Madras High Court
M. Hussain And Etc. vs Bharathiyar University, Coimbatore ... on 4 April, 1990
Equivalent citations: AIR1991MAD45, (1991)IMLJ163
ORDER
1. The prayer in the Writ Petition No. 9555 is as follows:--
".....to issue a writ, order or direction and more specifically a writ of mandamus to direct the respondents to forbear from preventing the continuance of the petitioner's studies in M.B.B.S. with the second respondent and also to direct the 1st respondent to grant recognition of the petitioner's admission for the I Year M.B.B.S. with the second respondent during the academic year 1987-88.
The prayer in W. P. No. 15402 of 1989 runs as follows :
".....to issue a writ of declaration or other appropriate writ or directions, declaring that the petitioner is entitled to continue and complete the 5 1/2 Years' M.B.B.S. Degree Course for which he has been admitted in 1986. . .. ."
The prayer in W. P. No. 15407 of 1989 is to the following effect :
". . . . .to issue a writ of mandamus to the respondents directing the respondents to permit the petitioner to continue and complete the M.B.B.S. (Degree Course) of the Bharathiyar University, Coimbatore at the P.S.G. Institute of Medical Sciences, Coimbatore..."
2. All those cases raise a common point for consideration, though facts are different. All the petitioners joined M.B.B.S. Course in P.S.G. College of Medical Sciences, Coimbatore. The petitioner in W. P. No. 15402 of 1989 has completed three years of the 5 1/2 years M.B.B.S. course having joined the college in 1986. The petitioner in W. P. No. 15487 of 1989 has joined M.B.B.S. course in the said college in the year 1986 having appeared for four semester examinations up to April 1989 and passed all the semester examinations. The petitioner in W. P. No. 9555 of 1989 joined the college in the year 1987-88 and he wrote the semester examination in April 1988. He wrote the second semester examinations in December 1988 under orders of this Court.
3. P.S.G. Institute of Medical Sciences, is a self-financing Institution affiliated to the Bharathiyar University, Coimbatore. In the prospectus issued by the P.S.G. Institute of Medical Sciences (hereinafter referred to as the 'Institute') among other things for the eligibility for admission, in so far as the candidates of Tamil Nadu are concerned, it was stated as follows for the year 1987-88 :
"Eligibility for admission :
Candidates for admission to the first year M.B.B.S. should have passed the Higher Secondary Examination of Tamil Nadu with Biology, Physics and Chemistry or an equivalent examination satisfying the eligibility requirements for admission as prescribed by the Indian Medical Council and the Bharathiyar University, Coimbatore.
It is desired that the candidates must have secured not less than 60% marks in Physics, Chemistry, Biology and an aggregate of 70% for the above subjects. . . . ."
4. The petitioner in W. P. No. 9555 of 1989 alleges in the affidavit filed in support of the petition that during the continuance of the studies suddenly he was informed that he was not eligible for the M.B.B.S. course. The petitioner also alleges in the affidavit that the respondent Institution was established in 1985, that since then four academic years were over and admissions to 1 Year M.B.B.S. were made and that some candidates were admitted with lesser marks by the respondent Institution. In para II of the affidavit, the petitioner refers certain cases where candidates with lesser marks have been admitted and given hall tickets. It is further alleged in the affidavit that as soon as the admissions are over, the respondent Institute is sending to the respondent University the detailed statement regarding eligibility of Tamil Nadu Higher Secondary Course Certificate holders, form for Registration and (sic) the statement showing the names of candidates who have passed the examination of other Universities or bodies during the academic year, that with reference to the particulars and records furnished, the respondent University would be able to find out incorrect admission and send out the candidates in the appropriate time, that the respondent University refused grant of recognition of admission to the candidates without being conscious of the far reaching consequences on the future of the candidates, that at the instance of the respondent University, the respondent Institute is refusing the petitioner herein to allow him to further prosecute his studies, and that he has not been permitted to attend the classes. It is further alleged in the affidavit that the order of the respondent University directing the respondent Institute not to allow the petitioner to continue in the M.B.B.S. Course is illegal, that the petitioner when applied for admission did not suppress any fact, that the respondent University and the respondent Director of Medical Education were fully aware of the marks secured by the petitioner and admitted him, and that they are estopped from doing so. It is further alleged in the affidavit that neither the first respondent University nor the respondent Director of Medical Education prescribed marks making it eligible for application or admission for the M.B.B.S. Course. It is also stated in the affidavit that in the previous years, students who have secured lesser marks have been admitted and allowed to continue and as such the action of the respondents offends Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India. It is also stated in the affidavit that the respondents have permitted the petitioner to write the First Semester Examination and the results were published and as such they are not entitled in law to refuse permission to continue the studies of the petitioner at this point of time.
