Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Pamidimukkala Sambasiva Rao, Repalle, ... vs The State, Rep. By P.P., Hyderabad. on 21 August, 2025
1
APHC010418042009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3369]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THURSDAY, THE TWENTY-FIRST
FIRST DAY OF AUGUST
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 1843/2009
Between:
1. PAMIDIMUKKALA SAMBASIVA RAO, REPALLE, GUNTUR, & ANR.,
S/O. RAGHAVAIAH DRIVER OF RTC BUS REPALLE BUS DEPOT,
REPALLE, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
2. SHAIK KHASI, S/O. HASSAN AHMED, CONDUCTOR OF RTC BUS,
REPALLE BUS DEPOT, REPALLE.
...PETITIONER(S)
AND
1. THE STATE REP BY P P HYDERABAD, Rep. by its Public Prosecutor,
High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, Sub-Inspector
Sub Inspector of Police,
Station House Officer,
...RESPONDENT
Revision filed under Section 397/401 of CrPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the Criminal Revision Case, the High Court may be pleased to aggrieved by the Judgment and Sentence imposed in C.C. No. 51 of 2007 on the file of the Additional Junior Civil Judge, Repalle, dated 25 25-02-2009 2009 as confirmed in Appeal, C.A. No. 80 of 2009 on the file of the Court of XI Additional District & Sessions Judge, Tenali, dated 03-11-2009, 2009, the petitioners herein beg to present this Memorandum of Criminal Revision Case to this Honourable C Court.
IA NO: 1 OF 2009 (CRLRCMP 2584 OF 2009 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to 2 enlarge the petitioner on bail by suspending the Judgment and Conviction imposed in C.C.No.51 of 2007 on the file of the Additional Junior Civil Judge, Repalle, dated 25-02-2009 as confirmed in Appeal, C.A.No.80 of 2009 on the file of the XI Additional District & Sessions Judge, Tenali, dated 03-11-2009, pending disposal of the above Criminal Revision Case.
Counsel for the Petitioner(S):
1. CH RAVINDRA BABU Counsel for the Respondent:
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR The Court made the following ORDER:
1. The Criminal Revision Case, under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'Cr.P.C.') is filed on behalf of the petitioners/A.1 and A.2 assailing the judgment dated 03.11.2009 passed in Crl.A.No.80 of 2009 on the file of the learned XI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tenali (for short, '1st Appellate Court') whereby the 1st Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, by confirming the conviction and sentence imposed against the appellants/A.1 and A.2 for the offence punishable under Section 304A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, 'IPC') vide judgment dated 25.02.2009 passed in C.C.No.51 of 2007 on the file of the learned Additional Junior Civil Judge, Repalle, (for short, 'the Trial Court').
2. The parties to this Criminal Revision Case will hereinafter be referred to as described before the Trial Court for the sake of convenience.
3. The brief facts of the case of the prosecution are that:
PW.1 lodged a complaint stating that on 08.04.2007, she and her husband (the deceased) boarded an APSRTC bus bearing No.AP10 Z 2803 at Bhattiprolu to travel to Pallekona village to visit their children. Upon reaching their destination, i.e., Uppuvagu bridge near Pallekona, the Conductor signalled the bus to stop. PW.1 alighted from the bus, and as the deceased was attempting to get down, the 3 driver suddenly drove the vehicle forward without ensuring that he had fully disembarked. As a result, the deceased fell to the ground, and the bus ran over him, causing multiple injuries. He was immediately taken to the hospital, where he was declared dead. Following this complaint, PW.5 took up the investigation and filed a charge sheet.
4. The Trial Court took cognizance under Section 304A of the IPC against the accused. Upon the appearance of the accused, copies of the documents were furnished to them as contemplated under Section 207 Cr.P.C. The accused were examined under Section 251 of the Cr.P.C., with the substance of the accusation explained to them in Telugu for the offences under Section 304A of the IPC. They denied the accusation levelled against them and pleaded not guilty, claiming their innocence.
