Bangalore District Court
Yashas C.L vs Nandini S on 22 August, 2025
1 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment
KABC010036132024
IN THE COURT OF LXIX ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL
AND SESSIONS JUDGE (CCH 70)
:Present:
Smt. Shirin Javeed Ansari, B.A.,LL.B (Hon`s) LL.M.,
LXIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru.
Dated this the 22nd day of August, 2025
Crl.A.No.234/2024
Appellant: Sri Yashas.C.L.
S/o Lingaiah.C.L.
Aged about 34 years,
R/at. No.5/79,
20th Main, 5th Cross
Near Seetha Circle
Muneshwara Block
Girinagar,
Bengaluru-560 085
(Sri K.C.Krishnappa, Advocate for
Appellant)
Vs.
Respondent: Smt. Nandini.S.
W/o Yashas.C.L.
d/o S.Shivappa
Aged about 29 years
R/at. No.32, 7th Main
2 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment
5th Cross, Subhas Nagar
Kengeri Upanagara
Bengaluru South-560 060
(Sri Rajanna, Advocate for
respondent)
JUDGMENT
This appeal under Section 29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter PWDV Act) is directed against the order dated 21.09.2023 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Traffic Court-II, Bengaluru, in C. Misc. No. 140/2023 on I.A. No. 1 under Section 23(2) read with Section 20(1) of the PWDV Act, whereby the appellant was directed to pay interim maintenance of Rs.8,000/- per month to the respondent from the date of the petition until further orders..
2. The Respondent in Crl.Misc.140/2023 before the trial court having preferred the instant appeal against the petitioner/applicant. The appellant and respondent are hereby assigned with their original ranks before the trial court i.e., the appellant as respondent and respondent as original petitioner in the instant discussion for the purpose 3 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment of brevity and convenience to avoid the confusion and perplexity.
3. The respondent before the trial court, now the appellant herein, assails the impugned order as arbitrary, passed without application of judicial mind, in breach of the principles of natural justice, and in excess of the respondent's actual needs, contending that it was granted ex-parte without notice or opportunity to file objections, and without consideration of his income, liabilities, or the respondent's earning capacity.
4. The respondent, asserting that she is the legally wedded wife of the appellant, filed a petition under Section 12 of the PWDV Act alleging acts of domestic violence. Alongside, she filed I.A. No. 1 under Section 23(2) read with Section 20(1), seeking ex-parte ad-interim maintenance of Rs.15,000/- p.m. and litigation expenses of Rs.20,000/-, averring that she was seven months pregnant and unable to work.
5. Without issuing notice to the appellant, the 4 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment learned Magistrate passed the impugned order granting Rs.8,000/- p.m. as interim maintenance, holding that the respondent had made out a prima facie case of domestic violence and required sustenance pending proceedings.
6. Being aggrieved by the impugned order Dated; 21.9.2023 the appellant/ respondent before the trial court, has filed this appeal on the following among the other grounds.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
a) That the impugned order and judgment passed by the Trial Court is against law and all probabilities of the case. Hence the impugned order dated 21-09-2023 is liable to be set aside.
b) That the trial court has gravely erred in not properly considering the pleadings and without giving an opportunity to file their objections to the Interlocutory Application and opportunity to hear the appellant committed grave error in granting exorbitant maintenance to the respondent.
c) The trial court erred in coming to the 5 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment conclusion in granting Rs.8,000/- as maintenance per month. The trial court erred in applying the judicial mind that the appellant being a salaried person having expenditure for himself and to take care of his aged parents.
d) The appellant is a patient and is suffering from mental depression as a result of cruelty met out by the respondent herein and also the false complaint against him and his mother and sister. He has to take care of his own health.
e) That the respondent is working women and earning well and said fact is suppressed and not brought out in the petition nor in the IA No. 1. Further, respondent has falsely stated in para number 19 of the petition as follows "the petitioner is not an earning person and she has no any independent means to support her". With this statement she deposed the false affidavit with an intention to get the wrong order from the Court by suppressing the true fact with wrong submissions.
f) The Respondent is a graduate and well 6 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment qualified and holds Graduation in Bachelor of Engineering. The respondent is working as Associate Manager Talent Acquisition with a Company GK HR Consulting India Private Limited, Bangalore and she is fully able and capable to contribute toward the financial commitments of herself and the child, instead of abusing section 498A and Prevention of Domestic violence Act and then demand further financial support, after throwing the appellant into financial disarray. The respondent currently earns income and can fully maintain her and share/contribute toward maintaining the household which fact she has suppressed in her petition.
g) The respondent in an attempt to mislead the court has claimed that the appellant's earnings significantly higher than his regular salary income are totally false and baseless.
h) The Respondent malice intentions behind framing of false charges of Domestic Violence and Dowry Harassment are with the sole intent to extort as much financial gains as possible.
