Madras High Court
The Special Tahsildar (Land ... vs Kaliyammal on 22 December, 2011
Author: G.Rajasuria
Bench: G.Rajasuria
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 22/12/2011 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.RAJASURIA A.S.(MD)No.215 of 2011 A.S.(MD)Nos.220 to 221, 225 to 228, 234 to 236, 238, 239, 243 to 245, 250, 252, 257, 261, 265 to 267, 269, 271, 273, 278, 279, 283,284, 286, 289, 290 to 292, 295, 296, 298, 299, 301, 302, 304, 306, 307, 309, 310, 312 to 315, 317, 319, 322, 323, 325, 326, 328, 331, 332, 335, 337 to 338, 340, 344, 345, 348, 351 to 358, 360, 365, 366, 368, 370, 373 to 380, 382 to 387, 391, 393, 395 to 400, 402 to 408, 410, 411, 415, 416, 418 to 420, 422 to 429, 433 to 441, 444, 446, 447, 453, 456, 459, 461, 465, 470, 474 to 476, 478, 479, 482, 484, 485, 487 to 489, 492 to 496, 498 to 500, 502 to 505, 510, 511, 513, 514, 516, 517, 519 to 523, 525, 526, 527, 530 to 534, 536 to 542, 544, 545, 551 to 553, 556, 558, 560, 562, 564, 565, 567 to 571 of 2011 and M.P(MD)Nos.2 of 2011 (in all cases) A.S.(MD)No.215 of 2011: The Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Air Force Station, Revenue Divisional Office, No.1, Vallam Road, Thanjavur. ... Appellant/ Referring Officer Vs. 1.Kaliyammal 2.Thangappan ... Respondents 1 & 2/Claimants 3.The Defence Estate Officer, Madras Circle, 306, Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai - 18. ... 3rd Respondent/Beneficiary Prayer in A.S.(MD)No.215 of 2011 Appeal filed under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, against the judgment and decree dated 03.02.2010 passed in L.A.O.P.No.354 of 1997 by the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Thanjavur. !For Appellant ... Mr.S.Chellapandian, Additional Advocate General assisted by Mr.S.Kumar, Govt. Advocate ^For Respondents... Mr.A.Rajendran for R.1 and R.2 Mr.K.K.Ramakrishnan for R.3 * * * * * :COMMON JUDGMENT
A.S.No.215 of 2011 has been filed to get set aside the judgment and decree dated 03.02.2010 passed in L.A.O.P.No.354 of 1997 by the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Thanjavur and accordingly, other appeals have also been filed with the prayers respectively.
2. The facts giving rise to the filing of these batch of appeals would run thus:
The action taken under the Land Acquisition Act was for acquiring a vast tract of a land for setting up Air Force Station at Thanjavur. Consequently, necessary steps were taken as per law for acquiring the lands and ultimately, the relevant awards emerged. The details relating to the publication of the notifications under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and other details are as under:
A.S. R.C. Date of 4(1) Award No. Land Value Fixed Land Value Fixed Nos. No. Notification & Date by the Land by the lower Court Acquisition Officer Rs. (Per Cent) Rs.(Per Cent) 215/11 77/91 07.01.1992 18/94 107.14 820/-
27.12.94 220/11 182/91 03.04.1992 11/94 57.14 820/-
20.10.94 221/11 81/91 27.04.1992 12/94 106.67 820/-
21.10.94 225/11 81/91 27.04.1992 12/94 106.67 820/-
21.10.94 226/11 3/91 02.12.1991 1/94 563.27 820/- 30.06.94 227/11 86/91 07.03.1992 15/94 57.14 820/- 18.11.94 228/11 79/91 25.12.1991 10/94 57.14 820/- 04.11.94 234/11 91/91 21.02.1992 6/94 107.14 820/- 02.09.94 235/11 86/91 07.03.1992 15/94 57.14 820/- 18.11.94 236/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/- 16.09.94 238/11 30/91 24.12.1991 6/94 120/- 820/- 05.08.94 239/11 72/91 02.03.1992 11/94 120/- 820/- 21.10.94 243/11 46/91 14.01.1992 18/94 120 & 186 820/- 12.01.95 244/11 81/91 27.04.1992 12/94 106.67 820/- 21.10.94 245/11 81/91 27.04.1992 12/94 106.67 820/- 21.10.94 250/11 81/91 27.04.1992 12/94 106.67 820/- 21.10.94 252/11 81/91 27.04.1992 12/94 106.67 820/- 21.10.94 257/11 182/91 03.04.1992 11/94 57.14 820/- 20.10.94 261/11 72/91 02.03.1992 11/94 120/- 820/- 21.10.94 265/11 46/91 14.01.1992 18/94 120 & 186 820/- 12.01.95 266/11 46/91 14.01.1992 18/94 120 & 186 820/- 12.01.95 267/11 101/91 23.03.1992 19/94 120/- 820/- 02.03.95 269/11 77/91 07.01.1992 18/94 107.14 820/- 27.12.94 271/11 7/91 24.12.1991 4/94 106.67 820/- 15.07.94 273/11 91/91 21.02.1992 6/94 107.14 820/- 02.09.94 278/11 182/91 03.04.1992 11/94 57.14 820/- 20.10.94 279/11 46/91 14.01.1992 18/94 120 & 186 820/- 12.01.95 283/11 183/91 30.04.1992 15/94 114.81 820/- 27.10.94 284/11 183/91 30.04.1992 15/94 114.81 820/- 27.10.94 286/11 7/91 24.12.1991 4/94 106.67 820/- 15.07.94 289/11 81/91 27.04.1992 12/94 106.67 820/- 21.10.94 290/11 72/91 02.03.1992 11/94 120/- 820/- 21.10.94 291/11 72/91 02.03.1992 11/94 120/- 820/- 21.10.94 292/11 81/91 27.04.1992 12/94 106.67 820/- 21.10.94 295/11 27/91 03.06.1992 17/94 120/- 820/- 30.12.94 296/11 86/91 07.03.1992 15/94 57.14 820/- 18.11.94 298/11 52/91 14.01.1992 3/94 106.67 820/- 30.06.94 299/11 72/97 02.03.1992 11/94 120/- 820/- 21.10.94 301/11 42/91 14.01.1992 13/94 120 & 186 820/- 21.10.94 302/11 81/91 27.04.1992 