Telangana High Court
Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd vs Mohd.Mujammil Qureshi And Another on 12 September, 2023
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE M.G.PRIYADARSINI
Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.1289 OF 2018
JUDGMENT:
Aggrieved by the order dated 03.10.2018 (hereinafter will be referred as 'impugned order') in E.C.Case No.77 of 2017 passed by the learned Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation Deputy Commissioner for Labour - I, Hyderabad, the opposite party No.2 has filed the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal to set aside the impugned order.
2. For the sake of convenience, hereinafter, the parties will be referred as per their array before the learned Deputy Commissioner (hereinafter will be referred as "Commissioner").
3. The brief facts of the case are that the applicant has filed an application under the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (amended as Employees' Compensation Act, 1923) claiming compensation of Rs.15,00,000/- alleging that he was employed by opposite party No.1 as labourer on Eicher Truck bearing No. AP 29 V 5019 (hereinafter will be referred as 'vehicle'), which was insured with opposite party No.2. On 12.04.2017 while the applicant was on duty on the vehicle and proceeding from Bahadurpura towards Zaheerabad at about 3.30 AM and when the vehicle reached 2 MGP,J CMA_1289_2018 near outer ring road, Kollur Shivar, another lorry bearing No. AP 09 TA 5999 was parked without any precautions or indicators and the driver of the vehicle could not observe the said stationed lorry and hit the said lorry from behind, as a result, accident took place. In the said accident, the vehicle was compleltely damaged and the applicant sustained Grade - III B open fracture to right tibia & fibula, closed right ankle bimalleolar fracture, type - I open tibia and fibula fracture, medial malleolous fracture and segmental fibula fracture left besides other multiple injuries all over the body. The applicant was shifted to Primary Health Centre and from there he was shifted to Udai Omni Hospital, Chapal road, Hyderabad. A case in Crime No.264 of 2017 of Ramachandrapuram Police Station was registered for the offence under Section 337 of the Indian Penal Code against the driver of the lorry bearing No. AP 09 TA 5999. The applicant, who was aged about 21 years, was drawing Rs.8,000/- per month besides Rs.650/- per day towards bata. Since the insurance policy was subsisting as on the date of the accident, the opposite party No.1 being the owner of the vehicle and opposite party No.2 being the insurer, are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation of Rs.15,00,000/- to the applicant.
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4. After receipt of notice, opposite party Nos.1 and 2 filed their respective counters, wherein the opposite party No.1 admitted all the averments of the application, however, denied his liability as the vehicle was insured with opposite party No.2 and insurance policy was subsisting as on the date of the accident. Thus, prayed to dismiss the application to the extent of opposite party No.1. On the other hand, the opposite party No.2 denied the residence of the applicant as mentioned in the claim application, employment of applicant under opposite party No.1, wages and age of the applicant, manner of the accident, and injuries of the applicant. It was further contended that the claim of the applicant is excessive and exorbitant and finally prayed to dismiss the application.
5. On behalf of the applicant, AWs 1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A1 to A14 were marked. Exs.A1 and A2 are the certified copies of FIR and charge sheet. Ex.A3 is the injury certificate, Exs.A4 and A5 are the original discharge summaries issued by Udai Omni Hospital. Exs.A6 and A7 are the hospital bills. Exs.A8 to A12 are the Photostat copies of registration certificate, permit, fitness certificate, insurance policy, driving license. Ex.A13 is the disability certificate issued by AW2. Ex.A14 is the x-ray film. Whereas, on behalf of the opposite party No.2, RWs 4 MGP,J CMA_1289_2018 1 and 2 were examined and got marked Ex.B1 true copy of insurance policy. The learned Deputy Commissioner after considering the evidence on record, both oral and documentary, has award1ed Rs.14,78,391/- towards compensation and interest @ 12% per annum on 9,03,445/- from 13.05.2017 till the date of realization.
6. Dissatisfied by the impugned order, the opposite party No.2 has filed the present appeal to set aside the impugned order.
