Bombay High Court
Phoenix Mills Ltd. And Ors. vs State Of Maharashtra on 2 December, 1977
JUDGMENT V.S. Deshpande, J.
1. Appellants Nos. 2 and 3 are the shareholders of the 1st appellant concern which carries on the business of spinning of yarn and weaving of cloth at their factory at Senapati Bapat Marg, Bombay. After the amendment of section 10 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Bonus Act') under the Ordinance dated 3rd September, 1977, introducing sub-section (2-A) in section 10 of the said Act, compulsorily requiring the employees to pay the minimum bonus to their employees at the rate of 8.33 per cent of the salary earned by the employees during the accounting year the appellants made an application to respondent No. 1 for exemption on 13-10-1977 under section 36 of the said Act. It is alleged, in the said application, that (a) there was not only no allocable surplus during the year ending on 31st March, 1977, but the concern suffered a cash loss without providing for depreciation to the tune of Rs. 56,93,300; (b) during the preceding three years, viz. 1974-75, 1975-76 and 1976-77, it incurred net losses respectively to the tune of Rs. 51,15,393, Rs. 1,47,86,319 and Rs. 92,91,189; (c) it liabilities as on 31-3-1977 amounting to Rs. 10,77,88,823 exceed its current assets to the tune of Rs. 8,59,02,091 by Rs. 2,18,86,732; (d) their reserves have been wiped out; (e) on 21st September, 1977, there was a disastrous fire in the Spinning Department which almost gutted it; and thereby the working of the mills have virtually been stopped from that date, further aggravating the liquidity which has already been eroded by the losses for the last there financial years; and (f) in all 6,000 workmen were employed in the concern and bonus liabilities under amended section 10(2-A) with regard to its Bombay unit would come Rs. 33,66,000 in addition to Rs. 8,00,000 with regard to its Ujjain unit. The compulsion to pay bonus for the year ending on 31st March, 1977 in these circumstances, would bring about it total collapse rendering all the 6,000 workers jobless as also losses of production of a vital necessity of life, i.e. cloth.
2. This application made on 13-10-1977, after approaches through the Mills Owner's Associations, was rejected by the Government by its order dated 1-11-1977. The appellants then challenged the validity of this order by a petition to this Court being Miscellaneous Petition No. 1566 of 1977 under Article 226 of the Constitution. The matter was placed for admission before a learned Judge of this Court, who was pleased to reject the same in limini on 9th November, 1977. This is an appeal against the same, when it came up for admission on 22nd November, 1977, after hearing Mr. Bhatt, the learned Advocate for the appellants, we felt it necessary to know the reasons why respondent No. 1 fled implead to reject the appellant's application. We indicated the same to Mr. N.H. Gursahani, the learned Government Pleader, appearing for the State, and we adjourned the matter to 24th November, 1977, to enable him to produce the case papers or file an affidavit indicating the reasons for such rejection. On 24th November, 1977 Mr. Gurshani, did neither produce the record nor file any affidavit but indicated his readiness to argue and satisfy that the impugned order was well founded. After hearing the learned Advocate on both the sides and also Mr. Buch the learned Advocate appearing for the Union of workmen, opposing, the admission of the appeal, we admitted the appeal and directed the appellants, to implead the Union as respondent, dispensed with the printing and with the consent of the parties posted the appeal for hearing on 29th November, 1977, in view of the extreme urgency involved. Under section 19 of the Act employees have to satisfy the liability of bonus within eight months of the accrual of the liability at the end of the accounting year. The accounting year closed in this case on 31st March, 1977, and the period for eight months, was to expire at the end of November, 1977. Mr. Gursahani pleaded Government's liability to extend the time in view of the "explosive" situation created by the pressing claim of the workmen. All that we could do in these circumstances was to expedite the hearing of the appeal.
3. When the appeal was taken up for hearing on 29th November, 1977, Mr. Gursahani, filed an affidavit sworn by Mr. Konkar, Under Secretary to the Government in reply for the limited purpose of meeting the case made out in the notice of motion for stay. He expressly reserved his right to file detailed affidavit, in reply to the main petition in the event of the matter being remanded to the learned Single Judge for issuing rule Nisi.