5. During the course of the trial, on behalf of the prosecution, PWs.1 to 5 were examined, and documents Exs.P1 to P8 were marked. After the closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused were examined under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., wherein the incriminating evidence deposed by the prosecution witnesses was explained to them in Telugu, after which the accused denied the allegations and stated that the incident did not occur due to their fault. The accused reported that they had no defence evidence to present.
6. The Trial Court, after hearing both sides and upon considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, found the accused guilty of the offence as mentioned above. Accordingly, by its judgment dated 25.02.2009 in C.C.No.51 of 2007, the Trial Court convicted the petitioners/A.1 and A.2 for the offence under Section 304A of the IPC and sentenced them to undergo simple imprisonment for three (03) months. Additionally, each was directed to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/-, and in default of payment, to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of one (01) month.4
7. Felt aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence, the unsuccessful accused filed Criminal Appeal No.80 of 2009 before the 1st Appellate Court, and the 1st Appellate Court dismissed the Criminal Appeal and confirmed the conviction and sentence imposed against the accused. Felt aggrieved by the same, the unsuccessful appellants filed the present Criminal Revision Case, challenging the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge in Criminal Appeal No.80 of 2009.
8. Learned counsel for the revision petitioners (A1 and A2) contends that the judgments of both Courts are contrary to law, evidence, and probabilities, and are legally unsustainable. It is argued that the conviction under Section 304A IPC is erroneous, as the essential ingredients of the offence are not established; the sole testimony of PW.1, the alleged eyewitness, remains uncorroborated and suffers from inconsistencies; both Courts wrongly shifted the burden of proof onto the petitioners, disregarding the prosecution's duty to establish guilt beyond doubt. It is further submitted that no rashness or negligence is attributable to the petitioners, and in any event, the sentence imposed is unwarranted and excessive.
9. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State has, while supporting the impugned judgments of conviction and sentence for the trial courts, submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts, by letting in valid and cogent evidence and that though the prosecution witnesses are interested witness, their evidence is sufficient to base conviction on the revision petitioners / A.1 and A.2 for the offence under section 304A of IPC and that thefore, the impugned judgments of conviction and sentence do not warrant any inference by this Court.
10. I have given due consideration to the above arguments of the learned counsel of both sides and perused the evidence on record, including the impugned judgments of both Courts.
11. Now, the points that arise for consideration are:5
(I) Whether the revision petitioners / A.1 and A.2 have established any valid grounds for interference with the impugned judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court, which was subsequently upheld by the 1st Appellate Court?
(II) Does the sentence passed by the 1st Appellate Court warrant any interference?
P O I N TS NO.I and II :
12. True, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C., this Court has minimal jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence available on record, however, in the present case, where the petitioners have been found guilty of the offence under Section 304A of IPC and have been convicted and sentenced for three months imprisonment and a fine of Rs.3,000/- each, solely with a view to ascertain that the judgments passed by the Courts below are based on correct appreciation of evidence on record and they are not perverse, this Court undertook exercise to critically examine the evidence be it ocular or documentary on record.
13. In Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan V. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke & Anr1, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:
Revisional power of the Court under Sections 397 to 401 of Cr.PC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the Court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.
14. As far as the scope of power of this Court while exercising revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 of Cr.P.C., is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another V. Krishnaveni and another 2, has held that 1 2015 (3) SCC 123 2 (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241 6 in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal Court in its judicial process or illegality or sentence or order. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as under:
"8. The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to mete out justice. In addition, the inherent power of the High Court is preserved by Section 482. The power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide. However, the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and cautiously when the Sessions Judge has simultaneously exercised revisional power under Section 397(1). However, when the High Court notices that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal Court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order."
15. To attract Section 304A of IPC, the prosecution must establish through valid and cogent evidence that the revision petitioners acted rashly or negligently. Therefore, to determine whether the offence is made out and whether the Trial Court and 1st Appellate Court rightly convicted the petitioners, this Court is to examine the entire oral and documentary evidence in its proper perspective.