12/94 106.67 820/- 21.10.94 304/11 101/91 23.03.1992 19/94 120/- 820/- 02.03.95 306/11 77/91 07.01.1992 18/94 107.14 820/- 27.12.94 307/11 81/91 27.04.1992 12/94 106.67 820/- 21.10.94 309/11 77/91 07.01.1992 18/94 107.14 820/- 27.12.94 310/11 7/91 24.12.1991 4/94 106.67 820/- 15.07.94 312/11 91/91 21.02.1992 6/94 107.14 820/- 02.09.94 313/11 135/91 08.05.1992 22/94 130/- 820/- 05.05.95 314/11 135/91 08.05.1992 22/94 130/- 820/- 05.05.95 315/11 92/91 06.04.1992 12/94 107.14 820/- 22.10.94 317/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/- 16.09.94 319/11 77/91 07.01.1992 18/94 107.14 820/- 27.12.94 322/11 101/91 23.03.1992 19/94 120/- 820/- 02.03.95 323/11 64/91 25.12.1991 14/94 57.14 820/- 18.11.94 325/11 72/91 02.03.1992 11/94 120/- 820/- 21.10.94 326/11 36/91 24.12.1991 7/94 120/- 820/- 05.08.94 328/11 72/91 02.03.1992 11/94 120/- 820/- 21.10.94 331/11 46/91 14.01.1992 18/94 120 & 186 820/- 12.01.95 332/11 3/91 02.12.1991 1/94 563.27 820/- 30.06.94
335/11 181/91 28.04.1992 16/94 114.81 & 57.14 820/-
18.11.94 337/11 72/91 02.03.1992 11/94 120/- 820/-
21.10.94 338/11 76/91 20.02.1992 8/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 340/11 69/91 24.01.1992 10/94 106.67 820/-
23.09.94 344/11 130/91 06.04.1992 17/94 130/- 820/-
16.12.94 345/11 130/91 06.04.1992 17/94 130/- 820/-
16.12.94 348/11 135/91 08.05.1992 22/94 130/- 820/-
05.05.95 351/11 181/91 28.04.1992 16/94 114.81 & 820/-
18.11.94 57.14 352/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 353/11 75/91 20.02.1992 21/94 107.14 820/-
20.02.95 354/11 65/91 25.12.1991 5/94 57.14 820/- 05.10.94 355/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/- 16.09.94 356/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/- 16.09.94
357/11 181/91 28.04.1992 16/94 114.81 & 57.14 820/-
18.11.94 358/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/0- 09.11.94 360/11 72/91 02.03.1992 11/94 120/- 820/-
21.10.94 365/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 366/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 368/11 135/91 08.05.1992 22/94 130/- 820/-
05.05.95 370/11 65/91 25.12.1991 5/94 57.14 820/- 05.10.94
373/11 46/91 14.01.1992 18/94 120 & 186 820/-
12.01.95 374/11 72/91 02.03.1992 11/94 120/- 820/-
21.10.94 375/11 46/91 14.01.1992 18/94 120 & 186 820/-
12.01.95 376/11 81/91 27.04.1992 12/94 106.67 820/-
21.10.94 377/11 65/91 25.12.1991 5/94 57.14 820/- 05.10.94 378/11 131/91 12.02.1992 7/94 130/- 820/- 14.09.94
379/11 181/91 28.04.1992 16/94 114.81 & 820/-
18.11.94 57.14 380/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 382/11 37/91 24.12.1991 5/94 106.67 820/-
15.07.94 383/11 37/91 24.12.1991 5/94 106.67 820/-
15.07.94 384/11 49/91 14.01.1992 2/94 106.67 820/-
27.06.94 385/11 69/91 24.01.1992 10/94 106.67 820/-
23.09.94 386/11 80/91 07.03.1992 8/94 57.14 820/- 24.10.94 387/11 135/91 08.05.1992 22/94 130/- 820/- 05.05.95 391/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/- 09.11.94 393/11 80/91 07.03.1992 8/94 57.14 820/- 24.10.94
395/11 46/91 14.01.1992 18/94 120 & 186 820/-
12.01.95 396/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 397/11 76/91 20.02.1992 8/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 398/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 399/11 75/91 20.02.1992 21/94 107.14 820/-
20.02.95 400/11 64/91 25.12.1991 14/94 57.14 820/-
18.11.94 402/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 403/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 404/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 405/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 406/11 91/91 21.02.1992 6/94 107.14 820/-
02.09.94 407/11 91/91 21.02.1992 6/94 107.14 820/-
02.09.94 408/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 410/11 91/91 21.02.1992 6/94 107.14 820/-
02.09.94 411/11 131/91 12.02.1992 7/94 130/- 820/-
14.09.94 415/11 91/91 21.02.1992 6/94 107.14 820/-
02.09.94 416/11 91/91 21.02.1992 6/94 107.14 820/-
02.09.94 418/11 46/91 14.01.1992 18/94 120 & 186 820/-
12.01.95 419/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 420/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 422/11 91/91 21.02.1992 6/94 107.14 820/-
02.09.94 423/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 424/11 132/91 02.04.1992 10/94 130/- 820/-
03.10.94 425/11 131/91 12.02.1992 7/94 130/- 820/-
14.09.94 426/11 131/91 12.02.1992 7/94 130/- 820/-
14.09.94 427/11 91/91 21.02.1992 6/94 107.14 820/-
02.09.94 428/11 91/91 21.02.1992 6/94 107.14 820/-
02.09.94 429/11 131/91 12.02.1992 7/94 130/- 820/-
14.09.94 433/11 134/91 08.04.1992 20/94 130/- 820/-
31.01.95 434/11 91/91 21.02.1992 6/94 107.14 820/-
02.09.94 435/11 131/91 12.02.1992 7/94 130/- 820/-
14.09.94 436/11 64/91 25.12.1991 14/94 57.14 820/-
18.11.94 437/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 438/11 134/91 08.04.1992 20/94 130/- 820/-
31.01.95 439/11 91/91 21.02.1992 6/94 107.14 820/-
02.09.94 440/11 64/91 25.12.1991 14/94 57.14 820/-
