Delhi District Court
Raja Kumar vs State on 12 August, 2025
IN THE COURT OF MS. SHIVALI BANSAL
LD. ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-02,
DWARKA COURTS, S-W DISTRICT, NEW DELHI.
In the matter of: -
Appeal No. 140/25.
CNR No. DLSW01-002941-2025.
Raja Kumar
S/o Sh. Meghu Paswan
R/o R. No. WZ-512, Dada Dev Road,
Near Radha Devi,
Dwarka Sector-7, Palam,
Delhi-110045. ... Appellant.
Vs.
State (NCT) of Delhi ... Respondent.
Date of Institution : 04.04.2023.
Date of Arguments : 07.08.2025.
Date of Order : 12.08.2025.
JUDGMENT
1. Vide this judgment, I shall dispose of present Criminal Appeal No. 140/25 filed against judgment of conviction dated 31.07.2024 and order on sentence dated 27.03.2025 passed by Ld. MM (Mahila Court-04), South-West District, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi.
2. The present appeal arises against an order of conviction u/s 354/354A IPC whereby the appellant is sentenced for rigorous imprisonment of one year and fine of Rs.4,000/-
CA No. 140/25Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 1 of 21. Digitally signed by SHIVALI SHIVALI BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12 16:44:59 +0530 for the offence u/S 354 IPC and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo 15 days simple imprisonment sentence. The appellant has also been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of one year and fine of Rs.2000/- for the offence u/S 354A IPC and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo 10 days simple imprisonment sentence. Both the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE AS PER APPELLANT
3. Prosecutrix alleged that on 17.10.2021 at rented flat i.e. 10B, FG1 Block, First Floor, Vikas Puri, New Delhi the present incident occurred when the prosecutirx called for laundry service. The appellant/accused had been collecting and delivering laundry for the prosecutirx for the past one and a half month and that was the third time when appellant came at her house. On the said day, after collecting the clothes and handing over the receipt, the appellant/accused was about to leave when he asked if prosecutrix stayed alone to which she replied in affirmation and at that moment, appellant grabbed her breast and attempted to push her towards the bedroom. Prosecutirx shouted and pushed appellant away. Appellant made another move but he was again resisted and pushed back.
4. On the complaint of the prosecutrix, the present FIR was registered and chargesheet was filed against the appellant. Thereafter Ld. Trial court framed charges against appellant U/S 354/354A IPC.
5. That prosecution in support of his case examined four witnesses and, thereafter, statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C of the CA No. 140/25 Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 2 of 21. Digitally signed by SHIVALI SHIVALI BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12 16:45:00 +0530 appellant was recorded. Appellant denied all the incriminating evidence against him and stated that he has been falsely implicated in the case. Appellant did not lead defence evidence.
6. That after hearing the case from the side of the prosecution the Ld. Trial Court passed impugned judgment dated 31.07.2024 and order on sentence dated 27.03.2025 and thereby Ld. Trial Court held guilty to the appellant under Sections 354/354A I.P.C.
7. That Ld. Trial Court awarded the sentence to the appellant as rigorous imprisonment of one year and fine of Rs.4,000/- for the offence u/S 354 IPC and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo 15 days simple imprisonment sentence. The appellant has also been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of one year and fine of Rs.2000/- for the offence u/S 354A IPC and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo 10 days simple imprisonment sentence. Both the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. GROUNDS OF APPEAL
8. That being aggrieved from the impugned judgment dated 31.07.2024 and order on sentence dated 27.03.2025 passed by ld. trial court, the appellant preferred the present appeal on the following amongst grounds: -
(a) Because the impugned order passed by ld. trial court is bad in law and Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence in its true perspective;
(b) Because the Id. trial court erred in holding the appellant guilty despite contradictions in the CA No. 140/25 Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 3 of 21.
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2025.08.12 16:44:57 +0530 testimonies of prosecution witnesses;
(c) Because the complaint dated 17.10.2021 was written in the Police Station and statement u/S 164 Cr.PC is contradictory and contains material improvements;
(d) Because there is no record that PW2 Sunil, who runs the laundry shop, was ever summoned as a witness.
