Delhi High Court
Aishani Chandna Mehra vs Rajesh Chandna & Ors on 8 January, 2019
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2019 DEL 1865
Author: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
Bench: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 8th January, 2019.
+ CS(OS) 235/2018
AISHANI CHANDNA MEHRA ..... Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Aman Nandrajog and Mr. Sumeer
Sodhi, Advs.
Versus
RAJESH CHANDNA & ORS ..... Defendants
Through: Mr. Shikhil Suri, Mr. Shiv Kumar Suri
and Ms. Vinishma Kant, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
IA No.12875/2018 (of the defendant no.1 u/O VII R-11 CPC)
1. The plaintiff has instituted this suit seeking partition of property
No.296, Block No.D, Defence Colony, New Delhi - 110 024, monies and
gold & jewellery of one Rita Chandna who is claimed to have died intestate
at Delhi on 14th April, 2018, pleading that (i) the three defendants are the
living son, daughter and husband of the said Rita Chandna; (ii) Rita
Chandna, besides the living son and daughter impleaded as defendants
herein, also had a son Rakesh Chandna who pre-deceased Rita Chandna; (iii)
the plaintiff is the daughter of the said Rakesh Chandna and granddaughter
of Rita Chandna; (iv) Rakesh Chandna was married to Shilpi Mehra, mother
of the plaintiff and of which marriage the plaintiff and her brother Sukrit
Mehra were born; (v) the mother of the plaintiff, after the demise in the year
2000 of Rakesh Chandna, in the year 2004 re-married one Sunil Mehra; and,
(vi) the plaintiff and her brother Sukrit Mehra were adopted by the said Sunil
Mehra; however the said adoption of the plaintiff is null and void ab-initio
being contrary to the provisions and essential conditions of adoption as
CS(OS) 235/2018 Page 1 of 17
prescribed in Section 11 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956
because Sunil Mehra, prior to the adoption of plaintiff, already had a Hindu
daughter namely Shraddha Mehra, aged 20 years out of his earlier marriage.
2. The suit was entertained and vide ad interim order dated 20th
September, 2018 status quo directed to be maintained with respect to the
estate of Rita Chandna as disclosed in the plaint.
3. The defendant no.1 seeks rejection of the plaint on the ground that the
plaintiff, in the plaint itself having admitted her adoption vide registered
Adoption Deed by Sunil Mehra, is left with no right, title or interest in the
estate of Rita Chandna.
4. The counsel for defendant no.1 and the counsel for the plaintiff have
been heard.
5. The contention of the counsel for the defendant no.1 is that the
plaintiff, on adoption by Sunil Mehra is deemed for all purposes to be the
child of her adoptive father Sunil Mehra and all ties of the plaintiff in the
family of her birth are deemed to be severed and replaced by those created
by the adoption in the adoptive family. Attention has been invited to Sections
12, 15 & 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. It is further
contended that the plaintiff having not taken any steps for having her
adoption by Sunil Mehra declared null and void and the limitation for the
plaintiff to seek such declaration having lapsed, the plaintiff is not entitled to
maintain this suit for partition of estate of her grandmother in the family of
her birth, claiming to be the daughter of a pre-deceased son of Rita Chandna.
Reliance is placed on Sitabai Vs. Ramchandra 1969(2) SCC 544, Dheer
Singh Vs. Amar Singh 1997 SCC OnLine Raj 649, Jai Singh Vs.
CS(OS) 235/2018 Page 2 of 17
Shakuntala (2002) 3 SCC 634 and Mst. Deu Vs. Laxmi Narayan (1998) 8
SCC 701.
6. Per contra, the counsel for the plaintiff has referred to Section 11 of
the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act and has contended that the
adoption of the plaintiff by Sunil Mehra is not valid since the said Sunil
Mehra, at the time of execution of the registered Adoption Deed by which
the plaintiff was purported to be adopted, had a Hindu daughter living. It is
argued that without the said essential condition being complied with, the
adoption of the plaintiff by Sunil Mehra is void ab-initio and did not severe
the ties of the plaintiff with her natural grandmother Rita Chandna and did
not create any ties in the adoptive family. It is further argued that what is not
valid or is void, is not required to be declared so and it is open to the plaintiff
to set up the plea of her adoption being void in any claim in the family of her
birth, as in the present case. Reliance is placed on Prem Singh Vs. Birbal
(2006) 5 SCC 353.