18.11.94 441/11 84/91 03.04.1992 18/94 57.14 820/-
30.11.94 444/11 131/91 12.02.1992 7/94 130/- 820/-
14.09.94 446/11 64/91 25.12.1991 14/94 57.14 820/-
18.11.94 447/11 132/91 02.04.1992 10/94 130/- 820/-
03.10.94 453/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 456/11 52/91 14.01.1992 3/94 106.67 820/-
30.06.94 459/11 72/91 02.03.1992 11/94 120/- 820/-
21.10.94 461/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 465/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 470/11 46/91 14.01.1992 18/94 120 & 186 820/-
12.01.95 474/11 79/91 25.12.1991 10/94 57.14 820/-
04.11.94 475/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 476/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 478/11 72/91 02.03.1992 11/94 120/- 820/-
21.10.94 479/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 482/11 81/91 21.07.1992 12/94 106.67 820/-
12.10.94 484/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 485/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 487/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 488/11 46/91 14.01.1992 18/94 120 & 186 820/-
12.01.95 489/11 69/91 24.01.1992 10/94 106.67 820/-
23.09.94 492/11 46/91 14.01.1992 18/94 120 & 186 820/-
12.01.95 493/11 52/91 14.01.1992 3/94 106.67 820/-
30.06.94 494/11 5/91 05.12.1991 5/94 220/- 820/- 21.07.94 495/11 181/91 28.04.1992 16/94 114.81 & 57.14 820/- 18.11.94 496/11 80/91 07.03.1992 8/94 57.14 820/- 24.10.94 498/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/- 09.11.94 499/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/- 09.11.94 500/11 79/91 25.12.1991 10/94 57.14 820/- 04.11.94 502/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/- 16.09.94 503/11 181/9128.04.1992 16/94 114.81 & 57.14 820/- 18.11.94 504/11 69/91 24.01.1992 10/94 106.67 820/- 23.09.94 505/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/- 09.11.94 510/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/- 16.09.94 511/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/- 16.09.94 513/11 131/91 12.02.1992 7/94 130/- 820/- 14.09.94 514/11 132/91 02.04.1992 10/94 130/- 820/- 03.10.94 516/11 131/91 12.02.1992 7/94 130/- 820/- 14.09.94 517/11 131/91 12.02.1992 7/94 130/- 820/- 14.09.94 519/11 132/91 02.04.1992 10/94 130/- 820/- 03.10.94 520/11 181/91 28.04.1992 16/94 114.81 & 57.14 820/- 18.11.94 521/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/- 16.09.94 522/11 182/91 03.04.1992 11/94 57.14 820/- 20.10.94 523/11 79/91 25.12.1991 10/94 57.14 820/- 04.11.94 525/11 182/91 03.04.1992 11/94 57.14 820/- 20.10.94 526/11 79/91 25.12.1991 10/94 57.14 820/- 04.11.94 530/11 181/91 28.04.1992 16/94 114.81 & 57.14 820/- 18.11.94 531/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/- 16.09.94 527/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/- 16.09.94 532/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/- 09.11.94 533/11 182/91 03.04.1992 11/94 57.14 820/- 20.10.94 534/11 134/91 08.04.1992 20/94 130/- 820/- 31.01.95 536/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/- 16.09.94 537/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/- 16.09.94
538/11 125/91 23.04.1992 14/94 120 & 186 820/-
31.10.94 539/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 540/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 541/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 542/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 544/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 545/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 551/11 131/91 12.02.1992 7/94 130/- 820/-
14.09.94 552/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 553/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 556/11 182/91 03.04.1992 11/94 57.14 820/-
20.10.94 558/11 131/91 12.02.1992 7/94 130/- 820/-
14.09.94 560/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 562/11 134/91 08.04.1992 20/94 130/- 820/-
31.01.95 564/11 182/91 03.04.1992 11/94 57.14 820/-
20.10.94 565/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 567/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 568/11 51/91 25.12.1991 12/94 57.14 820/-
09.11.94 569/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 570/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94 571/11 90/91 21.02.1992 9/94 107.14 820/-
16.09.94
3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with, such passing of awards quantifying the compensation, various references under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, were made to the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Thanjavur. Consequently, the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Thanjavur, assessed the value of the land and ultimately, enhanced the compensation to the tune of Rs.820/- (Rupees Eight Hundred and Twenty only) per cent, from the one assessed by the Land Acquisition Officer. Whereupon the Land Acquisition Officer preferred several appeals as set out supra.