There is no documentary evidence regarding his shop registration, employment records or proof of an established business etc.
(e) Because there are multiple lacunas in the investigation like appellant's call details records and location data was not obtained; there are no injury marks or signs of struggle on either the prosecutrix or the appellant; appellant was not provided with copy of FIR not he was informed the grounds of his arrest; appellant was not arrested from the spot; the alleged incident occurred on 17.10.21 between 15.30 to 16.15 IST while the police received information at 19.55 IST, there is no explanation for the unjustified delay of 3 ½ hours etc.
(f) Because IO failed to record the arrival and departure entries of the witnesses in the Daily Diary; caller of the PCR call was not documented; arrest of the appellant was not entered in Register No.5; medical examination of the prosecutrix was not conducted; clothes of prosecutrix were not seized; evidence of tenancy was not obtained; IO neither recorded the statement of the landlord or security guard or caretaker nor obtained CA No. 140/25 Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 4 of 21. Digitally signed by SHIVALI SHIVALI BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12 16:44:57 +0530 CCTV footage from nearby places; site plan was not prepared; invoice dated 17.10.21 is written in different ink and handwriting raising doubts about its authenticity; non preparing seizure memo of the said invoice etc. and;
(g) That appellant was not present at the location at the specified date and time of occurrence.
9. Ld. Additional PP for State/respondent has strongly opposed the present appeal and has argued that Ld. Trial Court has passed well versed impugned judgment of conviction and order on sentence after perusing the entire material on record. He prayed that present appeal may be dismissed.
10. Arguments advanced by ld. counsel for appellant as well as ld. Additional PP for State/respondent. Arguments have been heard at length. Record of the case including TCR have been meticulously perused.
11. The facts in nutshell are that on 17.10.2021, the complainant was subjected to physical touch and criminal force by the appellant herein, thereby resulting in outraging her modesty. It is stated by her in her complaint, statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C. and before the court as PW1, that on 17.10.2021, when convict Raja Kumar approached her house to deliver laundry clothes, he had grabbed her breast and attempted to push her towards the bedroom. Thus, the act of the accused is "grabbing the breast of the complainant and pushing her towards the bedroom"
12. The act of the appellant has to be seen in light of section 354 and 354A IPC which are reproduced herein under:
CA No. 140/25Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 5 of 21. Digitally signed by SHIVALI SHIVALI BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12 16:44:58 +0530 "354- Assault or criminal force to women with intention to outrage her modesty Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will there by outrage her modesty1, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.
354A - Sexual Harassment and Punishment for Sexual Harassment
1. A man committing any of the following acts--
a. physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures; or b. a demand or request for sexual favours; or c. showing pornography against the will of a woman; or d. making sexually coloured remarks, shall be guilty of the offence of sexual harassment.
2. Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (i) or clause (ii) or clause (iii) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
3. Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (iv) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."
13. Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) addresses the offence of assault or criminal force used against a woman with the intention of outraging her modesty. The key elements of this offence include an act of assault or criminal force against a female victim, with the intent or knowledge that it is likely to outrage her modesty. While "modesty" is not strictly defined in the IPC, courts determine it based on facts and circumstances of a case. The Supreme Court links a woman's modesty to her sex and virtue, considering actions that violate her dignity or cause discomfort as potentially outraging her modesty. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in "State of Punjab v. Major Singh" has held as under:
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2025.08.12 16:44:58 +0530 " 'Criminal force' is defined in s. 350 of the Code and it is not in dispute that such force had been used by the respondent to the child. It is, also not in dispute that the child was a woman within the Code for in the Code that word is to be understood as meaning a female human being of any age: see ss. 7 and 10. The difficulty in this case was caused by the words "outrage her modesty". The majority of the learned Judges in the High Court held that these words showed that there must be a subjective element so far as the woman against whom criminal force was used is concerned. They appear to have taken the view that the offence could be said to have been committed only when the woman felt that her modesty had been outraged. If I have understood the judgment of these learned Judges correctly, the test ,of outrage of modesty was the reaction of the woman concerned. These learned Judges answered the question in the negative in the view that the woman to whom the force was used was of too tender an age and was physically incapable of having any sense of modesty. The third learned Judge who answered the question in the affirmative was of the view that the word "modesty" meant, accepted notions of womanly modesty and not the notions of the woman against whom the offence was committed. He observed that the section was intended as much in the interest of the woman concerned as in the interest of public morality and decent behavior and the object of the section could be achieved only if the word 'modesty' was considered to be an attribute of a human female irrespective of whether she had developed enough understanding to realise that an act was offensive to decent female behaviour or not. The reported decisions on the question to which our attention was drawn do not furnish clear assistance. None of them deals With a case like the present.
