that no amount had been paid to Smt. Chameli Devi, or that the property was ancestral. She remained consistent on the central aspect that the suit property stood acquired in her name and was not allotted to her under any family partition or settlement.
53. It is true that in her cross-examination Plaintiff No. 1 (PW-1) made material corrections with respect to the separate mess and with respect to whether the defendants were first on the ground floor and then shifted to the first floor. She candidly accepted that para 7 and para 8 of her affidavit were incorrect. These admissions do affect her reliability on the question of internal living arrangement within the house. However, those contradictions pertain to the manner of occupation by the defendants and not to the source or character of title in the suit property. A witness may be disbelieved on one set of facts and yet be believed on another, provided the latter stands independently supported by record and surrounding circumstances.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 26 of 6354. Significantly, the testimony of PW-2, Hari Om, the husband of the plaintiff, fully corroborated the plaintiff's case that the property stood purchased in the plaintiff's name from Smt. Chameli Devi and that the defendants had been allowed to stay therein after marriage. PW-2 was not cross-examined at all by defendant No. 2 despite opportunity. His testimony, therefore, remained unrebutted. Though absence of cross-examination does not automatically convert every statement into gospel truth, it certainly deprives the contesting defendant of the benefit of challenging the witness on material particulars. In the present case, the corroborative version of PW-2 on acquisition in the name of the plaintiff remained untested.
55. The defence set up by defendant No. 2 is, however, marked by serious internal inconsistencies.
56. In her written statement, defendant No. 2 pleaded that the property is ancestral and that all family members contributed in the construction. In her evidence affidavit, she again described the property as her matrimonial home and disputed the plaintiff's ownership. Yet, in her cross-examination, she took a somewhat different stand and stated that the property was purchased by Nirmala Devi from the sale consideration of ancestral property bearing no. WZ-72, Chhotiyal, Palam Village and from the share in property no. WZ-154. Thus, according to her own cross- examination, the purchaser was still Nirmala Devi; the dispute was only as to the source of funds. This itself is a marked shift from the RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 27 of 63 plea of the property being straightaway ancestral. In the memorandum of appeal, yet another formulation is found, namely that the respondent purchased the property in 1982 out of her savings and the earnings of her husband. These stands are not merely alternative legal submissions; they are mutually inconsistent factual versions. A property cannot simultaneously be ancestral property, property received in family settlement, and a self-acquired property purchased in the wife's name from the husband's earnings.
57. This vacillation goes to the root of the defence. When the challenge is to the self-acquired character of the property, the defendant must present a clear and consistent positive case. The appellant has failed to do so.
58. The only witness produced by the defence to substantiate the theory of ancestral property/family arrangement was DW-2 Shivom Verma, the younger brother of husband of the Plaintiff i.e. Hari Om. His affidavit stated that Hari Om was in forcible possession of ancestral property at WZ-72, had sold it, and that in exchange for his share in another ancestral property at WZ-154 he was given a portion of plot RZ-9E-K-31, and that by utilising the money received from sale of ancestral property he constructed the suit property. This evidence, at first blush, appears supportive of the defence, but on closer scrutiny it suffers from multiple infirmities.
59. First, DW-2 produced no documentary proof whatsoever of the alleged ancestral properties, the alleged shares RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 28 of 63 therein, the alleged sale, the alleged exchange, or the alleged family arrangement. No title documents of WZ-72 or WZ-154, no mutation record, no revenue entry, no partition deed, no memorandum of family settlement, no sale deed, no receipt, and no municipal or revenue record connecting those properties to the suit property were brought on record. In a matter where a property purchased in 1982 in the plaintiff's name is sought to be displaced by a plea of antecedent joint family arrangement, the absence of any documentary support is telling.
60. Second, even the particulars furnished by DW-2 are vague. He did not specify the date of the alleged family arrangement, the persons who participated in it, the exact extent and dimensions of the shares relinquished or exchanged, the consideration of the alleged sale of WZ-72, or the mode by which the proceeds were carried into the present property. Such an unparticularised narrative cannot form the basis of a finding that the property was not self- acquired.
61. Third, in cross-examination DW-2 stated, "The address of disputed property is WZ-72, Mohalla Chhotiyal, Palam Village." This answer creates doubt whether the witness was clear about the distinction between the alleged ancestral property and the suit property. Even if this answer is taken as a slip, it certainly does not enhance the credibility of his testimony on the precise genealogy and flow of title.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 29 of 6362. Fourth, DW-2 is an interested family witness. His evidence is not liable to be discarded merely because of that relationship, but where an interested witness seeks to establish a family arrangement contrary to documentary acquisition standing in the plaintiff's name, the court would expect at least some contemporaneous documentary support. None was forthcoming.
63. The appellant also attempted, in the appeal, to rely upon an argument based on revenue record that Khasra No. 69/10/2 did not stand in the name of Chameli Devi. However, no such proved revenue witness or proved revenue record demonstrating falsity of the plaintiff's acquisition was brought before the Ld. Trial Court in a manner known to law. An appellate argument cannot substitute for proof. Unless the foundational material was duly proved, the same cannot dislodge the plaintiff's case.
64. Thus, the plaintiff's acquisition documents, her long- standing possession, the corroboration by PW-2, and above all the complete failure of the defence to prove the pleaded family arrangement or ancestral title, cumulatively establish on a preponderance of probabilities that the suit property was rightly treated as the plaintiff's self-acquired property for the purposes of the present lis. Conversely, the defendants failed to establish any right, title or interest therein on the basis of ancestral property, family settlement, or contribution.