4. At this juncture, it is just and necessary to recollect and recount as to what happened earlier in some of the similar matters. It so happened that on reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the lower Courts assessed the value of the land. Whereupon, the Land Acquisition Officer preferred several appeals before this Court and this Court vide judgments dated 23.03.2001, in A.S.Nos.519 and 520 of 1999 and in A.S.Nos.416 to 418 of 1999, confirmed the judgment of the learned Sub Judge in assessing the value of the land at Rs.1,176/- per cent ultimately. The Government preferred Special Leave Petitions vide Nos.24578-24579 of 2004 before the Honourable Apex Court and in that the Honourable Apex Court passed order as under:
" ... Mr.N.N.Goswamy, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted before us that though he is not in a position to challenge the statements contained in the impugned judgments of the High Court, which make it apparent that the judgments and orders were passed on concession or by consent, there are large number of other cases of acquisition where the quantum awarded by the Reference Court has been challenged before the High Court. Those matters are still pending before the High court and if the same principle of valuation is applied, the petitioner will suffer great injustice. His contention is that the lands in respect of which cases are still pending before the High Court are situate far away from the land in respect of which sale deed had been produced as Annexure A-9, as an exemplar as well as the lands subject matter of the impugned judgments. The law is fairly well settled that the Court must value the land acquired having regard to its value applying the statutory guidelines. Lands lying far away from the lands in respect of which sale deed is produced by way of evidence, cannot have the same value. The value of such lands may be more or less depending upon their potentiality and location and having regard to other relevant considerations which the court has to keep in mind under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.
We appreciate the submission urged on behalf of the petitioner and, therefore, we clarify that in all matters still pending before the High Court, it will be open to the petitioner to challenge the Award of the Reference Court of such grounds as it may be advised, and without anything more, the impugned judgments in these special leave petitions will not be treated as a precedent."
5. At the time of disposal of the matters by the Honourable Apex Court, several appeals were pending before this Court. The Government by way of precaution made representation before the Honourable Apex Court and got direction as aforesaid that what the High Court decided on the earlier cited judgments need not be followed as precedents for deciding the present appeals.
6. The learned Counsel for the respondents/land owners, subsequently in those pending matters would submit that the present appeals cannot be treated as a separate group from that of the appeals decided as per the aforesaid cited judgments of the High Court and that there should not be any discrimination among the equals.
7. The perusal of the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court would demonstrate that it is not a mere decision of the Honourable Apex Court on facts concerning a different type of case, but specifically in relation to existing appeals then under consideration before this Court, such directions were issued to the effect that those pending appeals shall be dealt with independently de hors the judgments passed by this Court earlier as cited supra. Accordingly, this Court decided those batch of appeals in different sets and assessed the compensation, modifying the award of the lower Courts.
8. The point for consideration is as to whether the compensation awarded by the lower Courts is not in accordance with the mandates of the Honourable Apex Court in various precedents but purely on rough and ready method without adhering to the norms for taking exemplar document and deductions under various sub-heads?
9. Accordingly, heard both sides.
10. Both sides in unison would submit that the present appeals are relating to one and the same type of cases and the lands acquired also are in the same vicinity as that of the lands involved in the earlier batch of appeals, which were disposed of by this Court vide common judgment dated 24.04.2008 in A.S.(MD)Nos.119 of 2008 and batch, and they agree for awarding the same amount of compensation.
11. Therefore, I would like to recollect what actually was set out in the earlier judgments of this Court dated 24.04.2008 in A.S.(MD)Nos.119 of 2008 and batch, in similar appeals and follow the same pattern in assessing the compensation and the discussions in the earlier matters would be on the following line, which are mostly applicable to these appeals also.
12. The Land Acquisition Officer preferred appeals on the following main grounds:
The lower Court committed an error in fixing the market value on Sq. ft basis, even though, the lands acquired are situated in Panchayat limit. The land value should not be assessed on cent basis also. The lower Court relied on sample sale deeds relating to smaller extent of lands sold for exorbitant price. There is nothing to show that the house plots were actually sold under the sale deeds relied on by the claimants. Those sale deeds were not proved by examining the vendor and the vendee concerning those sale deeds. The Reference Court has not properly made deductions towards development charges. The charge has not followed the belt system also. A mere reading of grounds of appeal would clearly demonstrate that the Land Acquisition Officer never adverted to the fact that the property is situated in a developing area.
13. At this juncture, I would like to highlight that the grounds of appeal are one sided as they are oblivious to the existing facts and situations which prevailed at the time of the Land Acquisition in these cases and the fact that a large mass of land was acquired en bloc for setting up an Air Force Station.
14. The gist and kernel of the earlier approach by this Court in its judgment dated 23.03.2001, in A.S.Nos.519 and 520 of 1999 and in A.S.Nos.416 to 418 of 1999, was to the effect that the Court took into account Ex.C.14, the sale deed dated 01.03.1991 executed by one Balusamy in favour of Dhanalakshmi, in R.S.No.168/8 tranferring an extent of 2,400 sq.ft as a plot for a sum of Rs.10,800/- (Rupees Ten Thousand and Eight Hundred only). In other words as per Ex.C.14, the land to an extent of one cent was valued at Rs.1,960/- and out of that 40% was deducted towards development charges and the land value was arrived at Rs.1,176/- per cent and consequently, the awards were passed with usual statutory entitlements.
15. The topo sketch relating to the entire land concerned marked in different colours, was relied on by both sides to highlight the location and other features. In fact, Ex.C.14, which was taken as a basic document for assessing the value and passing the award, is situated in S.No.168 just some what nearer to the Thanjavur - Pudukkottai State Public Highway. The said Ex.C.14, is obviously dated 01.03.1991 whereas in the same year, Section 4(1) notifications were made relating to earlier cases and in the year 1992, Section 4(1) notifications were made as aforesaid concerning these cases. As such, there was some force in the contention of the learned Government Pleader that Ex.C.14 might have emerged relating to such smaller extent purely for the purpose of getting higher compensation.
