Punjab-Haryana High Court
Parveen Bhatia And Ors. vs The State Of Punjab And Ors. on 29 May, 2002
Author: Adarsh Kumar Goel
Bench: Adarsh Kumar Goel
JUDGMENT Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.
1. The petition seeks quashing of FIR No. 303 dated 13.11.2001 registered with Police Station, Jhansi (UP) and in the alternative to transfer investigation to Ludhiana.
2. The case of the petitioners is that petitioner No. l is working as a C&F (carrying and forwarding) agent of respondent No.3 since prior to 1991 at Ludhiana and a fresh agreement was executed on 1.4.1999. Petitioners No.2 and 4 are not the partners of S. Bhatia Enterprises, but they are otherwise related to petitioner No. 1. M/s Bhatia Enterprises had two partners i.e. petitioner No. l and his mother, but the partnership was dissolved on 18.10.2001. There were certain differences of petitioner No. 1 with respondent No. 3, complainant on account of business dealings. On 19.10.2001, representatives of the complainant visited the business premises of petitioner No. 1 and asked him to hand over all books of account and cash of the C&F agency. They forcibly removed the books of account inspite of resistance by petitioner No. 1, who was told that the control of C&F agency had been handed over to one Shailesh Sharma and the petitioners lodged FIR No. 276 dated 19.10.2001 under Sections 452/323/342/382/384 IPC, Police Station, Habowal, Ludhiana. It is stated that representatives of respondent No.3 gave threats to the petitioner, for which the petitioner applied and was granted anticipatory bail and respondent No. 3 thereafter lodged FIR No. 303 dated 13.11.2001 at Jhansi. It is also stated that respondent No. 3 filed a civil suit on 31.10.2001 at Ludhiana and got a Local Commissioner appointed vide order dated 24.11.2001. FIR No.29 dated 7.12.2001 has also been lodged by respondent No. 3 at Ludhiana under Sections 406/467/468/471/504/506/523/323/382/120-B IPC, wherein arrest of the petitioners have been stayed by the High Court. It is further stated by the petitioners that the FIR lodged at Jhansi does not disclose any offence and since respondent No. 3 has lodged an FIR at Ludhiana and cause of action has accrued only at Ludhiana, the FIR at Jhansi was abuse of the process of the Court and an attempt to confer jurisdiction to the investigating agency at Jhansi was a pressure tactics. It has been prayed that the FIR lodged at Jhansi may be quashed or investigation be transferred to the State of Punjab at Ludhiana, in view of judgment of the Supreme Court in Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, 2000(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 30.
3. In the FIR lodged at Jhansi by respondent No.3, it is stated that the accused petitioners are agents of the complainant in Punjab and though they were working honestly earlier; from September, 2000 they started working dishonestly and misappropriated and converted to their own use the goods entrusted to them for sale, which were of the value of Rs.3,40,35,517/- for the period from 1.4.2001 to 18.10.2001 and sale proceeds of the value of Rs. 2,36,44,828/- have not been accounted for.
4. Notice of motion was issued on the basis of prayer of the petitioners in view of judgment of the Supreme Court in Navinchandra N. Majtihia's case (supra), wherein the Supreme Court held that a High Court within whose jurisdiction an offence is alleged to have been committed can transfer investigation from some other State, where FIR has been lodged claiming that a part of a cause of action had occurred in that State.
5. Reply has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 3 and it is submitted that jurisdiction to investigate into the alleged offence was with the investigating agency at Jhansi in view of provisions of Sections 178 to 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is further stated that the judgment in Navinchandra case (supra) is not applicable and in that case a complaint was held to be mala fide while in the present case, the petitioners had indulged in misappropriation and as the petitioners were to render accounts at Jhansi, the offence was committed at Jhansi. It is also stated that the FIR lodged by the petitioners was false. The petitioners also filed rejoinder to the reply.
6. An application has also been filed for initiating contempt proceedings against the complainant for concealing and withholding material facts in order to mislead the Court, as Criminal Misc. No. 10791 of 2002.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record of the case.
8. Counsel for the petitioners referred to judgment of the Supreme Court in Navin-chandra's case (supra) and submitted that investigation should be transferred to Ludhiana, where the offence, if at all, is committed as per the allegations of the FIR.
9. Counsel for the complainant submitted that offence is committed at Jhansi, where accounts were to be rendered and where the complainant has central activities.
10. Counsel for the petitioners also relied on L.N. Mukherjee v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court 1601; Piishotiamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court 1589; Mobarik AltAhmed v. The State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 857; Daitari Tripatty v. Subodh Chandra Chowdhury, A.I.R. (29) 1942 Calcutta 575; Bijoyanand Patnaik v. Mrs. K.A, A. Brinnand, A.I.R. 1970 Calcutta 110; Ra-jesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 1999(3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 512"; Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia, 2000(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 729; State (Delhi Administration) v. Sinha Govindji, A.I.R. 1967 Delhi 88; Banqshilal Bhora and Anr. v. Rowtmal Patwari and Anr., A.I.R. (38) 1951 Assam 131; S. Huda and Anr. v. All Hussain M. Iqbal A.I.R. 1940 Calcutta 367 and A.I.R. 1930 Bombay 490, in re: Jivandas Saychand.