65. Accordingly, Point of Determination No. 1 is answered in favour of the respondent/plaintiff and against the RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 30 of 63 appellant/defendant No. 2. It is held that the Ld. Trial Court was correct in rejecting the defence of ancestral property/family settlement and in holding that the defendants failed to prove any proprietary right in the suit property. However, the said finding is affirmed for the reasons recorded hereinabove.
POINT OF DETERMINATION NO. 2WHETHER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANTS WAS THAT OF LICENSOR AND LICENSEE, AND WHETHER THE LD.
TRIAL COURT RIGHTLY HELD THAT THE LICENCE STOOD VALIDLY TERMINATED?
66. This point requires the Appellate Court to examine two related but distinct questions: first, the juridical nature of the defendants' occupation in the suit property; and second, whether such permissive occupation, if established, was lawfully brought to an end by the plaintiff. It is necessary to keep these two aspects analytically separate. A finding that the defendants initially entered the property as permissive occupants does not, by itself, conclude the further question whether defendant No. 2 could still resist eviction by invoking an independent statutory right of residence. That latter aspect properly falls for consideration under the separate point concerning the "shared household" defence. For the present point, the inquiry is confined to the civil character of the entry and occupation, and to the factum of termination of permission/licence.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 31 of 6367. The consistent case of the plaintiff in the plaint as well as in evidence is that after the marriage of defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2, both defendants sought permission to reside in the suit property temporarily and were allowed to do so purely on a permissive basis. In her evidence affidavit Ex. PW-1/A, PW-1 expressly deposed that subsequent to the marriage of the defendants, they sought her permission to live in the suit property temporarily for a short period and purely on licence basis as permissive users. PW-2 Hari Om also supported the same version in his evidence affidavit Ex. PW-2/1. Thus, on the plaintiff's side, there is direct evidence that the defendants' induction into the property was permissive and arose out of family relationship, not out of any transfer of legal interest.
68. This evidence, far from remaining wholly uncorroborated, finds significant support from the pleadings of defendant No. 1 himself. In his written statement, defendant No. 1, while contesting his continued liability and asserting that he had later vacated the premises, made a material admission that after the inception of marriage, both defendants had sought permission from the plaintiff to live in the property temporarily for a short period as permissive users. This is a clear admission against interest. It is not a casual or ambiguous statement. It directly supports the plaintiff's foundational plea that the original entry of the newly married couple into the suit premises was not in assertion of any independent title but on permission of the plaintiff.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 32 of 6369. This admission assumes considerable importance because defendant No. 1 was not an outsider; he was the plaintiff's own son and the husband of defendant No. 2. If the son himself pleads that both he and his wife initially entered the property as permissive users, that statement carries substantial evidentiary weight on the nature of the original occupation. Indeed, it also explains the plaintiff's otherwise plausible case that, due to close relationship, she did not insist on any formal documentation of the arrangement.
70. Defendant No. 2, however, denied this case and asserted that the suit property was ancestral, that it was the matrimonial home/shared household, and that she had a right to reside there as the legally wedded wife of defendant No. 1. She also pleaded that the family had a common kitchen and that she had been residing in the property ever since marriage. These facts, even if assumed in her favour, do not by themselves negate the possibility that the original entry was permissive. A daughter-in-law may enter the house of her in-laws after marriage and reside there continuously, and yet her original induction may still be by permission and not by virtue of proprietary title. Long residence, common kitchen, and matrimonial association are relevant to the later plea of shared household; they are not, standing alone, proof that the original civil character of occupation was anything other than permissive.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 33 of 6371. It is also important that defendant No. 2 did not prove any independent source of legal entitlement to initial possession. She did not establish any document or transaction by which possession was conferred on her as of right. Nor did she prove that defendant No. 1 had any ownership share in the property entitling him to induct her in his own right as co-owner. Her entire resistance is built on matrimonial residence and statutory protection, not on any proved conveyance, partition, family arrangement, tenancy or licence granted directly in her favour independent of the plaintiff. Thus, on the purely civil plane, her occupation remained derivative and permissive in origin.
72. At the same time, the Court must fairly notice certain weaknesses in the plaintiff's testimony which prevent an overbroad acceptance of every detail of the pleaded licence story. In cross- examination, PW-1 made two important admissions. First, she admitted that para 7 of her affidavit--that the defendants had separated from the joint family and established a different mess/household soon after marriage--was incorrect. Second, she admitted that para 8 of her affidavit--that the defendants were first permitted on the ground floor and later shifted to the first floor--was also incorrect, and volunteered that they had always resided on the first floor. She also stated in her cross examination dated 18.10.2019 that it was not correct that the defendants had assured her that they would vacate once they got suitable accommodation, but then volunteered that such statement had been made by defendant No. 1. Again, on 26.02.2021, she admitted that defendant No. 2 never RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 34 of 63 stated to her that she would vacate within a month or two, and again volunteered that defendant No. 1 had so stated.
73. These admissions show that the plaintiff's account was embellished in certain particulars. The case that both defendants jointly and uniformly held out the same promise to vacate is not borne out by the plaintiff's own cross-examination. Similarly, the story of initial occupation of the ground floor and later shift to the first floor is rendered unreliable by her admission. The Appellate Court, therefore, cannot simply reproduce the licence theory in its broadest version as pleaded in the plaint and affidavit. The evidence instead warrants a narrower and more careful finding: the plaintiff has substantially proved that the son and daughter-in-law entered and continued in the property with permission and not under any proved legal estate, but some of the surrounding details narrated by the plaintiff are not free from contradiction.