16. Furthermore, I am of the view that Ex.C.14 referred to a smaller extent of plot, but the area intended to be acquired is a vast piece of agricultural land for Air Force Station at Thanjavur. Hence, in such a case, the normal rule is that when a sale deed referring to a similar extent of plot is taken as an exemplar for assessing a vast extent of agricultural land, some reduction should be made from the value found in the exemplar. Since there is weighty objections put forth on the Government side as against Ex.C.14, I am of the considered opinion that Ex.C.13, the sale deed dated 13.03.1989 which emerged almost two years anterior to such Section 4(1) notifications, could be relied on. I would clarify that Ex.C.13 is the one found referred to in the earlier judgment of this Court dated 23.03.2001, in A.S.Nos.519 and 520 of 1999 and in A.S.Nos.416 to 418 of 1999. Keeping these factors in mind, on scrutiny of records, it is found that among the documents already marked in the earlier proceedings, Ex.C.13 dated 13.03.1989 appears to be a document which would be beyond controversy for the reason that it emerged almost three years anterior to Section 4(1) notifications in these cases. Wherefore, on the side of the Government, there cannot be any objection to it as though it is a cooked up document for getting higher compensation.
17. Ex.C.13, relates to the sale of a plot of 2,400 sq.feet for a sum of Rs.9,600/- so to say, at the rate of Rs.4/- per sq.ft in the S.No.168/1 which forms part of the vast land acquired and accordingly, if worked out as per Ex.C.13, the value per cent of land would come to Rs.1,744/- (Rupees One Thousand Seven Hundred and Forty Four only). As such about three years had elapsed after the emergence of Ex.C.13 and then only, Section 4(1) notifications emerged. It is therefore clear that during the year 1992, the value of the land in all probabilities might have got escalated but still the same 1989 value is taken. A mere perusal of the sketch and the relevant available records speaks that it is a fast developing area. Considering the purpose of acquisition for setting up the Air Force Station, having the entire land as one block, there need not be any discrimination relating to the various portions of the same one block of land. It is also evident and obvious that the land acquired had the potentiality of becoming plots as the sample sale deeds filed on the side of the claimants earlier also would demonstrate the same. The fact also remains that Tamil University is already existing in the vicinity and the National Highway namely Thanjavur - Pudukkottai road is cutting across the huge mass of land acquired by the Government under these land acquisition proceedings.
18. This Court in the judgment dated 23.03.2001, in A.S.Nos.519 and 520 of 1999, at paragraph No.7 held as under:
"7. It is evident from a perusal of the records that Tamil University, Paddy Processing Research Centre, Thanjavur Textiles, Tantex, Kamala Subramaniam Matriculation School and the present Air Force Station, apart from other residential areas are very nearer to the acquired lands which situate in the main road referred to above. The said facts would lead to conclude that there is potentiality for the acquired lands from the claimants, by the Government of Tamil Nadu. The market value has to be arrived at not only taking into consideration of the potentiality of the land but also the purpose for which the said lands were acquired. As already pointed out, the piece of land sold under Ex.A.9 dated 01.03.1991 had fetched Rs.4.50 per square foot."
19. The Land Acquisition Officer also in the earlier counters filed before the Sub Court would state that the aforesaid Institutions along with Matriculation Schools and Industrial Workers Quarters are all situated about 2 - 3 Kms away from the land acquired and that the land acquired is situated 5 Kms from the Thanjavur Municipal area. A distinction is sought to be made by the Land Acquisition Officer between the land acquired and the developed area. The land acquired is a vast tract of land and in such a case, the developed areas which are allegedly 2 - 3 Kms away from the land acquired, cannot be taken as adverse factors. Thanjavur Municipality is situated with 5 Kms and that should be taken as a plus point in favour of the appellant and not an adverse one.
20. The Sub Court as well as the High Court clearly and categorically pointed out that the sample deeds relied on by the Land Acquisition Officer for assessing the market value are having no proximity to the land acquired and that the fixation of compensation per cent was totally without any basis. The alleged thirty sample sale deeds which emerged within three years anterior to Section 4(1) notifications, as per the findings of the Sub Court as well as the High Court in the previous proceedings were not reflecting the true market value. Those thirty sale deeds as per the earlier findings were ignored. Even during arguments before me, on the Government side, it has not been shown as to how the value arrived at by the Land Acquisition Officer was in order and that too ignoring the sale deeds relied on by the claimants. As such, the increase in the value of land would have been more during the year 1992 from that of the year 1989 to which Ex.C.13 relates. Robust common sense warrants to take the value for smaller extent in the year 1989, as the yardstick for assessing larger extent in the year 1992 in the same vicinity. Inasmuch as a vast extent of agricultural land is being assessed taking into consideration the value as it prevailed in the year 1992, by placing reliance on Ex.C.13 of the year 1989, no notional increase at 10% per year be given. As such, accordingly if worked out, per cent it comes to the same value of Rs.1,744/- for assessing the larger extent in the year 1992 during which Section 4(1) notifications were published. Over and above the deduction of 1/3rd from the value towards development charges, additionally 20% is being deducted to offset the price concerning the small plot of the year 1989 and also for the amount that would be incurred for effecting developments.
21. Both sides are not in a position to point out that there are other sale deeds in the same vicinity which would reflect any other true market value of the land before the publication of Section 4(1) notifications. Even though there is larger extent of land situated to the east of the said Public Highway, clinching documents are not available, yet the documents relating to S.No.168 situated to the west side of the road alone are available and among those documents, Ex.C.13 was chosen, whereas earlier Ex.C.14, was chosen by this Court while delivering judgments as aforesaid and that turned out to be no more precedent in view of the direction of the Honourable Apex Court as set out supra.
