Himachal Pradesh High Court
Vijay Kumar vs State Of H.P. & Others on 6 May, 2026
Author: Sandeep Sharma
Bench: Sandeep Sharma
2026:HHC:15070 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MMO No.1078 of 2023 with Cr.MMO No.1174 of 2023 .
Date of Decision: 06.05.2026 _______________________________________________________
1. Cr.MMO No.1078 of 2023 Vijay Kumar .......Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & others ... Respondents of
2. Cr.MMO No.1174 of 2023 Raj Kumar .......Petitioner rt Versus State of H.P. & others ... Respondents _______________________________________________________ Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? 1 For the Petitioner(s): Ms. Aprajita and Mr. Ajay Thakur, Advocates.
For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocate Generals with Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for the respondent/State.
Mr. Sunny Dhatwalia, Advocate, for respondent No.4.
_______________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral):
Since common questions of law and facts are involved in the above-captioned petitions and the petitioners herein are aggrieved of order dated 21.06.2023, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Barsar, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, thereby 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 08:01:02 :::CIS 2
2026:HHC:15070 issuing direction to the police station concerned to register FIR against the petitioners under the relevant provisions of law, all the .
petitions were heard together and now same are being disposed of by this common order.
2. By way of instant petitions filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioners for of quashing of FIR No.84 of 2023, dated 24.06.2023, under Sections 403, 420, 468, 120-B and 34 of IPC, registered at police Station, Barsar, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh as well as order dated rt 21.06.2023, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Barsar, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, whereby an application under Section 156(3)Cr.P.C filed by respondent No.4 for registration of the FIR against the petitioners under relevant provisions of law, came to be allowed.
3. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings as well as other material adduced on record by the respective parties, are that an application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C (Annexure P-11) came to be filed at the behest of respondent No.4 for lodging of FIR under Sections 403, 420, 468, 120-B and 34 of IPC on the ground that petitioners-accused, being BRCC and BEEO were authorized for organizing the seminars in the week commencing from 15.10.2018 to 21.10.2018. Complainant alleged that presence of Sh.
Rikhi Ram Teacher was also marked in the seminar and he was also ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 08:01:02 :::CIS 3 2026:HHC:15070 shown to be present during aforesaid period at Government Primary School, Chakmoh. Complainant also alleged that teacher, namely .
Onkar Singh, whose presence was marked in the school Dakhyora was also shown to have attended the seminar. Complainant also cited instances of teachers, namely Sunny Patial, Kamla Devi, Susheel Kumar, Sanjay Kumar, Kamla Dhiman and Kamlesh Kumar, who of allegedly had not actually attended the seminars in the week commencing from 15.10.2018 to 21.10.2018, but yet their presence was shown in the seminars. Complainant alleged that accused i.e. rt petitioners herein forged the signatures of aforesaid teachers in the record of the seminars and have embezzled the government money.
He further submitted that though complaint was moved to Deputy Director, Elementary Education, Hamirpur, but no action was taken and as such, he was compelled to file complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Hamirpur, which was forwarded to SHO, police station, Barsar, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh for inquiry, but same was withdrawn, because at that time complainant had no proof and police was demanding evidence from him. After having obtained relevant records, he again moved a complaint along with relevant record on 27.01.2021 to SHO, Police Station, Barsar, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, but since no action was taken, he again filed complaint to Superintendent of Police, Hamirpur against illegal act of SHO, Police station Barsar, District Hamirpur, Himachal ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 08:01:02 :::CIS 4 2026:HHC:15070 Pradesh, but fact remains that no FIR was lodged against the accused and as such, he was compelled to file complaint under .
section 156(3)Cr.P.C dated 29.06.2021(Annexure P-11).
4. Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Barsar, having taken note of the averments contained in the application, as detailed hereinabove, called SHO, police station concerned to submit his of report. SHO, Barsar, after having conducted the investigation submitted his report (Annexure P-13), stating therein that allegations leveled in the complaint have not been found to be correct. Police rt officials also reported that persons namely, Onkar Singh, Sanjay Kumar, Rikhi Ram and Kamlesh Kumari have categorically admitted that they had attended the seminars in the week commencing from 15.10.2028 to 21.10.2018 and signed in the attendance register.
5. On 19.06.2023, matter came to be listed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Barsar, but on that day, complainant i.e. respondent No.4, sought permission to withdraw the complaint. Taking note of statement made by the complainant, whereby he had expressed his desire to withdraw the complaint, Court concerned ordered posting of the matter before the National Lok Adalat on 09.09.2023 (Annexure P-14). Interestingly, complainant on the next day i.e. 20.06.2023 filed another application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C, praying therein to issue direction to SHO, Police station, Barsar to lodge the FIR under sections 403, ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 08:01:02 :::CIS 5 2026:HHC:15070 420, 468, 120-B and 34 of IPC against the accused i.e. petitioners (Annexure P-15). In afore application, complainant alleged that he .
had moved one application under section 156(3)Cr.P.C bearing complaint No.05 of 2021, titled Rishi Kumar vs. Raj Kumar etc., before Court on 02.07.2021 and thereafter Court sought status report from police station, Barsar without taking any preliminary evidence of from his side. Hence, he withdrew the said application on 19.06.2023.