4. Mr. Setalvad, the learned Advocate for the appellants, contends that the Bonus Act contemplates compulsory payment of bonus out of the profits or estimated future surplus profits, and not of the capital of concern, when allocable surplus is not available out of the profits of the concerned accounting year, and all the more so when capital is shown to be eroding and liabilities are shown to have exceeded two crores during the accounting year in dispute. He, secondly, contends that absence of speaking order prevent judicial review thereof under Article 226 of the Constitution to see while relevant factors weighted to compel the appellants to pay bonus inspite of its capital being exposed to erosion. The reluctance of the learned Single Judge to decide the effects of there being the no speaking order, has prevented the Court from exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution and its obligation there under to the citizens Mr. Setalvad relied on Jalan Trading Co. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha, in support of his first contention and on State of Bombay v. K.P. Krishnan, in support of the second contention. The Legislature background of the Bonus Act and the concept of the bonus is discussed in detail by the Supreme Court in the case of the bonus is discussed in detail by the Supreme Court in the case of Jalan Trading Co. (supra). The Supreme Court was called upon to consider the validity, among others, of section 19 of the Act on the ground of it being violative of Article 19 and the Article 31 of the Constitution. Challenge to its validity on the ground of being violative of Article 19 was not required to be decided. However, because of the then Emergency and the notification under Article 358 of the Constitution, section 10, as it then stood, contemplated payment of minimum bonus at the rates of 4 per cent of the wages of employees without regard to whether there were profit or leases during the said year maximum bonus being permissible under section 11 was 20 per cent of such salary, payable from the allocable surplus as determined under section 2(4) read with section 2(6) of said Act, section 10 was amended twice. At one time compulsory bonus was raised from 4 per cent to 8.33 per cent. However, by an Act, No. 23 of 1976 preceded by an Ordinance dated 25th September, 1975, the liability, to pay the compulsory minimum bonus was eliminated and payment of bonus was made dependent on the company making profits and leaving allocable surplus as computed under the provisions of the Act. Sub-section (2-A) now introduced in section 10 of the Act restores the position, as it existed before the Amendment Act No. 23 of 1976, and the preceding Ordinance. The Act requires the employer to pay minimum bonus at the rate of 8.33 per cent as indicated earlier. The legal position as now exists does not materially differs from what existed when Jalan's case (supra) was decided.
5. In Jalan's case (supra), after discussing the back ground of the Act the Supreme Court observed (paragraph 14 page 700).
"It may be broadly stated that bonus which was originally a voluntary payment out of profits to workmen to keep them contended, acquired the character, under the Bonus formula of right to share in the surplus profits and enforceable through the machinery of the Industrial Disputes Act. Under the payment of Bonus Act, liability to pay bonus has become a statutory obligation imposed upon employers covered by the Act".
A contention was then raised on behalf of the petitioners in that case, that requiring payment of 4 per cent of the wages, by way bonus without regard to whether the concern earns profits or incurs losses, completely alters the character of bonus and converts, what was the share in the year's profits, in the earning of which the labour has contributed, into additional wages. The Supreme Court repelled this contention and observed as follows (paragraph 24 page 704).
"Section 10 at first sight may appear to be a provision for granting additional wages to employees in establishments which have not on the year's working an adequate allocable surplus to justify payment of bonus at the rate of 4 per cent on the wages earned by each employees. But the section is an integral part of a scheme for providing for payment of bonus at rates which do not widely fluctuate from year to year and that in sought to be secured by restricting the quantum of bonus payable to the maximum rate of 20 per cent and for carrying of award the excess remaining after paying bonus at that rate into the account of the next year, and by providing for carrying forward the liability for amounts drawn from reserves of accounting year, the obligation to pay bonus at the minimum rates."
The Court then ultimately concluded as follows (and as paragraph 24, page 705).