22. This Court is fully aware of the fact that normally exemplar sale deed should relate to a land in the same vicinity and nearer to the place where the lands are acquired. Here, all the aforesaid notifications were published relating to one block of land for setting up Air Force Station and in such a case, taking into account the purposes of acquisition, i.e., setting up an Air Force Station, one and the same type of valuation can be resorted to and there need not be any discrimination. In fact, the land in S.No.168 forms part of the earlier Section 4(1) notifications. When the area covered under the exemplar sale deed Ex.C.13 forms part of the larger land acquired, there cannot be any plausible objection to place reliance on it.
23. In this connection earlier, the learned Counsel for the claimants would cite the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in K.Periasami v. Sub Tehsildar (Land Acquisition) reported in (1994) 4 Supreme Court Cases 180 and develop his argument to the effect that there should not be any discrimination in awarding the compensation between two Benches of the same High Court. Such an argument cannot be countenanced in view of the order of the Honourable Apex Court in Special Leave Petition Nos.24578-24579 of 2004, referred to supra.
24. The learned Counsel for the claimants would also cite the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in Smt.Lila Ghosh (dead) through LR v. The State of West Bengal reported in Supreme Court Judgments on Land Acquisition (1994-2004) Volume II page No.2053. An excerpt from it, would run thus:
"5. We are of the opinion that this was not a fit case for application of the belting method. The acquisition was of land on which a film studio stood. The acquisition was for the purposes of the film studio. It was a compact block of land which was acquired for a specific purposes. The land was not acquired for development into small plots where the value of plots near the road would have a higher value whilst those further away from may have a compact blocks is acquired the belting method would not be the correct method."
As such, it is clear that the aforesaid observations made by the Honourable Apex Court is squarely applicable to this case also.
25. The catena of decisions relating to the compensation in land acquisition cases would mandate that the sales relating to small pieces of lands, if they are genuine and reliable and comparable to the land acquired, the same could be relied on. In this regard, the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in Basavva v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer reported in (1996) 9 Supreme Court Cases 640, could rightly be relied on as cited by the learned Counsel for the claimants. An excerpt from it, would run thus:
"3.Having given our consideration, the question that arises for consideration is whether the High Court has committed any error of law in fixing the compensation at the rate of Rs.56,000/- per acre? On the principle of deductions in the determination of the compensation, this Court in K.Vasundara Devi v. Revenue Divisional Officer, LAO [(1995) 5 SCC 426] has considered the entire case law and has held that the Court, in the first instance, has to consider whether sales relating to smaller pieces of lands are genuine and reliable and whether they are in respect of comparable lands. In the event the Court finds that such sales are genuine and reliable and the lands have comparable features, sufficient deduction should be made to arrive at the just and fair market value of large tracts of land. The time-lag for real development and the waiting period for development are also relevant consideration for determination of just and adequate compensation. Each case depends upon its own facts. For deduction of development charges, the nature of the development, conditions and nature of land, the land required to be set apart under the building rules for roads, sewerage, electricity, parks, water etc. and all other relevant circumstances involved are to be considered. In this case, the facts recorded by the High Court are that Ex.P.10 sale deed is dependable sale but it is in respect of a small plot of land situated at a distance of more than 1 Km. It is also found that the land in the area is not developed and there is no development in those lands though the lands are capable of being used for non-agricultural purpose. On those findings the High Court held that the market value under Ex.P.10 cannot form the sole basis but keeping in view the developments the lands are capable of fetching compensation at the rate of Rs.56,000 after deducting 65%. For developmental charges, that deduction between 33-1/3 to 53% was held to be valid by this Court in several judgments. In Vasundara Devi case 63% deduction was upheld. In view of the fact that development of land would have taken years, the High Court has deducted another 12%. Obviously, the High Court kept in view the fact that the lands under Ex.P.10 were situated at far-flung places from the lands under acquisition and since the land takes long time for development it has given additional deduction of 12%, i.e.53 + 12% = 65% in determination of the compensation. On the basis of the rationale referred to above, the principle adopted by the High Court cannot be said to be illegal. Thus considered, we hold that there is no justification for interference in the finding recorded by the High Court or to further increase the compensation."
26. Relating to the deduction is concerned, previously 40% was deducted towards the development charges. For setting up the Air Force Station, the ground should be levelled and the major part of the area should be cemented and various other amenities should be installed before putting that land into use as Air Force Station.
27. At this juncture, I would also like to refer to the following recent decisions of the Honourable Apex Court:
(i) Chandrashekar v. Land Acquisition Officer reported in 2011(13) SCALE
48. Certain excerpts from it, would run thusly:
"18. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the analysis of the legal position referred to in the foregoing two paragraphs, we are of the view that there is no discrepancy on the issue, in the recent judgments of this Court. In our view, for the "first component" under the head of "development", deduction of 33-1/3 percent can be made. Likewise, for the "second component"
under the head of "development" a further deduction of 33-1/3 percent can additionally be made. The facts and circumstances of each case would determine the actual component of deduction, for each of the two components. Yet under the head of "development", the applied deduction should not exceed 67 percent. That should be treated as the upper benchmark. This would mean, that even if deduction under one or the other of the two components exceeds 33-1/3 percent, the two components under the head of "development" put together, should not exceed the upper benchmark.