7 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment
I) That the trial court passed the impugned order without giving an opportunity to hear from appellants and passed on the order on IA No.1 by without application of judicial mind.
j) The appellant is unable to pay the exorbitant maintenance amount to the respondent in order to maintain himself and his aged parents.
k) The impugned order passed by the trial court is illegal, improper and the same suffers from serious irregularities, inconsistency and non appreciation of merits placed on record. Hence, the impugned order of the court below is liable to be set aside.
Hence, the Appellant pray before this Court to set aside the impugned judgment dated 21.9.2023 in Crl.Misc.140/2023 passed by MMTC-II, Bengaluru by allowing this Criminal Appeal in the interest of justice and equity.
7. In light of the rival contentions, the following pivotal points emerge for determination in this appeal: 8 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment
1. Whether the applicant has made grounds to allow the application filed under section 5 of limitation act and to condone the delay of 111 days?
2. Whether the impugned order dated 21.09.2023 warrants interference and modification in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 29 of the PWDV Act?
3. What order?
8. This court upon re-appreciation of available materials on record with reference to prevailing law of the land, proceeds to give findings to the above points as follows:
Point No. 1 :- In the Affirmative Point No. 2 :- In the Affirmative Point No. 3 :- As per final order for the following;
REASONS
9. Point No.1: The present application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay of 111 days in preferring the appeal against the order dated 21.09.2023 passed on I.A. No. 1 in C. Misc. No. 196/2014. The applicant has explained that the delay occurred due to non-receipt of immediate 9 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment intimation of the interim maintenance order, his frequent out-station travel for employment, coupled with health issues, and the consequent inability to instruct his counsel in time. It is well settled that "sufficient cause" under Section 5 should receive a liberal construction to advance substantial justice, as enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353.
10. The applicant's explanation appears plausible and does not reflect any deliberate negligence or malafide delay. The reasons assigned -- particularly the non- communication of the order, frequent travels on work, and health constraints -- are supported in the affidavit and remain uncontroverted. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123, has held that the length of delay is immaterial so long as the explanation is satisfactory and the opposite party is not prejudiced irreparably.
11. The law is equally clear that the expression "sufficient cause" is elastic and should be applied to ensure 10 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment that technicalities do not defeat substantial justice, as observed in State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO, (2005) 3 SCC
752. The delay in this case is neither inordinate nor unexplained; rather, it is reasonably accounted for by circumstances beyond the applicant's control. The applicant's conduct does not indicate any intention to abandon the right of appeal or to gain any unfair advantage by delaying.
12. It is also pertinent to note that the appeal raises issues regarding the legality and propriety of the interim maintenance order, and non-condonation of delay would foreclose the applicant's statutory remedy on merits. As held in Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh, (2010) 6 SCC 786, when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred.
13. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds that the applicant has shown "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and the delay of 111 days in filing the appeal is liable to be condoned. 11 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment Condonation will not cause any irreparable prejudice to the respondent, whereas refusal would cause serious injustice to the applicant by shutting the doors of appellate scrutiny. Accordingly, the application is allowed, and the delay is condoned. Hence I answer Point No.1 in the Affirmative.
14. POINT NO.2:- The respondent, asserting that she is the legally wedded wife of the appellant, filed a petition under Section 12 of the PWDV Act alleging acts of domestic violence. Alongside, she filed I.A. No. 1 under Section 23(2) read with Section 20(1), seeking ex parte ad- interim maintenance of Rs.15,000/- p.m. and litigation expenses of Rs.20,000/-, averring that she was seven months pregnant and unable to work.
15. Without issuing notice to the appellant, the learned Magistrate passed the impugned order granting Rs.8,000/- p.m. as interim maintenance, holding that the respondent had made out a prima facie case of domestic violence and required sustenance pending proceedings.
16. The appellant challenges the impugned order, urging that the respondent is a qualified 12 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment engineering graduate and employed as Associate Manager - Talent Acquisition in a private company; she has suppressed her gainful employment; that he has limited earnings; he is the sole support for his aged parents, and is undergoing treatment for depression; the amount awarded is excessive and disproportionate to his means; the order ignores the requirement of affidavits of income as mandated by law.
17. The appeal raises serious questions as to:
a) Whether the learned Magistrate erred in exercising ex parte powers mechanically without verifying income and liabilities;
b) Whether suppression of employment by the respondent disentitles her to full relief claimed;
c) Whether the quantum awarded is disproportionate and unsupported by objective assessment;
d) Whether the order fails the test of fairness and proportionality in interim maintenance jurisprudence.
