Madhya Pradesh High Court
Prem Nath Kapur vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 15 July, 2025
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
1
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:18178
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT I N D O R E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 15TH OF JULY, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 36615 of 2018
PREM NATH KAPUR AND ANOTHER
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri Amit Singh Sisodiya, advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Santosh Singh Thakur, public prosecutor for respondent/State.
.....................................................................................................................
ORDER
This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is filed for quashing the proceedings of criminal complaint case No. 18467/2011 pending before the Special Magistrate (Municipal Corporation, Indore).
2 The exposition of facts, giving rise to present petition, are as under:
The Food Inspector, Food and Drugs Administration, District Indore submitted a written complaint for offence punishable under Section 7(ii) read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, alleging store and sale of misbranded Pasta Moccagatta Dal 1908 against Mahendra Desai, Milind Hathwalne, Premnath Kapur, Nirumapa Kapur, Monu Jain and M/s Laasya Exim. It was alleged that Ms.Jyoti Baghel working as Food Inspector Food and Drugs Administration Indore, inspected the Lemon Tree hotel (KRIZM Hotel Pvt Ltd), 3 RNT Road, Indore on 16.8.2010. During inspection, the Food Inspector collected sample of Pasta Moccagatta Dal. The sample was sent to the State Food Testing Laboratory, Bhopal. The State Laboratory reported the 2 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:18178 sample to be mis-branded. The Memorandum of Article of Association of Lemon Tree Hotels (Pvt) Ltd. was requisitioned.
Thereafter, the complaint for offence punishable under Section 7(ii) read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was filed against Mahendra Desai, Milind Hathwalne, Premnath Kapur, Nirumapa Kapur, Monu Jain and M/s Laasya Exim.
Learned Special Magistrate (Municipal Corporation) took cognisance against the petitioners and co-accused for offence punishable under Section 7(ii) read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and criminal case No. 18467/2011 was registered. The trial is underway.
3 Learned counsel for the petitioners, in addition to the facts and grounds mentioned in the petition, submitted that the trial Court committed an error in taking cognisance against the petitioners. There was no prima facie evidence against the petitioners as they were not directors of said Hotel on the date of incident or even in the recent past. The petitioners had resigned as directors of M/s. PMG Hotels on 5.8.2022 vide Form No. 32 (Annexure A-2), thereafter, hotel Lemon Tree at Indore was purchased by M/s Lemon Tree Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. The annual return submitted by M/s Lemon Tree Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. for the year 2009 to 2017 (Annexure A-3) makes it clear that petitioners were not the directors of Hotel Lemon Tree, Indore. The complainant had not filed any document showing involvement of the Petitioners in the alleged offence except the memorandum of Article of Association of year 1992. Learned counsel further referring to resolution dated 12.8.2010 and acknowledgment No. 555 dated 3.3.2011 contended that Milind Hathwalne, General Manager of Hotel Lemon Tree, Indore was nominated under Section 17(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 by M/s Lemon Tree Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. and the nomination was duly communicated to the local Health Authority, therefore, the 3 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:18178 Petitioners cannot be prosecuted for alleged offence. The criminal complaint and the subsequent proceedings deserve to be quashed qua the petitioners.
4 Learned counsel for the Respondent referred to the private complaint submitted by Food Inspector, Food and Drugs Administration, Indore before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore, to contend that the Annexure No. 19 mentioned in the private complaint shows that the information with regard to M/s Lemon Tree (Krizm Hotel Pvt. Ltd.), 3 R.N.T. Road, Indore was received vide acknowledgment No. 555 dated 3.3.2011. The memorandum enclosed with the information shows that Premnath Kapur and Nirupama Kapur as directors of the firm. Since, no nomination under Section 17(2) of the Act was made on 16.8.2010 (date of inspection), both the directors are responsible for day to day functioning of the firm. The resolution dated 12.8.2010 was presented in the office of Food and Drug Administration Indore on 3.3.2011. The nomination on Form No. 'VIII' is admissible only after signature of the competent food authority. The nomination cannot be considered for the reason that it was presented after the inspection dated 16.8.2010.