But I do not think that there is anything in them in conflict with what I propose to say in this judgment. I would first observe that the offence does not, in my opinion, depend on the reaction of the woman subjected to the assault or use of criminal force. The words used in the section are that the act has to be done "intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty". This intention or knowledge is the ingredient of the offence and not the woman's feelings. It would follow that if the intention or knowledge was not proved, proof of the fact that the woman felt that her modesty had been outraged would not satisfy the necessary ingredient of the offence. Likewise, if the intention or knowledge was proved, the fact that the woman did not feel that her modesty had been outraged would be irrelevant, for the CA No. 140/25 Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 7 of 21.
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2025.08.12 16:44:56 +0530 necessary ingredient would then have been proved. The sense of modesty in all women is of course not the same-, it varies from woman to woman. In many cases, the woman's sense of modesty would not be known to others. If the test of the offence was the reaction of the woman, then it would have to be proved that the offender knew the standard of the modesty of the woman concerned, as otherwise, it could not be proved that he had intended to outrage "her" modesty or knew it to be likely that his act would have that effect. This would be impossible to prove in the large majority of cases. Hence, in my opinion, the reaction of the woman would be irrelevant.
Intention and knowledge are of course states of mind. They are nonetheless facts which can be proved. They cannot be proved by direct evidence. They have to be inferred from the circumstances of each case. Such an inference, one way or the other, can only be made if a reasonable man would, on the facts of the case, make it. The question in each case must, in my opinion, be: will a reasonable man think that the act was done with the intention of outraging the modesty of the woman or with the knowledge that it was likely to do so? The test of the outrage of modesty must, therefore, be whether a reasonable man will think that the act of the offender was intended to or was known to be likely to outrage the modesty of the woman. In considering the question, he must imagine the woman to be a reasonable woman and keep in view all circumstances concerning her, such as, her station and way of life and the known notions of modesty of such a woman. The expression "outrage her modesty" must be read with the words "intending to or knowing it to be likely that he will". So read, it would appear that though the modesty to be considered is of the woman concerned, the word "her" was not used to indicate her reaction. Read all together, the words indicate an act done with the intention or knowledge that it was likely to outrage the woman's modesty, the emphasis being on the intention and knowledge. Another argument used to support the view, that the reaction of the woman concerned decided the question, was that the section occurred in a chapter of the Code dealing with offences affecting human body and not in the chapter dealing with offences relating to decency and morals. I think this argument is fallacious. None of the other offences against human body, which occur in the same chapter as s. 354, depends on individual reaction and therefore there is no reason to think that the offence defined in s. 354 depends on it. There is no incongruity in holding that the commission of an offence against human CA No. 140/25 Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 8 of 21.
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2025.08.12 16:44:58 +0530 body does not depend on the reaction of the person against whom it is alleged to have been committed but on other things.
It will be remembered that the third learned Judge (Gurdev Singh, J.) had said that modesty in the section has to be understood as an attribute of a human female irrespective of the fact whether she has developed a sense of modesty or not. This view seems to me to be erroneous. In order that a reasonable man may think that an act was intended or must be taken to have been known likely to outrage modesty, he has to consider whether the woman concerned had developed a sense of modesty and also the standard of that modesty. Without an idea of these, he cannot decide whether the alleged offender intended to outrage the woman's modesty or his act was likely to do so. I see no reason to think,, as the learned Judge did, that such a view would defeat the object of the section. The learned Judge said that modesty had to be judged by the prevalent notions of modesty. If this is so, it will also have to be decided what the prevalent notions of modesty in the society are. As such notions concerning a child may be different from those concerning a woman of mature age, these notions have to be decided in each case separately. To say that every female of whatever age is possessed of modesty capable of being outraged seems to me to be laying down too rigid a rule which may be divorced from reality. There obviously is no universal standard of modesty.
