Orissa High Court
Ram Krushna Padhiary vs State Of Orissa on 21 July, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1995(II)OLR419
Author: A. Pasayat
Bench: A. Pasayat
JUDGMENT A. Pasayat, J.
1. Prayer of petitioner not to summon or examine witnesses named in the supplementary charge-sheet having been turned down by the learned Sessions Judge, Koraput, Jeypore in S.C. Nos. 273 and 274 of 1991, this revision application has been filed. The proceedings have a chequered cereer. At various stages this Court was approached on several occasions
2. A brief reference to factual aspects is necessary for disposal of the application. On the basis of FIR lodged at Jeypore Town P.S. two GR cases were instituted in relation to accusations punishable under Section 302 read with Section 201 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, IPC). After completion of investigation charge-sheets were submitted on 24-7-1991 against the petitioner and another. The cases were committed to the Court of Session. While the cases were pending, further investigation was undertaken and supplementary charge-sheets along with case diary were submitted by police. Summons were issued to the witnesses named in the charge-sheets for examination during trial. Petitioner's stand was that there was no scope for further investigation, and in any event witnesses who are available to be examined were not examined earlier and prosecution has not thrown any light as to under what circumstances further investigation was necessary. Placing reliance on provisions of Section 173(6) of the Cods of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, the 'Code'), learned Sessions Judge held that there was scope for further investigation. Supplementary charge-sheets were submitted on-21-4-1992, accepted by learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Jeypore, and copies were supplied to the accused on 2-5-1992. Supplementary charge-sheets were received by learned Session Judge on 5-6-1992 and on consideration of charge-sheets originally submitted and supplementary charge-sheets, charge was framed on 7-5-1992. Order relating to framing of charge was assailed before this Court, but without any success. Charge was framed under Sections 302, 364 read with Section 34, IPC against petitioner and another. Petitioner urged before learned Sessions Judge that resort to Section 311 of the Code was uncalled for. This plea did not find acceptance by learned Sessions Judge on the ground that Section 311 of the Code had no application at all, and further investigation by prosecution was supportable under Section 173(8) of the Code.
3. Mr. H. S. Mishra for the petitioner submitted that further investigation without permission of Court is illegal and learned Sessions Judge should not have brought the case within the ambit of Section 173(8) of the Code. It is also submitted that no explanation has been offered by prosecution as to why witnesses subsequently indicated in the charge-sheet were not examined earlier by investigating agency and as to under what circumstances further investigation was felt necessary. Mr. N. Prusty for State on the other hand contended that Section 173(8) of the Code has been rightly applied by learned Sessions Judge. It is submitted that absence of prior permission does not invalidate the subsequent investigation.
4. A report under Section 173(1) of the Code normally brings an end to the investigation. Sometimes, however, the police officer after submitting the report comes upon evidence having hearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the greater interest of the society and for furthering ends of justice, the police officer should be able to collect that evidence and send it to the Magistrate. The section does not say or define the terms "charge-sheet" or "final report". The expressions are not used in the Code, but it is understood in Police Manuals of several States containing the Rules and regulations, to be a report filed under Section 170 and Section 169 of the Code respectively.
Under the old Code, there was no statutory provision for further investigation after forwarding the police report under Section 173(2) to the Magistrate and there was divergence of view as to whether further investigation after submission of such report was permissible. Section 173(8) of the Code has been newly added in order to make it expressly clear that merely because an Investigating Officer has sent a report to the Magistrate, he will not stand precluded from making further investigation in the case and submitting a further report or reports to the Magistrate regarding the additional evidence gathered by him in the further investigation. Supplementary reports can be submitted by the investigating agency to the Magistrate notwithstanding that the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence upon a police report submitted under Section 173(2) of the Code. A supplementary report can be filed after submission of the first report, if on further investigation fresh evidence is available. The subsequent report cannot be submitted without further investigation by the police and without obtaining further evidence relating to the offence. The Code has no specific provision empowering an investigating Officer to file a revised charge-sheet on the basis of the same material on the basis on which the first charge sheet was filed, nor does the section prohibit filling of a revised charge-sheet on the basis of same material. Unless cognizance is taken on submission of police report; Sub-section (8) of Section 173 cannot be pressed in aid for collecting further evidence which really can be called Fn aid if further evidence is discovered after the filing of the charge-sheet, or the police report on the completion of investigation. Section 173(8) operates at a stage after the submission of charge-sheet (the report under Sub-section (2) of Section 173 and enables the Officer-in-charge of police station to take up further investigation and after obtaining further evidence, to forward a further report. The police has statutory right and duty "register" every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The police has the statutory right and duty to investigate the facts and the circumstances of the case where the commission of a cognizable offence was suspected and to submit the report of such Investigation to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report. These statutory rights and duties of the police are not circumscribed by any power superintendence or interference in the Magistrate ; nor is any sanction required from a Magistrate to empower the police to investigate into a cognizable offence; (See King Emperor v. Khwaja Nagis Ahmad : (1944) 71 Ind. App. 203 : AIR 1945 PC 18). Even after cognizance is taken, a Magistrate is empowered to direct further investigation, if necessary, and to receive additional report or reports. The number of investigations into a crime is not limited by l3w and where one has been completed by the submission of a report, another may be begun on further information being received. The prosecution is not cribed, cabined or confined within the corners of the report under this action. There is no restriction placed by the Legislature on the reception of subsequent material before the conclusion of the enquiry or trial. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 is only permissive in character. Therefore, neither the prosecution, i.e. the informant nor the accused can claim as a matter of right a direction from a Court commanding further investigation by the Investigating Officer under Sub-section (8) of Section 173 after charge-sheet is filed after investigation. Said provision clearly recites that "nothing in the Section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation after filing a report". The Code thus statutorily recognised what was always implied. Codification is only a recognition and not a restriction. When Section 173(8) gives recognition to an unqualified power, it can be read as importing a prohibition. Thus seeking a prohibition would be against the tenor and statutory intent.