5 In reply, learned counsel for petitioners contended that the documents enclosed at acknowledgment No. 555 dated 3.3.2011 are true copy of the resolution passed at the meeting of the Board of Directors of M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd. on 12 th August, 2010, wherein it was resolved that name of the company would be changed to M/s Lemon Tree Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. from Krizm Hotels Pvt Ltd. The resolution was signed by Patanjali Govind Keswani, Chairman and Managing Director for M/s Lemon Tree Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. This resolution does not reveal that the petitioners Premnath Kapur or Nirupama Kapur were directors much less 4 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:18178 Managing Directors of M/s Lemon Tree Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. Learned counsel further submitted that the Chairman and Managing Director Patanjali Govind Keswani vide nomination Form No. 'VIII' under Rule 12 (B) of the Act dated 12.8.2010 nominated M/s Milind Hathwalne, General Manager of the Lemon Tree Hotel, Indore to be incharge and responsible to M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Indore for conduct of business of said unit of company and authorised to exercise all powers as may be necessary to prevent the commission by the said company of any offence under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. This nomination was accepted by Milinid Hathwalne and was enclosed with the resolution dated 12.8.2010. Both the documents were received by the office of Deputy Director, Food and Drug Administration vide acknowledgment No. 555 dated 3.3.2011, before filing of complaint on 22.9.2011. The complainant Food Inspector was aware of the nomination received by office of Deputy Director Food and Drug Administration on 3.3.201. These documents are enclosed alongwith the private complaint, therefore, the prosecution cannot deny the veracity of these documents.
6 Heard both the parties. Perused the record.
7 Section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 provides as under-
Offences by companies.--(1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company--
(a) (i) the person, if any, who has been nominated under sub-section (2) to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company (hereinafter in this section referred to as the person responsible), or
(ii) where no person has been so nominated, every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company; and
(b) the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded 5 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:18178 against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge and that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. (2) Any company may, by order in writing, authorise any of its directors or managers (such manager being employed mainly in a managerial or supervisory capacity) to exercise all such powers and take all such steps as may be necessary or expedient to prevent the commission by the company of any offence under this Act and may give notice to the Local (Health) Authority, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, that it has nominated such director or manager as the person responsible, along with the written consent of such director or manager for being so nominated.
Explanation.--Where a company has different establishments or branches or different units in any establishment or branch, different persons may be nominated under this sub-section in relation to different establishments or branches or units and the person nominated in relation to any establishment, branch or unit shall be deemed to be the person responsible in respect of such establishment, branch or unit. (3) The person nominated under sub-section (2) shall, until--
(i) further notice cancelling such nomination is received from the company by the Local (Health) Authority; or
(ii) he ceases to be a director or, as the case may be; manager of the company; or
(iii) he makes a request in writing to the Local (Health) Authority, under intimation to the company, to cancel the nomination [which request shall be complied with by the Local (Health) Authority], whichever is the earliest, continue to be the person responsible:
Provided that where such person ceases to be a director or, as the case may be, manager of the company, he shall intimate the fact of such cesser to the Local (Health) Authority:
Provided further that where such person makes a request under clause
(iii), the Local (Health) Authority shall not cancel such nomination with effect from a date earlier than the date on which the request is made. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-sections, where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, [not being a person nominated under sub-
section (2)] such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section--
(a) "company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals;
(b) "director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm; and
(c) "manager", in relation to a company engaged in hotel industry, 6 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:18178 includes the person in charge of the catering department of any hotel managed or run by it.] 8 Thus, where an offence under the Act has been committed by a company, the person who has been nominated under subsection 2, to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company or where no such person has been nominated, every person who at the time of the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company and the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence.
9 It is duty of the prosecutor to establish that the Director in question was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business at the time the offence was committed. Section 17 is a deeming provision which provides that where an offence under the Act is committed by a company, the person in charge and responsible to it, is also to be proceeded against. Where no person has been nominated, the liability is extended to every person who was in charge of and responsible to the company in the conduct of business. The prosecution has the duty to find out whether any person has been nominated in terms of section 17 (2). There has to be a prosecution against the company, whereafter the question of liability of other person of any of the categories indicated in clause (a) of subsection 1 arises. The expression "and (b) the company"
in above Section 17(1) makes it imperative to implead the company with the person responsible or the person in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company.
10 On a plain reading, it is apparent that the words "was in charge of"
and "was responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company" cannot be read disjunctively and the same ought be read 7 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:18178 conjunctively.