7. Heard both sides and perused the record.
8. The first and foremost contention of the learned Standing Counsel for the opposite party No.2 is that the learned Commissioner erred in awarding compensation, even though the evidence of RW2 coupled with Ex.B1 insurance policy establishes that no additional premium was paid to cover the labourer, who was travelling as unauthorized passenger. RW2 is the Legal Executive working with opposite party No.2 and he deposed that as per Ex.B1, the insurance policy covers the risk of driver and conductor and that no coolie/labourer is covered. He further deposed that the applicant was travelling as gratuitous passenger and there is no employee-employer 5 MGP,J CMA_1289_2018 relationship between applicant and opposite party No.1. He further deposed that as no additional premium was paid for covering the risk of labourer, the application is liable to be dismissed. In the cross-examination, RW2 deposed that Ex.B1 is a comprehensive policy. RW2 denied to a suggestion that Ex.B1 covers the risk of driver, conductor and 6 coolies. Learned Standing Counsel for the opposite party No.2 relied upon a decision in New India Assurance Company Limited v. Kurva Nagamma and others 1, wherein it was held as follows:
"The learned counsel for respondents 1 to 4 did not dispute that premium for covering the risk of each person is Rs.15/-. It, therefore, necessarily follows that the policy covers only driver and no additional premium covering other employees or coolies was paid. As this category of persons is not covered by the Act Policy, the appellant is not liable for the compensation awarded for the death of the deceased."
9. The learned Standing Counsel in support of his above contentions further relied upon a decision in Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Bathina Srinivasa Rao and another 2, wherein the High Court for the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh held as follows:
"Copy of the insurance policy, Exh. A6, issued by the appellant and marked by the respondent No.1 shows that the respondent No.2 paid premium of Rs.1,245/- towards liability to 'public risk' and did not pay any premium to cover the risk of any 1 2014 Law Suit (Hyd) 535 2 2009 ACJ 1758 6 MGP,J CMA_1289_2018 of his employees travelling in the lorry. In view of the proviso to section 147 (1) of the 1988 Act, the respondent No.2, who had an option either to take out a policy to cover the risk of his employees or not, chose not to take a policy covering the risk of his employees in the lorry. Unless and until the appellant (insurer) takes up the responsibility to cover the risk of the employees of respondent No.2, question of making it liable to pay any compensation to the employees of the respondent No.2 does not arise."
10. The learned Standing Counsel further relied upon a decision in Dudekula Salabee v. R. Siva Sankar Reddy and another 3, wherein the High Court for the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh held as follows:
"16. A bare perusal of sub - section (2) of section 147 of the Act makes it obvious that the coverage of policy is limited to the extent mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of section 147 of the Act only. Therefore, it further implies that a policy has to be necessarily taken if the insured wants coverage of a class or classes of persons. In any event, there must be a contractual obligation in the shape of insurance policy and there must be a specific condition under the policy covering a person or persons like the deceased in the present case. It presupposes and as decided by the Apex Court, in various judgments, a separate premium has to be paid for such a person or classes of persons and then only, the obligation of indemnification by the insurer does arise.
17. In this regard, I am fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramashray Singh v. New India Assurance Co.Ltd., 2003 ACJ 1550 (SC), wherein it was observed that an insurance policy only covers the persons or classes of person specified in the policy and the relief was denied to the claimants therein from the insurer on the ground that there was no 3 2009 ACJ 1053 7 MGP,J CMA_1289_2018 payment of premium for a conductor, whose designation was actually Khalasi.
18. The said observations further make it clear that taking a policy by paying premium covering risk or risks at discretion of the insured is permissible and the liability of the insured is permissible and the liability of the insurer is only limited to that extent, as was agreed in the policy."
11. The learned Standing Counsel relied upon a decision in Gangala Raju and others v. Rayavarapu Apparao and others 4, wherein the High Court for the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh held as follows:
"A perusal of the policy shows that premium has been paid only for driver of the tractor. As the premium does not cover the labourers, respondent No.3, insurance company is not liable to pay compensation for the death of the deceased, who was allegedly, a labourer travelling in the trailer."
12. Based on the principle laid down in the above said decisions, learned Standing Counsel for the opposite party No.2 contended that the Insurance Company is not liable to cover the risk of applicant without payment of any additional premium. However, it is to be seen that in Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Meena Variyal and others 5, the Honourable Supreme Court observed as under:
"Uninfluenced by authorities, we find no difficulty in understanding this provision as one providing that the policy must insure an owner against any liability to a third 4 2010 Law Suit (AP) 444 5 (2007) 5 SCC 428 8 MGP,J CMA_1289_2018 party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place, and against death or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. The proviso clarifies that the policy shall not be required to cover an employee of the insured in respect of bodily injury or death arising out of and in the course of his employment. Then, an exception is provided to the last foregoing to the effect that the policy must cover a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the death or bodily injury to an employee who is engaged in driving the vehicle or who serves as a conductor in a public service vehicle or an employee who travels in the vehicle of the employer carrying goods if it is a goods carriage. Section 149(1), which casts an obligation on an insurer to satisfy an award, also speaks only of award in respect of such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 147 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy). This provision cannot therefore be used to enlarge the liability if it does not exist in terms of Section 147 of the Act. 14. The object of the insistence on insurance under Chapter XI of the Act thus seems to be to compulsorily cover the liability relating to their person or properties of third parties and in respect of employees of the insured employer, the liability that may arise under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the driver, the conductor and the one carried in a goods vehicle carrying goods."