11. Counsel for the complainant relied on Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 1999(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 503; Lilade Shade Pavaida and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., 1983 Crl.L.J. 934; R.C. Kaushal v. Black Jack India Pvt. Lid., (1991)18 C.L.T. 405; Kimti Lal v. Motia Rani 1997(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 156; Slate of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 447; State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanna and Ors., A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 326; Eastern Spinning Mills Shri Virendra Kumar Sharda and Anr. v. Shri Rajiv Poddar and Ors., A.l.R. 1985 S.C. 1668; Arun Shankar v. State of U.P., 1999(3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 630; Union of India v. Shri B.R. Bajaj and Ors. J.T. 1994(1) S.C. 103; S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat, 2001(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 129; Dr. Ram Chander Singh Sagar v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.l.R. 1978 S.C. 475; Dukhishyam Benupani, Asstt. Director, Enforcement Directorate v. Arun Kumar Bajoria, 1998(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 354; M. Krishnan v. Vi-jay Singh, 2001(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 406; Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of West Bengal, 2001(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 522 and K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Rajan, (1999)26 Cr.L.T. 369 (S.C.).
12. In Navindhardra's case (supra), M/s J.B. Holdings Ltd. filed a complaint at Shil-long in the State of Meghalaya against the petitioner, who was Managing Director of M/s India Farmers Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai. The said Managing Director filed a writ petition in the Mumbai High Court alleging that the complaint at Shillong had been filed with a mala fide intention of exerting pressure on the petitioner, who was stationed at Mumbai, even though the entire transaction, of which the complaint was based had taken place at Mumbai and not at Shillong. It was stated that conduct of the Shillong police in registering the complaint of the complainant and taking over the investigation was in excess of jurisdiction under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Shillong police itself had requested the Mumbai police to carry out the investigation, which clearly indicates that the Shillong police was also aware that the entire transaction had taken place at Mumbai. The Mumbai High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that since the petitioner had sought quashing of complaint lodged at Shillong, the writ petition could not be entertained. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution extended to areas where cause of action accrued. Referring to earlier Supreme Court judgment in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors., 1999(4) S.C.C. 711, it was held that the Court had to examine the question of jurisdiction on the basis of facts alleged in a petition filed in Court. It was observed that main factor in a criminal case was as to at which place the offence had been committed. Reference was also made to K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidyan Balan and Anr. (1999) 26 Cr.L.T. 369 (S.C.), wherein it was held that the offence will be deemed to have been committed not only at the place where the bank was situated, but also the place where the cheque was dishonoured. Reference was also made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Satvinder Kaur v. State of NCT of Delhi) and Anr., 1998(8) S.C.C. 728, wherein it was held that if investigating officer finds that the crime was not committed in his jurisdiction, he can forward the investigation to the concerned police station, it was held that mere fact of filing of complaint at Shillong would not be conclusive of jurisdiction of the High Court and having regard to the fact and situation of the case, the Supreme Court itself directed that investigation be transferred to Mumbai police. It was observed that mere fact that some event, however, trivial to the cause of action taking place within the jurisdiction of the High Court would enable such a High Court to exercise jurisdiction, but mere fact of lodging of FIR in a particular State was not the sole criteria to decide that any part of cause of action had arisen in another State. The Supreme Court observed that large number of events had taken place at Mumbai in respect of the allegations obtained in the FIR and in fact major portion of facts which led to registration of the FIR had taken place at Mumbai and therefore, Mumbai High Court had the jurisdiction.