"This scheme of prescribing maximum and minimum rates of bonus together with the scheme of "Set off" and "Set on" not only secures the right of to share in the property of the establishment, but also ensures a reasonable degree of uniformity"
6. Indicating how the ratio of its earlier judgment in the case of Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala, is not applicable to the compulsory requirement of payment of minimum bonus, the Court observed :
"Ordinarily it may been predicated of unproductive agricultural land that it is incapable of being put to profitable agricultural use at any time. But that cannot be so predicated of an industrial establishment which has suffered loss in the accounting year, or even over several years successively. Such an establishment may suffer loss in one year and make profit in another..........The object of the Act is to make an suitable distribution of the surplus profits of the establishment with a view to maintain peace and harmony between the three agencies (viz. capital, management and labour which contributed to the earning of profits Distribution of profits which is not subject to great fluctuations year after year, would certainly conduct to maintenance of peace and harmony and would be regarded as equitable, and provisions for payment of bonus at the statutory minimum rate, even if the establishment had not earned profits is clearly enacted to ensure the object of that this legal position was present to the mind of the Central Government while invoking the statement of its Minister for Labour made to the Press enclosed at Exhibit 'A' with the petition. The authority of it is not disputed by Mr. Gursahani and Mr. Buch. It is as follows :
"To ensure that loss making units were not unduly burdened by the incidence of maximum bonus resulting in their becoming sick, provisions o section 36 of the Act, for the grant of exemption might be resorted to guidelines for this purpose would be worked out".
7. Any other view may expose section 10 to attack by reference to Article 19 Constitution. It is thus clear that though payment of minimum bonus is made compulsory under section 10 of the Act, as it stooped before the Amendment Act, No. 23 of 1976, and if the stands now under the present amendment introduced under sub-section (2-A) of section 10 by the ordinance dated 3rd September, 1977, the legislative intendment is to ensure that profits and prosperity of the concern is shared by the workmen also. In other words, the Legislature does not contemplate arising of such liability to pay minimum bonus, when the reserves of the concern wiped out and the capital itself is exposed to erosion and having no hope of any profits further exposing concern to the danger of being close of wiped out completely though mere losses in successive years may not create such danger. That seems to be the reasons why while conferring rights on the workmen to get the minimum bonus, without regard to whether the business of the year in the profit or losses, the Legislature has, in section 36, conferred power o exemption from the liability to pay such minimum bonus having regard to financial position of the concern an other relevant factor so justify. In other words, by providing for exemption from any or all the provisions of this Act, the Legislature has cast a duty on the appropriate Government to examine the financial position and other circumstance of the establishment concerned ad decided then as to whether grant or rejection of such application is in the public interest or not. This provision then thus creates right in the parties as also duty on the part of the appropriate Government to consider the application on merits and dispose it off in accordance with the scheme of the Act.
8. It is obvious that grant or rejection of such application affects the rights either of the employer or the reaction. Article 226 of the Constitution enables every citizen whether employer or workmen to approach this Court and insist on the judicial review of any such decision. It is well settled that when at the instance of any citizen judiciary of any such decision is resorted to, this Court cannot be in appeal over the judgment of the appropriate Government. It, however, is under a Constitutional obligation to examine whether the decision is arrived at by the relevant and germane consideration or not and in the event of it being found that no relevant but extraneous consideration weighted with the appropriate Government this Court has a Constitutional duty to strike down the same as being bad in law. It will be enough to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in this behalf in the case of State of Bombay v. K.P.Krishnan, . (Para 17)
9. The order rejecting the petitioner's application under section 36 of the Act is too laconic to admit of an judicial review. It is in this context that the petitioner's communication itself constitutes the order or decision. Mere absence of the reasons may not justify the quashing of the order. It is open for this Court in exercise of its power under Article 226, and it Constitutional obligation to citizens, to send for the records and examine whether reasons were relevant or not. It is also open for this out to rely on the affidavit, if the same is filed by the Government indicating what factors and circumstances weighed with it, while rejection the said applications. Instances cannot be ruled out where the reasons may be so patent that such affidavit or disclosure of the record may be dispensed with when the Court is satisfied that the reasons are patent. This may justify the rejection of such application in limini. In either case the reasons must exist. The authority is under an obligation to disclose the same when the reasons are not patent and not indicated in the order, when the order is challenged in the Court to enable the High Court to verify if the same are germane and relevant and not extraneous and prevent the order being struck down as arbitrary and capricious and prevent the order being struck own as arbitrary and capricious. The contention of the learned Government Pleader that reasons are liable to be disclosed only when the application is granted, is not correct. Power of the judicial review cannot be exercised without indication of the reasons and exercise of it does not depend on whether it is challenged by the employer or the workmen and whether prayer for exemption is rejected or granted.
