Legal Document View

Unlock Advanced Research with PRISMAI

- Know your Kanoon - Doc Gen Hub - Counter Argument - Case Predict AI - Talk with IK Doc - ...
Upgrade to Premium
[Cites 5, Cited by 1]

Supreme Court of India

Devi Cine Projector Manufacturingco., ... vs Commissioner Of Income Tax on 5 February, 1990

Equivalent citations: 1991 AIR 1892, 1990 SCR (1) 268, AIR 1991 SUPREME COURT 1892, 1990 (2) SCC 551, 1991 AIR SCW 2122, 1991 TAX. L. R. 230, (1990) 1 JT 250 (SC), (1990) 49 TAXMAN 85, 1990 (1) UJ (SC) 339, 1990 (1) JT 250, 1990 UJ(SC) 1 339, 1990 SCC(TAX) 325, (1990) 183 ITR 19, (1990) 82 CURTAXREP 142

Bench: N.D. Ojha, Jagdish Saran Verma

           PETITIONER:
DEVI CINE PROJECTOR MANUFACTURINGCO., ETC. ETC.

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/02/1990

BENCH:
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)
BENCH:
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)
OJHA, N.D. (J)
VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)

CITATION:
 1991 AIR 1892		  1990 SCR  (1) 268
 1990 SCC  (2) 551	  JT 1990 (1)	250
 1990 SCALE  (1)217


ACT:
    Income  Tax	 Act, 1961: Section  40(b)--Disallowance  of
interest---Firm	 paying	 interest to  partner--Partner	also
paying interest to firm on borrowing from firm--Whether such
interest to be confined only to net amount after setting off
interest paid by partner.
    Constitution of India, 1950: Article 136---Special Leave
Petitions filed against High Coun's rejection of  assessee's
applications  under  Section 256(2) of the Income  Tax	Act,
1961--1n  view of settled position on point of law  involved
and  to avoid time consuming procedure, Special Leave  Peti-
tions treated as arising out of appellate orders of Tribunal
and  matter remitted to Tribunal for disposal afresh in	 the
light of pronouncement of Court.



HEADNOTE:
The  Income  Tax  Appellate TribUnal  in  appeals  preferred
before	it  the revenue held that the entirety	of  interest
paid by a firm to its partner was disallowable under Section
40(b) of the Income Tax Act without reference to tile inter-
est  that might, in turn, have been paid by the	 partner  to
the firm on his borrowings. On appellants-assessees'  appli-
cation	under  Section 256(1) of the Act, the  Tribunal	 de-
clined	to state a case and refer a question of law for	 the
opinion	 of  the High Court. The  appellants-assessees	then
moved  Tax  case petitions under Section 256(2) of  the	 Act
before the High Court. The High Court rejected the  applica-
tions  on the view that there was no referable	question  of
law  arising  out  of the appellate order  of  the  Tribunal
having regard to its earlier decision in C.I.T. v.  O.M.S.S.
Sankaralinga Nadar & Co., 147 ITR 332, on which the Tribunal
had  relied.  The appellants-assessees filed  special  leave
petitions in this Court.
    Treating the special leave petitions as directed against
the  main appellate order of the Tribunal, and allowing	 the
appeals, this Court,
    HELD:  It  is now settled by the pronouncement  of	this
Court in Keshavji Ravji & Co. v. C.I.T., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 243
that where two or
269
more  transactions on which interest is paid to or  received
from  the partner by the firm are shown to have the  element
of mutuality and are referable to the funds of the  partner-
ship as such, Section 40(b) should not be so construed as to
exclude	 in  quantifying  the interest, if any,	 paid  to  a
partner by the firm in excess of what was received from	 the
partner. [270F]
Keshavji Ravji & Co., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 243, followed.
    C.I.T.  v.	O.M.S.S. Sankaralinga Nadar & Co.,  147	 ITR
332, over-ruled.
    In	the instant case, the appeals were directed  against
the  High Court's orders rejecting the	assessee's  applica-
tions  under Section 256(2) of the Act.	 However,  remitting
the cases to the High Court In the normal course for  neces-
sary  action would be an idle, time-consuming and  avoidable
formality. Further, as the position is settled on the  point
raised, interests of justice would be served by treating the
appeals as directed against the main appellate orders of the
Tribunal and remitting the cases to the Tribunal for dispos-
al. [270B; 271A-B]
    Accordingly, the orders of the Tribunal and of the	High
Court are set aside, and the appeals remitted to the  Tribu-
nal  for  disposal afresh on the extent of  disallowance  of
interest  under	 Section 40(b) of the Act in  the  light  of
pronouncement  of  this	 Court in Keshavji Ravji  &  Co.  v.
C.I.T., [1990] 1 S.C.R.243. [271E-F]



JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 11;55 to 1188 (NT) of 1990.