5. In Ram Lal Narayan v. State (Delhi Admn.) : AIR 1979 SC 1791, it was observed by the Apex Court not notwithstanding that a Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence upon a police report submitted under Section 173 of 1898 Coda, the. right of the police for further investigation is not exhausted and the police can exercise such right as often as necessary when fresh information comes to light. Neither Section 173 nor Section 190 lead to say that the power of the police to further investigate was exhausted by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Practice, convenience and prepondenance of authority permits repeated investigations on discovery of fresh facts. The Law Commission in its 41st report recommended that the right of the police to make further investigation should be statutorily affirmed, and in Clauses 14, 23 of the report necessary recommendations were made. Accordingly the new provision of Section 173(8) was introduced.
6. Anyone acquainted with the day-to-day working in the Criminal Courts will be alive to the . practical necessity of the police possessing the power to make further investigation and submit a supplemental report, it is in the interest of both the prosecution and the defence that the police should have such power. It is easy to visualise a case where fresh material may come to light which would implicate persons not previously accused, or absolve persons already accused. When it comes to the notice of the investigating agency that a person already accused of an offence has a good alibi, is it hot the duty of that agency to investigate the genuineness of the plea of alibi and submit a report to the Magistrate ? After all the investigating agency has greater resources at its command than a private individual. Similarly, where the involvement of persons who are not already accused comes to the notice of the investigating agency, the investigating agency cannot keep quiet and refuse to investigate the fresh information. It is their duly to investigate and submit a report to the Magistrate upon the involvement of other persons. In either care, it is for the Magistrate to decide upon his further course of action depending upon the stage at which the case is before him. If he has already taken cognizance of the offence, but has not proceeded with the enquiry or trial, he may direct the issue of process to" persons freshly discovered to be involved and deal with all the accused, in a single enquiry or trial. If the case of which he has previously taken cognizance has already proceeded to some extent, he may take fresh cognizance of the offence disclosed against the newly involved accused and proceed with the case as a separate case. What action a Magistrate is to take in accordance with the provisions of the Code in such situations is a matter best left to the discretion of the Magistrate. The criticise that a further investigation by the police would trench upon the proceedings before the Court is really not of very great substance, since whatever the police may do, the final discretion in regard to further action is with the Magistrate. In the interests of independence of the Magistracy and the Judiciary, in the interest of the purity of the administration of criminal justice, and in the interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such administration, it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform the Court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts come to light. Where the police desired to make a further investigation, they could express their regard and respect for the Court seeking its formal permission to make' further investigation. But mere absence of such permission would not make the order of the Magistrate vulnerable. These aspects were highlighted by me Surendra Sahoo and Ors v. The State of Orissa (1994) 7 OCR 139.
7. Great emphasis was led by Mr. Mishra for petitioner on the observations of Apex Court in Ram Lal Narayan's case (supra) at paragraph 21 of judgment about desirability of prior permission. As indicated above, it is certainly desirable that police should express their regard and respect for Court by seeking its formal permission to make further investigation, but mere absence would not make order of the Magistrate vulnerable. I therefore, find no substance in the plea that absence of permission rendered the course adopted by police vulnerable. It goes without saying that if any point is raised during trial about lack of basis for the delayed examination of certain persons, the effect and relevance thereof shall be considered on its own merits.
The revision application is devoid of merits and is dismissed.