Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
A. Sreenivasa Rao And Ors. vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh And Ors. on 26 July, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(4)ALD881, 2002(4)ALT475
Author: B. Sudershan Reddy
Bench: B. Sudershan Reddy
JUDGMENT B. Sudershan Reddy, J.
1. The petitioners herein invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 227 and 228 of the Constitution of India and accordingly pray for issuance of a writ of mandamus or appropriate direction directing the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal (for short 'the Tribunal') to transfer O.A.No.2913 of 2002 filed by the petitioners herein to this Court in order to decide the constitutional validity of the rules called as "the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Subordinate Service (Supplementary Rules" issued in G.O. Ms. No. 384, Panchayat Raj and Rural Development (Estt.IX) Department, dated 22-12-2001.
2. Before we proceed further to consider as to whether the petitioners are entitled for grant of any such relief and as to the maintainability of the writ petition, it may be necessary to briefly notice a few relevant facts:
3. The petitioners herein claim to have worked as nominee Village Administrative Officers in leave vacancies for a considerable time. The required particulars are stated in the annexure appended to the writ petition.
They claim to have the requisite minimum qualifications to hold the newly created post of Panchayat Secretary.
4. The Government of Andhra Pradesh having examined the issue of providing a Secretary to each Gram Panchayat in the interest of good village level governance decided to appoint a Secretary to each Gram Panchayat who will be called as 'Panchayat Secretary', The Government accordingly created the post of Panchayat Secretary in each Panchayat combining the revenue and Panchayat functions and accordingly promulgated the rules called as "The Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Subordinate Service (Supplementary) Rules" (for short 'the Rules') where under the service consisting of certain additional categories of posts in the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Subordinate Service is constituted. The method of appointment is by transfer from the V.D.O. Grade-I, V.D.O. Grade-II, V.D.O. Grade-III and also from the surplus manpower pool maintained by the Finance Department. There is no direct recruitment as such for filling up the said posts. The posts are sought to be filled up with the eligible candidates by way of re-deployment.
5. The grievance of the petitioners is that the Government did not consider their case for being appointed as Panchayat Secretaries though they are fully qualified and eligible with sufficient experience to hold the posts. In short, it is their case that the Government without any reason or justification ignored their legitimate claim for being appointed as Panchayat Secretaries and resorted to filling up the posts from out of the surplus manpower working in various other departments on temporary basis though the said surplus employees do not have any experience or even acquaintance with the village administration. It is under those circumstances, the petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal by filing OA No. 2913 of 2002 challenging the constitutional validity of the said rules on various grounds.
6. It is not necessary to notice any further details for the purpose of adjudication of this writ petition.
7. It may be required to notice that somewhat similarly situated individuals filed various Original Applications in the Tribunal assailing the action of the Government in keeping them out of the zone of consideration in the matter of appointment as Panchayat Secretaries. Those Original Applications "appear to have been filed before the said rules were made and notified. During the pendency of the said Original Applications the rules came into force. But the applicants therein did not take any steps to challenge the constitutional validity of the said rules.
8. Be that as it may, the Tribunal disposed of those Original Applications with certain directions and against the said order, the State preferred WP No. 2306 of 2002 and Batch before this Court. This Court is seized of the matter. It appears that during the course of hearing of the said batch of writ petitions by this Court, the petitioners herein filed OA No. 2913 of 2002 before the Tribunal challenging the constitutional validity of (he said rules.
9. It is the case of the petitioners that the subject-matter that arises for consideration in WP No. 2306 of 2002 and Batch and the subject-matter in OA No. 29I3 of 2002 are substantially one and the same. It is submitted that identical questions do arise for consideration in OA No. 2913 of 2002 filed by the petitioners herein and as well as in WP No. 2306 of 2002 and Batch pending in this Court. It is under those circumstances, the petitioners invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 read with Article 228 of the Constitution of India.
10. Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners contends that this Court has the power to withdraw and transfer any case pending before the Tribunal if a case is made out for such withdrawal and transfer. It is submitted that this Court in exercise of the power of judicial superintendence over the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal or the Central Administrative Tribunal, in appropriate cases, may withdraw any case from the said Tribunal and dispose of the same. It is submitted that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 is wide and sweeping. Being a Court of record this Court has all the incidental and ancillary powers that may be necessary for a meaningful exercise of judicial supervision over the Tribunals. The power of withdrawal and transfer of a case to its own file is nothing but an exercise of judicial superintendence. It is further submitted that the power to withdraw and transfer is an integral part of judicial review jurisdiction.