11 In case of Charanjit Pal Jindal v. L.N. Metalics, (2015) 15 SCC 768, the Supreme Court, while considering pari-materia provision contained in Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 held as under-
10.In Aneeta Hada v.Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 the question that arose for determination by this Court was whether an authorised signatory of a company would be liable for prosecution under Section 138 of the Act without the company being arraigned as an accused. As there was a difference of opinion between the two learned Judges regarding the interpretation of Sections 138 and 141 of the Act reference was made to the larger Bench of three Judges. In the said case, this Court noticed the ratio laid down in State of Madras v. C.V. Parekh, (1970) 3 SCC 491 and the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal v. State of M.P., (1984) 4 SCC 352 while interpreting Sections 138 and 141 of the Act, this Court observed as follows:
"53. It is to be borne in mind that Section 141 of the Act is concerned with the offences by the company. It makes the other persons vicariously liable for commission of an offence on the part of the company. As has been stated by us earlier, the vicarious liability gets attracted when the condition precedent laid down in Section 141 of the Act stands satisfied. There can be no dispute that as the liability is penal in nature, a strict construction of the provision would be necessitous and, in a way, the warrant.
***
58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words 'as well as the company' appearing in the section make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected when a Director is indicted.
59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. State of Madras v. C.V. Parekh, (1970) 3 SCC 491 which is a three-8
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:18178 Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal v. State of M.P., (1984) 4 SCC 352 does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision inAnil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd., (2000) 1 SCC 1 is overruled with the qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Modi Distillery, (1987) 3 SCC 684 has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove."
11. From the aforesaid finding, we find that after analysing all the provisions and having noticed the different decisions rendered by this Court, the three- Judge Bench arrived at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning a company as an accused is imperative. Hence in this case, we find no reason to refer the matter to the larger Bench.
(Also relied- Bijoy Kumar Moni v. Paresh Manna, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3833).
12 The Supreme Court, in case of R. Banerjee v. H.D. Dubey, reported in (1992) 2 SCC 552, dealing with Section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, held as under-
3.Section 23 of the Act empowers the Central Government to make rules. In exercise of the said power the Central Government has framed rules known as the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (hereinafter called 'the Rules'). Rule 12-B with which we are concerned reads as under:
"12-B. Form of nomination of Director or Manager and his consent, under Section 17.-- (1) A company may inform the Local (Health) Authority of the concerned local area, by notice in duplicate, in Form VIII containing the name and address of the Director or Manager, who has been nominated by it under sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company or any establishment, branch or unit thereof:
Provided that no such nomination shall be valid unless the Director or Manager who has been so nominated, gives his consent in writing and has affixed his signature, in Form VIII in duplicate in token of such consent.
(2) The Local (Health) Authority shall sign and return one copy of the notice in Form VIII to the company to signify the receipt of the nomination and retain the second copy in his office for record."
Form VIII is in three parts. The first part is in the nature of a notice that the company has by a resolution passed at its meeting nominated its named Director/Manager to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the said company or establishment/branch/unit thereof. A certified copy of the resolution has to be sent along with the form. This part must be signed by the Managing Director/Secretary of the Company.
9NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:18178 The second part relates to the acceptance of the nomination and must be signed by the nominated Director/Manager. The third part has to be signed by the Local (Health) Authority acknowledging the receipt of the nomination.