19. In Lal Chand's case (supra) and in Andhra Pradesh Housing Board's case (supra), this Court expressed the upper limit of permissible deductions as 75 percent. Deductions upto 67 percent can be made under the head of "development". Under what head then, would the remaining component of deductions fall? Further deductions would obviously pertain to considerations other than the head of "development". Illustratively a deduction could be made keeping in mind the waiting period required to raise infrastructure, as also, the waiting period for sale of developed plots and or built-up areas. This nature of deduction may be placed under the head "waiting period". Illustratively again, deductions could also be made in cases where the exemplar sale transaction, is of a date subsequent to the publication of the preliminary notification. This nature of deduction may be placed under the head "de-escalation". Likewise, deductions may be made for a variety of other causes which may arise in different cases. It is however necessary for us to conclude, in the backdrop of the precedents on the issue, that all deductions should not cumulatively exceed the upper benchmark of 75 percent. A deduction beyond 75 percent would give the impression of being lopsided, or contextually unreal, since the land loser would seemingly get paid for only 25 percent of his land. This impression is unjustified, because deductions are made out of the market value of developed land, whereas, the acquired land is undeveloped (or not fully developed). Differences between the nature of the exemplar land and the acquired land, it should be remembered, is the reason/cause for applying deductions. Another aspect of this matter must also be kept in mind. Market value based on an exemplar sale, from which a deduction in excess of 75 percent has to be made, would not be a relevant sale transaction to be taken into consideration, for determining the compensation of the acquired land. In such a situation the exemplar land and the acquired land would be uncomparable, and therefore, there would be no question of applying the market value of one (exemplar sale) to determine the compensation payable for the other (acquired land). It however needs to be clarified, that even though on account of developmental activities (under the head "development"), we have specified the upper benchmark of 67 percent, it would seem, that for the remaining deduction(s), the permissible range would be upto 8 percent. That however is not the correct position. The range of deductions, other than under the head "development", would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Such deductions, may even exceed 8 percent, but that would be so only, where deductions for developmental activities (under the head "development") is less than 67 percent, i.e., as long as the cumulative deductions do not cross the upper benchmark of 75 percent. We therefore hold, that the range for deductions, for issues other than developmental costs, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, they may be 8 percent, or even the double thereof, or even further more, as long as, cumulatively all deductions put together do not exceed the upper benchmark of 75 percent.
20. Before applying deductions for ascertaining the market value of the undeveloped acquired land, it would be necessary to classify the nature of the exemplar land, as also, the acquired land. This would constitute the second step in the process of determination of the correct quantum of deductions. The lands under reference may be totally undeveloped, partially developed, substantially developed or fully developed. In arriving at an appropriate classification of the nature of the lands which are to be compared, reference may be made to the developmental activities referred to by us in connection with the "first component", as also, the "second component" (in paragraph 17 above). The presence (or absence) of one or more of the components of development, would lead to an appropriate classification of the exemplar land, and the acquired land. Comparison of the classifications thus arrived, would depict the difference in terms of development, between the exemplar land and the acquired land. This exercise would lead to the final step. In the final step, the absence and presence of developmental components, based on such comparison, would constitute the basis for arriving at an appropriate percentage of deduction, necessary to balance the differential factors between the exemplar land and the acquired land.
* * * * *
27. Our conclusions in respect of the quantum of permissible deductions have been recorded in paragraphs 18 and 19 hereinabove. While determining the validity of individual deductions, it is also imperative to examine whether or not the total deductions put together fall within legal parameters. We have upheld 55 percent deduction accorded by the High Court towards "development". We have also individually upheld deduction of 10 percent on account of "de- escalation", as also, the deduction of 5 percent on account of "waiting period". Cumulatively these deductions would amount to 70 percent (55+10+5=70). The outer benchmark for deductions laid down by this Court in Lal Chand's case (supra) and in Andhra Pradesh Housing Board's case (supra) is 75 percent. Cumulatively also the deduction allowed by the High Court, fall well within the parameters laid down by this Court. We therefore find no infirmity in the quantum of accumulated deductions applied by the High Court during the course of making an assessment of the market value of the acquired land."
(ii) Subh Ram and others v. State of Haryana and another reported in (2010) 1 Supreme Court Cases 444. Certain excerpts from it, would run thus:
"27. Administrator General of W.B. v. Collector, Varanasi [(1988) 2 SCC 150]contains a precise statement as to the concept of deducting development cost. This Court stated: (SCC p. 157, para 12) "12. It is trite proposition that prices fetched for small plots cannot form safe bases for valuation of large tracts of land as the two are not comparable properties. . The principle that evidence of market value of sales of small, developed plots is not a safe guide in valuing large extents of land has to be understood in its proper perspective. The principle requires that prices fetched for small developed plots cannot directly be adopted in valuing large extents. However, if it is shown that the large extent to be valued . is ripe for use for building purposes; that building lots that could be laid out on the land would be good selling propositions and that valuation on the basis of the method of hypothetical layout could with justification be adopted, then in valuing such small, laid out sites the valuation indicated by sale of comparable small sites in the area at or about the time of the notification would be relevant. In such a case, necessary deductions for the extent of land required for the formation of roads and other civil amenities; expenses of development of the sites by laying out roads, drains, sewers, water and electricity lines, and the interest on the outlays for the period of deferment of the realisation of the price; the profits on the venture, etc. are to be made. In Brig. Sahib Singh Kalha v. Amritsar Improvement Trust[(1982) 1 SCC 419], this Court indicated that deductions for land required for roads and other developmental expenses can, together, come up to as much as 53 per cent. But the prices fetched for small plots cannot directly be applied in the case of large areas, for the reason that the former reflects the 'retail' price of land and the latter the 'wholesale' price."
(emphasis supplied) This Court referred to and relied upon several earlier decisions including three-Judge Bench decisions in Mirza Nausherwan Khan v. Collector (LA)[(1975) 1 SCC 238] and Padma Uppal v. State of Punjab[(1977) 1 SCC 330].
28. In Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(1988) 3 SCC 751], this Court held: (SCC pp. 755-56, para 4) "4. (15) . a large block of land will have to be developed by preparing a layout, carving out roads, leaving open space, plotting out smaller plots, waiting for purchasers (meanwhile the invested money will be blocked up) and the hazards of an entrepreneur. The factor can be discounted by making a deduction by way of an allowance at an appropriate rate ranging approximately between 20 per cent to 50 per cent to account for land required to be set apart for carving out lands and plotting out small plots. The discounting will to some extent also depend on whether it is a rural area or urban area, whether building activity is picking up, and whether waiting period during which the capital of the entrepreneur would be locked up, will be longer or shorter and the attendant hazards."