Immediately, after two days of filing the application, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Barsar, which had actually passed order dated rt 19.06.2023, thereby ordering listing of the case before the National Lok Adalat scheduled to be held on 09.09.2023, passed impugned order dated 21.06.2023, thereby directing police station concerned for registration of FIR under relevant provisions of law against the petitioners. In the aforesaid background, petitioners have approached this Court in the instant proceedings, for quashing of aforesaid impugned order as well as FIR.
6. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioners, as has been highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Ms. Aprajita and Mr. Ajay Thakur, Advocates, is that there was no occasion, if any, for the Court concerned to entertain second application filed under section 156(3)Cr.P.C., especially when earlier application filed under section 156(3)Cr.P.C was pending consideration before the Court below. He submitted that on 19.06.2023, though complainant had ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 08:01:02 :::CIS 6 2026:HHC:15070 expressed his intention to withdraw the earlier application filed under section 156(3)Cr.P.C, but Court at the relevant time posted the matter .
before the National Lok Adalat scheduled to be held on 09.09.2023, but cleverly complainant without waiting for the outcome if any, of earlier application filed under section 156(3)Cr.P.C, proceeded to file fresh application, which further came to be wrongly allowed by the of Court for the reason that no due procedure was followed.
7. Learned counsel representing the petitioners vehemently argued that Court below without summoning the report, if any, from rt the police authorities merely on the basis of allegations contained in the application, which were otherwise not found to be genuine and correct in earlier report submitted by the police, proceeded to issue direction to lodge the FIR, which is not permissible.
8. To the contrary, Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General and Mr. Sunny Dhatwalia, learned counsel representing the respondent-complainant, while refuting aforesaid submissions made at the behest of learned counsel for the petitioners, supported the impugned order dated 21.06.2023. They submitted that since on 19.06.2023, statement already stood given by the complainant that he intends to withdraw his application filed under section 156(3) Cr.P.C and such prayer of him was recorded in the aforesaid order, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the respondent as well as Court, while filing/ entertaining fresh ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 08:01:02 :::CIS 7 2026:HHC:15070 application filed under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. They further submitted that since Court concerned had already received report from the .
police station concerned in earlier application filed under section 156(3) Cr.P.C, there was otherwise no occasion for him to call for new report. They further submitted that otherwise also, offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioners are cognizable. Hence, of Magistrate rightly ordered for registration of the FIR. Lastly, it also came to be argued at the behest of the respondents that present petition is not maintainable under section 482 Cr.P.C., because being rt aggrieved, if any, of order dated 21.06.2023 passed by learned Magistrate, petitioners herein ought to have filed Criminal Revision Petition under Section 397 Cr.P.C.
9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material adduced on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned order dated 21.06.2023, this Court is persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the petitioners that same is not sustainable in the eye of law and as such, needs to be interfered with.
10. Admittedly, in the case at hand, second application under section 156(3)Cr.P.C., upon which impugned order dated 21.06.2023 came to be passed, was filed during the pendency of earlier application filed by the complainant under section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
Once earlier application filed under section156(3)Cr.P.C was pending consideration before competent Court of law, respondent otherwise ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 08:01:02 :::CIS 8 2026:HHC:15070 could not have filed second application. Interestingly, careful perusal of order dated 19.06.2021, shows that earlier application filed by the .
respondent/complainant under section 156(3)Cr.P.C., was referred to National Lok Adalat and order dated 21.06.2023, whereby direction came to be issued to the police to lodge FIR, was passed by the same Judicial Officer. No doubt, order 19.06.2021 passed in the of earlier application filed by the complainant, suggests that on that day complainant had expressed his intention to withdraw the application, but such prayer of him was not accepted, rather matter was ordered rt to be listed before the National Lok Adalat scheduled to be held on 09.09.2023. However, complainant acted cleverly and filed fresh application under same provisions of law, averring therein similar facts, coupled with the fact that learned Judge, who was responsible for passing impugned order was aware of pendency of earlier application filed by the complainant under section 156(3)Cr.P.C, again proceeded to pass order dated 21.06.2023, thereby directing the police to lodge the FIR. Once learned Judge responsible for passing impugned order was aware of order dated 19.06.2023, thereby posting the matter before the National Lok Adalat, there was otherwise no reason for him to pass order dated 21.06.2023. Since, second application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C came to be filed on the next day i.e. 20.06.2023, it cannot be said that learned Judge ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 08:01:02 :::CIS 9 2026:HHC:15070 responsible for passing order dated 21.06.2023 had no knowledge of previous application as well as order passed thereupon.
.