74. The next question is whether that permissive occupation was validly terminated.
75. On this aspect, the record is much clearer. The plaintiff proved legal notice dated 26.04.2016 as Ex. PW-1/8 (colly). Postal receipts were marked, and, more importantly, the reply sent on behalf of defendant No. 2 was proved as Ex. PW-1/9 (colly). The fact that a reply was sent is of decisive significance. It conclusively establishes service of notice and full knowledge of its contents. The notice expressly called upon the defendants to hand over peaceful vacant possession within fifteen days and further stated that upon RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 35 of 63 failure, legal proceedings would be taken and they would be liable for damages/use and occupation charges. Thus, as a matter of fact, the plaintiff unequivocally withdrew the permission under which the defendants had been residing.
76. Defendant No. 1 himself pleaded that after receipt of the notice he vacated the premises. Though the plaintiff disputes the bona fides of his departure and alleges that he left behind his wife and child in furtherance of an ulterior design, the important aspect for the present point is that even according to defendant No. 1, the notice was received and acted upon by him. This strengthens the inference that the plaintiff had clearly revoked whatever permission had earlier existed.
77. Defendant No. 2, in turn, replied to the notice and did not vacate. Her reply did not invalidate the fact of termination; it only contested the plaintiff's entitlement to bring her occupation to an end. In civil law, a licence, being generally revocable unless coupled with a grant or protected by some other legal provision, stands terminated when the licensor communicates withdrawal of permission. The service of the notice dated 26.04.2016, coupled with the defendants' reply and conduct, amply proves that the plaintiff brought the permissive arrangement to an end.
78. The appellant argued that defendant No. 2 could not be treated as a mere licensee because she was residing in her matrimonial home/shared household. This objection, in the considered view of this Court, does not really negate the fact of RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 36 of 63 termination of the plaintiff's permission. It raises a different legal consequence. In other words, even if defendant No. 2 had some protective right of residence under the PWDV Act, that would not mean that the plaintiff's notice failed to revoke the underlying family permission. It would only mean that notwithstanding such revocation, the Court must still test whether the daughter-in-law could continue in possession until due process of law is followed and whether her statutory residential protection survives. The expression "without due process of law" in residence orders and in the jurisprudence on shared household presupposes that the in-laws' unilateral demand to vacate is not itself enough to physically dispossess the woman; but that does not mean the in-laws cannot terminate permission and thereafter seek appropriate legal relief.
79. Therefore, the present point must be answered with precision. As a matter of original civil relationship, the occupation of the defendants in the suit property was permissive in nature and arose from family indulgence/permission rather than from any proved right, title or interest. The plaintiff has also proved that such permission/licence was expressly revoked by legal notice dated 26.04.2016, knowledge whereof is indisputable in view of the reply Ex. PW-1/9 and the stand of defendant No. 1 himself.
80. However, the Ld. Trial Court's reasoning would require one clarification. The trial court appears to have treated the successful proof of ownership and the notice of termination as almost automatically entitling the plaintiff to recover possession RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 37 of 63 from both defendants. That approach is somewhat compressed. In the case of defendant No. 1, who himself admitted the permissive entry and pleaded that he had vacated, the position is relatively straightforward. But in the case of defendant No. 2, though the plaintiff validly terminated the permissive arrangement on the proprietary plane, the legal effect of such termination still had to be examined in the light of her plea of right of residence/shared household. Thus, while the finding of termination is correct, its consequence vis-à-vis defendant No. 2 cannot be viewed in isolation from the separate statutory defence raised by her.
81. Accordingly, Point of Determination No. 2 is answered partly in favour of the respondent/plaintiff in the following terms:
1. The relationship under which the defendants came to occupy the suit premises was, on the civil and proprietary plane, one of permissive occupation/licence, and not one flowing from any proved right, title or interest of the defendants.
2. The plaintiff validly terminated such permission/licence by serving legal notice dated 26.04.2016, receipt and knowledge whereof stood proved.
3. Nevertheless, the mere fact of such termination did not, by itself, conclude the issue of defendant No. 2's continued right to remain in possession, for that question must still be examined independently on the anvil of her plea of right of residence/shared household and due process of law.RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 38 of 63
82. To that extent, the core finding of the Ld. Trial Court on termination of licence is affirmed, but its full legal consequence qua defendant No. 2 remains subject to adjudication under the subsequent point of determination.
POINT OF DETERMINATION NO. 3WHETHER DEFENDANT NO. 2 HAS ANY INDEPENDENT RIGHT OF RESIDENCE IN THE SUIT PROPERTY AS A "SHARED HOUSEHOLD" UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT, 2005, AND WHETHER SUCH RIGHT, IF ANY, AFFECTS THE PLAINTIFF'S ENTITLEMENT TO SEEK EVICTION BY WAY OF MANDATORY INJUNCTION?
83. This point lies at the heart of the present appeal. The plaintiff approaches the matter from the standpoint of ownership and termination of permission; the appellant/defendant No. 2 approaches it from the standpoint of her status as a daughter-in-law residing in her matrimonial home/shared household. The error that courts must guard against in such cases is to treat one of these claims as wholly eclipsing the other. Neither approach is correct in law. The inquiry has to be undertaken by harmonising the proprietary rights of the owner with the statutory residential protection conferred upon an aggrieved woman under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 39 of 6384. At the statutory level, Section 17 of the PWDV Act declares that every woman in a domestic relationship has the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in it; Section 17(2) further provides that she shall not be evicted or excluded therefrom save in accordance with procedure established by law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satish Chandra Ahuja (supra) has made it clear that this right is independent of title and is not confined only to houses owned or tenanted by the husband. The restrictive approach in S.R. Batraa and Another v. Taruna Batra (2007) 3 SCC 169 has been held not to lay down the correct law; the expression "shared household" is not limited to a property in which the husband has a proprietary share, and a household belonging to a relative of the husband can also answer that description if the conditions of Section 2(s) of PWDV Act are otherwise fulfilled. The same line of authority also emphasises that the residence right is one of occupation and protection, not ownership, and that it is not indefeasible in every factual situation.