5. The petitioner in W. P. No. 15462 of 1990 alleges in the affidavit that in the respondent Institute, students were admitted both on the basis of the pass in the qualifying examinations and payment of capitation fees, that after having successfully passed in the qualifying examination, the petitioner joined the respondent Institute as a student in September, 1986, and that he has written examinations one at the end of Semester System and subsequently the second year examination conducted by the respondent University for all the medical Institutions. It is further alleged in the affidavit that he had been successful in the examinations conducted so far, that he had prosecuted his third year course and that he is now eligible to write the third year examination to be conducted by the respondent University. It is further alleged in the affidavit that when he (Petitioner in W. P. No. 15402 of 1989) approached the respondent college authorities on 1-12-1989 for paying the examination fees and to receive the hall ticket, he was told by the respondent Institute that they do not have the hall ticket in his name expressing their inability to receive the examination fee and issue him the hall ticket. It is further submitted by the petitioner in the affidavit that when the petitioner asked the respondent Institute the reason for the refusal of the hall ticket, no reason was given to him. It is further submitted in the affidavit that he has been a diligent student, that he has been diligently prosecuting his studies, that to his shock and surprise he was denied the halt ticket, that no reasons have been given for refusing to give him the hall ticket, and that as such the petitioner has come up to this court praying to declare the respondents to receive the fees from him and issue him the hail ticket.
6. The petitioner in W. P. No. 15487 of 1989 applied for the M.B.B.S. Degree Course in the respondent Institute in 1986, that he was selected for admission to the M.B.B.S. Degree Course at the respondent Institute and that he has completed three years of study so far. It is also alleged in the affidavit that during the course of three years he has appeared for semester examinations prescribed by the respondent University for M.B.B.S. Course, and that he has passed in all the four semester examinations. It is submitted in the affidavit filed in support of the petition that in November, 1989, he was denied the hall ticket and when he made enquiries he was told that he was not eligible for the M.B.B.S. Course since he had not scored sufficient marks in the B.Sc. Degree examination. It is further submitted that the respondents owe a public duty to permit him to appear for all semester examinations until he completes the M.B.B.S. Course, that he had satisfied the prescribed conditions of eligibility, that he had undergone the necessary formalities including interview, that all documents necessary for admission including his B.Sc. degree certificate and mark lists were made available for scrutiny and that only after satisfying with other formalities also the respondents admitted him and allowed to join M.B.B.S. course in 1986. The petitioner has further alleged in the affidavit that on the faith of the admission given to him, he joined the course, spent considerable time and money and has completed 3/4th of the course passing all the four semester examinations held so far, that the respondents are estopped by the principles of promissory and equitable estoppel as the petitioner has altered his position by taking up the course and completed passing up to fourth semester examination.
7. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the Bharathiyar University, the first respondent in W.P. No. 9555 of 1989. The University Regulation, with regard to the eligibility for admission into the M.B.B.S. course has been stated in the counter-affidavit. It is claimed in the counter-affidavit that the respondent Institute by its letter dated 31-10-1987 requested the respondent University to approve the admission of the petitioner as well as five other candidates, that the respondent University placed the matter before the Courses Committee in which the Director of Medical Education, Madras, the third respondent in W. P. No. 9555 of 1989 happens to be a member that the said Committee resolved to grant recognition of the examination passed by the petitioner, and that the Syndicate of the respondent University in which also the Director of Medical Education happens to be a member, on 21-12-1987 has resolved to refer the matter to the Director of Medical Education for his opinion. It is further claimed that the Director of Medical Education was therefore addressed to offer his remarks as to the eligibility of the petitioner in W. P. No. 9555 of 1989 and other candidates who were admitted during the academic years 1985-86, 1986-87 and 1987-88 in the M.B.B.S. course, that the respondent University wanted the Director of Medical Education to forward the list of candidates admitted by the respondent Institute in the M.B.B.S. course during the academic years 1985-86, 1986-87 and 1987-88 which was approved by the Director of Medical Education so that the petitioner can be permitted to write the examinations, that though reminders on 30-3-1988 and 25-4-1988 were sent to the Director of Medical Education, no reply was received and that in those circumstances, the petitioner was permitted to write the examination held in April, 1988. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that the Director of Medical Education by letter dated 24-5-1988 directed the respondent Institute to offer the remarks on the querries made by the respondent University, that the respondent Institute by letter dated 31-5-1988 requested the Director of Medical Education to consider the case of the petitioner and other candidates sympathetically on humanitarian grounds and that by letter dated 28-11-1988 the Director of Medical Education directed the respondent Institute to contact the respondent University for recognition of the students. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that since the Director of Medical Education did not give any remarks on the querries, the respondent University by letters dated 27-9-1988 and 9-11-1988 informed the respondent Institute that inasmuch as no recognition having been given by the Director of Medical Education, for the previous examinations, the respondent Institute may approach the Director of Medical Education, the third respondent herein. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that the Director of Medical Education was also reminded by the respondent University to give a reply to the querries raised as early as 30-12-1987. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that the respondent Institute permitted the petitioner to write the Second Semester examination of the I M.B.B.S. course in December, 1988 after obtaining an undertaking from the candidates to the effect that they will not hold the respondent Institute liable in case, the recognition was not granted at a later stage. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that the respondent Institute had permitted the petitioner in W. P. No. 9555 of 1989 and others to write the examinations without proper hall-tickets issued by the respondent University. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that in those circumstances the respondent University informed the respondent Institute that the answer papers will not be valued and that the candidates will not be allowed to undergo practical examination. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that the Secretary of the Selection Committee by his letter dated 3-1-1989 informed the respondent University that the candidates were admitted by the respondent Institute under the management quota in G.O.Ms.No. 1196, Health Department dated 24-7-1985 and also stated that the minimum mark rules prescribed by the Government applies to the candidates filled up in the management quota also. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that the repeated requests of the respondent Institute to consider the case on sympathetic and humanitarian grounds and for the grant of the eligibility certificate could not he answered in view of the clarifications not being made available by the Director of Medical Education, that it could be seen from paras 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the affidavit filed by the petitioner that he does not possess the minimum qualification prescribed for the M.B.B.S. course, that the petitioner is not a qualified person and that having secured the admission in the respondent Institute, the respondent University cannot be held responsible in any way for the omission on the part of the respondent Institute. It is categorically stated in the counter-affidavit that the respondent University is acting with the diligence and care, that the said inaction is due to the delay in giving clarification by the Director of Medical Education and that the respondent University is in no way responsible for the same. It is also stated in the counter-affidavit that the respondent Institute, after admitting the candidates under the management quota, ought to have verified the applicability of the rules prescribing minimum marks, that the petitioner having applied with full knowledge that he is not eligible for admission and the second respondent herein, the respondent Institute having admitted the petitioner under the management quota, he is not entitled to invoke the equity and that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed in limine. It is also stated in the counter-affidavit that there is no legal duty cast upon the respondent University to give the recognition to the petitioner who has not qualified and as such the writ petition is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that the respondent University has taken effective steps at the appropriate stage and that the petitioner having sought for admission even though he is not qualified and the second respondent having admitted with full knowledge that the petitioner is not qualified they are not entitled to plead estoppel. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that there is no question of promissory estoppel in this case. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that the ground that the prescription of 70% is not mandatory, and that it is only desirable qualification as wholly misconceived in view of the specific averment in the advertisement. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that the allegation made by the petitioner with regard to other similar cases relating to management quota that the respondent University has ratified admission for the students who have secured lesser marks is not correct. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner cannot take any advantage over this narrow limit of the percentage 0.45%.