4.It is clear from the plain reading of Section 17 that where an offence under the Act is alleged to have been committed by a company, where the company has nominated any person to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business that person will be liable to be proceeded against and punished for the commission of the offence. Where, however, no person has been so nominated, every person who at the time of the commission of the offence was in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business shall be proceeded against and punished for the said crime. Even in such cases the proviso offers a defence, in that, the accused can prove his innocence by showing that the offence was committed without his knowledge and notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence to prevent it. The scheme of sub-section (1) of Section 17 is, therefore, clear that the cases where a person has been nominated under sub-section (2) of Section 17, he alone can be proceeded against and punished for the crime in question. It is only where no such person has been nominated that every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business can be proceeded against and punished. The proviso, however, lays down an exception that any such person proceeded against shall not be liable to be punished if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge and that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission thereof. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 empowers the company to authorise any of its Directors or Managers to exercise all such powers and take all such steps as may be necessary or expedient to prevent the commission by the company of any offence under the Act. It further empowers the company to give notice to the Local (Health) Authority in the prescribed form that it has nominated a Director or Manager as the person responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. This has to be done with the written consent of the nominated Director or Manager. Where a company has different establishments or branches or units, different persons may be nominated in relation to the different establishments/ branches/ units and the person so nominated shall be deemed to be the person responsible in respect of such establishment, branch or unit. Sub-section (4) of Section 17 overrides the preceding sub-sections and posits that where an offence has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the company, other than the one nominated, such Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer shall also be deemed guilty and be liable to be proceeded against and punished for the same. This sub-section, therefore, makes it clear that notwithstanding the nomination under sub-section (2) of Section 17 and notwithstanding clause (a)(i) of sub-section (1) of Section 17, any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the company, other than the nominated person, can be proceeded against and punished if it is shown that the offence was committed with his consent or connivance or negligence. It is crystal clear from the scheme of Section 17 that where a company has committed an 10 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:18178 offence under the Act, the person nominated under sub-section (2) to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business shall be proceeded against unless it is shown that the offence was committed with the consent/ connivance/ negligence of any other Director, Manager, Secretary or Officer of the company in which case the said person can also be proceeded against and punished for the commission of the said offence. It is only where no person has been nominated under sub-section (2) of Section 17 that every person, who at the time of the commission of the offence was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business can be proceeded against and punished under the law.
7.The appellants, however, contend that since the company had made a nomination as required by sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act, only the person nominated could be proceeded against and punished for the alleged offence along with the company. So far as Lipton India Limited is concerned, it is said that it had nominated one H. Dayani by company resolution dated December 15, 1988 as the person to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business at its Nagpur branch and intimation thereof was sent as required by Rule 12-B with the consent of the said H. Dayani to the concerned Local (Health) Authority and hence the said H. Dayani alone could be proceeded against and punished, besides the company, for the commission of the offence in question. A copy of the resolution passed by the Board of Directors of the company at its meeting held on December 15, 1988 was annexed to the intimation sent in the prescribed form under Rule 12- B of the Rules. M/s Hindustan Lever Limited contends that it too had nominated one Dr Nirmal Sen as the person in charge of, and responsible to, the said company for the conduct of its business at the Shamnagar factory and hence besides the company the said Dr Nirmal Sen alone could be proceeded against and punished. That company also had intimated the Local (Health) Authority about the nomination of Dr Nirmal Sen as the person in charge of, and responsible to, the said company for the conduct of its business at its Shamnagar factory and this was duly verified by the Local (Health) Authority of Bhatpara Municipality exercising administrative control over the area in which the said factory was situate. As pointed out earlier if the two companies succeed in showing that they had made valid nominations of H. Dayani and Dr Nirmal Sen, respectively, and had duly intimated the concerned Local (Health) Authority about the same before the commission of the alleged offences, there can be no doubt that the case would fall within the ambit of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act and not under sub-clause
(ii) thereof. It would then be necessary for the prosecuting agency to show from the averments made in the complaint that the case falls within sub- section (4) of Section 17 of the Act. If the prosecuting agency fails to show that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of any particular Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the company or on account of the negligence of any one or more of them, the case set up against the appellants cannot be allowed to proceed.
9. On a careful perusal of the complaints lodged by the Food Inspector under the Act it is evident that intimation regarding the nomination in favour of H. Dayani and Dr Nirmal Sen had been communicated to the Food Inspector 11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:18178 before the complaints came to be lodged. This is evident from the averments made in the respective complaints. The nomination was, however, not acted upon by the complainant on the ground that it was incomplete. It was, therefore, said that in the absence of a valid nomination from the concerned company the Directors of the company were liable to be proceeded against and punished on proof of the charge levelled against them in the complaint. It will thus be seen that there is no allegation in the complaint which would bring the case within the mischief of Section 17(4) of the Act. There is no allegation in the complaint that the offence was committed with the consent/ connivance/ negligence of the Directors, other than the nominated person, who were impleaded as co-accused. We are, therefore, satisfied that the allegations in the complaint do not make out a case under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act. That being so, the inclusion of the co-accused other than the company and the nominated person as the persons liable to be proceeded against and punished cannot be justified. As held by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi [(1983) 1 SCC 1 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 :
(1983) 1 SCR 884] where the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute any offence, no process can be issued against the co-accused other than the company and the nominated person and the High Court would be justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to quash the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence against such co-accused.