7. I have considered the rival contentions. However before proceeding to
deal with the same I must mention that Mr. Shikhil Suri counsel for the
defendant no.1 and Mr. Aman Nandrajog counsel for the plaintiff, both,
despite their young age have argued with great precision, maturity, without
wasting any time and following the highest traditions of the Bar.
8. Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, as per its preamble is an Act
to amend and codify the law relating to adoptions and maintenance among
Hindus. Section 4 of the said Act gives the Act an overriding effect and
provides that any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or
usage as part of that law, in force immediately before the commencement
CS(OS) 235/2018 Page 3 of 17
thereof shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which
provision is made therein and any other law in force immediately before the
commencement of the Act shall cease to apply to Hindus insofar as it is
inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act.
9. Section 11 of the Act is titled "Other conditions for a valid adoption"
and prescribes the conditions which must be complied with in every
adoption. One of such conditions is:-
"(ii) if the adoption is of a daughter, the adoptive father
or mother by whom the adoption is made must not
have a Hindu daughter or son's daughter (whether
by legitimate blood relationship or by adoption)
living at the time of adoption".
10. Sections 12, 15 & 16 to which reference has been made by the counsel
for the defendant no.1, are as under:-
"12. Effects of adoption - An adopted child shall be
deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or
mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the
adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the
family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed
and replaced by those created by the adoption in the
adoptive family :
Provided that -
(a) the child cannot marry any person whom he or
she could not have married if he or she had
continued in the family of his or her birth;
(b) any property which vested in the adopted child
before the adoption shall continue to vest in such
CS(OS) 235/2018 Page 4 of 17
person subject to the obligations, if any,
attaching to the ownership of such property,
including the obligation to maintain relatives in
the family of his or her birth;
(c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of
any estate which vested in him or her before the
adoption.
15. Valid adoption not to be cancelled. - No
adoption which has been validly made can be cancelled
by the adoptive father or mother or any other person, nor
can the adopted child renounce his or her status as such
and return to the family of his or her birth.
16. Presumption as to registered documents
relating to adoption - Whenever any document registered
under any law for the time being in force is produced
before any court purporting to record an adoption made
and is signed by the person giving and the person taking
the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the
adoption has been made in compliance with the
provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved."
11. The want of the counsel for the defendant no.1 is (i) that as long as the
registered Adoption Deed, vide which the plaintiff was adopted by Sunil
Mehra, remains and has not been declared void, the plaintiff under Section
12 is deemed to be the daughter of Sunil Mehra and all her ties in the family
of her birth stand severed; and, (ii) the Court has to presume that adoption of
the plaintiff by Sunil Mehra has been made in compliance with the
provisions of the Act and the plaintiff, to dislodge the said presumption, was
required to institute proceedings for having the registered Adoption Deed
CS(OS) 235/2018 Page 5 of 17
declared null and void and which the plaintiff has not done and the limitation
for which has expired.
12. The question for consideration thus boils down to, whether for having
an adoption declared as null and void, and for cancellation thereof, a suit or
other proceeding is required to be instituted or even without instituting the
suit or other proceeding, the invalidity of the adoption can be set up by way
of a claim or defence in a suit or other proceeding, wherever Adoption Deed
is cited to deny the claim or to meet the defence.
13. Supreme Court in Sitabai supra was not concerned with such an issue;
otherwise it was held, (i) the effect of adoption under the Act is that it brings
about severance of all ties of the child given in adoption in the family of his
or her birth; (ii) the child altogether ceases to have any ties with the family of
his birth; (iii) correspondingly, these very ties are automatically replaced by
those created by the adoption in the adoptive family; and, (iv) when either of
the spouses adopts a child, all the ties of the child in the family of his or her
birth become completely severed and these are all replaced by those created
by the adoption in the adoptive family; in other words, the result of adoption
by either spouse is that the adoptive child becomes the child of both the
spouses.