11. Sri P. Balakrishna Murthy, learned Counsel submitted that the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal is subordinate to the High Court and, therefore, this Court has the jurisdiction to withdraw and transfer any case from the Tribunal and decide the same if the situation so requires.
12. Sri D. Prakash Reddy and Sri Ramesh Ranganathan, learned Additional Advocates General assisted the Court as Amiens Curiae and rendered valuable assistance. In their submission, this Court has no jurisdiction or power to withdraw and transfer the cases from the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. Both of them in one voice stated that the Tribunal is not subordinate to this Court. It is submitted that there is no such specific power conferred upon this Court. Nor this Court has any inherent power to withdraw and transfer the cases from the Tribunal.
13. Before we proceed to consider the submissions and contentions of the learned Counsel who appeared before us, it may be necessary to briefly set out the legal and historical background leading to the establishment of the Administrative Tribunals:
14. Part X1V-A of the Constitution was inserted through Section 46 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect from 1-3-1977. The same comprises two provisions, Articles 323-A and 323-B. In the instant case, we are concerned with Article 323-A.
15. Article 323-A of the Constitution enables the Parliament, by law, to provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government. Such law made may provide for the establishment of an Administrative Tribunal for the Union and a separate Administrative Tribunal for each State specifying the jurisdiction, powers and authority, which may be exercised by such Tribunals.
16. The Parliament, in pursuance of the power conferred upon it by Clause (1) of Article 323-A of the Constitution, enacted the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (Act 13 of 1985) (for short "the Act') which inter alia provides for establishment of Administrative Tribunals. Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Act deal with the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal, the State Administrative Tribunals and the Joint Administrative Tribunals respectively. Exclusive jurisdiction is conferred upon the Tribunals under the Act in respect of all service related matters. The Administrative Tribunal for a State shall exercise all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable by all Courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to service related matters. Section 28 of the Act declares that no Court except the Supreme Court shall have, or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to service matters.
17. In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, , the Supreme Court repelled the contention that the Tribunals should not be allowed to adjudicate upon matters where the vires of legislations is questioned, and that they should restrict themselves to handling matters where constitutional issues are not raised. It is observed that "to hold that the Tribunals have no power to handle matters involving constitutional issues would not serve the puipose for which they were constituted......
The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions is questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules." The Supreme Court in categorical terms declared that "the Tribunals created under Article 323-A of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules." It is held that "the Tribunals perform a supplemental role in discharging the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution." Such is the nature of the power including that of judicial review of legislation in respect of the areas of law for which the Tribunals have been constituted. The Tribunals have the power to handle the matters involving the constitutional issues. However, all such decisions shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226/227 of the Constitution before a Division Bench. The Tribunals are the forums of the first instance where all service related matters are required to be adjudicated, even if such matters involve substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Such is the nature of the power and jurisdiction conferred upon the Administrative Tribunals in service related matters. No doubt, this Court retains its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to judicially review the decisions of the Tribunals.
18. A bird's eye view of the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act read with Article 323-A of the Constitution of India would make it abundantly clear that the Tribunals established under the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 are not subordinate to that of a High Court.
19. However, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Govt. of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 516, in support of the submission that the Tribunals are subordinate to the High Courts. This submission is totally untenable and unsustainable. The decision in T.Sudhakar Prasad (supra) in no manner supports the submissions made in this regard. On the other hand, the Apex Court found fault with the view taken by this Court that the status of Administrative Tribunals to be equivalent to the Courts or Tribunals subordinate to the High Court. The Supreme Court cautioned that:
20. "The jurisdiction should not be confused with the status and subordination."
It is observed:
"Subordination of Tribunals and Courts functioning within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court can be either judicial or administrative or both. The power of superintendence exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is judicial superintendence and not administrative superintendence, such as one which vests in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution over subordinate Courts. Vide para 96 of L. Chandra Kumar case the Constitution Bench did not agree with the suggestion that the Tribunals be made subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts within whose territorial jurisdiction they fall, as our constitutional scheme does not require that all adjudicatory bodies which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of any High Court should be subject to its supervisory jurisdiction. Obviously, the supervisory jurisdiction referred to by the Constitution Bench in para 96 of the judgment is the supervision of the administrative functioning of the Tribunals as is spelt out by discussion made in paras 96 and 97 of the judgment.