10. In the present case, as indicated earlier, the petitioner's averment in their application to this Court is that losses successively incurred by them during the course of the three years have wiped out their resources and eroded their capital as to increase their liability as on 31st March, 1977 over the assets by Rs. 2 crores and add. It is possible that the figures indicated are manipulated and do not give the correct picture. This, however, was not suggested by the learned Government Pleader or even Mr. Buch, excepting indicating suspicion at the fag end of the arguments. It is not even suggestion in the affidavit of the Under Secretary file for the limited purpose suggestion by the learned Government Pleader. The situation indicated in these averments is grave. The Advocates for the respondents could not explain to us how the apprehension of closure can be dismissed as speculative or more bluff. Requiring the employer to pay from the capital is far from the Legislative intent as indicated in Jalan's case (supra). The bonus is intended as enable the workmen to share the profits and prosperity of the concerned not to accelerate the process of its sinking. Case of mere losses in successive year may not deprive the workmen of the bonus as long as the capital is not eroded. But instance when the process of erosion of capital has commenced is quite different. This is what makes it necessary to know what weighed with the Government to ignore the same and the probable consequences thereof and reject their claim for exemption from section 10 of the Act or the year in dispute.
11. It is not possible to know the working of the mind of the Government from the laconic communication sent by respondent No. 1 to the petitioners. There are also no means of knowing what reasons weighed within as no affidavit was filed by respondent No. 1 before the Court presumably because the Court itself did not think it necessary to issues any Rule Nisi. Our attention was also not drawn to any patent reasons of the application in limini. Respondents cannot render judicial review possible by withholding the reasons. Failure to disclose reasons may raise the inference of there being no reasons at all. Reference to the judgment in the case of Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, 1968(1) All.E.R. 694 will be relevant.
12. We, therefore, find substance in the contention of Mr. Setalwad. In our opinion averments in the petition do call for the records, if necessary to ascertain what reasons weighed with the Government and if the same were relevant or not. We are also reluctant to hold loss caused by fire in the month of September, 1977, is irrelevant consideration merely because the liability had accrued before that date. In our opinion, its relevancy must depend upon the extent of the damage and it effect on the liquidity as also on the stability of the concern. It cannot be irrelevant merely because it takes place after the date of accrual of the liability. It can still be relevant till the actual payment if the damage has caused wiping off reserves and if consequently the conform is incapable of paying without disposing off its capital asset. Actual financial position also cannot be ignored merely because liability is common to all. Every concern complains of losses and inability to pay. It will be an error to assume that liability is common when section 36 itself envisages making exception in deserving cases. Each case shall have to be examined on its merits by the State Government to discharge the statutory obligation under section 36 of the Bonus Act. The existence of particular occasion be ruled out without examining the individual cases. Section 36 itself requires the Government to make distinction between those whose financial position is found to be sound and those whose position is liable to be found otherwise. As observed in Jalan's case, scheme of payment of compulsory bonus is closely linked with the scheme of sets off and set in. This is based on the assumption that running business is not likely to suffer losses for all years to come ad situation of its capital being eroded will never arise. When a situation of its capital being exposed to erosion and reserves being wiped out is shown to exist, it should be difficult to say that the said situation would be irrelevant either because accrued rights to bonus are liable to be affected or because incident after the accrual of such right has to be affected or because aggravated or accelerated it or because several other concerns also may fall in the same category or that workmen on whole may not acquiescence herein. Its relevances, as the relevancy of every circumstance shall have to be determined by the object of the Act, as found by the Supreme Court in Jalan's case, namely to enable the employees to share the profits and the prosperity of the employer.
13. Mr. Gursahani tried to justify the order of the learned Judge rejecting the petition in limine on several grounds. According to him, provisions of section 36 are essentially discretionary and the Court cannot sit in judgment over the action of the Government in rejecting the application, when the same is no shown to have been made mala fide. In the first instance, even if it is assumed that powers under section 36 of the Act are discretionary, the same do not absolve the authority exercising such discretionary power from indicating its reasons. As it is the relevancy of the reasons and the ground that will go to determine the validity or otherwise of the impugned order. Absence of the reasons will render the judicial review impossible. Even the discretionary orders are liable to challenged in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution on certain limited grounds, though the High Court in such cases cannot act as a Court of Appeal. In the case or Fire stone Tyre and Rubber Co., (supra) the Supreme Court was indeed dealing with as dictionary power of the State Government under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Notwithstanding this, the Court held that reasons as to why the Government though it proper to refuse reference are liable to be tested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and the said order is liable to be struck down in the event of reasons weighing with the Government found to be not germane or irrelevant.