14. The same was the position in Dheer Singh supra and the observation
therein:-
"Once, adoption deed has been signed by the natural and
the adoptive father, the presumption of the adoption deed
being genuine has to be given due weightage as Section
16 of the Act, 1956 is a rule of evidence. Once the
registered adoption deed is produced in the court, the
CS(OS) 235/2018 Page 6 of 17
court is bound to presume that the adoption has been
made in compliance of the Act unless it is disproved. The
said presumption is not merely a statutory presumption
which can be rebutted in ordinary manner of rebuttal.
This presumption has to be dislodged by disproving all
the facts of adoption. The courts are bound to take the
factum of adoption proved and onus is shifted on the other
side to prove the contrary by disproving adoption."
cannot be read as precedent, making it incumbent on a person whose
Deed of Adoption is invalid, to institute a suit or other proceeding for having
the said invalidity declared.
15. Emphasis of the counsel for the defendant no.1 however was on Mst.
Deu supra and on the basis whereof it was argued that it was incumbent on
the plaintiff to, within the limitation prescribed in Article 57 of the Schedule
to the Limitation Act, 1963, institute a suit to have the adoption deed
declared null and void and the plaintiff cannot in this suit for partition prove
the invalidity of adoption.
16. Supreme Court in Mst. Deu supra was concerned with an application
for substitution, on the basis of an adoption deed, as a legal heir of a plaintiff
in a suit for partition. It was held (i) that in view of Section 16 supra,
whenever any registered document purporting to record an adoption made
and signed by the parties mentioned therein is produced before the court, the
court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the
provisions of the said Act unless and until it is disproved; (ii) it was not open
to the defendants in the said suit for partition to collaterally challenge the
said "registered deed of partition" (supposedly incorrect for "registered deed
for adoption"); and, (iii) in view of Section 16 supra it was open to the
CS(OS) 235/2018 Page 7 of 17
defendants to disprove such deed of adoption but for that they had to take
independent proceeding; the High Court was fully justified in directing
substitution on the basis of the registered adoption deed.
17. I am afraid, the aforesaid judgment also cannot be read as a precedent
on the question as has arisen. What has been held qua the aspect of
substitution as legal heir, will not apply to a substantive claim in a suit.
18. Jai Singh supra also, only lays down that Section 16 envisages a
statutory presumption that in the event of there being a registered document
pertaining to adoption, there would be a presumption that adoption has been
made in accordance with law.
19. The counsel for the defendant no.1, on the basis of Mst. Deu has
argued that similarly the plaintiff in the present suit for partition cannot make
a claim contrary to the registered adoption deed.
20. Prem Singh supra, on which reliance is placed by the counsel for the
plaintiff, on the contrary is concerned directly with the question as has arisen
in the present case and holds (i) Section 31 titled "When cancellation may be
ordered" of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 refers to both void and voidable
documents; (ii) it provides for a discretionary relief; (iii) when a document is
valid, no question arises of its cancellation; (iv) when a document is void ab-
initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same
is non-est in the eye of law as it would be a nullity; (v) once however a suit is
filed by the plaintiff for cancellation of the transaction, it would be governed
by Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act and even if Article 59 is
not attracted, the residuary Article would be; (vi) Article 59 would be
attracted when coercion, undue influence, misappropriation or fraud which
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the plaintiff asserts is required to be proved; it would therefore apply where
a document is prima facie valid; it would not apply only to instruments
which are presumptively invalid; (vii) if the plaintiff is in possession of a
property he may file a suit for declaration that the deed is not binding upon
him but if he is not in possession thereof, even under a void transaction, the
right by way of adverse possession may be claimed; and, (viii) thus, it is not
correct to contend that the provisions of the Limitation Act would have no
application at all in the event the transaction is held to be void.
21. Otherwise also, I find the question to be not res integra. Reference in
this regard may be made to:
(A) Gopal Vs. Basdeo 1886 SCC OnLine All 84 (DB) holding that
Article 57 can apply only to suits purely for a declaration that an
adoption is invalid or never, in fact, took place but where the suit is for
possession of property, to which another limitation law is applicable, it
will be governed by it, although the question of validity of adoption
may arise. It was further held that it is discretionary in a Court to
grant relief by declaration of a right, and consequently the fact that a
person has not sued for a declaration should not be a bar to a suit for
possession of property on any ground of limitation prescribed for the
former.