Jurisdiction should not be confused with status and subordination. Parliament was motivated to create new adjudicatory fora to provide new, cheap and fast-track adjudicatory systems and permitting them to function by tearing off the conventional shackles of the strict rule of pleadings, strict rule of evidence, tardy trials, three/four-tier appeals, endless revisions and reviews - creating hurdles in the fast flow to the stream of justice. The Administrative Tribunals as established under Article 323-A and the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 are an alternative institutional mechanism or authority, designed to be not less effective than the High Court, consistently with the amended constitutional scheme but at the same time not to negate judicial review jurisdiction of constitutional Courts. Transfer of jurisdiction in specified matters from the High Court to the Administrative Tribunal equates the Tribunal with the High Court insofar as the exercise of judicial authority over the specified matters is concerned. That, however, does not assign the Administrative Tribunals a status equivalent to that of the High Court nor does that mean that for the purpose of judicial review or judicial superintendence they cannot be subordinate to the High Court, It has to be remembered that what has been conferred on the Administrative Tribunal is not only jurisdiction of the High Court but also of the Subordinate Courts as to specified matters. The High Courts are creatures of the Constitution and their Judges hold constitutional office having been appointed under the Constitution. The Tribunals are creatures of statute and their Members are statutorily appointed and hold statutory office. In State of Orissa v. Bhagaban Sarangi it was held that the Administrative Tribunal is nonetheless a Tribunal and so it is bound by the decision of the High Court of the State and cannot sidetrack or bypass it. Certain observations made in the case of T.N. Seshan, Chief Election Commissioner of India v. Union of India, may usefully be referred to. It was held that merely because some of the service conditions of the Chief Election Commissioner are akin to those of the Supreme Court Judges that does not confer the status of a Supreme Court Judge on the CEC. This Court observed:
"Of late it is found that even personnel belonging to other fora claim equation with High Court and Supreme Court Judges merely because certain jurisdictions earlier exercised by those Courts are transferred to them not realising the distinction between constitutional and statutory functionaries."
We are therefore clearly of the opinion that there is no anathema to the Tribunal exercising jurisdiction of the High Court and in that sense being supplemental or additional to the High Court but at the same time not enjoying status equivalent to the High Court and also being subject to judicial review and judicial superintendence of the High Court."
21. An analysis of both the judgments referred to hereinabove would make it clear that this Court exercises the power of judicial superintendence under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution over the Administrative Tribunals in order to judicially review the decisions of the Tribunals. This Court does not exercise any administrative superintendence, such as one which vests in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution over the subordinate Courts. The High Court does not exercise any supervisory jurisdiction. Therefore, the Tribunal is not a subordinate Court to the High Court. The Administrative Tribunal may have all the trappings of the Court. Its decisions are amenable to be judicially reviewed by this Court. Yet, it is not a Court subordinate to this Court. The Tribunal is conferred with the jurisdiction to decide substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, which may be necessary for the disposal of the cases pending before it in seivice related matters.
22. It is difficult to discern as to how the decision of the Apex Court in Ganga Pratap v. Allahabad Bank Ltd., , would really support the point urged on behalf of the petitioners that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 228 of the Constitution is entitled to withdraw any case from the Administrative Tribunal for the disposal by itself. The respondent therein, a scheduled bank, sued the appellant in the Court of the Civil Judge, for the recovery of money due under an instrument of mortgage. The appellant contested the suit on the ground that he was entitled to relief under the Uttar Pradesh Zamindar's Debt Reduction Act, which reduced the amount recoverable on a debt as defined in it. It was urged that the definition of debt in the said Act insofar as it excluded certain debts offended Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it made an arbitrary distinction between several classes of debtors and denied the excluded debtors, the equal protection of the law and that hence that portion of the definition which excluded certain debts was invalid and should be struck out and the rest of the definition should be left as operative. This defence of the appellant raised a question as to the validity of a provision in the Act. The appellant accordingly made an application to the Civil Judge, Sitapur, under the proviso to Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure asking him to state a case for the opinion of the High Court at Allahabad to which he was subordinate as to the invalidity of the impugned portion of the definition. The learned trial Judge held that it was not necessary for the disposal of the case to decide such question of invalidity. The appellant then made an application to the High Court of Allahabad under Article 228 of the Constitution. The High Court rejected the application. In the appeal preferred, the Supreme Court observed that the question raised in the case is as to the validity of a provision in the Zamindar's Debt Reduction Act involving as to the interpretation of the Constitution, for the validity of the provision is challenged on the ground that it contravenes an Article of the Constitution. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that without a decision of the said question, the case could not be disposed of. It is under those circumstances, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and accordingly requested the High Court to withdraw the case and either dispose it of itself or determine the question of the validity of the definition of a debt in the Zamindar's Debt Reduction Act and return the case to the Civil Judge, Sitapur for disposal in accordance with its determination of the question. It was a straight case where a suit was pending before a civil Court subordinate to the High Court in which a question as to the interpretation of the Constitution was involved. The proceedings were pending in a Court subordinate to that of a High Court. The said judgment is of no assistance to determine the real question that falls for consideration in the instant case.