13. In National Insurance Company Limited v. Prembai Patel and others 6, the Honourable Supreme Court held as under:
"15. Though the aforesaid decision has been rendered on Section 95(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 but the principle underlying therein will be fully applicable here also. It is thus clear that in case the owner of the vehicle wants the liability of the insurance company in respect of death of or bodily injury to any such employee as is described in clauses
(a) or (b) or (c) of proviso (i) to Section 147(1)(b) should not be restricted to that under the Workmen's Act but should be more or unlimited, he must take such a policy by making payment of extra premium and the policy should also contain a clause to that effect.
However, where the policy mentions "a policy for Act Liability" or "Act Liability", the liability of the insurance 6 AIR 2005 SC 2337 9 MGP,J CMA_1289_2018 company qua the employees as aforesaid would not be unlimited but would be limited to that arising under the Workmen's Act."
14. In New India Assurance Company Limited, Represented by its Branch Manager, Kadapa v. Pujala Chenchu Nagaiah and others 7, wherein the High Court for the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh held as follows:
"13. In the earlier judgments, rendered by this Court, referred to above, it was proceeded on the assumption that the proviso to Section 147(1) of the M.V. Act would relieve the owners of vehicle from the obligation to take out a policy, to cover the risk towards drivers, conductors or other employees, and it is left to their discretion to take out such policy, by paying extra premium. The importance of the phrase "other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act" was not appreciated. The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prembai Patel's case [2005(5) ALL MR 563 (S.C.)] (supra), would put at rest, the doubt, that may exist in this context. Recently, this Court in National Insurance Company Limited Vs. D. Sivasankar, 2006(4) ALD 398, explained the purport of sub- section (1) of Section 147 of the M.V. Act, as under; "Para-9 : The liability, which a policy of insurance is expected to cover, is of three categories, viz., i) the liability that will be incurred by the owner of a vehicle, in respect of death or bodily injury or damage to property of a third party, caused due to the use of the vehicle in a public place; ii) such liability in respect of a passenger of a public service vehicle, and iii) the liability arising out of death or bodily injury of a person engaged in driving of the vehicle or other employees, depending on the category of the vehicle. A perusal of Section 147 of the M.V. Act makes this, amply clear..."
"Para-10 : The first two categories of coverage are referred to in Section 147(1)(b)(i) and (ii), in specific terms. The third type of coverage, namely, the one towards the Drivers and other employees, is to be discerned from the proviso. The proviso indicates that the policy is to per se, cover the liability towards the employees referred to in proviso (i) (a), (b) and (c), i.e., Driver of the vehicle, the Conductor of a public transport vehicle or any other employee in a goods vehicle. The coverage for any employees other than those, referred to above, is optional and cannot be treated as a requirement under the M.V. Act. The liability arising under the W.C. Act, in respect of death or bodily injury towards a Driver is statutory and mandatory and any basic policy would cover it. The insurer would not be under obligation to pay any extra premium to cover the liability towards the Driver of the vehicle".
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14. Therefore, the contention of the appellant, that it is not under obligation to cover the liability arising out of the death or bodily injuries to a cleaner, unless extra premium is paid; cannot be accepted. The vehicle was admittedly a goods carriage, and a cleaner engaged on such vehicle is covered by clause (i)(c) of proviso to Section 147(1) of the M.V. Act. Therefore, no exception can be taken to the order passed by the Commissioner, holding that the 3rd respondent and the appellant herein are jointly and severally are liable to pay the compensation. No serious infirmity is pointed out, as to the quantum of compensation."