8. Mr. M. Venkatachalapathy, the learned counsel appearing for the University represents before this Court that the counter filed in W. P. No. 9555 of 1989 can be adopted as counter in other writ petitions also.
9. Mr. C. Chinnasamy, the learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petition in W. P. No. 9555 of 1989 contends that in so far as the admission in a self-financing Institution is concerned for management quota, the minimum marks prescribed for the Government colleges will not apply to it. The learned senior counsel refers to the prospectus issued by the respondent Institute for the years 1986-87, 1987-88 and 1988-89 and points out the wordings of the prospectus that "it is desired that the candidates must have secured not less than 60% marks in physics, chemistry, biology and an aggregate of 70% for the above subjects". The learned counsel also points out that for the year 1986-87 the desired marks are shown as 50% for the year 1987-88 the desired marks are the aggregate marks to be not less than 140 out of 200 marks in Science subjects. The learned counsel also argues that the prospectus was the only guide under which a student had applied to the said course and that the respondent Institute having admitted the petitioner on the basis of the prospectus issued by it, it is not open to the respondent University to state at this stage that the petitioner should not have been admitted into the M.B.B.S. Course. The learned counsel further points out that the respondent Institute has admitted the petitioner and that the respondent University also allowed him to write the examinations as indicated above. The learned counsel further contends that the students are helpless in this case and as such they gave an undertaking when the University authorities wanted to that effect. The learned Counsel further points out that the respondent University in its counter-affidavit refers to only the correspondence which was exchanged between the respondent University and the respondent Director of Medical Education behind the back of the petitioner herein and that the petitioner was not aware as to what was going on behind his back. The learned Counsel further refers to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court which is reported in Registrar v. Sundara, AIR 1956 Mad 309. The learned Counsel refers to a decision of another Division Bench of this Court in K. K. Jacob v. Madurai University, , for the proposition that the petitioner is entitled to continue his studies if the principle of equitable estoppel is applied where admissions were made and the petitioners were permitted to write the examinations and allowed to continue their studies up to a certain period. The learned Counsel also refers to the decision in Rajendra Prasad v. Karnataka University, , wherein the Supreme Court after holding that the students therein were ineligible to get admitted into the said course but yet allowed the students therein to continue their courses. The learned Counsel points out that this Court also should follow the same method.
10. Mr. M. Venkatachalapathy, the learned Counsel appearing for the University in all these cases, contends that the University was not aware of the marks obtained by the students, and that lot of correspondence went on with the Director of Medical Education and that no reply was sent to the University by Director of Medical Education, The learned Counsel further points out that it has been clearly stated in the counter-affidavit filed by the University that the University was unaware of the marks obtained by the students when they got seats under the management quota. Mr. M, Venkata Chalapathy, the learned Counsel appearing for the University categorically states that the University came to know about the marks obtained by the petitioners only in the month of Novem-
ber, 1989 and at that time they were asked to give an undertaking. The learned Counsel further points out that the respondent Institute itself had advertised eligibility for admission prescribing the minimum marks for getting seats for the management quota i.e. in ., the advertisement itself it had been clearly stated that the eligibility prescribed for the Government colleges is also applicable for management quota. It is also stated by the learned Counsel that the P.S.G. Institute of Medical Sciences has notified in 1986 that the minimum marks for getting admission was the same as that of Government Colleges.