23. The Courts, subordinate to the High Court are not entitled and empowered to determine the question as to the validity of any Act, Ordinance or Regulation or of any provision contained in an Act, Ordinance or Regulation. Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure mandates the subordinate Court to refer the case pending before it to the High Court if such a case involves a question as to the validity of any Act, Ordinance or Regulation, the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the case by duly stating and setting out its opinion and the reasons for such reference for the opinion of the High Court. But the Administrative Tribunal established and constituted under the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is clothed with necessary power and jurisdiction even to test the validity of a legislation and also determine the substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution insofar as the service related matters are concerned. The Tribunal is the "only Court" of first instance where all service related matters are required to be instituted for its consideration and final disposal in accordance with law. The Administrative Tribunals exercise the power of judicial review akin to that of the power exercised by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in such service related matters, however, subject to the judicial superintendence of this Court as held by the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra).
24. The Rajasthan High Court in Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, , took the view that the power of withdrawal in Article 228 of the Constitution has been given only in respect of cases pending before Courts alone, which were subject to appellate or ordinary revisional jurisdiction of High Court, and not before Tribunals. It is observed by the Court that "the Constitution makers seem to have been very anxious to use as far as possible very clear and unambiguous expressions in the various Articles of the Constitution, and, therefore, wherever they intended to apply a particular provision to any person or authority they clearly said so.......This being the case, it can hardly be believed that in Article 228, they would have been satisfied with using word "Court" alone, although they intended to apply it to Courts as well as Tribunals. In our opinion, power of withdrawal in Article 228 has been given only in respect of cases pending before Courts alone, which were subject to appellate or ordinary revisional jurisdiction of High Court, and not before Tribunals."
25. Thus the Administrative Tribunal cannot be held to be a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Article 228 of the Constitution of India. The Tribunal itself is entitled to decide the questions involving substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, the determination of which is necessary for disposal of the case pending before it. The question of transfer and withdrawal of any case from the Administrative Tribunal to this Court in order to decide such substantial questions of law does not arise. We are of the considered opinion that invocation of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 228 of the Constitution of India for transfer and withdrawal of a case pending in the Administrative Tribunal is misconceived and not maintainable.
26. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 228 of the Constitution of India cannot withdraw the case pending on the file of the Administrative Tribunal for the purpose of either disposing of the case or to determine the substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and return the case to the Tribunal for disposal in conformity with such determination made by the Court.
27. The next question that falls for consideration is as to whether this Court in exercise of its Jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can withdraw any case from the Administrative Tribunal in order to decide and dispose of the same in accordance with law?
28. It may be necessary to notice the Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which is to the following effect:
227. Power of superintendence over all Courts by the High Court:--(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may-
(a) call for returns from such Courts;
(b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such Courts; and
(c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such Courts.
(3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such Courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practising therein :
Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or (ables settled under Clause (2) or Clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor.
(4) Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any Court or Tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.
29. It is very well settled and needs no restatement in our hands that under Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court exercises both the judicial and as well as administrative superintendence over the hierarchy of the civil and criminal Courts functioning directly under its control. This supervisory jurisdiction is limited to see that the inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.
30. At once we may notice that under Article 227(1) of the Constitution, the High Court exercises the superintendence over all the Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. Such superintendence is judicial superintendence and not administrative superintendence. Whereas under Article 227(2) of the Constitution the High Court exercises both the judicial and administrative superintendence over such Courts functioning directly under its control. The nature of power of superintendence of the High Court exercised under Article 227(2) of the Constitution is clearly different from that of the power exercised under Clause (1) of the Article 227 of the Constitution.
31. The further question that falls for consideration is as to whether the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has the power to transfer the cases from one forum to the other?
32. In Mohd. Baquar v. Hyderabad State, AIR 1951 Hyd. 82, and Mohd. Abdul Raoof v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1951 Hyd. 50, the Hyderabad High Court in exercise of the power of judicial superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution transferred the cases from the Special Tribunal constituted under Special Tribunals Regulation.