85. Applying the above principles to the present facts, this Court has no hesitation in holding that defendant No. 2 did have, and does have, a statutory right of residence referable to the concept of a shared household. The material on record clearly shows that she came to the suit property after her marriage with defendant No. 1 in 2005 and has been residing there with a degree of permanence. The plaintiff herself admitted in cross-examination that defendant No. 2 came to reside in the suit property after marriage and that since that RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 40 of 63 day she has continuously resided there. PW-1 further admitted that there was only one kitchen in the property, though she attempted to explain that groceries and cooking were separate. These admissions are significant. They establish not a casual or fleeting stay, but long, continuous residence in a domestic relationship within the suit property.
86. The shared-household character of the premises is not destroyed merely because the husband later shifted out in or around 2016. Modern family litigation has repeatedly shown a pattern where, once matrimonial discord erupts, the husband leaves the house or starts residing elsewhere, while the daughter-in-law continues in the same premises. The subsequent physical absence of the husband does not retrospectively erase the domestic character of the residence already enjoyed by the wife. If the law were otherwise, the statutory protection would become illusory and would be defeated simply by the expedient of the husband moving out. The relevant inquiry is whether the aggrieved woman lived there in a domestic relationship with sufficient permanence. On the admitted evidence, that requirement stands satisfied here.
87. It also cannot be ignored that the appellant had already approached the competent court under the PWDV Act and had obtained a protection/residence order dated 17.05.2016 restraining dispossession except by due process of law. Even if that order is interlocutory in nature and does not finally determine rights, it reflects that the appellant's possession was not treated as that of a RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 41 of 63 rank trespasser. It also shows that, even before the institution of the present civil suit, the issue of her residential protection had entered the judicial sphere. Therefore, the plaintiff's case could not have been examined in the abstract as a simple owner-versus-licensee dispute without accounting for this subsisting statutory overlay.
88. At the same time, the appellant's right of residence cannot be elevated into a proprietary or indefeasible right to remain in the very same premises for all times to come, regardless of circumstance. The PWDV Act does not create title in favour of the aggrieved woman. Nor does the expression "shared household"
mean that the daughter-in-law acquires an immutable right to occupy the in-laws' property, wholly immune from judicial regulation. The recent Hon'ble Delhi High Court view in Manju Arora v. Neelam Arora & Anr in RFA(OS) 64/2025 dated 30.10.2025, consistent with the Hon'ble Supreme Court's exposition in Satish Chandra Ahuja (supra), recognises that while the right under Section 17 is real and substantive, a competent civil court may, in an appropriate case, pass a decree of eviction or exclusion, provided the woman's right of residence is meaningfully protected, including through suitable alternate accommodation under Section 19(1)(f).
89. Thus, the answer to the first limb of the point is in the affirmative: defendant No. 2 does have an independent statutory right of residence in the suit property as a shared household. It is "independent" in the sense that it does not depend upon proof of ownership in her favour or in favour of her husband. It arises from RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 42 of 63 the statute and from the fact of domestic residence with sufficient permanence.
90. The second limb of the point, however, requires equal clarity. This statutory right does affect the plaintiff's entitlement to seek eviction, but it does not extinguish it. Its legal effect is threefold.
91. First, the plaintiff cannot succeed merely by proving title and termination of licence and then characterising defendant No. 2 as a bare trespasser. That approach is too narrow for a case involving a daughter-in-law who has long resided in the premises and invokes Sections 17 and 19 of the PWDV Act. The Ld. Trial Court, in the opinion of this Court, fell into this error when it treated the plaintiff's ownership and notice of termination as virtually conclusive against defendant No. 2 without a fuller engagement with her statutory residence defence.
92. Second, the right of residence under the PWDV Act means that eviction, if granted, must be the result of due process and not of unilateral action. In that limited sense, the plaintiff's suit is certainly maintainable. A civil suit is itself one mode of following due process of law. Therefore, the appellant is not correct in contending that the very institution of the suit was legally incompetent. Her protection order did not forever immunise her from court-directed exclusion; it only protected her from being dispossessed otherwise than by law.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 43 of 6393. Third, because of the existence of this statutory right, the court, before granting relief of mandatory injunction resulting in eviction, is required to undertake a balancing exercise. The court must examine the nature of the premises, the feasibility of separate residence within the same building, the conduct of parties, the rights of aged in-laws if any, and whether alternate accommodation or similar safeguards are needed so that the daughter-in-law is not rendered shelterless and the right under Section 17 is not reduced to empty form. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court has reiterated this balancing approach in Manju Arora (supra) while recognising both the dignity rights of senior-citizen owners and the daughter-in-law's residence rights under the PWDV Act.
