Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
S. Mahipal Reddy vs Secretary, Labour Dept., Govt. Of A.P., ... on 16 August, 1999
Equivalent citations: 2000(1)ALD266, 1999(5)ALT777
ORDER
M.S. Leberhan, CJ
1. The appellant (hereinafter refereed to as 'the petitioner') was suspended during the pendency of the enquiry. The petitioner challenged the order of suspension inter alia contending (1) that the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (Conduct, Classification and Appeal) Regulations (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations') were not published in the Government Gazette in conformity with Section 23 of the General Clauses Act; Consequently, the Regulations having not come into force, the petitioner cannot be suspended under the Regulations; and (2) that the petitioner does not come within the definition of 'employee' and there being no Standing Orders of the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation governing workmen, he cannot be suspended. It is only the employees of the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation who are covered by the Regulations and not the workmen.
2. The learned single Judge found that the previous publication of the Regulations in the Gazette is not sine qua non and the power conferred on the Corporation by Section 45 of the Corporation Act to make Regulations is not subject to the previous publication of such Regulations. Consequently, he rejected the contention. It is found that since every employee falls under the definition of 'workman' and as the petitioner is squarely covered by the definition of 'employee' apart from the fact that he is a workman, he is squarely covered by the Regulations and the authorities are competent to place him under suspension and there is no irregularity in the same.
3. .The learned Counsel for the petitioner impugned the judgment of the learned single Judge in this appeal inter alia contending that in view of the observations made in B.K. Srinivasan v. State of Karnataka, , the Regulations cannot come into force unless they are duly notified in the Gazette and the suspension of the petitioner cannot be sustained.
4. Concedingly, the Regulations have not been notified in the Gazette. We find no force in the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner for the reason that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the facts and circumstances of that case and the context of the proposition being dealt with, observed:
"......It is, therefore, necessary that subordinate Legislation, in order to take effect, must be published or promulgated in somewhat suitable manner, whether such publication or promulgation is prescribed by the parent statute or not. It will then take effect from the date of such publication or promulgation. Where the parent statue prescribes the mode of publication or promulgation that mode must be followed. Where the parent statute is silent, but the subordinate legislation itself prescribes the manner of publication, such a mode of publication may be sufficient, if reasonable. If the subordinate Legislation docs not prescribe the mode of publication or if the subordinate legislation prescribes a plainly unreasonable mode of publication, it will take effect only when it is published through the customarily recognised official channel, viz., the official Gazette or some other reasonable mode of publication. There may be subordinate legislation which is concerned with a few individuals or is confined to small local area. In such cases publication or promulgation by other means may be sufficient........"
5. A reading of the proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court shows that it does not support the case of the petitioner that the publication of the Regulations can be made only in Gazette notification and by no other mode. It is not the case set up by the petitioner that no publication of the Regulations has been effected in any other mode than the Gazette. Otherwise too, it is well known that the Regulations are known to all the employees. It is not the case of the petitioner that he did not know the Regulations. The appointment letter itself contains the condition that he is appointed subject to the Regulations. He cannot revert back and now say that he does not know any Regulations being in existence. Be that as it is, the Hon'ble Supreme Court specifically observed that the publication can be in any reasonable mode. If it is a local area or relating to individuals, it can be confined to that local area or those individuals. Though the epithets have been used in generality but no proposition of law in general can be inferred from the observations made that for coming into force of the delegated legislation the publication is sine qua non though in the good administration it is desirable that the Regulations are made known to the people who are to be governed by them.
6. Thus we find no force in the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Regulations having not been published in the Gazette, they have got no force of law. The same is not accepted.
7. There is no gain-saying that since the Regulations provided for the employees of the Corporation includes the workmen, the workmen cannot be dealt with as a separate or distinct category. Even otherwise, the benefit claimed by the petitioner in exercise of the writ jurisdiction is that there is no authority to suspend him under the Regulations which have not come into force. The petitioner cannot revert back to the provisions of industrial law. In case he wants to take the benefit of industrial law he was at liberty to raise the industrial dispute. Be that as it is, there is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down in RSRTC v. Krishnakant, 1995 (3) Scale 440. But the same is not attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case wherein the question dealt with was whether the civil Court has got jurisdiction when a person is covered by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It has been categorically observed that inspite of the questions being covered by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 if the claim is solely based on the contract, civil Court's jurisdiction is not ousted and when the benefit claimed is only tinder the industrial law then the claimant will be at liberty to raise the industrial dispute and the civil Court's jurisdiction is barred. None of the above propositions arise in the case in hand. We find no force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that he having not been covered by the Regulations can claim exemption from the applicability of the Regulations which covers all employees including the workmen. Nothing has been addressed to us on merits.
8. In view of the above observations the writ appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.