15. In National Insurance Company Limited v. Balakrishnan and Another 8, the Apex Court held as under:
"21. In view of the aforesaid factual position, there is no scintilla of doubt that a "comprehensive/package policy" would cover the liability of the insurer for payment of compensation for the occupant in a car. There is no cavil that an "Act Policy" stands on a different footing from a "Comprehensive/Package Policy". As the circulars have made the position very clear and the IRDA, which is presently the statutory authority, has commanded the insurance companies stating that a "Comprehensive/Package Policy" covers the liability, there cannot be any dispute in that regard. We may hasten to clarify that the earlier pronouncements were rendered in respect of the "Act Policy" which admittedly cannot cover a third party risk of an occupant in a car. But, if the policy is a "Comprehensive/Package Policy", the liability would be covered. These aspects were not noticed in the case of Bhagyalakshmi (supra) and, therefore, the matter was referred to a larger Bench.
We are disposed to think that there is no necessity to refer the present matter to a larger Bench as the IRDA, which is presently the statutory authority, has clarified the position by issuing circulars which have been reproduced in the judgment by the Delhi High Court and we have also reproduced the same."
16. In the case on hand, as per Ex.B1 and Ex.A11, the insurance policy is package policy, which is also known as comprehensive policy. It is pertinent to note that the vehicle in the case on hand is goods carriage vehicle, the applicant was travelling in the vehicle as labourer. In view of the above discussion and considering the principle laid down in the above 8 2013 (1) SCC 731 11 MGP,J CMA_1289_2018 said authorities and since the applicant was not a gratuitous passenger and as the applicant was an employee rendering his services to the opposite party No.1 under employee-employer relationship, the contention of the learned Standing Counsel for the opposite party No.2 that the policy does not cover the risk of applicant being labour, is unsustainable. Therefore, the opposite party No.2 is liable to indemnify the opposite party No.1 i.e., owner of the vehicle.
17. The other contention of the learned Standing Counsel for the opposite party No.2 is that the learned Commissioner erred in assessing the loss of earning capacity of the applicant @ 100% when the applicant suffered permanent partial disability @ 63%. The opposite party No.2 in support of above contention, got examined its manager (claims) as RW1. In the chief examination, RW1 deposed that he was working as Manager Claims and also working as panel doctor in the opposite party No.2. He further deposed that as per the medical record and disability certificate issued by AW2, the applicant is not suffering from any deformity and disability as mentioned by AW2. He further deposed that as per the guidelines of Indian Gazette and Kessler's guidelines, the applicant may have disability of 50% with respect to right lower limb and 30% with 12 MGP,J CMA_1289_2018 respect of left lower limb, which on using combining formula comes to 63%, which is partial and permanent and that in future the applicant can do other normal works in future and that the applicant can do labour work with some difficulty. In the cross-examination RW1 admitted that he is not an orthopedic surgeon and that he was not doing any practice in any hospital. He further admitted that as per Ex.A13, Dr. G. Subash Rao (AW2) issued the same as a qualified orthopedic surgeon.
18. AW2 deposed that the applicant was having grade 3 B fracture right tibia and fibula, bimalleolar fracture or right ankle, type 1 open tibia and fibula fracture, segmental fracture of left fibula and fracture to medial malleolus. He further deposed that due to the injuries, the applicant became permanently disabled and having non union of right leg with infection he is having painful restricted movements and thus, he cannot sig, squat, walk without support and cannot do heavy work, thus, AW2 has estimated the percentage of permanent disability at 80% and also assessed the loss of earning capacity at 100%. He also deposed that due to the disability, the applicant cannot discharge his duties as coolie/labour. The learned Commissioner after considering the evidence of AWs 1 13 MGP,J CMA_1289_2018 and 2, oral and documentary evidence, has assessed the loss of earning capacity of the applicant @ 55% in consonance with the version of AW2.
19. It is pertinent to note that on one hand RW1, who is the employee of opposite party No.1 is admitting that as per the guidelines of Indian Gazette and Kessler's guidelines the applicant sustained 63% permanent partial disability and on the other hand, a suggestion was given to AW1 stating that Exs.A4 to A14 are created and fabricated for the purpose of this case. RW1 further admitted that as per Ex.A13 AW2 is a qualified doctor as surgeon, however, in the cross-examination of AW2, a suggestion was given to AW2 that he is not proper person to assess the disability. Thus, opposite party No.2 is blowing hot and cold at a time.