11. Mr. P. Arivudainambi, the learned Government Advocate appearing for the Government in all these cases, on instructions, states that in G.O.Ms. No. 1196 Health and Family Welfare Department dated 24-7-1985, certain conditions are provided for starting Medical Educational Institutions that the same marks as that of applicable to Government College be applicable to management quota, with regard to filling up of 60% of total seats. The learned Counsel further contends that the respondent Institute was not furnishing the list of students admitted into the medical sciences granted by private colleges, to the Director of Medical Education. The learned Government Advocate further argues that as per G.O.Ms. No. 1196 Health and Family Welfare Department, dated 24-7-1985 the petitioners in these writ petitions are not eligible to get admitted in to the M.B.B.S. Course in the respondent Institute and as such they cannot come to this Court and ask for the issuance of a writ of mandamus against the said Government Order in G.O.Ms. No. 1196 Health and Family Welfare Department dated 24-7-1985.
12. Mrs. Uma Vijayakumar, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. No. 15402 of 1989 and Mr. P. Anantha Krishna Nair, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. No. 15487 of 1989 adopt the arguments of Mr. C. Chinnasamy the learned Senior Counsel who appeared for the petitioner in W.P. No. 9555 of 1989.
13. I have carefully considered the arguments of Mr. C. Chinnasamy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. No. 9555 of 1989 Mr. M. Venkata-chalapathy, the learned Counsel appearing for the University and of Mr. P. Arivudainambi, the learned Government Advocate.
14. The point in these writ petitions is very simple and falls also within a narrow compass. All the petitioners herein obtained seats under the management quota in the respondent Institute, the P.S.G. Institute of Medical Sciences, Coimbatore and joined the M.B.B.S. Course. As I have already stated two petitioners joined in the 1987. They were allowed to continue their studies by the respondent Institute as well as by the respondent University till the middle of the academic year 1989. The trouble started thereafter with regard to the eligibility of these petitioners to get admitted into the M.B.B.S. Course. It cannot be disputed that the respondent Institute is one of the Institutions started with the permission of the Government as a self-financing Institution by private management/Trust, as per G.O.Ms. No. 1196 Health and Family Welfate Department dated 24-7-1985. One of the conditions stipulated is to the following effect :
"... The private management/Educational Trusts/Agencies which propose to open unaided Self-financing Medical Colleges shall be allowed to admit candidates of their choice up to 60% of the approved intake of the college adhering to the minimum mark rules prescribed for Government Medical Colleges. Candidates to the remaining 40% of the seats will be allotted to by the Director of Medical Education every year and this will be filled from among the approved list of candidates selected for admission to Government and Private Medical Colleges ..... "
So it is very clear that though the respondent Institute is a self-financing institution, permission is granted to admit 60% of the intake under management quota subject to the conditions stipulated in Annexure I of the above mentioned Government Order. In the prospectus, which has been produced before me for the year 1986, the eligibility for admission is stated as follows :
"... Candidates for admission to the first year MBBS should have passed the Higher Secondary Examination of Tamil Nadu with Biology, Physics and Chemistry or an equivalent examination satisfying the eligibility requirements for admission as prescribed by the Indian Medical Council and the Bhara-thiar University, Coimbatore. STUDENTS MUST HAVE SECURED NOT LESS THAN 50% IN THE AGGREGATE FOR PHYSICS, CHEMISTRY AND BIOLOGY ...."
For the year 1987, the eligibility for admission is stated, in the prospectus issued by the respondent Institute, as follows :
"Eligibility for admission : Candidates for admission to the first year MBBS should have passed the Higher Secondary Examination of Tamil Nadu with Biology, Physics and Chemistry or an equivalent examination satisfying the eligibility requirements for admission as prescribed by the Indian Medical Council and the Bharathiar University, Coimbatore. IT IS DESIRED THAT THE CANDIDATES MUST HAVE SECURED NOT LESS THAN 60% MARKS IN PHYSICS, CHEMISTRY, BIOLOGY: AND AN AGGREGATE OF 70% FOR THE ABOVE SUBJECTS...."