13. Reference may also be now made to some other judgments, which have been cited by the parties. In L.N. Mukherjee's case (supra), it was observed by the Apex Court that the Court having jurisdiction to try the offences committed in pursuance of conspiracy could also try the offence of conspiracy, even if the same was committed outside the jurisdiction of the Court. In Purushottamdas's case (supra) also, same view was taken by the Apex Court. In Mobarik All's case (supra), it was held by the Apex Court that the question whether the evidence discloses only a breach of civil liability or a criminal offence depended upon whether the complainant had acted on the representations of the accused and whether representations of the accused were false to the knowledge of the accused at the time when such representations were made. In Daityari Tripathy's case (supra), it was held by a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court that an offence of criminal breach of trust was not triable at a place where neither the entrust-ment nor any positive act of conversion of the monies entrusted took place because an offence of criminal breach of trust always consisted in an act and not in ommission. Similar view was expressed by a Single Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Bijoy-anand Patnaik 's case (supra). In Rajesh Ranjan's case (supra), it was held by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court that even though investigation can be entrusted by State Police, reinvestigation can be entrusted to the CBI. In Murray's case (supra), it was held by the Apex Court that even when no advantage have been taken, a person committing contempt may be liable to be dealt with under the Contempt of Court's Act. This judgment is cited in support of plea of contempt filed by the petitioners. Judgment in State (Delhi Administration)'s case (supra) deals with interpretation of Sections 177 and 182 of the Code and it has been held by a Single Bench Judgment of the Delhi High Court that the offence under the Imports and Export (Control) Act could be deemed to have been committed at a place where goods are sold. Judgment in State of Assam's case (supra) deals with the requirement of alleging and proving ingredients of an offence by the prosecution. Judgment in S. Hooda's case (supra) is to the effect that jurisdiction in the case of criminal breach of trust was governed by Section 181 of the Code and not by Section 179 of the Code. Same view was taken by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jivandas Savchand's case (supra).
14. Reference may now be made to the decisions cited by the complainant. In Satvinder Kaur's case (supra), it was observed by the Supreme Court that at the stage of investigation, there was no question of interference under Section 482 of the Code on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In Lilade Sitade Pavaiya's case (supra), it was observed that immunity under Section 156(2) of the Code extended to cases of absence of territorial jurisdiction. In R.C. Kaushal's case (supra), it was held that the places where accounts are to be rendered will be the places having jurisdiction under Section 181(4) of the Code. In Kimti Lal's case (supra), same view was expressed. In State of West Bengal's case (supra), it was held that investigation into cognizable offence could not be interfered with when no charge had been laid. In State of Bihar's case (supra), the Supreme Court held that ordinarily interference with the investigation was not justified by the High Court. In Eastern Spinning Mill's case (supra), same view was taken. In Arun Shankar's case (supra), it was held that inherent powers had to be used sparangly. In Union of India's case (supra), the Supreme Court held that the statutory power of the police to investigate should not be interfered with when the investigation was still pending. In S.M. Datta's case (supra), similar view was expressed. In Dr. Ram Chander Singh Sagar's case (supra), it was observed that under Section 406 of the Code, the investigation could not be transferred from one place to the other. In Dukhishyam Benupani's case (supra), it was observed that it was not the function of the Court to monitor the investigation process so long, as no provision of law was transgressed. In M Krish-nan's case (supra), it was held by the Supreme Court that civil and criminal proceedings could go on side by side. In Kamaladevi Agarwal's case (supra), it was held that the High Court ought not to quash criminal proceedings on the ground that civil suit was pending, in K. Bhaskaran's case (supra), it was held that the complaint could be filed not only at the place where the cheque was drawn, but also where the cheque was presented, returned unpaid, a notice was given and failure to pay took place.
15. A perusal of the above judgments shows that though cause of action can arise at different places and FIR can be filed at all places where offence is partly committed and though the High Court will not normally interfere with the investigation or the place where the investigation is carried out, there is no absolute bar to interference by the High Court, where jurisdiction of a Court or an investigating agency is invoked at a place other than the place where cause of action has mainly accrued. In the present case, cause of action mainly accrued at Ludhiana, where the petitioners were acting as C&F agents of respondent No. 3. Even if they are alleged to have misappropriated proceeds of sale as alleged by the complainant and a part of cause of action may have arisen as claimed by the complainant at Jhansi, where the complainant is having its head office, the matter is to be examined in the light of allegations made by the petitioners that the object of lodging complaint at Jhansi was mala fide, to put pressure on the petitioners for settling the civil dispute between the parties. No doubt, civil and criminal proceedings can go on, criminal proceedings at Jhansi will definitely put the complainant at a great advantage and put the petitioners at a great disadvantage. The complainant has already filed FIR No.29 at Ludhiana in the matter and has also filed a civil suit and got a Local Commissioner appointed. The complainant will, therefore, suffer no prejudice, if the proceedings take place at Ludhiana, as the complainant himself has filed main proceedings at Ludhiana and the evidence in the said proceedings and evidence in the FIR lodged at Jhansi is by and large same and the contention of the petitioners that jurisdiction at Jhansi has been invoked with a mala fide object of putting pressure on the petitioners may have some substance, though I do not record any final view on this aspect of the matter. I am of the view that having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, it would have been in the interest of justice to transfer the investigation from Jhansi to Ludhiana, where main dispute between the parties was already pending, the interest of justice that the proceedings take place at Ludhiana Court.
16. 1, therefore, direct that the proceedings in FIR No.303 dated 13.11.2001 will stand transferred to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana for decision in accordance with law.
17. Criminal Misc. No. 10791 of 2002 was filed for contempt. I am not inclined to entertain the same at this stage in view of conflicting versions and the same is disposed of accordingly.