Karnataka High Court
Karnataka Electricity Board vs Ashok Iron Works Pvt. Ltd. on 3 October, 1988
Equivalent citations: ILR1989KAR1501, 1989(1)KARLJ306
ORDER Chandrakantaraj Urs, J.
1. This revision petition is directed against the order dated 23rd February, 1988 in regard to the maintainability of the suit and payment of Court fee arising out of the plea taken in the written statement by the defendant, the suit was not maintainable as well as the Court fee paid was Inadequate.
2. The facts leading to the impugned order may be stated briefly and they are as follows: The plaintiff filed a suit seeking a declaration that certain bill submitted by the 1st defendant-Karnataka Electricity Board through its Assistant Executive Engineer, City Division No. 2, Belgaum, was a nullity and therefore not enforceable. The plaintiff a consumer of electrical energy supplied by the 1st defendant-Board valued his relief at Rs. 1,000/- and paid Court fee thereon in terms of Section 24(d) of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The defendants raised the two pleas set-out earlier in the course of this order inter alia on the ground that the substantive relief prayed for in the suit was to extinguish the right of the Board to collect Rs. 12,17,992-50 billed for energy supplied and therefore the Court fee payable thereon should really be on the value of the bill in accordance with Section 38 of the Act and not under Section 24(d) of the Act, It also contended that the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be deemed to be barred because the plaintiff had an alternative remedy under the Regulations framed under the Electricity Supply Act. The trial Court formulated these two questions as points 1 and 2 and they are as follows:
(1) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of the allegations in para 2 of the written statement-cum-objections to Interim Application No. 1 filed by defendant No. 2? (2) Whether the Court fee paid by the plaintiff-Company on the reliefs claimed by it is proper?
It answered both the questions against the defendants. Therefore, the present revision petition.
3. In this Court, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of SETRA KALAMMA v. APPAYANAHALLI CHENNABASAMMA AND ORS1981(2) KLJ 261. in support of the proposition canvassed that the substantial relief sought for was not a declaration of the right of the plaintiff, but to prevent the Electricity Board from collecting the amount billed. Undoubtedly, that decision was directly on Section 38(1) of the Act. Section 38(1) of the Act reads as follows:
"38. Suits for cancellation of decree, etc.-
(1) In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest in money, movable or immovable property, fee shall be computed on the value of the subject matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be -
if the whole decree or other documents is sought to be cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which the decree was passed or other document was executed;
if a part of the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property.
(2) If the decree or other document is such that the liability under it cannot be split up and the relief claimed relates only to a particular item of property belonging to the plaintiff or to the plaintiff's share in any such property, fee shall be computed on the value of such property or share or on the amount of the decree, whichever is less.
Explanation 1 - A suit to set aside an award shall be deemed to be a suit to set aside a decree within the meaning of this Section.
Explanation 2 - In a suit for cancellation of a decree and possession of any property, the fee shall be computed as in a suit for possession of such property."
4. There is no difficulty in understanding the import of the Section in so far as it relates to decree for money or other property having money value. The difficulty arises only when it refers to other document which in turn purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest In money, movable or immovable property and when fee shall be computed on the value of the subject matter of the suit and such value shall be deemed to be, if the whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which the decree was passed or other document was executed. Therefore, the key to the Interpretation lies in the two conditions incorporated in the body of the Section. The document must be something which is executed which in turn implies volition on the part of the persons who are parties to the document. In Setra Kalamma's case what was involved was an Insurance policy nominating a particular person to be the recipient of the benefits under the Life Insurance Policy. The declaration sought was with reference to nullifying that nomination which In effect was to extinguish the right of the person nominated to receive the amount. It was in that circumstance that the Court ruled as to what constituted the substantial relief on the facts of that case. The suit bill is not a document executed as we normally understand that expression. The bill is an intimation indicating the amount that is due for services rendered or goods supplied which the consumer has to pay person who has billed for such supply of goods or services rendered. It is a document originating from the supplier to the consumer. To put it broadly, it cannot be said that that is a document which is executed for any particular purpose creating right, title and interest or extinguish such right, title or interest. Even if the substantive relief theory is accepted what the plaintiff has to prove in the Court below is the fact that the energy is not supplied and therefore is not liable to pay. If there is any other ground it must be relatable to other facts on which the plaintiff depends to deny the Board the right to receive the payment under the bill. Therefore, declaration that the bill is not liable to be enforced against him is a matter clearly falling under Section 24(d) of the Act which is the residuary clause in that Section. If the relief is not valued in the plaint then the plaintiff is bound to pay Rs. 1,000/- particularly when the relief cannot be valued on the amount billed. Therefore, the view taken by the trial Court is correct and Court fee paid must be held to be sufficient.
5. The other argument that on account of the Regulations providing for an appeal, the suit is barred is equally untenable. Any civil right may be enforced n a Court by way of a suit. Civil dispute may also be resolved in a like manner when there is no express prohibition and the Regulations do not specifically provide for barring the jurisdiction of the Courts. It cannot be said that Regulation 41 of the Electricity Supply Act expressly or impliedly acts as a bar. In such cases it will be open to the parties aggrieved to resort to one or the other method. In fact, the plaintiff could as well have filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to have the bill cancelled. If he has not chosen that remedy, the defendants cannot take advantage of it. They will have to defend the suit on merits.
6. The view taken by the trial Court is correct and does not call for interference by this Court. Therefore, the revision petition is misconceived and it is rejected.