94. Viewed thus, the appellant's right of residence did not bar the plaintiff from suing; but it did materially affect the nature of adjudication required. The court could not simply proceed as though defendant No. 2 stood on the same footing as defendant No. 1 after termination of permission. Defendant No. 1's position was that of a son who had admittedly left the premises and who himself had acknowledged permissive entry. Defendant No. 2's position was legally distinct, because she was a continuously residing daughter- in-law asserting a shared-household right under a special welfare statute.
95. Accordingly, Point of Determination No. 3 is answered partly in favour of the appellant/defendant No. 2 in the following terms:
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 44 of 631. Defendant No. 2 has a statutory right of residence in the suit property as a "shared household" under the PWDV Act, 2005.
2. Such right is not a right of ownership, nor is it absolute or indefeasible.
3. The said right does not bar the plaintiff from seeking eviction through due process of law, including by a civil suit.
4. However, the existence of this right materially affects the plaintiff's entitlement to immediate eviction by mandatory injunction, inasmuch as the court must balance the competing rights and consider appropriate safeguards, including alternate accommodation or equivalent protective arrangements, before directing dispossession.
96. To that extent, the finding of the Ld. Trial Court requires correction: while the plaintiff's title was rightly recognised, the trial court did not sufficiently account for the distinct statutory right of residence available to defendant No. 2 under the PWDV Act.
POINT OF DETERMINATION NO. 4WHETHER THE LD. TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN GRANTING A DECREE OF MANDATORY INJUNCTION DIRECTING THE DEFENDANTS TO VACATE THE SUIT PROPERTY?
97. This point has to be decided in the light of the findings already returned on the earlier points, namely: first, that the plaintiff RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 45 of 63 has a better proprietary claim and the suit property was rightly treated as her self-acquired property for the purposes of the present lis; second, that the original occupation of the defendants was permissive and the permission/licence was validly terminated by notice dated 26.04.2016; and third, that defendant No. 2 nevertheless has a statutory right of residence in the suit property as a shared household under the PWDV Act, though such right is not one of ownership and does not absolutely bar recourse to due process of law. The present point, therefore, is not to be answered in an all-or- nothing manner. The real question is whether, on these facts, the Ld. Trial Court was right in granting an unqualified decree of mandatory injunction simpliciter against both defendants. In the considered opinion of this Court, the answer is only partly in the affirmative.
98. As a matter of principle, there was nothing inherently incompetent in the plaintiff seeking a decree of mandatory injunction for recovery of possession against persons whose permissive occupation had been terminated. In family property disputes of this nature, especially where the occupation is initially permissive and the owner seeks restoration of possession after revocation of permission, the form of a suit for mandatory injunction has often been entertained where no independent title is proved in the occupant and where the essential relief is to direct the permissive occupant to hand back possession. Thus, the appellant is not correct in contending that merely because the plaintiff sought mandatory injunction instead of a differently styled relief, the suit was legally dead on arrival. To that limited extent, the plaintiff was entitled to RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 46 of 63 invoke the civil court's jurisdiction and to ask for recovery through due process. The expression "save in accordance with procedure established by law" in Section 17(2) of the PWDV Act clearly contemplates that recourse to a competent civil court is one recognised mode of due process. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satish Chandra Ahuja (supra) has expressly held that the right of residence under the PWDV Act does not oust the maintainability of a civil suit by the owner, but the civil court cannot ignore the statutory protection available to the aggrieved woman while moulding relief.
99. Therefore, the Ld. Trial Court was justified in principle in examining the plaintiff's prayer for mandatory injunction and in not rejecting the suit as barred merely because defendant No. 2 asserted a shared-household right. On that threshold issue, the approach of the trial court does not call for interference.
100. However, the difficulty begins when one examines the manner in which the relief was actually granted.
101. The Ld. Trial Court, after holding that the plaintiff had proved ownership and that the defendants had failed to prove ancestral character, proceeded to decree issue No. 1 and directed "defendants" to return back the suit premises to the plaintiff. In doing so, the Ld. Trial Court substantially treated the matter as if title plus termination of licence necessarily led to a decree for immediate eviction. That line of reasoning may have been sufficient if the contest had been only between an owner and an ordinary gratuitous RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 47 of 63 licensee with no further statutory protection. But that was not the present case. Defendant No. 2 had specifically pleaded, both in the written statement and in evidence, that the suit premises were her matrimonial home/shared household; she had also relied upon the subsisting protection/residence order under the PWDV Act restraining dispossession without due process of law. The trial court noticed this defence in narration, but it did not undertake the necessary legal harmonisation between the plaintiff's ownership rights and defendant No. 2's statutory residence rights. That, in the opinion of this Court, is a material omission.
102. The later and binding legal position is not that a daughter-in-law must remain in the in-laws' property forever, nor that the owner is remediless. Equally, it is not that the moment title is proved, the daughter-in-law can be treated as a simple trespasser and directed to vacate unconditionally. The law requires a balancing exercise. The residence right under Sections 17 and 19 of the PWDV Act is real and enforceable; though it is not a proprietary right, it cannot be brushed aside while passing a decree that has the effect of ejecting the woman from the very premises where she has resided in a domestic relationship. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satish Chandra Ahuja (supra) specifically disapproved a purely title-centric approach and held that the civil court must consider the statutory claim of residence and the legal consequences flowing therefrom before passing a decree of eviction.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 48 of 63103. This balancing approach stands reinforced by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court line of authorities placed before this Court. In Vinay Varma (supra), the Hon'ble High Court analysed the overlap between ownership rights, the PWDV Act, and the need to avoid rendering the daughter-in-law roofless, especially in situations where the husband has moved out or is acting in concert with the parents. The Hon'ble High Court treated such disputes as falling in different factual categories and recognised that the judicial response must be calibrated to the actual family arrangement and to the possibility of alternate accommodation. The later Hon'ble Delhi High Court decision in Manju Arora (supra) goes a step further in a factual setting involving senior-citizen in-laws. There, the Hon'ble Delhi Court upheld a decree directing the daughter-in-law to vacate, but only while simultaneously protecting her right of residence by ensuring suitable alternate accommodation under Section 19(1)(f), and by explicitly balancing the daughter-in-law's statutory rights with the senior citizens' right to live peacefully with dignity in their own property.