If my reading of the section is correct, the question that remains to be decided is, whether a reasonable man would think that the female child on whom the offence was committed had modesty which the respondent intended to outrage by his act or knew it to be the likely result of it. I do not think a reasonable man would say that a female child of seven and a half months is possessed of womanly modesty. If she had not, there could be no question of the respondent having intended to outrage her modesty or having known that his act was likely to have that result. I would for this reason answer the question in the negative. At the Bar, instances of various types of women were mentioned. Reference was made to an imbecile woman, a sleeping woman who does not wake up, a woman under the influence of drink or anesthesia, an old woman and the like. I would point out that we are not concerned in this case with any such woman. But as at 'Present advised, I would venture to say that I feet no difficulty in applying the test of the outrage of modesty that I hate indicated in this judgment to any of these cases with a satisfactory CA No. 140/25 Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 9 of 21.
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2025.08.12 16:44:57 +0530 result. If it is proved that criminal force was used on a sleeping woman with intent to outrage her modesty, then the fact that she does not wake up nor feel that her modesty had been outraged would be no defence to the person doing the act. The woman's reaction would be irrelevant in deciding the question of guilt.
Before concluding, I may point out that the respondent had been convicted by the trial court under s. 323 of the Code for the Injury caused to the child and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 1,000 / with a further period of imprisonment for three months in default of payment of the fine. That sentence has been maintained by the High Court and as there was no appeal by the respondent to this Court, that sentence stands. I would, for these reasons, dismiss the appeal. Mudholkar, J. It has been found as a fact by the courts below that the respondent had caused injuries to the vagina of a seven and a half month old child by fingering. He has been held guilty of an offence under s. 323, Indian Penal Code. The contention on behalf of the State who is the appellant before us is that the offence amounts to outraging the modesty of a woman and is thus punishable under s. 354, Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge and two of the three learned Judges of the High Court who heard the appeal against the decision of the Sessions Judge were of the view that a child seven and a half month old being incapable of having a developed sense of modesty, the offence was not punishable under s.
354. The third learned Judge, Gurdev Singh, J., however, took a different view. The learned Judge quoted the meaning of the word "modesty"given in the Oxford English Dictionary (1933 Edn.)-which is, "womanly propriety of behaviour, scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct (in men or women) reserve or sense of shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or coarse suggestions"-and observed: "This obviously does not refer to a particular woman but to the accepted notions of womanly behaviour and conduct. It is in this sense that the modesty appears to have been used in section 354 of the Indian Penal Code". The learned Judge then referred to s. 509 of the Penal Code in which also the word "modesty" appears and then proceeded to say:
"The object of this provision seems to have been to protect women against indecent behaviour of others which is offensive to morality. The offences created by section 354 and section 509 of the Indian' Penal Code are as much in the interest of the women concerned as in the interest of public morality and decent behaviour. These CA No. 140/25 Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 10 of 21. Digitally signed by SHIVALI SHIVALI BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12 16:44:59 +0530 offences are not only offences against the individual but against public morals and society as well, and that object can be achieved only if the word "modesty" is considered to be an attribute of a human female irrespective of fact whether the female concerned has developed, enough understanding as to appreciate the nature of the act or to realise that it is offensive to decent female behaviour or sense of propriety concerning the relations of a female with others"."