(B) Gulab Singh Vs. Natthu Singh 1895 SCC Online All 14 also
holding that Article 57 applies to simplicitor suits for declaration of
invalidity of adoption.
(C) Doddawa Vs. Yellawa AIR 1922 Bom 223 (FB) also holding
that omission to bring a declaratory suit qua adoption within the time
CS(OS) 235/2018 Page 9 of 17
provided therefor is not a part of a suit for possession. It was further
held that the mere fact that an adoption alleged to have taken place is
not challenged does not set time running in favour of any party, so that
another party may acquire a title and it is open to the other party to say
"your adoption is invalid" and make a substantive claim.
(D) Radha Dulaiya Vs. Rashik Lal AIR 1923 All 25 (DB) also
holding that where the suit is not merely for declaration of invalidity
of adoption, it will not be governed by Article 57 of the Schedule to
the Limitation Act.
(E) Kalyanadappa Vs Chanbasappa 1924 SCC OnLine PC 14
holding that, (i) the words "to obtain a declaration that an alleged
adoption is invalid..." in Article 57 of the Schedule to the Limitation
Act relate to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act; (ii) that the date
from which the time of three years provided for in Article 57 begins to
run is a subjective or personal date; and, (iii) that if the adoption is
void, the plaintiff is entitled to brush it aside and sue for possession to
which he has a right and the time limit wherefor is twelve years from
the death of the person as whose reversioner possession is claimed.
(F) Ravula Kamalamma Vs. Ravula Venkata Narasimha Reddi
MANU/AP/0205/1967 (DB) also holding that (i) the relief that the
adoption is invalid or in fact did not take place need not expressly be
asked for; however, if in essence that is the relief which is asked for,
undoubtedly Article 57 would apply; (ii) a suit for possession on the
basis of the plaintiff's title would not be a suit which could be said to
fall within the purview of Article 57, though it might be necessary in
CS(OS) 235/2018 Page 10 of 17
such a suit for the plaintiff to establish incidentally the invalidity of
adoption; and, (iii) merely because an issue in reference to adoption is
framed and that the matter has been gone into, cannot change the
character of the suit and convert the suit into one under Article 57 of
the Schedule to the Limitation Act.
(G) Jamnadas Vs. Radhabai MANU/SC/0549/1969 also holding
that a mere statement in the plaint that the adoption had never taken
place or was invalid does not attract Article 57 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, when the real relief claimed in the suit is otherwise. It
was further held that the fact that it was necessary to decide the
question of adoption, still did not bring the suit within the purview of
Article 57.
(H) Sadasiba Ratha Vs. Bimala Dibya AIR 1982 Ori 129 holding
that (i) the relief even though claimed of declaration of invalidity of
adoption was redundant and a surplusage inasmuch as a declaration
regarding adoption was not necessary to decree the suit for partition,
though it may be necessary to decide the said question; and, (ii) there
was a consensus of the High Courts that Article 57 applies only to
suits where a bare declaration that an adoption is invalid is asked for
and it does not apply to a suit for possession of property, even though
it may be necessary to find that a given adoption is invalid.
(I) Hiraman Manga Jangale Vs. Girjabai 1982 SCC OnLine Bom
292 also holding that a mere fact that an adoption alleged to have
taken place is not challenged does not set time running.
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(J) Daya Devi Vs. Angoori Devi AIR 2002 Delhi 295 held that
Article 57 of the Limitation Act deals with a suit brought to obtain a
declaration to the effect that an alleged adoption is invalid or never in
fact took place; however, where the principal relief is not the relief for
obtaining declaratory decree as to the adoption being invalid but is a
suit for the principal relief to recover possession on the ground of title
as heirs and it was only incidentally that the adoption deed was sought
to be avoided, the suit could be instituted within the limitation
prescribed for a suit for possession.
