Patna High Court
Mahanth Ramlagan Gossain vs Nandipat Mahton on 23 November, 1937
Equivalent citations: 174IND. CAS.391, AIR 1938 PATNA 143
JUDGMENT Wort, J.
1. I propose to state very briefly my reasons for coming to the conclusion that the decision of the learned Judge in the Court below was right. The appeal concerns two out of twelve sale deeds--one executed on April 11, 1917 and the other on September 3, 1917, by Mahanth Bhagwat Bhagat. I do not propose to deal with the question of the plaintiff s tile to sue in this action for the reason which will presently appear, namely that the matter is disposed of on the ground of limitation, which is the only substantial point. The death of Mahanth Bhagwal Bhagat took place on January 7 1920 and tins suit was brought on December 4 1931 and but for other events to which. I must refer, the action would have been clearly within time, the death of the Mahantt having taken place within 12 years of the death of the suit. But other considerations apply. On September 5, 1917, that is to say, two days after the date of the last of the two alienations to which I have referred, Mahanth Bhagwat Bhagat purported to dispose of the balance of the property of the Math. The deed was a deed of samarpannama and purported to deal with 37 bighas and 810 kathas. But the learned Judge is correct in coming to the conclusion that not merely the 37 odd bighas but all the remaining balance of the property was dealt with by that deed, that is to say, the balance remaining after he disposal of the property by the sale deeds the subject-matter of this suit. There are two observations in the recent casein Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal 60 I.A. 124 : 142 Ind. Cas. 214 : A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 75 : 12 Pat. 251 : Ind. Rul. (1933) P.C. 56 : 14 P.L.T. 185 : 37 L.W. 512 : 64 M.L.J. 505 : (1933) M.W.N. 272 : 10 O.W.N. 455 : 37 C.W.N. 541 : (1933) A.L.J. 327 : 57 C.L.J. 229 : 35 Bom. L.R. 530 : 17 R.D. 754(P.C.), which in my judgment govern this case, and that is the only authority to which I propose to refer. The opinion of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was stated in the course of the judgment in these words:
In other words a Mahanth has power(apart from any question of necessity) to create an interest in property appertaining to the Math which will continue during his own life, or to put it perhaps more accurately, which will continue during his own life, or to put it perhaps more accurately, which will continue during his tenure of office of Mahanth of the Math, with the result that adverse possession of the particular property will only commence when the Mahanth who had disposed of it ceases to be Mahanth by death or otherwise
2. The two observations to which I more particularly refer are these:
(1) To create an interest in property appertaining to the Math which will continue during his own life or to put it perhaps more accurately which will continue during his tenure of office of Mahanth of the Math.
3. and (2) adverse possession will only commence when the Mahant who had disposed of it ceases to be Mahant by death or otherwise.
4. It is the contention here by the defendant respondent that by the deed of September 5, 1917, the Mahanth not only disposed of all the remaining properties of the Math but that he ceased to be a Mahanth and therefore in that sense suffered civil death, the consequence being (so it is argued) that the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal 60 I.A. 124 : 142 Ind. Cas. 214 : A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 75 : 12 Pat. 251 : Ind. Rul. (1933) P.C. 56 : 14 P.L.T. 185 : 37 L.W. 512 : 64 M.L.J. 505 : (1933) M.W.N. 272 : 10 O.W.N. 455 : 37 C.W.N. 541 : (1933) A.L.J. 327 : 57 C.L.J. 229 : 35 Bom. L.R. 530 : 17 R.D. 754(P.C.), would; apply. I have already pointed out that the balance of the properties was disposed of by that deed, that is to say, everything--not the 37 bighas odd but other; properties, indeed the whole of the Math properties as is clear from the body of the deed itself and from the schedules thereto. But the matter goes further. The Mahanth by that deed dedicates the properties to the worship of Khauri Maharaj, and the learned Judge in the Court below states that the plaintiff's witnesses had admitted that Khauri Maharaj was a deity worshipped not by the sect to which the Mahanth himself belonged but another sect, namely the Satkabir sect. The finding of the learned Judge in the Court below is not controverted by the appellant in this Court. The substance, therefore, of the transaction of September 5, 1917, was that the Mahanth to all intents and purposes, and effectively, had ceased to be the Mahanth of that particular Math. It seems to me, therefore, that the case would come within the propositions which I have read from the judgment of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal 60 I.A. 124 : 142 Ind. Cas. 214 : A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 75 : 12 Pat. 251 : Ind. Rul. (1933) P.C. 56 : 14 P.L.T. 185 : 37 L.W. 512 : 64 M.L.J. 505 : (1933) M.W.N. 272 : 10 O.W.N. 455 : 37 C.W.N. 541 : (1933) A.L.J. 327 : 57 C.L.J. 229 : 35 Bom. L.R. 530 : 17 R.D. 754(P.C.),
5. But it is contended by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant before us that the reference made by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to the two cases, one reported in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram 27 I.A. 69 : 23 M. 271 : 10 M.L.J. 29 : 7 Sar. 671(P.C.), and the well-known case in Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das 37 I.A. 147 : 7 Ind. Cas. 240 : 37 C. 885 : 14 C.W.N. 889 : 12 C.L.J. 110 : (1910) M.W.N. 303 : 7 A.L.J. 791 : 8 M.L.T. 145 : 20 M.L.J. 624 : 32 A. 410(P.C.),would govern the facts of this case. The contention, as I understand it, is this, that the appellant in this case is not concerned with the properties which were disposed of by the deed of September 5, 1917, but admittedly concerned with the properties under the two sale deeds of a prior date and that, therefore, the rule which was laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case reported in Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal 60 I.A. 124 : 142 Ind. Cas. 214 : A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 75 : 12 Pat. 251 : Ind. Rul. (1933) P.C. 56 : 14 P.L.T. 185 : 37 L.W. 512 : 64 M.L.J. 505 : (1933) M.W.N. 272 : 10 O.W.N. 455 : 37 C.W.N. 541 : (1933) A.L.J. 327 : 57 C.L.J. 229 : 35 Bom. L.R. 530 : 17 R.D. 754(P.C.),namely the adverse possession of the particular property will commence when the Mahanath who had disposed of it ceased to be Mahanth by death or otherwise would not apply to the facts of this case. The contention in more detail is this, that the transactions although they purported to be alienations of the absolute right to the properties, the subject-matter of the deed would, by their Lordships' decision, enure for the lifetime of the Mahanth: that the transactions were not void but voidable and that consequently so long as the Mahanth was alive, time would not begin to run against the plaintiff. But the short answer to that argument is quite clearly found in the observations to which I have already referred to the effect that the Mahanth was entitled to create an interest in property appertaining to the Math which will continue during his own life, or to put it perhaps more accurately, which will continue during his tenure of office of Mahanth of the Math.
6. The finding being as it is and being in my judgment a correct finding that the Mahanth has in effect ceased to be a Mahanth, the proposition to which I have just made reference would apply and the argument which was addressed to us in this connection on behalf of the appellant is, in my judgment, one which cannot be sustained. Time would run either from the death or from the date on which the Mahanth ceased to be Mahanth--in this case from September 5, 1917, which makes the action quite clearly barred by limitation. In my judgment the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.
Manohar Lall, J.
7. I entirely agree.