104. Thus, the legal position emerging from the authorities is not against eviction through civil process, but against unconditional eviction without protective balancing.
105. When the facts of the present case are tested on that standard, it becomes apparent that the Ld. Trial Court was not fully justified in granting the decree in the form in which it did.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 49 of 63106. First, as regards defendant No. 1, the plaintiff herself admitted in cross-examination that her main grievance was against defendant No. 2 and not against defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 had taken a clear stand in his written statement that he had vacated the suit property; defendant No. 2 also stated in evidence that her husband was living separately in government accommodation at Pusa. Even the trial court recorded that defendant No. 1 was residing separately. In these circumstances, a blanket decree directing both defendants to "return back" the suit premises was, at the very least, imprecisely framed. A mandatory injunction to vacate is ordinarily directed against the person in actual occupation or in effective control of the premises. The case against defendant No. 1, by the time of decree, had become largely formal or academic, unless the court intended to proceed on a theory of continued constructive possession through his wife and child. But the decree does not articulate that reasoning. To that extent, the relief granted against defendant No. 1 was broader than the evidence strictly warranted.
107. Second, and more importantly, as regards defendant No. 2, the plaintiff was certainly entitled to seek possession through due process, but the trial court was not justified in treating her as standing on the same footing as an ordinary licensee after termination of permission. Defendant No. 2 had been residing in the property since 2005 as the wife of defendant No. 1. The plaintiff admitted her continuous residence. The plaintiff also admitted the existence of one kitchen in the property, though with separate groceries/cooking. These facts were sufficient to attract the shared-
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 50 of 63household analysis. Once that statutory defence arose, the court ought to have considered whether the plaintiff's entitlement to exclusion should be enforced immediately and unconditionally, or only subject to safeguarding defendant No. 2's residential protection through alternate accommodation or similar directions. The trial court did not address this question in a meaningful way. It neither considered Section 19(1)(f), nor moulded relief so as to preserve the residence right while still protecting the plaintiff's ownership and dignity. In that sense, the decree suffers from legal incompleteness.
108. Third, the trial court's own reasoning on damages indirectly underscores why the mandatory injunction issue required more nuanced treatment. While rejecting damages, the Ld. Trial Court observed that defendant No. 2 was not a stranger but a family member and that the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 were sharing the same kitchen. If these features were relevant enough to deny mesne profits/damages, they were certainly relevant to the structure of the mandatory relief also. Yet the decree for eviction was framed as though the family-statute dimension had no substantive bearing. That internal mismatch in the judgment also persuades this Court that the relief was granted without full harmonisation of the competing legal positions.
109. At the same time, this Court is unable to accept the appellant's submission that, because the premises are a shared household, no decree of mandatory injunction could at all be passed. Such a proposition would travel too far and would practically RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 51 of 63 convert the right of residence into an indefeasible right to remain in the in-laws' property regardless of circumstances. That is not the law after Satish Chandra Ahuja (supra). Nor is it the law reflected in the subsequent Hon'ble Delhi High Court cases like Manju Arora (supra) balancing the claims of senior-citizen in-laws and daughter- in-law. Where the owner is able to establish title, where continued cohabitation has become impossible or oppressive, and where suitable safeguards are put in place for the aggrieved woman's residence, the court can grant relief resulting in exclusion from the particular premises. What the law insists on is not perpetual co- residence, but lawful, balanced, and humane transition.
110. In the present case, therefore, the correct appellate conclusion is this: the plaintiff's suit for mandatory injunction was maintainable; the plaintiff was entitled in substance to seek recovery of possession through due process; but the Ld. Trial Court was not fully justified in granting an unqualified decree directing both defendants simpliciter to vacate the suit property, without appropriately addressing the distinct legal status of defendant No. 2 as an aggrieved woman claiming a shared-household right, and without considering whether her eviction should be conditioned upon suitable protective arrangements consistent with the PWDV Act. The decree, to that extent, requires interference and re-shaping at the appellate stage.
111. Accordingly, Point of Determination No. 4 is answered partly in favour of the appellant/defendant No. 2 and RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 52 of 63 partly in favour of the respondent/plaintiff, in the following terms:
1. The Ld. Trial Court was justified in entertaining and adjudicating the plaintiff's prayer for mandatory injunction as a mode of due process of law.
2. The Ld. Trial Court was also justified in holding, in substance, that the plaintiff was not remediless and could seek recovery of possession despite the appellant's plea of shared household.
3. However, the Ld. Trial Court was not justified in granting an unconditional decree of mandatory injunction against both defendants in the form in which it did, without adequately harmonising the plaintiff's ownership rights with defendant No. 2's statutory right of residence under the PWDV Act, and without considering appropriate protective conditions/safeguards.
112. The exact manner in which the relief requires to be moulded shall naturally follow while deciding the subsequent point and the final operative portion of the appeal.
POINT OF DETERMINATION NO. 5WHETHER THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 25.10.2024 SUFFERS FROM ANY ILLEGALITY, PERVERSITY, OR MATERIAL IRREGULARITY WARRANTING INTERFERENCE BY THIS APPELLATE COURT?