As per the above stipulations mentioned in the prospectus, the petitioners before me applied for the M.B.B.S. Course and they have been admitted. I am not able to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the University that the University was not aware of the conditions which were imposed upon by the respondent Institute when they started the Institution. The respondent Institute is undoubtedly under the jurisdiction of the Bharathiar University. To say that the University is not aware of the minimum marks prescribed for the admission to the M.B.B.S. Course and the marks obtained by the petitioners herein is highly surprising. In addition to this, it is also interesting to note the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the University that the Director of Medical Education has informed the University only in November, 1989, with regard to the minimum marks prescribed for admission. At any rate, the fact remains that all the petitioners before me have been admitted into M.B.B.S. Course in the respondent Institute which has been started as a self-financing Institute as per G.O.Ms. No. 1196 Health and Family Welfare Department dated 24-7-1985. In fact, the respondent Institute has not notified this condition in the prospectus. This is partly due to the fault of the authorities of the respondent Institute and also due to the fault of the authorities of the University. These petitioners having been admitted into the M.B.B.S. Course in the respondent Inslitute applied for the respondent University to write the examinations and the petitioners have come up successfully. At this stage, even assaming that the petitioners have no eligibility or admission in the M.B.B.S. Course according to the G.O.Ms. No. 1196 Health and Family Welfare Department dated 24-7-1985 on the ground that they have not obtained required minimum marks, in my view, the action of the respondent University is not at all reasonable and it cannot be justified also. In my view, the principle of equitable estoppel squarely applied to the facts of these cases also.
15. However. T am not able to agree with the contention of Mr. C. Chinnasamy, the learned Senior Counsel that the minimum marks required to get admitted into M.B.B.S. Course under the management quota in a private institute can be different from that of minimum marks to get admitted into a Government college. If such a situation arises, it will end in disastrous results. Even without the minimum marks any private Institution would like to offer seats to a candidate on payment of capitation fees raising the figures to astronomical figures. So, I am inclined to accept the contention of Mr. P. Arivudai-nambi, the learned Government Advocate that with regard to admission of the students in the M.B.B.S. Course, the private colleges, even though they are self-financing institutions, should adhere to the minimum mark rules prescribed for Government Medical Colleges.
16. But as I have already stated the principle of equitable estoppel applies to the facts of the case on hand. What is the principle? A Division Bench of this Court in Registrar v. Sundara, AIR 1956 Mad 309, has enunciated the principles of equitable estoppel. In the abovementioned case, the petitioner therein sat for the Secondary School Leaving Examination held by the Government and in due course the S.S.L.C. book was despatched to him with the marks obtained by him at the public examination entered in it, with a rubber stamp certificate stating "Certificate completed". At the bottom of the page on which the marks were entered and the certificate was stamped, it bore the signature of the Secretary to the Board of Secondary Education and the date. On the basis of the said certificate, the petitioner therein sought and obtained admission to the Intermediate Class in Thiagaraja College, Madurai and sat for the examination held by the College at the end of the first year and he was promoted to the second year course. While he was studying in the Senior Intermediate Class, he was served with a letter from the Principal of the said college stating that his name was not found in the list of S.S.L.C. holders declared eligible for the University course published in the Gazette. In that case, the Division Bench of this Court has held that the rubber stamp endorsement of eligibility of the S.S.L.C. book of the petitioner therein was at best a prima facie proof of the declaration of the eligibility of the petitioner for admission to a University course of study and the University did hold out that the eligibility endorsement on the certificates was prima facie proof of the declaration of the eligibility of the candidate concerned. It was held further that it is only on the strength of the endorsement the Principal could proceed to make admission and otherwise at the time of admission, there would be no other data to help the Principal to decide whether a candidate was or was not eligible. On those facts, the Division Bench of this Court in the abovementioned case held that that was a case of legal or equitable estoppel which satisfied all the conditions embodied in Sec. 115 of the Evidence Act and a mandamus should be issued both to the University and to the Principal of the said College to forbear from preventing the petitioner to complete his intermediate course and appear for the intermediate examination in due course. So also in the cases on hand, on the basis of the prospect us they applied to the respondent Institute for admission into M.B.B.S. Course, and being unaware of the Government order referred to by the learned Government Advocate. The respondent Institute admitted them, the petitioners herein joined the M.B.B.S. Course in the respondent Institute after paying the capitation fees and appeared for the examinations for certain semesters. The respondent University also permitted them to appear for the examinations without any demur. As such, to say at this stage that the petitioners are not eligible to get admission into M.R.B.S., course in the respondent Institute will be against the Principle laid down by the Division Bench of this Court, in the case cited supra.