14. The contention of Mr. Gursahani that powers under section 36 confers a right on the affected party to apply for exemption and cast a duty on the appropriate Government not only to consider the application for exemption by reference to the factors indicated therein but also decide as to for what period and under what conditions such exemption should be granted. In the case of Mohalaxmi Textile Mills Ltd. Madurai v. Government of Madra, 1969(II) L.L.J. 133, justice Lailasam of Madras High Court negatives the contention of Mr. Gurashani is this liable to be rejected.
15. Mr. Gursahani then contends that the liability in dispute with regard to minimum bonus is in respect of the year ending on 31st March, 1977. The right to get bonus accrued to the third persons like workmen on 31st March, 1977, itself. No application, so contends Mr. Gursahani, can be made or exemption after the accruel of such rights on 31st March, 1977, nor the Government has any power to grant such application and deprive the workmen of their accrued rights. Mr. Buch, the learned Advocate appearing for the workmen also supported this contention. We have, however, not see any merit in the same. Two points as worthy of note in this context. In the first instance, till the promulgation of the ordinance on 3rd September, 1977, the management had no reason to assume that any liability to apply minimum, bonus without regard to the existence of profits as will ever arise and they will ever be require to make any such application for exemption. It is not disputed that till that time section 10, as amended under Act No. 23 of 1976, was inforce and the same did not contemplate payment of any bonus unless allocable surplus of profits in the according year is available for such distribution. It is true that the ordinance contemplates making the liability restropective so as to cover the previous year ending on 31st March, 1977 also. This retrospectively certainly confers legality on the claim of the workmen and the obligation of the employees to pay the said bonus. It is difficult, however, to conceive how this retrospectively by itself will deprive the employers from claiming exemption, when the Legislature by enacting section 36 in terms has conferred such right on suitable case being made out. Section 36 itself does not contemplate any application for exemption being made at any particular stage or within any prescribed period. Section 19, no doubt, requires the employer to satisfy the liability on any day during the period from the accrual of liability from 31st March, 1977 till the end of eight month's period therefrom i.e. end of November, 1977. Government has power extend this period. There is nothing in section 36 itself to warrant any inference that claim for exemption cannot be made either after 31st March, 1977, or for the sake of argument even after the expiry of the month of November, 1977. In the event of any application being made after in ordinates delay, the Government may consider the same as part of the merits. But mere fact tat application is made after the date of the accrual of the right cannot justify its rejection. In fact, it takes time for every concern to get the accounts settled, prepare balance sheet, get the same audited ad have an over all picture can never be clear on the day of the closing year. As indicated earlier, the Act creates liability to pay the minimum bonus as against the employers and confers a right on the workmen but this obligation and the right is subject to the claim of exemption under section 36 of the Act. The liability cannot be said to have accrued as long as claim for exemption, when made within a reasonable time, is not properly disposed off. We are unable to see how the question of mere accrual of liability on 31st March, 1977, can prevent the employers from making such an application or the State Government such application in the event of such a case being made out.
16. Mr. Gursahani then contends that financial position in not only circumstances that has to be weighed with the Government. The Government is under on obligation to consider other relevant circumstances also as conceived under the said section itself and if the on consideration of the same, the application is found liable to be rejected, no fault can be found with such rejection. There can hardly, be any quarrel with his broad proposition of Mr. Gursahani. The question that arises is as to what those "other relevant circumstances" could be and which of those have weighed with the Government so as to out weighed the drastic effect of the bonus claim on financial position as discussed and indicated earlier. We should be slow of make observation on this vexed question as this can be examined only after Rule Nisi is used and the respondent gets full opportunity of have their say. We may, however, indicate that the contentions of the learned Advocates and the limited affidavit filed on behalf of the State could not satisfy us about the existence of any such relevant factor. We have already indicated how circumstances that (1) exemption was claimed after accrual of right to bonus, and (2) the fire had taken place after such accrual of right cannot be relevant. We have also no hesitation in holding that such a claim cannot be rejected by way of any policy decision as was suggested by Mr. Gursahani the claim shall have to been decided by reference to the objective factors obtaining in this as well as in any individual case. The factors that the Government had offered to stand guarantee to any Bank to the extent of 50 per cent of the amount required and it has moved the Central Government to stand guarantee for the remaining 50 per cent also cannot be held as relevant circumstance under section 36 of the Act.
