Karnataka High Court
Mr. M. Nawaz Basha vs The Karnataka State Transport ... on 9 March, 2026
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WP No. 5739 of 2026
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 9TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
WRIT PETITION No. 5739 OF 2026 (MV)
BETWEEN:
MR. M. NAWAZ BASHA,
S/O LATE AKBAR SAHEB,
AGED 53 YEARS
R/AT No. 15-16, CTM ROAD
MADANAPALLE, ANNAMMAYYA DISTRICT,
ANDHRA PRADESH, PIN - 517 325.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. C V KUMAR, ADVOCATE)
Digitally signed by
MAHALAKSHMI B M
Location: HIGH
COURT OF AND:
KARNATAKA
1. THE KARNATAKA STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,
BMTC-TTMC BUILDING,
KH ROAD, SHANTI NAGAR,
BANGALORE - 560 027.
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY
K.S.T.A, BENGALURU.
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2. THE SECRETARY,
KARNATAKA STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,
BMTC-TTMC BUILDING,
KH ROAD, SHANTHI NAGAR,
BANGALORE - 560 027.
3. K. ANANTHA RAJU & CO.
REPRESENTED BY MANAGING PARTNER
(A PARTERSHIP FIRM)
SRI K.A RAMAKRISHNA RAJU,
S/O LATE ANANTHA RAJU,
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS,
SRI MADHUSUDHAN MOTORS,
GULPET, KOLAR- 563 101.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. RASHMI RAO, HCGP FOR R1 & R2
SRI. A. S. PRASANNA KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR C/R3)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
QUASH THE ORDER OF THE KARNATAKA STATE TRANSPORT
APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, BANGALORE DATED 17.12.2025 MADE
IN REVISION PETITION No. 157/2022 (ANNEXURE-E).
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
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WP No. 5739 of 2026
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CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
ORAL ORDER
Learned HCGP accepts notice for respondents Nos.1 and 2.
2. The petitioner aggrieved by the order of the Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "Tribunal" for short), condoning the delay of 758 days in filing the Revision Petition No.157 of 2022 has preferred this writ petition.
3. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned counsel appearing for the caveator- respondent No.3.
4. Permit No.8/67 for the inter State Interstate route Kadapa - Bangalore was originally held by M/s Venkateshwara Transport, a Partnership Firm, of which the petitioner was the Managing Director. The -4- NC: 2026:KHC:14012 WP No. 5739 of 2026 HC-KAR permit permitted operation of one round trip with one vehicle and there existed vacancy for an additional round trip under the intestate agreement between the States of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh.
5. The said firm applied for variation of permit conditions seeking permission for an additional round trip with an additional vehicle within the scope of interstate agreement. The Andhra Pradesh Transport Authority by order dated 24.04.2013 granted the variation. Pursuant thereto, the Karnataka State Transport Authority granted counter signature on 19.06.2013.
6. Aggrieved by the grant of counter signature, rival operators, including the predecessor of respondent No.3 filed RP No.414 of 2013 and connected matters before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by order dated 23.03.2016 and 24.03.2016 allowed the revision petitions and set aside the counter signature granted by the Karnataka State Transport Authority. -5-
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7. The permit holder challenged the said orders before this Court in WP No.18997-19001 of 2016 against the orders dated 23.03.2016 and 24.03.2016. This Court by order dated 13.03.2019 set aside the orders of the Tribunal and held at paragraph No.5 as under;
"5. For the foregoing reasons the Writ Petitions stand disposed of setting aside the impugned order at Annexures-E and F dated 23/3/2016 and 24/3/2016 respectively. The proceedings are restored to the file of the respondent no.1 Karnataka state transport authority, Bengaluru, to consider the petitioner's application for renewal of stage carriage permit in accordance with law."
8. Pursuant to the said direction, the Karnataka State Transport Authority by order dated 02.02.2021 restored the counter signature of the permit, holding that the permit was in operation as on 18.12.2014.