14. In the instant case the appellant has intentionally applied force upon the complainant to commit an offence without her consent. The force has been applied by the appellant at the private body part i.e., breast, of the complainant. In State of Punjab (supra) it has been held that the intention of an accused person is to be inferred from circumstances as no direct evidence is available for the same. And the circumstances have to be evaluated by using test of a reasonable man. If the act committed by the accused satisfies the test of a reasonable man i.e, to say that any reasonable person would say that the act was done with the intention to outrage the modesty then the same would be so. In the facts of the present case the appellant has touched the private body part of the female which will shock the sense of decency a woman possess. The act of the appellant cannot tantamount to an accident as the appellant after grabbing the breast have also pushed the complainant towards the room which also leads to commission of another offence u/s 354A IPC. Touching of private part of women of a body is outrageous and reprehensible conduct. Such an act is against the public morals and decency. All the acts jointly culminated to evidence the sexual intent of the appellant. This court finds support from the judgment of the CA No. 140/25 Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 11 of 21. Digitally signed by SHIVALI SHIVALI BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12 16:44:56 +0530 Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in T. Manikadan v. The State (CRL.REV.P. 404/2016 & & Crl.M.B. 1114/2016) has held as under:
"Whereas Section 354 IPC deals with a single act of criminal force being used to outrage a woman's modesty, Section 354 (A) (1) (i) talks about physical contact and advances both. The use of word 'and' in Section 354A requires that there should be a physical contact with sexual advances/overtures. Therefore, the newly added provision is applicable in a situation where the accused does not stop after committing a single isolated act of criminal force but rather goes on to commit several other similar acts which end up converting his actions into advances of a sexual overture."
15. Ld. Counsel for the appellant has filed the present appeal on the ground that there was faulty investigation by the police officers. It is stated that the police officials have failed to collect evidence like call detail records and location data of the appellant, medical examination of the complainant was not conducted, clothes of complainant were not seized, evidence of tenancy was not obtained etc. It is well settled that the defect in the investigation by itself cannot be a ground for acquittal and if primacy is given to such design or negligent investigation or to the omissions or lapses by perfunctory investigation, the faith and confidence of the people in the criminal justice administrated would be eroded. The consequence of defective investigation have been elaborated in Dhanaj Singh @ Shera And Ors vs State Of Punjab, (2004) 3 SCC 654, wherein it was observed as under:
"In the case of a defective investigation the Court has to be circumspect in evaluating the evidence. But it would not be right in acquitting an accused person solely on account of the defect; to do so would tantamount to CA No. 140/25 Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 12 of 21. Digitally signed by SHIVALI SHIVALI BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12 16:44:59 +0530 playing into the hands of the investigating officer if the investigation is designedly defective."
16. The same was reiterated in State Of Gujarat vs Kishanbhai, 2014(1) Scale 177; (2013) 10 SCC 192; Hema v. State, (2013) 10 SCC 192; Dayal Singh & Ors vs State Of Uttaranchal (2012) 8 SCC 263; and C. Muniappan v. State of T.N., (2010) 9 SCC 567 as well.
17. In the instant case PW1 supports the prosecution case and accused has not brought anything on record to show that why PW1 will falsely implicate the appellant herein. There is nothing on record to show previous animosity between the complainant and the appellant. The appellant was working as a delivery boy with PW2 and PW2 has confirmed the presence of the appellant at the house of the complainant. The appellant has not lead any evidence to show that the accused was not present at the spot. The burden to prove plea of alibi is upon the appellant and not upon the prosecution. There is no bar in law that the conviction of an accused cannot be based upon the sole testimony of the prosecutrix/complainant. In the instant case, the complainant has withstood cross-examination and her testimony is of sterling quality. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in " Jitender Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR 2012 SC 2488 has held that:
"51. .... The burden of establishing the plea of alibi lay upon the appellants and the appellants have failed to bring on record any such evidence which would, even by reasonable probability, establish their plea of alibi. The plea of alibi in fact is required to be proved with certainty so as to completely exclude the possibility of the presence of the accused at the place of occurrence and in the house which was the home of their relatives."CA No. 140/25
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18. Ld. Counsel for the appellant has argued that the testimony of the complainant cannot be the basis of conviction as the same suffers from contradiction and there is a requirement of independent corroboration. As regards this, it is observed that there is not impediment in convicting an accused on the sole testimony of the complainant. In this regard, it is imperative to outrightly make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while dealing with the contention of the akin effect, inter alia noted as under:
"21. ...The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations."