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 53 of 63113. This point requires the Appellate Court to step back from the individual issues and assess the impugned judgment as a whole. The appellate function is not to interfere merely because another view is possible. Interference is warranted where the trial court's findings are perverse, or contrary to law, or where material evidence has been ignored, or where the correct legal principles have not been applied to proved facts. When the impugned judgment is tested on that standard, this Court is of the view that it does not suffer from perversity in its entirety, nor does it warrant being wholly set aside. However, it does suffer from material legal irregularity and partial illegality to the extent it granted an unconditional decree of mandatory injunction against both defendants without properly harmonising the plaintiff's ownership rights with defendant No. 2's statutory right of residence under the PWDV Act. To that extent, appellate interference is clearly called for.
114. At the first level, the findings of the Ld. Trial Court on ownership/title do not call for wholesale disturbance. The trial court was justified in concluding that the plaintiff had established a better proprietary claim to the suit property through the acquisition documents placed on record and that the defence of ancestral property/family settlement was not proved. The trial court also rightly noticed that the defendants failed to produce any convincing documentary material to substantiate the plea that the suit property was ancestral or came to the plaintiff through a family arrangement. That core finding has already been affirmed by this Court while RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 54 of 63 deciding Point of Determination No. 1. Therefore, the impugned judgment cannot be termed perverse on that aspect.
115. Similarly, the ld. trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff had served a legal notice dated 26.04.2016 and that the permissive arrangement stood withdrawn is also substantially correct. The notice was proved, and the reply of defendant No. 2 to that notice was also on record. Thus, on the facts concerning termination of permission/licence, the judgment is not vitiated by perversity.
116. However, the serious flaw in the impugned judgment lies in its treatment of Issue No. 1, i.e. the relief of mandatory injunction directing the defendants to hand back possession.
117. The Ld. Trial Court narrated the defence of defendant No. 2, including her plea that she had a right to reside in the matrimonial home and that proceedings under the PWDV Act were pending. Yet, while deciding Issue No. 1, the judgment effectively reduced the controversy to a simple title dispute between owner and occupant. After holding that the plaintiff had proved ownership and that the defendants had failed to prove ancestral character, the Ld. Trial Court directly proceeded to decree eviction. In doing so, it did not meaningfully engage with the legal effect of defendant No. 2's claim of residence in a shared household, nor with the residence/protection order under the PWDV Act referred to in the pleadings and appeal.
RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 55 of 63118. This omission is material because the current binding law, as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satish Chandra Ahuja (supra), is that a daughter-in-law's right of residence under Sections 17 and 19 of the PWDV Act is a substantive statutory protection, independent of ownership, and that a civil court cannot simply decree possession on the basis of title alone without weighing the effect of that right. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has clarified that while a civil suit by the owner is maintainable and due process of law can be followed through such proceedings, the court must consider the woman's residence rights and cannot treat her as a mere trespasser merely because the property belongs to the in-laws.
119. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court decision in Manju Arora (supra), also show that where the daughter-in-law has been residing in the premises as matrimonial/shared household, and especially where the husband has shifted out, the court must balance competing rights. It may, in an appropriate case, direct eviction through due process, but ordinarily with suitable safeguarding of the residence right, including alternate accommodation under Section 19(1)(f).
120. The ld. trial court did not perform that balancing exercise. It did not ask whether defendant No. 2's right of residence survived termination of the civil permission; it did not consider whether continued cohabitation was feasible or impossible; it did not consider whether alternate accommodation or similar safeguards were necessary if the plaintiff were to be granted effective RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 56 of 63 possession; and it did not attempt to reconcile its decree with the existing statutory protection already operating in favour of defendant No. 2 except through due process. That is not a mere error of appreciation; it is a material irregularity in application of law.
121. Another aspect reinforcing the need for interference is that the decree of mandatory injunction was passed against both defendants, though the evidence itself showed that defendant No. 1 had long since shifted out. The plaintiff admitted in cross- examination that her main grievance was against defendant No. 2 and not against defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 2 also admitted that her husband was residing separately in government accommodation at Pusa. Even the trial court recorded that defendant No. 1 was residing separately. Yet the decree was framed against both defendants without precise articulation of how defendant No. 1 continued to hold or control possession. That renders the decree, to that extent, overbroad and imprecise.
122. Thus, the appellate conclusion must be a balanced one. The impugned judgment is not wholly illegal. It correctly recognises the plaintiff's superior title, validly rejects the ancestral- property defence, rightly grants preventive injunction against creation of third-party interest, and properly refuses damages for want of proof. But it is partly unsustainable because, in granting unconditional mandatory injunction/ejectment against both defendants, it fails to apply the correct legal framework governing RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 57 of 63 the overlap between ownership claims and the daughter-in-law's shared-household residence rights under the PWDV Act.
123. Accordingly, Point of Determination No. 5 is answered partly in favour of the appellant/defendant No. 2, in the following terms:
1. The impugned judgment and decree do not suffer from perversity in their entirety.
2. The findings on the plaintiff's title/ownership, on rejection of the ancestral/family settlement plea, on refusal of damages/mesne profits, and on grant of permanent injunction against creation of third-party interest do not warrant interference except for minor clarificatory reasons already recorded.
3. However, the impugned judgment and decree do suffer from material irregularity and partial illegality in so far as they grant an unconditional decree of mandatory injunction against both defendants without properly considering and harmonising defendant No. 2's statutory right of residence in the shared household under the PWDV Act and without moulding relief in accordance with law.