17. In K. K. Jacob v. Madurai University, , a Division Bench of this Court has held that the University cannot cancel the admission of a student therein after 4 or 5 months. In that case, the Division Bench has relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Registrar, University of Madras v. Sundara Shetty, AIR 1956 Mad 309, and another decision of Delhi High Court in University of Delhi v. Ashok Kumar Chopra. . In Thirunavukkarasu v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1973) 2 Mad LJ 181. Palaniswamy, J., has considered the question of principle of equitable estoppel. In that case, the said person was employed as a field surveyor in the Tamil Nadu State Service in the permanent establishment and was also promoted as Deputy Surveyor, When a scrutiny of the records was made, it was found that the said Officer did not possess the minimum educational qualification for appointment of the said Post of Field Surveyor and he was reverted to the said post. The said Officer challenged that order. In that case, Palaniswamy, J. considering various decisions including the decisions in K. Jagannadham v. District Collector, and in Kothainayaki v. Director of Secondary Education (W.P. No. 2749 of 1967) held that the principle of equitable estoppel applies in such circumstances. In that case, the learned Judge has held that it would be most inequitable and unjust to revert back the petitioner in that case and observed as follows (at p. 185) :
"..... Though the authorities concerned cannot be charged with having done anything positively to the detriment of the petitioner they by reason of their inaction or silence for a long number of years after the petitioner's entry into service have induced the petitioner to believe that he was qualified to continue in service. In those circumstances, this is eminently a fit case for the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and the order of the respondent cannot be sustained....."
18. In this case also, there is no fault on the petitioner's side. They applied bona fide and got the seats with the impression that they would be allowed to complete the full course. They have not suppressed any facts before the authorities of the respondent Institute as well as before the authorities of the respondent University. They have not kept back any information. As such, I am of the view that the petitioners herein should not be penalised for the fault committed by the authorities of the respondent Institute as well as the authorities of the University, in allowing the petitioners to sit for examinations in certain semesters. At best it would be a case of .....
the respondent Institute violating the conditions prescribed by the Government in G.O.Ms. No. 1196 Health and Family Welfare Department dated 24-7-1985 cited supra. If the conditions set out in the above mentioned Government order are not followed, it may be open to the Government to take action against the respondent Institute for not adhering to the conditions. For that, I am of the view, the petitioners before me who are innocent should not be penalised.
19. I am also of the opinion that the principles of promissory estoppel and the decisions of the Supreme Court therefor, will apply to the facts of the cases on hand. In Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, , the Supreme Court enunciated the principle of promissory estoppel and observed as follows (at p. 650) :
"..... The true principle of promissory estoppel seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any preexisting relationship between the parties or not. The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term. It is an equitable principle evolved by the Courts for doing justice and there is no reason why it should be given only a limited application by way of defence. There is no reason in logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action, if necessary to satisfy the equity. It is not necessary, in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, that the promisee, acting in reliance on the promise, should suffer any detriment. What is necessary is only that the promisee should have altered his position in reliance on the promise. But if by detriment we mean injustice to the promisee which would result if the promisor were to recede from his promise, then detriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient. The detriment in such a case is not some prejudice suffered by the promisee by acting on the promise, but the prejudice which would be caused to the promisee, if the promisor were allowed to go back on the promise. If this is the kind of detriment contemplated, it would necessarily be present in every case of promissory estoppel, because it is on account of such detriment which the promisee would suffer if the promisor were to act differently from his promise, that the Court would consider it inequitable to allow the promisor to go back upon his promise. In India not only has the doctrine of promissory estoppel been adopted in its fullness but it has been recognised as affording a cause of action to the person to whom the promise is made...."