19. Analogously, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pratap Singh, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3207, in the similar context observed as under:
"17. It is now well-settled that conviction for an offence of rape/sexual assault can be based on the sole testimony of prosecutrix, if the same is found to be natural, trustworthy and worth being relied on. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars..."CA No. 140/25
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20. Demonstrably, it is observed from above that it is a settled law that conviction for an offence of sexual assault/rape can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. In fact, even on a general principle, it has been recurrently avowed by superior courts in a catena of decisions that there is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness if his version is clear and reliable, reason underlying the same being; 'the evidence has to be weighed and not counted'. Notably so, in the instances of sexual offences, courts have even gone on to the extent to appreciate and declare that to seek corroboration to the testimony of the prosecutrix Kusti Mallaiah v. State of A.P., (2013) 12 SCC 680. 3 State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 and Munna v. State of M.P., (2014) 10 SCC 254 before relying upon the same would amount to adding insult to the injury sustained by such victim and have, consequently, deprecated the said practice. Unmistakably, the reasons for the same can be easily inferred from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court4 in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550, wherein the Hon'ble Court observed as under:
"17. We think it proper, having regard to the increase in the number of sex violation cases in the recent past, particularly cases of molestation and rape in custody, to remove the notion, if it persists, that the testimony of a woman who is a victim of sexual violence must ordinarily be corroborated in material particulars except in the rarest of rare cases. To insist on corroboration except in the rarest of rare cases is to equate a woman who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that her CA No. 140/25 Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 15 of 21. Digitally signed by SHIVALI SHIVALI BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12 16:44:59 +0530 story of woe will not be believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars as in the case of an accomplice to a crime. Ours is a conservative society where it concerns sexual behaviour. Ours is not a permissive society as in some of the western and European countries. Our standard of decency and morality in public life is not the same as in those countries. It is, however, unfortunate that respect for womanhood in our country is on the decline and cases of molestation and rape are steadily growing. An Indian woman is now required to suffer indignities in different forms, from lewd remarks to eve-teasing, from molestation to rape. Decency and morality in public life can be promoted and protected only if we deal strictly with those who violate the societal norms. The standard of proof to be expected by the court in such cases must take into account the fact that such crimes are generally committed on the sly and very rarely direct evidence of a person other than the prosecutrix is available. Courts must also realise that reference also made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217 that ordinarily a woman, more so a young girl, will not stake her reputation by levelling a false charge concerning her chastity."
21. Concurrently, this Court is also cognizant of the fact that the incidents of sexual offences usually occur in secrecy, out of public gaze and even in the cases where witnesses to such events exit, they may not be forthcoming in supporting the prosecution's case. Unmistakably, under such circumstances, to discard the sole testimony of a prosecutrix, consistent in material particulars and withstanding the rigors of cross- examination, would amount to causing gross prejudice as well as aggravating the plight of such victim/prosecutrix on one hand, while acting as impetus for the potential perpetrators of similar offences to proceed with their nefarious designs. Needless to mention the same would not only perpetuate a sense of blameworthiness in the prosecutrix/victim of such offences, rather, expose such a victim to stigmatization and penalization in the hands of the CA No. 140/25 Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 16 of 21. Digitally signed by SHIVALI SHIVALI BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12 16:44:58 +0530 society despite the courage exhibited by her to speak out against her perpetrator. Indisputably, such a recourse would act antagonist to, both, the rule or law as well as the sense of justice, on which the entire criminal jurisprudence and rule of law are premised. Accordingly, the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant pertaining to the lack of corroboration in the testimony of the victim/complainant in the instant case, necessitates appreciation by this Court in light of the foregoing observations.
22. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the courts will insist on corroboration. In fact, it is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The testimony of the complainant, in the instant case, is not only natural but also trustworthy and worth being relied upon.
23. Ld. Counsel for the appellant has argued that the uncle, who is an independent material witness was not examined by the prosecution and therefore, the appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v Gian Chand, AIR 2001 SC 2075, has stated that non-examination of a material witness is again not a mathematical formula for discarding the weight of the testimony available on record howsoever natural, CA No. 140/25 Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 17 of 21. Digitally signed by SHIVALI SHIVALI BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12 16:44:59 +0530 trustworthy and convincing it may be. The charge of withholding a material witness from the court levelled against the prosecution should be examined in the background of facts and circumstances of each case so as to find whether the witnesses were available for being examined in the Court and were yet withheld by the prosecution. The Court has first to assess the trustworthiness of the evidence adduced and available on record. If the Court finds the evidence adduced worthy of being relied on then the testimony has to be accepted and acted on though there may be other witnesses available who could also have been examined but were not examined. However, if the available evidence suffers from some infirmity or cannot be accepted in the absence of other evidence which though available has been withheld from the Court then the question of drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution for non-examination of such witnesses may arise. In the present case, the testimony of the PW1 and PW2 are reliable and does not suffer from any infirmity so that other material witnesses are required to be examined.