13 The material on record and case on hand is examined in the light of the aforestated prepositions of law.
14 The impugned written complaint was filed against (i) Mahendra Desai, Assistant Manager of M/s Lemon Tree (Krizm Hotels Pvt. Ltd.) Indore; (ii) Milind Hatwalne Licensee, M/s Lemon Tree (Krizm Hotels Pvt. Ltd.) Indore; (iii) Premnath Kapur, Director, M/s Lemon Tree (Krizm Hotels Pvt. Ltd.) Indore; (iv) Nirumapa Kapur, Director M/s Lemon Tree (Krizm Hotels Pvt. Ltd.) Indore; (v) Monu Jain, Proprietor, M/s Arihant Sales and (vi) M/s Laasyya Exim, for offence punishable under Section 7(ii) read with section 16(1)(a)(i) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 with regard to sale of misbranded food article Pasta Moccagatta Dal from Hotel Lemon Tree, Indore. The petitioners Prem Nath Kapur and Nirupama Kapur are impleaded as Directors of M/s Lemon Tree (Krizm) Hotels Pvt. Ltd. without impleading the company 12 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:18178 M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd. or M/s Krizm Hotels Pvt Ltd. Thus, the complaint against the directors alleging that they are the person incharge of and responsible to the company (M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd.) for conduct of its business without impleading the company was not maintainable in view of the provisions contained under Section 17(1) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. There is no averment in the complaint that the petitioners were present at Indore at the time of inspection i.e. the commission of offence and they were incharge of and were responsible to M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd. For conduct of business of hotel Lemon Tree, Indore. There is no allegation in the complaint that the offence was committed with the consent/ connivance/ negligence of the Directors, the Petitioners.
15 It was duty of the complainant, after receiving the intimation dated 3.3.2011, to verify whether the person responsible Mr. Milin Hatvalne is duly nominated by the company M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd. The information received by the office of Deputy Director Food and Drug Administration vide acknowledgment No. 555 dated 3.3.2011 (enclosed with the complaint) shows that there was the resolution with regard to change of name of the company from Krizm Hotels Pvt Ltd. to M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd. and this resolution was signed by Patanjali Govind Keswani in the capacity of Chairman and Managing Director of the M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd. Despite receiving this information and enclosing it with the private complaint, the complainant Food Inspector did not verify that whether petitioners Premnath Kapur and Nirupama Kapur, who were directors in erstwhile Krizm Hotels Pvt Ltd. as per its memorandum of Article of Association continued as directors of M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd. Further, despite receiving information 13 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:18178 of resolution dated 12/8/2010 and nomination under Rule 12(B) dated 12.8.2010 signed by Chairman and Managing Director of M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd., namely, Patanjali Govind Keswani, the complainant did not proceed against such Managing Director. No reason is given for impleading the petitioners, instead of Managing Director of M/s Lemon Tree Hotels Pvt. Ltd. who was in-charge of the Lemon Tree Hotel at Indore. Therefore, the complaint against the present petitioners is, apparently, an abuse of process of Court.
16 In the considered opinion of this Court, inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure needs to be invoked to prevent the abuse of process of the Court.
17 Consequently, the petition (MCRC No. 36615 of 2018) is allowed and proceedings of criminal case No. 18467/2011 pending before Special Magistrate Municipal Corporation Indore are quashed with reference to the petitioners Prem Nath Kapur and Nirupama Kapur. The petitioners stand discharged.
18 Let a copy of this order be sent to the trial Court for information and compliance.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR) JUDGE Digitally signed by BHUNESHWAR DATT BHUNESH DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENTCH AT INDORE, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENTCH AT INDORE, 2.5.4.20=3fb5bcda9fd75d95d6c7cdcbd092ee5a74 a94a5534aed3a66d9385cfcfc201e0, WAR DATT postalCode=452001, st=MADHYA PRADESH, serialNumber=89FD75A8D0C99E05779A327974E 46BC85102826CE0604B211E4C91102B4D1269, cn=BHUNESHWAR DATT Date: 2025.07.15 19:59:29 +05'30'