17. It is true that the claim and demand of the workmen in the fact of type rising cost of living and the effect of the exemption on the intensity of their claim, and law and order position may not be wholly irrelevant. The urgency is writ large on the fact of the situation and the fact that the Government had to rush with an ordinance to go their rescue itself speaks volumes in support of it. Even so, the Government has to act according of the dictators of the statutes and these factors cannot be overemphasized to out weigh the effect of the financial situation so as to enable defeat the very object of the legislation, namely to enable the workmen to share prosperity and profits of the employers. No question of their sharing prosperity can arise when financial position possess a threat to its existence. Reliance by Mr. Gursahani on Jalan's case or on the judgment of Gujarat High Court in the case of Patel Mills Co. Ltd. v. Textile Labour Association Ahemadbad, 1972 L.I. Cases 392 is misconceived. We have discussed Jalan's case in detail. Gujarat High Court lays down that minimum bonus cannot be avoided merely because there is a loss on the accounting years concerned. It does to deal with a case where capital is exposed to erosion. The Government cannot abandon its statutory duty under section 36 in an anxiety to diffuse what is considered to be an explosive situation. Expendiency can never be substitute for statutory considerations. There cannot be two opinions, as to the need to relieve the plight of the working class. The questions to what extent it can be relevant under section 36 of the Act. The statement of the Labour Minister of the Government of Indian adverted to earlier also shown that authors of the ordinance did not contemplate refusing exemption in suitable cases, even in the explosive situation which necessitated the promulgation of the ordinance. The above discussed financial position is pregnant with identical consequences, not only of the employer but also to the employees as it raises the possibility of the concern being closed down and the employees being turned out and rendered jobless. Neither side can be scarified to appears the other. Not much need be said about at this stage. We shall have to find out in the limited scope of Article 226 of the Constitution as to which relevant factors have weighed with the Government.
18. At the end a para 9 a grievance is made that the State Government has no received guidelines from the Central Government. Mr. Gursahani informed us at the bar that the deponent had the statement of the labour Minister issued a copy of which is enclosed with the petitioner at Exhibit 'A' Absence of the guide Lines with respondent No. 1 as admitted at the end of para 9, also creates doubt if all relevant factors have been considered by the State Government at all.
19. Mr. Buch, the learned Advocate appearing for the union, also contended that the other relevant factors conceived under section 36 of the Act can only be such which has relevance in defeating the worker's claim to minimum bonus. According to Mr. Buch, such relevant factors can only such factors can deprive the workers of the statutory right to claim the minimum bonus. We have already discussed the genesis of sections 10 and 36 of the Act. It is true that the legislative has not given any indication as to what these "other factors" can be. However, we find ourselves in agreement with Mr. Gursahani, when he says that such other relevant circumstances can be (1) industrial peace, (2) Law and order situation, (3) effect on the production of the consumer goods and (4) difficulties o the management. The extent of their relevance will be determined by the object of the Act discussed earlier.
20. It is difficult, however, to conceive of any of these other analogies or factors not expressly referred in section 36 having any overriding effect on the grant or refusal of exemption when financial position of any concern possess real threat to its closure. Such financial position is likely to out weigh other factors, as along as concept of bonus is based on sharing profits past, present or future, unlike in the case of wages under Minimum Wages Act, 1948.
21. We are thus of the opinion that it is necessary to issue rule Nisi in this case.
22. We accordingly allow the appeal and remand the matter for issuing rule and disposing of the same in according with law.
23. Mr. Setalwad, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners, asked for interim relief. Mr. Gursahani and Mr. Buch learned Advocate appearing for the respondent opposed the same. As, however, we are remanding the matter to the Single Judge, proper course will be to leave this to the learned Single Judge. However, it is necessary to pass some interim order for disposal. We accordingly restrain respondent No. 1 from giving effect to the liability under the Act till 22nd December, 1977. The case papers may be placed before the learned Single Judge on that day for suitable orders. The learned Advocates agree that they will appear before the learned Judge on that day.
24. Costs in the cause.