From the Judgments and Orders dated 7.11.1985, 12.8.85, 6.2.85 and 24.7.86 of Madras High Court in T.C.P. Nos, 739/85, 3 13/85, 260/84 and 42/86.

T.A. Ramachandran and Mrs. Janaki Ramachandran for the Appellants.

S.C. Manchanda, B.B. Ahuja and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATACHALIAH, J. These four petitions for grant of 270 special leave arise out of the orders of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in the corresponding four Tax Case Petitions rejecting the assessee's applications under Sec- tion 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the reference of a question of law whether the disallowance under Section 40(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Act) of the interest paid by the firm to its partner should be the gross amount of such interest or should be confined to the net-amount after setting-off the interest, in turn, paid_by the partner to the firm on his borrowings from the firm.

2. In each of these cases the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had, in substance, held that what was disallowable was the entirety of the interest paid by the firm to the partner without reference to any interest that may, in turn, have been paid by the partner to the firm. The Tribunal in the appeals preferred by the Revenue before it, allowed the appeals and reversed the view to the contrary taken in favour of the assessees by the first-appellate authority. The Tribunal also declined to state a case and refer a question of law under Section 256(1) of the Act to the High Court; whereupon the assessees moved the aforesaid Tax Case Petitions before the High Court under Section 256(2). The High Court rejected these applications on the view that there was no referable question of law arising out of the appellate orders or' the Tribunal, having regard to the earlier pronouncement of the High Court in C.I.T. v. O.M.S.S. Sankaralinga Nadar & Co., ITR 332 on which the Tribunal had relied.

3. The correctness of the decision of the High Court in the said Sankaralinga Nadar's case has come to be examined by this Court in Keshavji Ravji & Co. v. C.I.T., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 243 this Court has taken a view in the light of which Sankaralinga Nadar & Co. 's case cannot be held to have laid down the law correctly in all respects. The pronouncement of this Court in the said Keshavji Ravji & Co's case (supra) covers the point raised in these Special Leave Petitions.

4. However, as the present special leave petitions arise out of the orders of the High Court rejecting the Tax Case Petitions under Section 256(2) of the Act, we should, in the normal course, grant special leave, register the correspond- ing civil-appeals and after setting-aside the orders of the High Court remit the corresponding Tax Case Petitions to the High Court with a direction to allow petitions and 20 direct the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to state a case and refer a question of law for the opinion of the High Court and thereafter, to 270 dispose-of the references in the light of the pronouncement of this Court in the said Keshavji Ravji & Co. 's case. This procedure would, indeed, be an idle, time-consuming and wholly avoidable formality in the circumstances of the present cases. As the position is now settled, we are of the opinion that interests of justice would be served by treat- ing the present Special Leave Petitions as directed against and arising from the main Appellate Orders of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras, and after granting Special Leave, set-aside that part of the appellate orders as per- tain to the extent of disallowance of the interest under Section 40(b) of the Act and direct the Tribunal to dispose of the appeals on the point afresh in the light of the aforesaid pronouncement of this Court.

5. These petitions are, therefore, treated as directed against the main Appellate Judgments dated 9.3.1984 in ITA 1521/Mds/1982; 29.2.84 in ITA No. 898/Mds/1982; 30.8.1983 in ITA 1520/Mds/82 and 22.2. 1984 in ITA 1848/Mds/83 'of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras and Special Leave granted.

The orders of the Tribunal made under Section 256(1) of the Act in each of these cases as well as the orders of the High Court in Tax Case Petition 739 of 1985, 3 13 of 1985, 260 of 1984 and 42 of 1986 are set-aside.

Further, the appellate orders of the Income-tax Appel- late Tribunal, in so far as they pertain to the extent of disallowance of interest under Section 40(b) of the Act, are set aside and the said appeals remitted to the Tribunal for a fresh disposal of the appeals on the point in the light of the pronouncement in Keshavji Ravji & Co. 's case.

6. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

N.P.V.					       Appeals	 al-
lowed.
      272