11. Leaving everything aside, order dated 21.06.2023, nowhere suggests application of mind, rather same appears to have been passed in hot haste manner. As per procedure laid down under section 156(3), Judicial Magistrate before considering the application of made under aforesaid provisions of law, is required to satisfy him/herself that prior to making such application, applicant had approached SHO, police station concerned or thereafter rt Superintendent of police.
12. In the instant case, though second application filed by the complainant suggests that prior to filing his application, he had approached SHO of police station concerned or Superintendent of police of District concerned, but there is no mention, if any, of the same in the impugned order dated 21.06.2023. Even if it is presumed that learned Judge had knowledge that in first complaint police had furnished report in first application that otherwise could not have been taken into consideration in second case, especially when police officer in his report given in first application had categorically stated that no case is made out against the petitioners.
13. Leaving everything aside, once first application filed by the respondent under section 156(3) Cr.P.C was pending consideration, in no eventuality, second application filed 156(3) ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 08:01:02 :::CIS 10 2026:HHC:15070 Cr.P.C could have been entertained by the Court. In view of aforesaid, impugned order dated 21.06.2023 is not sustainable. True .
it is that petitioners herein being aggrieved against aforesaid order had remedy to file criminal revision petition under section 397 Cr.P.C but omission, if any, to file such petition under aforesaid provision of law would not disentitle them for grant of relief, which otherwise they of deserve in the facts and circumstances of the case by filing petitions under section 482 Cr.P.C
14. Aforesaid question of law otherwise came to be rt determined by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd. and others vs. State of Maharashtra and another, passed in Criminal Appeal No.2055 of 2007 ( arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2272 of 2007), wherein Court, while answering the question "whether an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be dismissed only on the premise that an alternative remedy of filing of a revision application under Section 397 of the Code is available" held as under:-
"13. We may furthermore notice that in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava, [ (2006) 7 SCC 188 ] this Court while opining that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code does not function either as a court of appeal or revision, held :-
"7. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 08:01:02 :::CIS 11 2026:HHC:15070 Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the .
exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. The courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers of as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the rt section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers the court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto."
14. It is interesting to note that the Bombay High Court itself has taken a different view. In a decision rendered by the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court, a learned Single Judge in Vishwanath Ramkrishna Patil (supra), where a similar question was raised, opined as under :-
"It is difficult to curtail this remedy merely because there is a revisional remedy available. The alternate remedy is no bar to invoke power under Article 227. What is required as to see the facts and circumstances of the case while entertaining such petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and/or under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code. The view therefore, as taken in both the cases V.K. Jain and Saket Gore, no way expressed total bar. If no case is made out by the petitioner or the party to invoke the inherent power as contemplated under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 08:01:02 :::CIS 12 2026:HHC:15070 Code and/or the discretionary or the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India they may approach to the revisional Court, against the order of issuance of process.
11. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of those .
cases, the learned Judge has observed in V.K. Jain and Saket Gore (supra) that it would be appropriate for the parties to file revision application against the order of issuance of process. There is nothing mentioned and/or even observed that there is total bar to file petition under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code and/or petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
12. The Apex Court's decision already referred above, nowhere prohibited or expressly barred to invoke Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code or Article 227 of the Constitution of India against of the order of issuance of process."
In Keki Bomi Dadiseth (supra), another learned Single Judge of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court entertained an application under Section 482 of the Code, where summons have been served rt for commission of offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, holding:-
"33. In view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the above referred cases, it is well settled that inherent power under Section 482 can be invoked by the accused in the appropriate case irrespective of other factors and this Court can exercise the same in a deserving case within parametres of law and, therefore, the contentions canvassed by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor in this regard are misconceived and same are rejected."
15. In our considered opinion V.K. Jain (supra) does not lay down a good law. It is over-ruled accordingly.
15. Otherwise also, bare perusal of Section 482 Cr.P.C suggests that nothing in the code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court otherwise to secure ends of justice. Inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and precautionally and only when such exercise justifies test specifically laid down in the section itself. High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction suo motu in the interest of justice.
::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 08:01:02 :::CIS 132026:HHC:15070 It can do so, while exercising other jurisdiction such as appellate or revisional jurisdiction. No formal application for invoking inherent .
jurisdiction is necessary. Inherent jurisdiction can be exercised in respect of substantive as well as procedural matters. It can be exercised in respect of incidental or supplemental power irrespective of nature of proceedings. (See:-Popular Muthiah vs. State of represented by Inspector of Police, (2006) 7 Supreme Court Cases 296).
16. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well rt as law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court (supra), FIR No.84 of 2023, dated 24.06.2023, registered at police Station Barsar, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh under Sections 403, 420, 468, 120-B and 34 of IPC as well as order dated 21.06.2023 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Barsar, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, are quashed and set-aside and petitioners -accused are acquitted of the offences alleged in the FIR. Interim order, if any, is vacated. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
2. (Sandeep Sharma), Judge May 06, 2026 (shankar) ::: Downloaded on - 16/05/2026 08:01:02 :::CIS