(K) Bodla Ravindranath Vs. Chintala Venkatalaxmi 2005 SCC
OnLine AP 587 holding that the relief that an adoption is invalid need
not expressly be asked for; if and only if, it is the essence i.e. the relief
asked for by the plaintiff, will Article 57 apply. It was held to be the
settled view that a suit for possession on the basis of title would not be
a suit which would fall under Article 57 merely because an issue in
reference to adoption is framed and that that has been gone into. The
same was held not to change the character of the suit. SLP(Civil)
No.13899/2006 preferred against the said judgment was dismissed on
15th January, 2008.
(L) Gangavva Vs. Ningavva 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 44 holding
that, (i) the words in Article 57 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act,
"to obtain a declaration" have to be understood in the context of
Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act; (ii) the suit envisaged in Article
57 is a suit under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act; (iii) for Article
57 to apply, the suit must be in truth and substance, one for a
CS(OS) 235/2018 Page 12 of 17
declaration that an adoption is invalid; however, when the plaintiff
does not admit adoption, the question of the plaintiff seeking a
declaration that the alleged adoption is invalid, would not arise; (iv) it
is not necessary for the plaintiff to seek such a declaration before
claiming right to the property by inheritance; (v) a suit for possession
or a suit for partition do not fall within Article 57, even if in such a
suit, the Court has to incidentally go into the question of validity of
adoption; and, (vi) a suit for partition cannot be treated as one for
setting aside of the adoption, merely because one of the claims set up
therein attracts Article 57.
22. The contention of the counsel for the defendants thus is contrary to the
consistent view of the Courts including the Supreme Court.
23. Otherwise also, I have in Sunil Kohli Vs. Subhash Chand Dua 2016
SCC OnLine Del 3244, Ashok Kumar Vs. Mohd. Rustam (2016) 227 DLT
385 and Capital Land Builders Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Komal 2018 SCC OnLine Del
11867, held (i) that in suits claiming relief with respect to immoveable
property, the relief of declaration, even if claimed, is superfluous and the
limitation for the suit would be governed by the limitation provided for the
relief of possession; the longer limitation period provided for instituting a
suit for recovery of possession would not be curtailed by the lesser limitation
of three years provided for a suit for declaration; (ii) that to hold otherwise
would tantamount to providing two different periods of limitation for a suit
for recovery of possession of immovable property based on title i.e. of three
years if the suit, besides for the said relief is also for the relief of declaration
of title and of twelve years, if no relief of declaration is claimed; (iii) that a
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relief of declaration of title to immovable property is implicit in a suit for
recovery of possession of immovable property based on title inasmuch as
without establishing title to property, if disputed, no decree for the relief of
possession also can be passed; (iv) that thus, merely because a plaintiff in
such a suit also specifically claims the relief of declaration of title, cannot be
a ground to treat him differently and reduce the period of limitation available
to him from that provided of twelve years, to three years; and, (v) that when
a relief of declaration is coupled with the relief of possession, the larger
period of limitation for the relief of possession and not the lesser period of
limitation for the relief of declaration would apply. Reference in this regard
may also be made to Vidur Impex and Traders Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Pradeep
Kumar Khanna (2017) 241 DLT 481 and C. Natrajan Vs. Ashim Bai
(2007) 14 SCC 183.
24. What has been held hereinabove with respect to a suit for possession
would equally apply to a suit for partition, as the present suit is.
25. The cause of action for the present sit for partition accrued to the
plaintiff only on 14th April, 2018 on demise of the paternal grandmother of
the plaintiff in the family of her birth. It is not the case of the defendants that
the claim for partition is barred by time.
26. The answer to the question framed in para 12 above, in my view is in
the statute itself and is beyond pale of any controversy, Section 5 of the
Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act is as under:-
"5. Adoptions to be regulated by this chapter. -
(1) No adoption shall be made after the commencement of
this Act by or to a Hindu except in accordance with the
CS(OS) 235/2018 Page 14 of 17
provisions contained in this Chapter, and any adoption
made in contravention of the said provision shall be void.
(2) An adoption which is void shall neither create any
rights in the adoptive family in favour of any person
which he or she could not have acquired except by reason
of the adoption, nor destroy the right of any person in the
family of his or her birth.