16. It is an admitted fact that A.1 was the driver and A.2 the Conductor of the APSRTC bus bearing registration No.AP10 Z 2803; the deceased, along with his wife, boarded the said bus at Bhattiprolu village en route to Pallekona village. As per the record, the prosecution's case against the accused primarily rests on the solitary testimony of PW.1, who is none other than the wife of the deceased. Although the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 5, the 7 record indicates that no eyewitnesses were examined to prove the accident in question except PW.1.
17. PW.3, Dr. K. Yedukondalu, was examined to establish that he conducted the post-mortem examination and issued the corresponding certificate. His testimony confirms that the deceased, Gantaiah, died due to shock and haemorrhage resulting from multiple injuries. The death of Gantaiah is not disputed due to the injuries sustained in the accident. PW.4, Y.Rama Swamy, Motor Vehicle Inspector, testified that the bus involved in the accident was free from any mechanical defects. The prosecution also examined PW.2 (Mannava Rama Koteswara Rao), and the Trial Court noted that he had deposed, explaining as to how the accident occurred. However, it appears that this observation was made without a proper reading of PW.2's testimony, as rightly pointed out by the petitioner's counsel. I have reviewed the evidence of PW.2 to assess this submission.
18. According to the testimony of PW.2, he visited the scene of the offence and prepared the scene observation report (Ex.P2) on the same day. He also proceeded to the Government Hospital in Repalle, where the inquest over the dead body of G. Chantaiah was conducted, and the inquest report (Ex.P3) was prepared. However, it is unclear how the Trial Court treated him as a witness to the accident itself. The evidence of PW.2 merely establishes his presence during the scene observation and the inquest proceedings, not at the time of the incident. The testimony of PW.2, when read in conjunction with the inquest report, supports the prosecution's case insofar as it establishes that the deceased died as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident. Therefore, the Trial Court erred in considering him an eyewitness to the accident. Thus, apart from PW.1, there is no other eyewitness to the accident in question. Upon a careful reading of PW.1's testimony, this Court finds that both the Trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court failed to scrutinize her testimony properly. Both Courts have referred to PW.1's evidence as though she had deposed to specific facts, which, upon examination, do not appear to 8 have been stated in her deposition. In this context, I refer to the evidence of PW.1, as recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court. According to the Trial Court's findings, PW.1 is said to have stated as follows:
She got into the bus, along with her husband (deceased), at Battiprolu. When they reached the destination point, she requested the Conductor to stop the bus. She stated that she got down from the bus safely, but as her husband was getting down, the bus driver drove the vehicle speedily. As a result, her husband (deceased) fell on the ground and came under the rear wheels of the bus.
19. The 1st Appellate Court referred to the evidence of PW.1 as follows:
According to PW1, they wanted to get down at Pallekona village, and her husband requested the Conductor to stop the bus. The driver stopped the bus, and even before PW1's husband could get down, the driver started the bus. As a result, Gantaiah fell under the back tire of the bus.
20. Upon a careful examination of PW.1's deposition, this Court has no hesitation in holding that both the Trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court failed to refer to her testimony accurately. In fact, PW.1 deposed before the Trial Court on 11th July 2008 as follows:
I boarded an RTC bus at Bhattiprolu at 6.00 pm, when the said RTC bus reached Pallikona Bridge, the deceased requested the Conductor of the bus, then the Conductor of the said RTC bus cautioned the driver to stop the bus at that stage. Accordingly, the driver of the bus stopped. Then my husband, Garika Ghantaiah, tried to get down from the bus. At the request of my husband, the driver of the bus did not stop the bus. When the bus was slowed down, my husband tried to get down. When my husband is trying to get down from the bus immediately, the driver proceeded, then my husband fell on the back tire of the bus and died on the spot.
21. The evidence of PW.1 indicates that the bus driver did not agree to stop the vehicle when the Conductor signalled him to do so. The Conductor may alert the driver about a passenger's request or a possible stop, but it is the driver's responsibility to stop the bus safely. Merely because the Conductor signals the driver doesn't mean the driver must stop the bus immediately and suddenly. The primary duty of the driver is to ensure the safety of passengers, other road users, and pedestrians. When the conductor signals, the driver 9 must take all necessary precautions before stopping. The Conductor's signal starts the process, but it's up to the driver to decide the right time and way to stop the bus safely. However, this Court is of the view that passengers should not expect or assume the bus will stop right away just because the Conductor gave a signal.
22. In Bijuli Swain V. State of Orissa3, the High Court of Orissa held that:
7.If the evidence available on record in the instant case is judged on the principles laid down by this Court, as stated above, it is evident that there is no evidence on behalf of the prosecution that the petitioner was driving rashly and negligently. Due to such rash and negligent driving, the accident took place. Merely because some persons have been injured, it cannot be said that the accident was deliberate or due to rash and negligent driving.
The prosecution has failed to establish the ingredients of Sections 279 and 304-A, Indian Penal Code, and, as such, the conviction of the petitioner is not sustainable."
23. In Bagtawar Singh V. State of Rajasthan 4 , the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court held:
"4. The deceased, on his own, opened the gate and alighted from the bus, while it was still in motion. On asking by the Conductor and the passengers, the petitioner immediately stopped the bus. On these facts, if the deceased had no patience and, without waiting for the bus to come to complete halt, alighted, no negligence can be attributed to the driver of the bus. Thus, even if the prosecution case goes un-rebutted there are no chances of petitioner's being guilty for offence under Section 279 or 304-A IPC.
24. The evidence on record indicates that, despite the driver's apparent reluctance to stop the bus, the deceased attempted to alight from the moving vehicle as it was slowing down while negotiating a slope. The Trial Court noted that the bus was still in motion when the deceased attempted to disembark. In this context, both the Trial Court and the 1 st Appellate Court could have recognized the negligence of the deceased, as there is no evidence on record explaining the deceased's decision to disembark without the bus coming to a complete stop.
3MANU/OR/0085/1980 4 MANU/RH/0535/2004 10
25. In a criminal trial, the burden of proof for everything essential to the establishment of the charge against the accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on record, no presumption of rashness or negligence could be drawn against the petitioners/accused.
26. A rash act is primarily an overhasty act. It is opposed to a deliberate act. Still, a rash act can be an intentional act in the sense that it was done without due care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness and with indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise due care and take proper precautions to guard against injury to the public generally or to any individual in particular. It is the imperative duty of the driver of a vehicle to adopt such reasonable and proper care and precaution.
27. Both the Trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court treated the Section 313 Cr.P.C., examinations of accused persons as if the statements made under Section 161 Cr.P.C., contained incriminating evidence. During the Section 313 Cr.P.C., examination, A.2, the Conductor, said that after crossing Upputeru village, he rang the bell; since there was a curve ahead, the driver was moving slowly; he warned the deceased not to get down because there was no door; however, the deceased tried to get down on the opposite side, and thereby the accident happened. A.1, the bus driver, stated during the Section 313 Cr.P.C., examination that the Conductor rang the bell, and because of the curve, he slowed the bus and moved it to the side to stop; at that juncture, the deceased got down from the bus, which caused the accident.
28. It is incorrect to presume that negligence on the part of the driver should be assumed in every motor accident. Only in cases where the nature of the accident is such that it suggests no other explanation than the driver's 11 negligence can a presumption arise. In such instances, the driver must provide an explanation demonstrating that the accident occurred without negligence on their part. However, the mere fact that a passenger fell while attempting to alight from a moving bus does not, by itself, give rise to a presumption of negligence against the driver.
29. At this point, it is important to look at the cross-examination of PW.1. She stated that she got down from the bus about five minutes after her husband got down, after hearing his cries. This shows she only left the bus after her husband had already gotten off. Given this, it is unclear why the Trial Court referred that PW.1 testified she got down safely while her husband was getting off and that the bus driver was driving the vehicle slowly at that time. This Court is of the view that if the Trial Court had carefully examined PW.1's evidence, it would not have referred like so in its judgment. Similarly, the 1st Appellate Court also referred to PW.1's evidence wrongly.
30. PW.1's evidence shows some inconsistency. The evidence from PW.1 in chief examination shows that the driver did not fully stop the bus when it slowed down, and during this time, her husband got off the vehicle. In her cross-examination, PW.1 testified that the bus slowed down at a turn near a bridge, where there is a slope on the left side. This suggests that the driver slowed the bus, but did not stop it at the turn near the slope, and the deceased tried to get off while the bus was still moving. The prosecution does not claim that the accident happened at a designated bus stop.
31. After carefully reviewing PW.1's evidence, it is clear that when her husband asked the driver to stop, the bus was still moving through a turn after the bridge, because of the slope and the bus was not stopped completely, her husband attempted to get off without checking whether she was following him or not. The Conductor claims that the bus did not have any doors. The record shows that the deceased tried to get off the bus while it was moving slowly, and neither the driver nor the Conductor can be blamed for this. It is not 12 claimed that the Conductor assisted the deceased in getting down by opening any doors. There is no clear evidence on record to say whether the bus had doors or not.
32. The record indicates that the Conductor (A.2) signalled the Driver (A.1) to stop the bus; meanwhile, the deceased attempted to alight from the moving vehicle, which resulted in a fatal accident. The evidence on record is insufficient to establish criminal negligence on the part of either the driver or the Conductor. Additional evidence is required to demonstrate that the deceased's fall was caused by the negligence of the accused persons. In the absence of such evidence, this Court cannot conclude that the deceased's fall was solely attributable to the negligent actions of the driver or the Conductor.
33. This Court, upon thorough examination of the entire record and evidence adduced, finds that both the Trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court erred in their approach to the evaluation of the evidence, particularly in relation to the testimony of PW.1. It is apparent that neither Court gave due weight or proper consideration to the actual testimony of PW.1. Instead, both Courts appeared to place undue reliance on the facts enumerated in the charge sheet. The charge sheet, being a formal accusation and not evidence in itself, cannot supplant the requirement that facts relied upon for conviction must be supported by admissible and credible testimony. This misconception led to a flawed assessment of the evidence, undermining the integrity of the adjudicative process. As a result, the convictions recorded against the petitioners/A.1 and A.2 lack a sound evidential basis. The Courts' failure to critically and independently assess the witness testimony renders the convictions legally unsustainable.
34. On a cumulative reading of the evidence placed on record, there being no cogent and convincing evidence to establish negligence or rashness on the part of the petitioners/accused, it cannot be said that the view taken by both the Courts below in convicting the petitioners/accused is plausible. The 13 prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the petitioners/accused beyond a reasonable doubt for the offences under Section 304A of the IPC. I, therefore, hold that both the Courts erred in convicting the petitioner/accused of the offence under Section 304A of the IPC. The judgment under challenge is illegal, improper, and irregular, warranting the interference of this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 of the Cr.P.C. The petitioners/accused are entitled to an acquittal of the offences charged against them. Accordingly, this Court holds that the impugned judgments convicting A.1 and A.2 for the alleged offence cannot stand and must be set aside. Accordingly, the points are answered.
35. In the result, this Criminal Revision Case is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence, dated 03.11.2009 made in Crl.A.No.80 of 2009, by the XI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tenali affirming the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence, dated 25.02.2009, made in CC.No.51 of 2007 under Sections 304A of IPC, by the Additional Junior Civil Judge, Repalle, are set aside and reversed. The revision petitioners / A.1 and A.2, are acquitted of all the charges levelled against them. The personal bonds and surety bonds, if any, executed by the revision petitioners shall stand cancelled, and the sureties are discharged. The revision petitioners, A.1 and A.2, shall be released forthwith, unless required in connection with any other case or crime. Any fine amount paid by A.1 and A.2 shall be refunded to them after the expiry of the appeal period. The Registry is directed to transmit a copy of this order to both the Trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court, along with their respective records, forthwith.
Interim orders, if any, granted earlier shall stand vacated, and all pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
_____________________________ JUSTICE T.MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date: 21.08.2025 SAK 14 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Criminal Revision Case No.1843 OF 2009 DATE: 21.08.2025 SAK