4. Consequently, appellate interference is warranted, but only to that limited extent.
124. The precise modification required in the operative decree shall follow in the final relief portion.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 58 of 63
125. In view of the findings returned on the aforesaid Points for Determination, the present appeal is partly allowed and the impugned judgment and decree dated 25.10.2024 are modified in the following terms:
a. The findings of the Ld. Trial Court that the plaintiff has a superior proprietary claim over the suit property and that the defendants failed to prove that the same is ancestral/joint family property or subject to any family settlement are affirmed. The finding that the initial occupation of the defendants was permissive in nature and that the permission/licence stood terminated by legal notice is also affirmed.
b. The decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from parting with possession of the portion under their occupation or from creating any third-party interest in the suit property is maintained, subject to the clarification that such restraint is only protective and does not, by itself, authorise dispossession otherwise than in accordance with law. c. Insofar as the relief of mandatory injunction is concerned, this Court holds that the respondent/plaintiff, being the owner, is entitled to recover peaceful possession from the appellant/Defendant No. 2 through due process of law; however, such relief must be moulded in a manner that preserves the appellant's statutory right of residence as an aggrieved woman in a shared household under Sections 17 and 19 of the PWDV Act. The law declared in Satish RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 59 of 63 Chandra Ahuja (supra) makes it clear that a civil court may pass an eviction/exclusion decree, but the residence right under the PWDV Act must be meaningfully safeguarded and cannot be ignored.
d. Accordingly, the decree for mandatory injunction is modified qua the appellant/Defendant No. 2 in the following manner:
1. The respondent/plaintiff shall, within eight weeks from today, secure and offer to the appellant/Defendant No. 2 a safe, self-contained alternate accommodation consisting of at least two rooms with kitchen, bathroom and toilet, with basic civic amenities, in the same area or a reasonably nearby locality, so that the appellant and her minor daughter are not rendered shelterless or displaced to an unreasonable distance. This direction is being issued in exercise of the balancing approach recognised in Satish Chandra Ahuja (supra) and the later Hon'ble Delhi High Court line of cases like Manju Arora (supra) where eviction of the daughter-
in-law was permitted only while protecting her residential entitlement through alternate accommodation under Section 19(1)(f).
2. The respondent/plaintiff shall bear the initial security deposit, if any, and shall also bear the rent of such alternate accommodation for a period of six months from the date the appellant hands over possession of the suit premises. The respondent shall further bear the RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 60 of 63 brokerage/placement charges, if any, for securing such alternate accommodation. This arrangement is directed so that the appellant's right of residence is not reduced to an empty formality and the transition is lawful and workable.
3. Upon the alternate accommodation, as aforesaid, being made available and its particulars being communicated in writing to the appellant, the appellant/Defendant No. 2 shall vacate and hand over peaceful vacant possession of the suit premises to the respondent/plaintiff within four weeks thereafter. Thereafter, the Respondents/Plaintiffs will be entitled, to not permit the Appellant/Defendant No. 2 from entering the suit property.
4. If the parties mutually agree, the respondent/plaintiff may, instead of directly taking a premises on rent, pay to the appellant the monthly rent amount for a suitable alternate accommodation, along with the initial security deposit and brokerage, provided the alternate arrangement is accepted in writing by the appellant. In the absence of such consensus, the obligation of the respondent shall be to directly secure and make available the alternate accommodation itself.
5. It is made clear that in case, the Respondents/Plaintiffs' default in making payments towards rental, etc. as stipulated above, resulting in the Defendant No. 2's RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 61 of 63 being evicted from the rental property, the Defendant No. 2 will be entitled to return to the suit property and reside therein.
e. It is clarified that the appellant's right under the PWDV Act is a right of residence and protection, not a right of ownership or perpetual occupation of the respondent's very property irrespective of circumstances. At the same time, the respondent/plaintiff's ownership right cannot be enforced by ignoring the statutory residential protection available to the appellant. The present modified decree is intended to harmonise both sets of rights, which is the course mandated by the governing law.
f. Insofar as Defendant No. 1 is concerned, since he is not the appellant before this Court and the evidence on record is that he is not residing in the suit property, no separate relief is required to be moulded in his favour in this appeal. The decree against him shall stand subject to law, but the operative relief regarding actual recovery of possession from the occupied portion shall work in terms of the above directions qua appellant/Defendant No. 2.
g. Till expiry of the above timeline and till compliance with the present modified decree:
1. the appellant/Defendant No. 2 shall not create any third-party interest in the suit property, nor induct any third person therein; and RCA CIVIL DJ ADJ 1304/2024 Page 62 of 63
2. the respondent/plaintiff shall not dispossess the appellant otherwise than in accordance with this judgment.
126. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs in the present appeal.
127. TCR be returned as per rules. Forward a copy of the judgment to the ld. Trial court for information.
128. Decree sheet be drawn accordingly.
129. File be sent to the Court of Ld. District Judge - 04, South West District, Dwarka, New Delhi for passing appropriate orders for consignment of the file to the record room, after due compliance.
ANNOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT DATED: 23.03.2026 (SUMIT DALAL)1 Joint Registrar (Judicial) - 072, Hon'ble Delhi High Court, 23.03.2026.
1Note - The order is being uploaded without digital signature as the digital signature of the undersigned has expired on 13.03.2026 and renewal of the same will take some time.
2Formerly, District Judge - 04, South West District, Dwarka Courts, at the time of reserving orders.
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