24. As regards the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that there is delay in lodging the FIR, this submission again is devoid of merits. The delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in lodging the first information report. Delay has the effect of putting the Court on its guard to search if any explanation has been offered for the delay, and CA No. 140/25 Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 18 of 21. Digitally signed by SHIVALI SHIVALI BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12 16:44:58 +0530 if offered, whether it is satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is possibility of embellishment in prosecution version on account of such delay, the delay would be fatal to the prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the court, the delay cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and discarding the entire prosecution case.
25. In Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1973 SC 501, dealing with the aspect of delay in lodging the FIR, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed as under:
"12. First information report in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial. The importance of the above report can hardly be overestimated from the standpoint of the accused: The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the report to the police in respect of commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and the part played by them as well as names of eye witnesses present at the scene of occurrence. Delay in lodging the first information report quite often results in embellishment which is a creature of afterthought. On account of delay, the report not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story As a result of deliberation and consultation. It is, therefore, essential that the delay in the lodging of the first information report should be satisfactorily explained."
26. However, in Ram Jag And Others vs The State Of U.P (1974) 4 SCC 201, the position was explained that whether the delay is so long as to throw a cloud of suspicion on the seeds of the prosecution case must depend upon a variety of factors which would vary from case to case. Even a long delay can be condoned if the witnesses on whose evidence the prosecution relies have no motive for CA No. 140/25 Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 19 of 21. Digitally signed by SHIVALI SHIVALI BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12 16:44:57 +0530 implicating the accused and / or when a plausible explanation is offered for the same. On the other hand, prompt filing of the report is not an unmistakable guarantee of the truthfulness of authenticity of the version of the prosecution. In the instant case there is no delay in lodging of the FIR as such. The FIR was lodged after 3.5 hours which is explainable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The alleged incident had taken place between 3:30 PM to 4:15 PM and police has lodged the FIR at 5:55 PM. As per the testimony of PW3 the police made a DD entry no. 52A thereafter the complainant upon reaching the police station had submitted a written complaint on which tehrir was prepared i.e, Ex. PW3/A and FIR was lodged. The delay of 3.5 hours is self -explanatory as procedural formalities are time consuming. Thus, it cannot be said that there is an unexplainable delay in lodging of FIR and consequently, miscarriage of justice.
27. This court has given a thoughtful consideration whether the appellant should be released on probation. Since the offence committed by the appellant is against a woman, this court is not inclined to release the appellant on probation. Releasing the appellant on probation would tantamount to perpetrating crimes of similar nature.
28. In view of foregoing reasons, findings of the Ld. Trial Court are sustained. Prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and there, is no merit in the contentions of the appellant. The present appeal is dismissed. The impugned judgment dated 31.7.2024 and CA No. 140/25 Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 20 of 21. Digitally signed by SHIVALI SHIVALI BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12 16:44:58 +0530 order on sentence dated 27.3.2025 of Trial Court are upheld. Appellant be taken into custody to undergo sentence awarded to him. Sentence warrant be prepared accordingly.
29. Copy of this judgment be given dasti to appellant free of cost. The convict has been informed about his right to prefer an appeal against this judgment.
30. A copy of this order be attached with the warrant of appellant.
31. TCR alongwith copy of this judgment be sent to concerned Ld. Trial/Successor Court for information and compliance.
32. The Criminal Appeal alongwith pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
33. Appeal file be consigned to record room after due compliance.
(SHIVALI BANSAL) Announced in the open ASJ-02, DWARKA COURTS, Court on 12.08.2025. S-W DISTRICT, NEW DELHI CA No. 140/25 Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 21 of 21. Digitally signed by SHIVALI SHIVALI BANSAL BANSAL Date:
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