9. Respondent No.3 thereafter filed RP No.157 of 2022 challenging the order dated 02.02.2021, along with an application seeking condonation of delay of 758 days in filing the Revision Petition. The -6- NC: 2026:KHC:14012 WP No. 5739 of 2026 HC-KAR petitioner filed objections opposing the said application. The Tribunal by order dated 17.12.2025 allowed the application and condoned the delay of 758 days, directing the revision petitions to be heard on merits. Aggrieved by the said order, the present writ petition is filed.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Tribunal has committed a serious error in condoning the delay of 758 days, which is far beyond the prescribed limitation period of thirty days under Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It is submitted that respondent No.3 has not assigned any satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay and the Tribunal has condoned the delay on an erroneous assumption that the service commenced only in October 2022.
11. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.3 seeks to justify the impugned order. It is submitted that the Tribunal has exercised its discretion after considering the material on record and the explanation offered for the delay.
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12. This Court has carefully considered the rival contentions and perused the material on record, the point that would arise for consideration is;
"Whether the Tribunal was justified in condoning the delay of 758 days in filing the Review Petition and consequently allowing IA No.I and whether the same warrants any interference by this Court?"
13. The concept of "sufficient cause" is a condition precedent for the condonation of delay in filing the appeal or a revision. In the present case, respondent No.3 has stated in the affidavit filed in support of the application that he came to know about the impugned order only in October 2022 when the service commenced operations and thereafter applied for the certified copy on 02.11.2022, which was made ready on 04.11.2022, and thereafter, filed the revision petition. The reasons are stated at paragraph Nos.3 and 4 of the affidavit which reads as under:
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"3. I submit that the impugned order dated 4.11.2020 was given effect to by way of endorsement only on 4.11.2020 and I came to know the operation of 3rd respondent's service with the impugned order on the route in question only the month of October, 2022. However on 02.11.2022, I applied for Certified copy of the impugned order and the same was made ready and delivered on 4.11.2022. The revision petition is filed within 30 day from the date of receipt of certified copy of the Impugned Order endorsement.
4. I submit that the Permit No.8/03-04 valid upto 9.1.2024 held by m late father operating on the route Bangalore to Madanapalli challenged the earlier countersignature before the Tribunal and remanded by the Hon'ble High Court has been transferred to Petitioner's name and as on the date the impugned order passed, the 1st Respondent has not heard neither my late father or Petitioner who is the transferee of the said permit. So, the revision petition is filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of certified copy."
14. The Tribunal on consideration of the material on record, and the explanation offered has held that respondent No.3 was not a party before the Authority in -9- NC: 2026:KHC:14012 WP No. 5739 of 2026 HC-KAR the proceedings leading to the order dated 02.02.2021 and therefore, the explanation offered for delay constituted 'sufficient cause'.
15. Though the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that the reasoning assigned by the Tribunal is inconsistent with the affidavit filed in support of the application, this Court is of the considered view that the Tribunal has exercised its discretion for condoning the delay after considering the explanation offered and surrounding circumstances.
16. The Apex Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy1 (N. Balakrishnan) at paragraph Nos.9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 held that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, which reads as under:
"9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion 1 (1998) 7 SCC 123
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NC: 2026:KHC:14012 WP No. 5739 of 2026 HC-KAR can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court.
10. The reason for such a different stance is thus:
The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause.
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11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption
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NC: 2026:KHC:14012 WP No. 5739 of 2026 HC-KAR that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality.
13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss."
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17. In the present case, there was a delay of 758 days in filing the revision petition before the Tribunal and in light of the decision of the Apex Court as stated supra is that, acceptability of explanation of delay is the sole criteria, length of delay is not relevant.
18. It is well settled that where an aggrieved person establishes that he was prevented by 'sufficient cause' from filing the revision within the prescribed period, the delay can be condoned in the interest of justice. In the present case, the Tribunal having found sufficient cause and having condoned the delay, this Court does not find any ground to interfere with the said discretionary order and the point framed for consideration is answered accordingly and this Court pass the following;
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NC: 2026:KHC:14012 WP No. 5739 of 2026 HC-KAR ORDER The writ petition is hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
____________________ JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA DS List No.: 1 Sl No.: 11 Ct.sm