20. In the case on hand, the applicant was working as 'labour' and he did not suffer disablement of permanent in nature. Admittedly the applicant is not a skilled worker. Even as per the evidence of AW2, the disability suffered by the applicant was of permanent partial. In the United India Insurance Company 14 MGP,J CMA_1289_2018 Limited v. S.K.Razak and others 9, the High Court for the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh held as follows:
"What is of significance in the evidence of both the witnesses is that they have spoken on the disability suffered by the claimant as a driver. Neither of them have deposed that the disablement has reduced the claimants earning capacity in every employment which he was capable of undertaking at that time. As noted above, the claimant has merely stated that he is not working anywhere else, from which it can be inferred that though he is capable of undertaking works other than driving, he is not undertaking such works. In order to be entitled for 100% of loss of earning, it is necessary for the claimant to prove that he was not only disabled to driver, but also to perform any other work which he was capable of performing at the time of accident. The Commissioner has therefore committed a serious error in taking the loss of earning capacity at 100% without considering the fact that the claimant was capable of performing works other than driving."
21. Further, in T.J.Parameshwarappa v. the Branch Manager, New India Assurance Company Limited and others 10 the Honourable Supreme Court held as under:
"8. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the Doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often than not, with reference to a particular limb. When a disability certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent disability to an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is not the same as 45% permanent disability with reference to the whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions of that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of disability of the whole body. If there is 60% permanent disability of the right hand and 80% permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability with reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus 60%). If different parts of the body have suffered different percentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent 9 MANU/AP/0119/2015 10 MANU/SC/1510/2022 15 MGP,J CMA_1289_2018 disability with reference to the whole body, cannot obviously exceed 100%.
22. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar 11 the Honourable Supreme Court held as under:
"11. The Tribunal should not be a silent spectator when medical evidence is tendered in regard to the injuries and their effect, in particular the extent of permanent disability. Sections 168 and 169 of the Act make it evident that the Tribunal does not function as a neutral umpire as in a civil suit, but as an active explorer and seeker of truth who is required to `hold an enquiry into the claim' for determining the `just compensation'. The Tribunal should therefore take an active role to ascertain the true and correct position so that it can assess the `just compensation'. While dealing with personal injury cases, the Tribunal should preferably equip itself with a Medical Dictionary and a Handbook for evaluation of permanent physical impairment (for example the Manual for Evaluation of Permanent Physical Impairment for Orthopedic Surgeons, prepared by American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons or its Indian equivalent or other authorized texts) for understanding the medical evidence and assessing the physical and functional disability. The Tribunal may also keep in view the first schedule to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 which gives some indication about the extent of permanent disability in different types of injuries, in the case of workmen. If a Doctor giving evidence uses technical medical terms, the Tribunal should instruct him to state in addition, in simple non- medical terms, the nature and the effect of the injury. If a doctor gives evidence about the percentage of permanent disability, the Tribunal has to seek clarification as to whether such percentage of disability is the functional disability with reference to the whole body or whether it is only with reference to a limb. If the percentage of permanent disability is stated with reference to a limb, the Tribunal will have to seek the doctor's opinion as to whether it is possible to deduce the corresponding functional permanent disability with reference to the whole body and if so the percentage.
12. The Tribunal should also act with caution, if it proposed to accept the expert evidence of doctors who did not treat the injured but who give `ready to use' disability certificates, without proper medical assessment. There are several instances of unscrupulous doctors who without 11 (2011) 1 SCC 343 16 MGP,J CMA_1289_2018 treating the injured, readily giving liberal disability certificates to help the claimants. But where the disability certificates are given by duly constituted Medical Boards, they may be accepted subject to evidence regarding the genuineness of such certificates. The Tribunal may invariably make it a point to require the evidence of the Doctor who treated the injured or who assessed the permanent disability. Mere production of a disability certificate or Discharge Certificate will not be proof of the extent of disability stated therein unless the Doctor who treated the claimant or who medically examined and assessed the extent of disability of claimant, is tendered for cross- examination with reference to the certificate. If the Tribunal is not satisfied with the medical evidence produced by the claimant, it can constitute a Medical Board (from a panel maintained by it in consultation with reputed local Hospitals/Medical Colleges) and refer the claimant to such Medical Board for assessment of the disability."