The same unequivocally provides that any adoption made in
contravention of the provisions of the Act shall be void and an adoption
which is void shall neither create any rights in the adoptive family in favour
of any person which he or she could not have acquired except by reason of
adoption nor destroy any rights of the person in the family of his or her birth.
If that be so, then in my view there is no need for institution of a suit for
declaration as void of the adoption and for cancellation of the adoption deed
vis-à-vis the plaintiff. However, if such a suit were to be filed, it would have
to satisfy the conditions as to limitation.
27. When Section 12 of the Act provides the effect of adoption, it provides
so on the premise of adoption being valid. An adoption which is contrary to
provisions of the Act, per Section 5(1) is void and per Section 5(2) neither
creates any rights nor destroys any rights. Section 12 cannot be read as
providing otherwise. Section 15 also prohibits cancellation by the adoptive
parents or any other person of adoption, only if adoption has been validly
made. A presumption under Section 16 on which much emphasis was placed
by the counsel for the defendants, also is a rule of evidence and is not
absolute and permits evidence to be led that adoption has not been made in
CS(OS) 235/2018 Page 15 of 17
compliance with the provisions of the Act. Once evidence to rebut the
presumption is permitted to be led, there can be no rejection of plaint.
28. Once the statute declares an adoption made in contravention of the
provisions therein to be void, the purported act of adoption, even if by way of
a registered document cannot validate the same.
29. „Void‟ is defined in Black‟s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition as "of no legal
effect; null; of no effect whatsoever; thus i.e. an absolute nullity" and Section
5(2) of the Act further provides that and adoption which is void shall neither
creates any rights in the adoptive family nor destroys the rights in the family
of birth. Thus, if the plaintiff proves the factum of Sunil Mehra, at the time of
execution of the registered adoption deed having a living Hindu daughter as
is claimed, notwithstanding the registered adoption deed, the plaintiff, neither
acquired any rights in the family of Sunil Mehra nor did the registered
adoption deed destroy any rights of the plaintiff in the family of her birth.
Once there is a prohibition in law to do something, the thing is deemed to
have been not done and/or not had any effect.
30. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar (2000) 3 SCC
460 it was held that when in pursuance to an order which is without
jurisdiction and nullity, a sale deed is executed, the sale deed is also a nullity
and it is not necessary to seek a declaration about the validity of the sale deed
and ignoring the said document, a suit for a substantive relief can be filed
contending the documents to be a nullity. This Court also, in Sanjay
Kaushish Vs. D.C. Kaushish AIR 1992 Delhi 118 held that if a particular
document or decree is void, the person affected by the said document or
decree can very well ignore the same and file a suit seeking substantive relief
CS(OS) 235/2018 Page 16 of 17
which may be available to him without seeking any declaration that the said
decree or document is void or any consequential relief of cancellation of the
same. Supreme Court, again in Ranganayakamma Vs. K.S. Prakash (2008)
15 SCC 673 held it to be a well settled principle of law that a void document
is not required to be avoided whereas a voidable document must be.
Reliance was placed on Prem Singh supra. Again, in The Rajasthan State
Industrial Development Vs. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society
Jaipur (2013) 5 SCC 427 referring to the earlier judgments, it was held that
void means non-existent from its very inception; the word, "void" has been
defined as: ineffectual; nugatory; having no legal force or legal effect; unable
in law to support the purpose for which it was intended; it also means merely
a nullity, invalid; null; worthless; sipher; useless and ineffectual and may be
ignored even in collateral proceeding as if it never were. It was further held
that a thing which is non-est is not required to be set aside and there is no
need for an order to quash it.
31. The registered adoption deed, if what the plaintiff pleads is proved to
be correct, from the moment of execution thereof, did not create any rights in
favour of the plaintiff in the family of Sunil Mehra or destroy any rights of
the plaintiff in the family of her birth. The plaint is thus not liable to be
rejected.
32. IA No.12875/2018 is dismissed.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
JANUARY 08, 2019 „pp/bs‟ (corrected and released on 25th January,2019) CS(OS) 235/2018 Page 17 of 17