It can be seen from the facts of the cases on hand that the petitioners applied for M.B.B.S. course in the respondent Institute on the basis of the prospectus issued by the said respondent Institute, that the respondent Institute admitted them and the petitioners were allowed to write examinations for certain semesters by the respondent University and that by this way the petitioners before me spent considerable time and money in the respondent Institute for the porion of the M.B.B.S. Course. In my view, the action of the respondent University preventing the petitioners herein are not eligible to get admitted into the respondent Institute for M.B.B.S. Course itself at this stage is directly hit by principles of promissory estoppel also.
20. Professor H.W.R. Wade in Administrative Law, 5th Edition, at page 232 observes that the basic principle of estoppel is that a person who by some statement or representation of fact caused another to act to his detriment in reliance on the truth of it is not allowed to deny it later, even though it is wrong. Justice here prevails over truth. Estoppel is often described as a rule of evidence, but more correctly it is a principle of law. As a principle of common law it applies only to representations about past or present facts. But there is also an equitable principle of 'promissory estoppel' which can apply to public authorities.
21. An unreported decision of S. Rama-lingam, J. in Joseph LA. Rajah v. The Vice-Chancellor of Dr. M.G.R. Medical University, Tamil Nadu, Madras (W.P. No. 13329 of 1989 dated 11-1-1990) is brought to my notice. In that case, the learned Judge has come to a different condition because there has been no supine or inordinate delay in the order passed by the University therein. The learned Judge in that case ordered the college therein to pay the petitioner therein a sum of Rs. one lakh and dismissed the writ petition. So on facts, that case is distinguishable.
22. It is worthwhile to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Rajendra Prasad v. Karnataka University, . In that case at p. 1454 the Supreme Court has observed as follows :
"... There can therefore be no doubt that the appellants were not eligible for admission to the Engineering Degree Course of the Karnataka University and their admission was contrary to the Ordinance prescribing the condition of eligibility ....." After holding thus.
The Supreme Court has further observed at p. 1455 as follows :--
".... The fault lies with the Engineering Colleges which admitted the appellants because the Principals of these Engineering Colleges must have known that the appellants were not eligible for admission and yet for the sake of capitation fee in some of the cases they granted admission to the appellants. We do not see why the appellants should suffer for the sins of the managements of these Engineering Colleges. We would, therefore, notwithstanding the view taken by us in this judgment allow the appellants to continue their studies in the respective Engineering Colleges in which they were granted admission...."
As extracted above, I think the conclusion arrived at by the Supreme Court in the above mentioned case has to be applied to the facts of the cases on hand also.
23. As I have already stated, it is for the Government and the Director of Medical Education and the University to keep such institutions like the respondent Institute herein, under control and if they do not follow the guidelines under which the permission has been granted to run the self-financing institutions, appropriate action should be taken, for not following the guidelines against the respondent Institute management, wherein the petitioners herein, who are innocent students are taken for a ride.
24. For the foregoing facts and the reasons I am of the view that a direction is to issue to the respondents herein to permit the petitioners before me to continue their studies in the respondent Institute and complete their M.B.B.S. Course, for which they were granted admission. Since the examinations are nearing, I also direct the respondents to receive fees and to issue halt tickets to the petitioners before me so as to enable them to take their ensuing examinations, if they apply to the same. The writ petitions will stand allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
25. If the result of any one of the petitioners is withheld, I direct the respondents to publish it forthwith.
26. Petition allowed.