23. Admittedly, AW2 has not treated the applicant but he has assessed the disability of the applicant based on the previous medical record. As per the disability certificate under Ex.A13 and the evidence of AW2, the applicant has suffered disability @ 63%. It is not the evidence of AW2 that the injuries sustained by the applicant were permanent in nature. AW2 admitted in his cross-examination that there is no dislocation and malunion of the fracture. AW1 i.e., the applicant admitted in his cross - examination that injuries sustained by him are healed, however, he added that he is getting pain and not in a position to walk and squat as prior to the accident. Admittedly, the applicant sustained non schedule injuries. It is not even the evidence of AW2 that the applicant cannot do any work in future. In the absence of any such evidence, the contention of learned counsel 17 MGP,J CMA_1289_2018 for the applicant that learned Assistant Commissioner ought to have assessed the percentage of disability of the applicant @ 100% is unsustainable. The injuries alleged to have been sustained by the applicant are grade 3 B fracture right tibia and fibula, bimalleolar fracture of right ankle, type 1 open tibia and fibula fracture, segmental fracture of left fibula and fracture to medial malleolus. Mere fractures of right tibia and fibula, bimalleolar fracture of right ankle, grade 3 B fracture right tibia and fibula, bimalleolar fracture or right ankle, type 1 open tibia and fibula fracture, segmental fracture of left fibula and fracture to medial malleolus do not amount to permanent disablement. After the accident, the only difficulty to the applicant cannot sit, squat, cannot walk without support and cannot do heavy work. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Commissioner erred in assessing the loss of earning capacity @ 100/-. Therefore, this Court is inclined to interfere with the percentage of loss of earning capacity as fixed by the learned Commissioner. Considering the nature of the injuries sustained by the applicant, age of the applicant and as the applicant did not sustain permanent disablement, the loss of earning capacity of the applicant can be fixed at 70%.
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24. The learned Standing Counsel for the opposite party No.2 has not disputed the wages of the applicant @ Rs.6,761/- as fixed by the learned Commissioner in pursuance of G.O.Ms.No.83, L.E.T. & F (lab-II) Department, dated 22.11.2006 and the relevant factor "222.71" for the age of the applicant being 21 years.
25. Based on the above discussion, the applicant is entitled for compensation, which is calculated as under:
Rs.6,761/- x 60 x 70 x 222.71 = Rs.6,32,411.77 100 100 (rounded off to Rs.6,32,412/-)
26. It is further contention of the learned Standing Counsel for the opposite party No.2 that the learned Commissioner erred in awarding Rs.5,70,000/- towards medical expenditure relying upon the evidence of AW3 and the medical bills under Exs.A6 and A7. The applicant got examined AW3, who is the billing manager of Udai Omni Hospital, Chapal Road, Hyderabad, wherein the applicant took treatment. Apart from examining AW3, the applicant also placed reliance on Exs.A6 and A7 in support of his contention that he incurred Rs.5,70,000/- towards medical expenditure. AW3 in his chief examination deposed that the applicant was admitted as inpatient in their hospital on 12.04.2017 and discharged on 03.05.2017 and 19 MGP,J CMA_1289_2018 during the said period a sum of Rs.4,30,000/- vide Ex.A6 was incurred by the applicant. He further deposed that the applicant again admitted in their hospital on 17.08.2017 and discharged on 24.08.2017 and during the said period a sum of Rs.1,40,000/- vide Ex.A7 was incurred by the applicant. AW3 categorically deposed that Exs.A6 and A7 were issued by their hospital. Learned counsel for the opposite party No.2 gave a suggestion that the patient was treated under Government Scheme and that AW3 was deposing false to help the applicant. However, it is pertinent to note that no contra evidence is adduced by the opposite party No.2 to substantiate that the applicant took treatment under Government Scheme. Hence, by considering the oral evidence of AW3 and documentary evidence in the form of Exs.A6 and A7, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Commissioner has rightly awarded Rs.5,40,000/- in pursuance of Section 4(2A) of the Employees Compensation Act.
27. In view of the above facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order is required to be modified only to the extent of reducing the compensation in view of reduction of loss of earning capacity from 100% to 70%.
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28. Accordingly, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed in part. The order dated 03.10.2018 in E.C.Case No.77 of 2017 passed by the learned Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation Deputy Commissioner for Labour - I, Hyderabad is modified to the extent of reducing the compensation from Rs.9,03,445/- to Rs.6,32,412/-. Apart from the compensation amount of Rs.6,32,412/-, the applicant is also entitled for Rs.5,70,000/- towards medical expenses as rightly awarded by the learned Commissioner. There shall be no order as to costs.
Pending Miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.
______________________________ JUSTICE M.G.PRIYADARSINI Date: .09.2023 AS