18. The PWDV Act is a social welfare legislation intended to provide prompt and effective relief to women 13 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment subjected to domestic violence. However, as held in Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab, (2011) 12 SCC 588, while the statute is remedial, relief must be granted in accordance with established judicial principles, balancing rights of both parties.
19. Section 23(2) empowers the Magistrate to grant ex parte interim orders on the basis of an affidavit of the aggrieved person. This provision is intended for urgent situations where delay may defeat the purpose of relief. However, as laid down in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, and reiterated in Krishna Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2022) 6 SCC 597, denial of pre- decisional hearing must be justified with cogent reasons, and such power cannot be exercised mechanically.
20. In Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324, the Hon'ble Supreme Court issued binding directions that in all maintenance proceedings, parties must file affidavits of disclosure of income, assets, and liabilities. These disclosures enable courts to determine a just and realistic 14 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment quantum. The omission to obtain such affidavits before fixing interim maintenance here amounts to non- compliance with binding precedent.
21. The learned Magistrate fixed ₹8,000/- purely on the respondent's averments, without considering:
▪ the appellant's salary after deductions; ▪ his dependent obligations; ▪ his medical expenses; and ▪ the respondent's earning capacity.
22. This runs contrary to Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena, (2015) 6 SCC 353, which mandates that capacity and need must be balanced.
23. The appellant has produced prima facie material showing that the respondent is an engineering graduate employed in the private sector. While employment alone does not bar maintenance (Sunita Kachwaha v. Anil Kachwaha, (2014) 16 SCC 715), the income of the claimant must be factored in when determining the amount (Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai, (2008) 2 SCC 316). 15 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment
24. In B. S. Santhosh v. State of Karnataka, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 1471, the Karnataka High Court held that granting ex-parte maintenance without even a rudimentary inquiry into income and liabilities invites appellate interference, particularly when suppression of facts is alleged.
25. Suppression of material facts disentitles a party to discretionary relief, as held in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1. If indeed the respondent was earning at the time of filing, her failure to disclose this amounts to misrepresentation.
26. Further, in Sudeep Chaudhary v. Radha Chaudhary, (1997) 11 SCC 286, the Court cautioned that maintenance orders must be realistic, not speculative. The absence of any reference to actual figures in the impugned order makes the quantification vulnerable.
27. The principle of proportionality, as embedded in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555, applies equally to maintenance determinations. Relief must 16 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment be sufficient for sustenance but not punitive or oppressive.
28. This Court is mindful that the respondent, being in an advanced stage of pregnancy when the application was filed, required immediate sustenance. The humanitarian object of the Act therefore justifies interim relief. But at the same time, the amount must reflect a fair balance between need and capacity.
29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan, (2015) 5 SCC 705, emphasised that maintenance must ensure dignity to the wife but also account for the paying spouse's limitations.
30. Having considered the appellant's limited means, dependent parents, medical expenses, and the respondent's qualifications and potential earning capacity, this Court finds the figure of Rs.8,000/- disproportionate. A sum of Rs.5,000/- p.m. would, at this interim stage, secure the respondent's sustenance without imposing undue hardship on the appellant.
17 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment
31. This modification preserves the respondent's right to approach the trial court for enhancement upon disclosure of complete financial details by both parties. It is therefore just and proper to partially set aside the impugned order and substitute the interim maintenance with Rs.5,000/- p.m., with liberty to the learned Magistrate to re-determine the quantum after compliance with Rajnesh v. Neha (supra). Hence, Point No.1 is answered in the Affirmative.
32. Point No.3:- In light of my answer to point No.1 and 2, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER The application filed by the appellant under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 111 days is hereby allowed.
The delay of 111 days in filing the appeal is hereby condoned.
The appeal filed by the appellant under Sec.29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is hereby ALLOWED.
The impugned order dated 21.09.2023 on I.A. No. 1 in C. Misc. No. 140/2023 is 18 Crl.A.No.234/2024 Judgment hereby modified and accordingly, the appellant is directed to pay interim maintenance of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand only) per month to the respondent from the date of the petition until further orders. The matter is remanded back to the trial court.
The trial court shall, after issuing notice, direct both parties to file affidavits of income, assets, and liabilities in terms of Rajnesh v. Neha (2021) 2 SCC 324, and may revise the quantum accordingly.
All other aspects of the impugned order remain unaltered.
Both the parties shall appear before the trial court on 25.9.2025 without expecting any further notice from trial court.
Send the entire records of the trial court with a copy of the judgment for compliance.
(Dictated to the Stenographer Grade-1 directly on the computer, corrected, signed and then pronounced by me in open court on this the 22nd day of August, 2025) (Shirin Javeed Ansari) LXIX Addl.C.C. & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru.