Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Munna Lal Sharma vs Union Of India on 17 November, 2009
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH OA No.2303 of 2008 New Delhi this the 17th day of November, 2009 Honble Shri N.D. Dayal, Member (A) Honble Dr. Dharam Paul Sharma, Member (J) Munna Lal Sharma, S/o Late Hoti Lal Sharma, Retd. Postal Asstt. Civil Lines, Agra. Residential Address: B-575, Trans Yamuna Colony, Agra (U.P). .... Applicant ( By Advocate Shri D.P. Sharma) VERSUS 1. Union of India Through Secretary, Ministry of Communication and I.T., Department of Posts, Dak Bhawan, Sansad Marg, New Delhi. 2. The Sr. Superintendent Post Offices, Agra Division, Agra. .. Respondents ( By Advocates Shri R.V. Sinha and Shri R.N. Singh) O R D E R Shri Dharam Paul Sharma, Member (J) :
This application has been filed by the applicant under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 against the impugned penalty order of 50% cut in pension on permanent basis as at Annexure A/1 to the Original Application with a prayer that the said impugned order be quashed and set aside and full pension be restored with retrospective effect and the impugned recovery be ordered to be refunded with interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
2. The applicants case in brief is that there were charges for major penalty under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 issued to the applicant by respondent no.2 vide Memo dated 9.9.2002 relating to the period from 22.8.2000 to 16.12.2000 while working as Assistant Post Master, Agra Head Post Office. It has further been contended by the applicant that a separate charge of minor penalty under Rule 16 of the CCS Rules, 1965 on the above said intervening period from 17.11.2000 to 20.11.2000 was also issued to the applicant vide Memo dated 30.5.2005 on the same issue of clearing of cheque of one Shri Bhupendra Pal Singh whereby penalty of recovery of Rs.5000/- was inflicted upon the applicant vide order dated 21.7.2005.
3. The grievance of the applicant is that major penalty proceedings, however, remained pending and were completed belatedly in more than three years on 12.1.2006. Although the applicant has submitted his statement of defence to the disciplinary authority on the inquiry report but the same was kept pending for final orders without any justified cause. This compelled the applicant to move this Tribunal in OA No.2666/2006 seeking direction to the disciplinary authority to pass the final order within the time-framed period. The said OA was disposed of vide order dated 22.12.2006 directing the respondents, without affecting the rights of the parties, to dispose of the disciplinary case within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the said order. The respondents, however, failed to comply with the said directions for passing the final order within two months, there upon the respondents sought extension of time by moving Misc. Application NO.823/2007 in OA 2666/2006. The time period was extended upto 15.07.2007 vide order dated 14.5.2007 as a last opportunity. Yet the respondents failed to pass the final order within the stipulated period but nonetheless passed final order on 30.7.2007 whereby on the advice of the Union Public Service Commission, penalty of 50% cut in pension on permanent basis was imposed upon the applicant under Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 as the applicant had retired in the mean time.
4. The applicant has assailed the legality of the impugned order on a number of grounds. These grounds in seriatim are: (1) The impugned order is bad on the doctrine of double jeopardy since the applicant has earlier been inflicted upon the punishment of Rs.5000/- for the same period for which major penalty proceedings have been initiated against him; (2) It is open to objection on the ground of unexplained delay in passing it after a long litigation. There is no justified cause or explanation for the said delay. The disciplinary proceedings were delayed at every stage without any explanation or reason; (3) The applicant was prejudiced in his defence as all the documents sought for by him for his defence were not provided to him. The applicant made application on 4.4.2004 to the inquiry officer requesting to make available 15 documents required for his defence. The inquiry officer refused to allow three of these documents, i.e., 1, 3 and 6 without giving any reason. This vitiated the impugned order under sub rule 12 of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 as this caused undue prejudice to the applicant in defending his case. Even as regards remaining documents for which directions were issued by the inquiry officer to make them available to the applicant, the respondents failed to provide as many as five of them as mentioned at Serial no. 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14 without any cogent reasons and simply stating that these are not available; (4) The alleged misconduct did not relate to the work assigned to the applicant. The applicant case is that there are two posts of Assistant Post Master Saving Bank at Agra Head Office. The alleged charges of misconduct relate to the duties of the Assistant Post Master Savings Bank-II. At the relevant time, the applicant was posted as APM (SB-I). In order to substantiate this, he wanted to adduce the attendant register of the Savings Bank Branch but the same was denied to him which caused great prejudice to the applicant; (5) Since there was no witness to corroborate the fact that the applicant worked as APM Savings Bank II, it is the case of no evidence against the applicant; (6) There is violation of Sub Rule (18) of Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 according to which when the Government servant closed his case, the IO was required to question the charged officer as to circumstances appearing against him under sub Rule (18) of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 referred to above but he did not put any question to the applicant. It has further been submitted that the applicant did not appear as a witness in the case. The requirement of sub Rule (18) of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 is mandatory and non-compliance with it vitiated the impugned order; (7) It was further contended by the applicants counsel that respondents have mechanically accepted the recommendations of the UPSC without any application of its mind; and (8) Lastly, there is no allegation of fraud or misappropriation against the applicant. The allegation is that he has not checked the matter as per the rules and alleged lapse are technical in nature without attributation any mala fide or motive to the applicant. Therefore, it is contended that the punishment of 50% cut in pension on permanent basis is shockingly disproportionate and harsh in nature.
5. While elaborating the aforesaid contentions at the hearing, the learned counsel for the applicant referred to a number of cases in support thereof. In Union of India vs. Naman Singh Shekhawat, (2008) 4 SCC 1, the disciplinary proceedings were held to be vitiated on the ground inter alia that (1) the disciplinary proceedings initiated after 9 years, respondent denied certain documents and detailed procedure for major penalty proceedings not followed. Another case relied upon by the learned counsel is Lt. Governor Delhi vs. H.C. Narender Singh wherein second penalty based on the same cause of action was held to be double jeopardy and, therefore, it was held that such an action could not be sustained. Another case referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is Govt. of A.P. and others vs. A. Venkata Raidu, (2007 1 SCC (L&S) 254, wherein the Honble Court, inter alia, observed that it is a settled principle of natural justice that if any material is sought to be used in an inquiry, then copies of that material should be supplied to the party against whom such inquiry is held. Another case referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is Moni Shankar vs. Union of India and another, (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 819 wherein the departmental inquiry was held to be bad for the failure on the part of the inquiry officer in questioning the charged employee generally on the circumstances appearing against him as envisaged under Rule 9 (21) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968.This rule envisages that the inquiring authority may, after the railway servant closes his case, and shall, if the railway servant has not examined himself, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the railway servant to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. The Honble High Court held that the purpose of this procedure is to afford an opportunity to the charged employee to explain the circumstances appearing against him. Rule 9 (21) of the Railway Servants (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1968 corresponds to Rule 14 (18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. In this regard, the learned counsel for the applicant referred to the decision of the coordinate Bench of this Tribunal in Raj Kumar Sharma vs. Union of India and others in OA No.1185/2008 decided on 15.1.2009 wherein relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Moni Shanker vs. Union of India and another (supra) the said Original Application was allowed by setting aside the impugned orders therein.
6. Replying to the contentions of the applicants counsel, Shri R.V. Sinha appearing for Shri R.N. Singh, learned counsel for the respondents referred to a number of cases. One of these is Union of India and another vs. B.C. Chaturvedi,(1995) 6 SCC 750, wherein the principles of judicial review on administrative action have been elaborated by the Honble Supreme Court. Referring to the factors to be considered in making such a judicial review, the Honble Supreme Court has inter alia observed that if findings of the disciplinary authority/appellate authority are based on some evidence, Court/Tribunal cannot reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own findings. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. When the inquiry is conducted on the charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with; whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. Another case referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is State Bank of patiala and others vs. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, wherein the Honble Supreme Court summarized the principles in para 33 of the judgement, emerging from the case law on the subject. These, inter alia, include that an order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. It has further observed that in case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/ employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or the Tribunal should make appropriate directions (including the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in Managing Director, ECIL vs. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727. The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called. Another case referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is State of U.P. and others vs. Ramesh Chandra Mangalik, (2002) 3 SCC 443, wherein non-furnishing of copies of relevant documents in the absence of proof of consequential prejudice as well as the fact that the material or documents in question have not been relied upon by the inquiry officer was held not sufficient to vitiate the inquiry on the ground of non-supply of such documents. Another case referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is State of Madras vs. A.R. Srinivasan, AIR 1966 SC 1827, wherein the contention that the disciplinary authority being the quasi judicial authority, the disciplinary authority/ appellate authority should have communicated some reasons as to why it has accepted the findings of the Tribunal since no reasons have been given and did not find favour with the Honble High Court, the Honble Supreme Court inter alia observed that It is conceivable that if the State Government does not accept the findings of the Tribunal which may be in favour of the delinquent officer and proposes to impose a penalty on the delinquent officer, it should give reasons why it differs from the conclusions of the Tribunal though even in such a case, it is not necessary that the reasons should be detailed or elaborate. But where the State Government agrees with the findings of the Tribunal which are against the delinquent officer, we do not think as a matter of law, it could be said that the State Government cannot impose the penalty against the delinquent officer in accordance with the findings of the Tribunal unless, it gives reasons to show why the said findings were accepted by it. The proceedings are, no doubt, quasi-judicial, but having regard to the manner in which these enquiries are conducted, we do not think an obligation can be imposed on the State Government to record reasons in every case. In view of the aforesaid authorities, Shri R.V. Sinha for Shri R.N. Singh, learned counsel for the respondents very strongly contended that the inquiry has been initiated and conducted by competent authority in accordance with the applicable rules and penalty has been duly imposed on the applicant which is not open to objection on any of the grounds raised by the applicant.
7. We have given our careful consideration to the respective submissions made by both the parties and have also carefully gone through the records of the case as well as the case law referred to by both the parties in support of their respective submissions.
8. As to the first ground on which the impugned order has been sought to be assailed by the applicant, namely, double jeopardy, we have carefully gone through the chargesheet for minor penalty on the one and the chargesheet for major penalty on the other. Minor penalty of recovery so imposed was not the subject matter of the major penalty proceedings. The major penalty proceedings were not in respect of continued period from 22.8.2000 to 16.12.200. In fact these proceedings relate to spell of different periods as can be seen from Annexure A-1. Thus the alleged misconduct are stated to have been committed during the period 22.08.2000 to 05.09.2000, 30.10.2000 to 10.11.2000, 29.11.2000 to 04.12.2000 and 16.12.2000. As against this, the minor penalty proceedings were initiated in respect of misconduct alleged to have been committed during the period from 17.11.2000 to 20.11.2000. It is thus clearly seen that the period in respect of which minor penalty proceedings were initiated were not the subject matter of the major penalty proceedings and, therefore, the plea of double jeopardy cannot be sustained.
9. As regards the applicants contention that he did not work as Assistant Post Master Savings Bank-II, it is found on perusal of the records that this is not borne out by the records of the case. The UPSC too has also gone into this aspect of the matter in para 5 of its letter. The Commission has specifically noted that though the applicant has argued that his attendance as APM SB II during the period in question has not been proved, yet the attendance of the applicant during the period is confirmed as per exhibits and statement of witnesses as under:-
The nominal roll (Exh. Ka-45 produced during inquiry);
The statement of the applicant dated 9/10.4.2002 regarding having worked as APM SB II during the period in question made before Shri S.K. Gupta, then CIDO (Exh. Ka-48). This has been confirmed by the said officer, Shri S.K. Gupta, appearing as State Witness (SW-7); and Witnesses (SW-1 & SW-II) The Commission also noted that the applicant has not produced any evidence regarding having worked in any other seat or having been on leave during the period. Accordingly, the Commission observed that the exhibits mentioned above establish that the applicant worked as APM SB II during the period in question. In view of the aforesaid, it cannot be said to be a case of no evidence. The applicant has not been successfully able to controvert this fact, as a matter of fact. We thus find no substance in the forth and the fifth contentions of the applicant referred to in para 4 above.
10. We also do not find any substance in the contention of the applicant that the respondents have mechanically accepted the recommendations of UPSC without any application of mind in view of A.R. Srinivasan case (supra). It is not incumbent upon the respondents to record reasons for its acceptance of UPSC advice. While passing the impugned order, the authority concerned has expressly recorded that the same has been passed after careful consideration of the submissions made by the applicant in his written submission and advice tendered by the UPSC vide their letter dated 26.5.2006 and all relevant facts and circumstances of the case. As a matter of principle as can be gathered from the case of A.R. Srinivasan (supra) where one propose to disagree with the recommendations of some one else, it would be appropriate to record reasons for such disagreement but where recommendation was given are proposed to be agreed with, mere concurrence would suffice in such a case. This proposition find support from the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in A.R. Srinivasan (supra) and in view of this, we do not find any infirmity in the order on this count in the present case.
11. As regards delay in every stage of disciplinary inquiry as alleged by the applicant, we are of the considered view that it would not be appropriate to go into this aspect of the matter after a coordinate Bench of this Tribunal has allowed the respondents to pass final orders within the stipulated time frame and even extended the same at the request of respondents subsequently, as has been referred to by the applicant in his Application. Such directions/extension may be viewed as having been issued/granted upon satisfaction of the conduct of the respondents in making the disciplinary inquiry against the applicant. We are, therefore, of the view that the impugned order is not open to objection on account of delay in the inquiry as contended by the applicant.
12. We will now deal with the applicants contention as to denial of reasonable opportunity of being heard as a result of non-supply of the documents sought by him in his defence. As far back as in 1961, Government have issued instructions as to supply of copies of documents and affording access to official records to the delinquent official which view hold good even today. For better appreciation of the issue involved in this case, it would be appropriate to reproduced paras 1 to 5 of Government of India, M.H.A., O.M. No.F.30/5/61-AVD dated 25th August, 1961:-
1. The question often arises whether a particular document or set of documents asked for by a Government servant involved in a departmental enquiry should be made available to him or not and pending the decision on the question, the submission of the written statement by the Government servant concerned is delayed, in some cases for months. In view of this and also of the judgment pronounced by the Supreme Court in Raizada Trilock Nath v. The Union of India, in which it has been decided that failure to furnish copies of documents such as the First Information Report and statements recorded during investigation amounts to a violation of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, the whole question of the extent access of official records to which a Government servant is entitled under the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules or the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules has been examined in consultation with the Ministry of Law.
2. The right of access to official records is not unlimited and it is open to the Government to deny access if in its opinion such records are not relevant to the case, or not desirable in the public interest to allow such access. The power to refuse access to official records should, however, be very sparingly exercised. The question of relevancy should be looked at from the point of view of the defence and if there is any possible line of defence to which the document may, in some way, be relevant, though the relevance is not clear to the Disciplinary Authority at the time the request is made, the request for access should not be rejected. The power to deny access on the ground of public interest should be exercised only when there are reasonable and sufficient grounds to believe that public interest will clearly suffer. Cases of the latter type are likely to be very few and normally occasion for refusal to access on the ground that it is not in public interest should not arise if the document is intended to be used in proof of the charge and if it is proposed to produce such a document before the Inquiry Officer, if an enquiry comes to be held. It has to be remembered that serious difficulties arise when the Courts do not accept as correct the refusal by the Disciplinary Authority, of access to documents. In any case, where it is decided to refuse access, reasons for refusal should be cogent and substantial and should invariably be recorded in writing.
3. Government servants involved in departmental enquiries often ask for access to and/or supply of copies of-
documents to which reference has been made in the statement of allegations;
documents and records not so referred to in the statement of allegations but which the Government servant concerned considers are relevant for the purpose of his defence;
statements of witnesses recorded in the course of
(a) a preliminary enquiry conducted by the department; or
(b) investigation made by the Police;
reports submitted to Government or other Competent Authority including the Disciplinary Authority, by an officer appointed to hold a preliminary inquiry to ascertain facts; and reports submitted to Government or other Competent Authority including the Disciplinary Authority by the Police after investigation.
4. A list of the documents which are proposed to be relied upon to prove the charge and the facts stated in the statement of allegations should be drawn up at the time of framing the charge (this will incidentally reduce the delay that usually occurs between the service of the charge-sheet and the submission of the written statement). This list should normally include Anonymous and pseudonymous complaints on the basis of which inquiries were started need not be included in the list. The list so prepared should be supplied to the officer either along with the charge-sheet or as soon thereafter as possible. The officer should be permitted access to the documents mentioned in the list, if he so desires.
5. If the officer requests for any official records other than those included in the list, the request should ordinarily be acceded to in the light of what has been stated in Paragraph 2 above. We may now examine the present case in the light of the aforesaid instructions. The applicant asked the inquiry officer to provide him 15 documents in his defence, which he would be requiring to defend himself. The inquiry officer denied the access to three of these documents but without recording any reasons therefor. As regards the remaining documents, which were directed to be provided to the applicant by the inquiry officer, five documents were not actually provided to him on account of non-availability. No reasons have been assigned for the same. The thrust of the respondents argument in this regard has been that relied upon documents have been provided to the applicant. Therefore, no prejudice has been caused to him. We are not inclined to subscribe to this. Documents or record not so referred to in the statement of allegations may be relevant for the purpose of defence of the delinquent officer/charged officer. Relevancy of the documents has already been determined by the inquiry officer by directing the supply of the same to the applicant. Non-supply of the same would certainly operate to the prejudice of the applicant and to that extent, it can be said that the applicant has been denied reasonable opportunity of hearing in the matter.
13. Coupled with the aforesaid, there is another aspect, which goes to the root of the matter, namely, non-compliance with the mandatory/compulsory requirement of sub rule (18) of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. This sub rule (18) of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 reads as follows:-
The Inquiring Authority may, after the Government closes his case, and shall, if the Government servant has not examined himself, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the Government servant to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. This rule corresponds to Rule 9 (21) of the Railway Servant (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968. A plain reading of the said rule reveals two exigencies:-
Where it is the discretion of the inquiring authority to examine the charged officer on the circumstances appearing against him, any evidence for the purpose of enabling the Government servant to explain such circumstances appearing in the evidence against him; and Where it is obligatory upon the inquiring authority to put such questions, Recourse to which of these two courses of action has to be taken by the inquiring authority depends upon the fact as to whether the charged officer has examined himself or not. Where the charged officer has not examined himself, after the closure of his case, it is incumbent upon the inquiring authority to comply with the requirement of Rule 14 (18) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 or, as the case may be, Rule 9 (21) of the Railway Servant (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968. Annexure C at page 142 of the paperbook clearly reveals that the charged officer has not examined himself. As such the inquiring authority ought to have proceeded in terms of Rule 14 (18) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and for that matter under Rule 9 (21) of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968 in the present case.
14. The Honble Supreme Court in Moni Shanker (supra) has clearly held that the provisions of Rule 9 (21) of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968 is imperative, overruling the opinion of the High Court to the contrary. While doing so, the Honble Supreme Court observed that the purpose for which the sub rule has been framed is clear and unambiguous. Railway servant must get an opportunity to explain the circumstances appearing against him. Following the dicta laid down by the Apex Court as aforesaid, the coordinate Bench of this Tribunal allowed OA No.1185/2008 in the matter of Raj Kumar Sharma vs. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Communication, Department of Post and others vide its order dated 15.1.2009 setting aside the impugned order with liberty to the respondents to start afresh from the stage of Rule 9 (21) of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968. In this case, the applicant has been denied the said opportunity. Cumulative effect of this as well as denial of requisitioned documents, as referred to above, are required to be taken into consideration by the Judge as to whether the impugned action against the applicant should vitiate or not?
15. Viewed this in the context of the penalty of 50% cut in the pension on permanent basis, the conduct of the applicant also assumes relevancy. He was not the one, who has committed the fraud or misappropriate the amount resulted in loss to the Government. The main culprit has been some one else. The allegations against the applicant levelled are that he has failed to make proper check and verification of the documents as envisaged in the relevant rules. He does not stand gain personally on account of such failure in any way. It is also an admitted fact that the post related to which irregularities are said to have been committed by the applicant, was not the regular charge of the applicant. He was working against another post and was made to hold the charge of additional post as a stop-gap arrangement in the absence of regular incumbent of that additional post. Besides in response to similar allegations alleged to have occurred during the period between 17.11.2000 to 20.11.2000, the respondents themselves have proceeded under minor penalty proceedings whereupon a penalty of recovery of a sum of Rs.5000/- was ordered to be made and the amount involved in that case was to the tune of Rs.1,17,118/-. In these premises, imposition of 50% cut in pension on permanent basis appears to be bit on higher side and grossly disproportionate.
16. In view of the facts that the alleged misconduct is said to have committed as far back as in 2000 and the applicant has superannuated after prolonged disciplinary proceedings and protracted litigations, we are of the view that this is not a case wherein the respondents should be granted liberty to start afresh from the stage of Rule 9 (21) of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1968.
17. In the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated above, we are of the considered opinion that the respondents are directed to restore back full pension to the applicant as due to him and also refund the amount which have been recovered/cut from his pension within a period of four months from the receipt of certified copy of this order. While doing, the respondents shall also examine, if any, interest is payable on such pension cut on its restoration and if so, pay the same to the applicant within the period of four months referred to above.
18. The Original Application is allowed. The impugned order is accordingly set aside. No order as to costs.
(Dr. Dharam Paul Sharma) (N.D. Dayal)
Member (J) Member (A)
/ravi/