33. In Ranbir Yadav v. Stale of Bihar, , the Supreme Court upheld the order of transfer of criminal cases from one Court of Sessions to the other by the Patna High Court in exercise of its administrative jurisdiction. It is observed that "however, from the material on record which we have already detailed, it appears that the order was passed by the High Court in its administrative jurisdiction. Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India every High Court has superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and its trite that this power of superintendence entitles the High Court to pass orders for administrative exigency and expediency." The Court rejected the contention that the administrative power could not be exercised at a stage when judicial power was not only available and operational but was equally effective and efficacious. The Court observed that "so long as power can be and is exercised purely for administrative exigency without impinging upon and prejudicially affecting the rights or interests of the parties to any judicial proceeding we do not find any reason to hold that administrative powers must yield place to judicial powers simply because in a given circumstances they coexist. On the contrary, the present case illustrates how exercise of administrative powers were more expedient, effective and efficacious."
34. It is required to notice that in all the three cases (5 to 7 supra) the proceedings were pending in the Courts subordinate to that of the High Court in respect of which the High Court exercises both the power of judicial and as well as administrative superintendence.
35. In Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank, , the Supreme Court while considering the nature and scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution in comparison to that of the jurisdiction under Article 228 of the Constitution held that Article 228 of the Constitution is only intended to confer jurisdiction and power on the High Court to withdraw a case for the purpose mentioned therein from the ordinary Courts of law whose decision may, in the normal course of things, be taken upto the High Court by way of an appeal. Whereas Article 227 is ofwider ambit; it does not limit the jurisdiction of the High Court to the hierarchy of Courts functioning directly under it under the Civil Procedure Code and Criminal Procedure Code but it gives the High Court power to correct errors of various kinds of all Courts and Tribunals in appropriate cases. It is further observed:
"Needless to add that errors as to the interpretation of the Constitution is not out of the purview of Article 227 although the High Court could not, under the powers conferred by this Article, withdraw a case to itself from a Tribunal and dispose of the same or determine merely the question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution arising before the Tribunal." (Emphasis is of ours).
36. The above judgment is an authority for the proposition that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot withdraw a case to itself from a Tribunal and decide the same or determine the substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and return the case to the Tribunal with a direction to dispose of the case in conformity with its opinion on the substantial question of law.
37. May be as in the case of Mohd Baquar and Mohd. Abdul Raoof (supra), the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial superintendence in order to render substantial justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice may transfer the proceedings from one Tribunal to the other, but in exercise of such power cannot withdraw the case from the Tribunal to itself for its disposal. We may, at once, clarify that even that power of transfer of a case from one Tribunal to the other under Article 227 of the Constitution is available only as against inferior Tribunals and not against the Tribunals constituted and established under the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 whose origin is traceable to Article 323-A of the Constitution. The High Court in exercise of both the judicial and as well as administrative superintendence conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution, may transfer any case from one subordinate Court to the other which functions directly under its control.
38. For the aforesaid reason, we are of the considered opinion that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot withdraw a case from the Administrative Tribunals constituted and established under the provisions of the Act on any ground whatsoever.
39. It is clear from the dicta laid down in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) that no litigant is entitled and be permitted to directly invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution for grant of any relief in service related matters. It will not be open for the litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. However, the decisions of Tribunals created pursuant to Article 323-A of the Constitution will be subject to this Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution before a Division Bench.
40. It is thus clear that this Court at the instance of an aggrieved litigant is entitled to judicially review the decision of the Tribunal. But this Court cannot entertain directly any writ petition in service related matters. But put it simply, this Court cannot exercise original jurisdiction in any service related matters. The power and jurisdiction is circumscribed. Therefore, this Court cannot withdraw any case or proceeding from the Tribunal even before any decision is rendered by the Tribunal. The decision alone is susceptible to be judicially reviewed by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
41. Withdrawal of an original proceeding by this Court for whatever reason in order to decide the same may amount to indirectly interfering with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) and such a course is impermissible. This Court is not only bound by the law declared by the Supreme Court but also bound to follow and enforce the law so declared by the Supreme Court in its letter and spirit. Any interference in this matter by this Court in order to transfer and withdraw the pending original proceeding from the Tribunal may amount to tinkering with the law declared by the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra). What cannot be done directly cannot be done in an indirect manner,
42. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered view that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction either under Article 226, or 227 read with Article 228 of the Constitution is not empowered to withdraw a case to itself from a Tribunal established and constituted under the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and dispose of the same or determine merely the question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution arising in such a case before the Tribunal.
43. For all the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in this writ petition. The same shall accordingly stand dismissed. No order as to costs.
44. The Court acknowledges the valuable assistance rendered by Sri D. Prakash Reddy and Sri Ramesh Ranganathan, learned Additional Advocates-General.
45. It is needless to observe that the observations, if any, made in this order shall have any bearing whatsoever upon the merits of the case in OA No. 2913 of 2002 pending before the Tribunal.