It should be noted that deduction of 20% to 50% referred to therein is only in regard to the land to be earmarked for roads, community areas, etc. and does not refer to further deduction towards the expenses of development.
29. In K.S. Shivadevamma v. Asstt. Commr. & Land Acquisition Officer [(1996) 2 SCC 62] this Court held: (SCC p. 65, para 10) "10. It is then contended that 53% is not automatic but depends upon the nature of the development and the stage of development. We are inclined to agree with the learned counsel that the extent of deduction depends upon development need in each case. Under the Building Rules 53% of land is required to be left out. This Court has laid as a general rule that for laying the roads and other amenities 33-1/3% is required to be deducted. Where the development has already taken place, appropriate deduction needs to be made. In this case, we do not find any development had taken place as on that date. When we are determining compensation under Section 23(1), as on the date of notification under Section 4(1), we have to consider the situation of the land development, if already made, and other relevant facts as on that date. No doubt, the land possessed potential value, but no development had taken place as on the date. In view of the obligation on the part of the owner to hand over the land to the City Improvement Trust for roads and for other amenities and his requirement to expend money for laying the roads, water supply mains, electricity, etc. the deduction of 53% and further deduction towards development charges @ 33-1/3%, as ordered by the High Court, was not illegal."
30. In Atma Singh v. State of Haryana [(2008) 2 SCC 568] this Court reiterated the settled principles regarding deductions thus: (SCC p. 576, para
14) "14. The reasons given for the principle that price fetched for small plots cannot form safe basis for valuation of large tracts of land, according to cases referred to above, are that substantial area is used for development of sites like laying out roads, drains, sewers, water and electricity lines and other civic amenities. Expenses are also incurred in providing these basic amenities. That apart it takes considerable period in carving out the roads making sewers and drains and waiting for the purchasers. Meanwhile the invested money is blocked up and the return on the investment flows after a considerable period of time. In order to make up for the area of land which is used in providing civic amenities and the waiting period during which the capital of the entrepreneur gets locked up a deduction from 20% onward, depending upon the facts of each case, is made."
31. The legal position is therefore clear and well settled. But in Atma Singh, after reiterating the said principle regarding deduction of development cost, this Court made an observation that no deduction need be made having regard to the purpose of acquisition, which requires to be clarified. We extract the relevant portion below: (SCC pp. 576-77, para 15) "15. The question to be considered is whether in the present case those factors exist which warrant a deduction by way of allowance from the price exhibited by the exemplars of small plots which have been filed by the parties. The land has not been acquired for a housing colony or government office or an institution. The land has been acquired for setting up a sugar factory. The factory would produce goods worth many crores in a year. A sugar factory apart from producing sugar also produces many byproducts in the same process. One of the byproducts is molasses, which is produced in huge quantity. Earlier, it had no utility and its disposal used to be a big problem. But now molasses is used for production of alcohol and ethanol which yield lot of revenue. Another by- product begasse is now used for generation of power and press mud is utilised in manure. Therefore, the profit from a sugar factory is substantial. Moreover, it is not confined to one year but will accrue every year so long as the factory runs. A housing board does not run on business lines. Once plots are carved out after acquisition of land and are sold to public, there is no scope for earning any money in future. An industry established on acquired land, if run efficiently, earns money or makes profit every year. The return from the land acquired for the purpose of housing colony, or offices, or institution cannot even remotely be compared with the land which has been acquired for the purpose of setting up a factory or industry. After all the factory cannot be set up without land and if such land is giving substantial return, there is no justification for making any deduction from the price exhibited by the exemplars even if they are of small plots. It is possible that a part of the acquired land might be used for construction of residential colony for the staff working in the factory. Nevertheless, where the remaining part of the acquired land is contributing to production of goods yielding good profit, it would not be proper to make a deduction in the price of land shown by the exemplars of small plots as the reasons for doing so assigned in various decisions of this Court are not applicable in the case under consideration."
32. The above observations in Atma Singh no doubt seem to suggest that where the acquisition is for a residential layout, deduction towards development cost is a must, but if the acquisition is for an industry which does not require forming a layout of sites, the market value of small residential plots may be adopted without any cuts towards development cost. The said observations are made with reference to the special facts of that case. If they are read out of context to support a contention that the purpose of acquisition is a relevant factor to avoid the deduction of development cost in valuation, it may then be necessary to consider the said observations as having been made per incuriam, as they overlook a mandatory statutory provision-Section 24 (clause Fifthly) of the Act and the series of decisions of larger Benches of this Court which hold that when value of large tracts of undeveloped lands is sought to be determined with reference to small residential plots in developed area, it is mandatory to deduct an appropriate percentage towards development cost. But it may be unnecessary to consider whether the observations are per incuriam as para 15 of the decision makes it clear that what is stated therein, is with reference to the special facts of that case, with a view not to disturb the smaller deduction of 10% by the High Court, and not intended to be statement of law."
28. A mere poring over and a bare perusal of the aforesaid precedents would support the view already taken in the earlier decisions of this Court and that there is no ground for discriminating the present claimants/land losers.
29. The aforecited precedents would also indicate and exemplify that the Honourable Apex Court laid down the law that the deductions can be from 20% to 75%, which refers to a wide margin and so the duty of the Court is onerous in fixing the correct percentage of deduction which might differ from case to case and there could be no straight jacket formula.
30. I am of the considered opinion that 53% should be deducted from the value of the land arrived at Rs.1,744/- per cent. As such, the following formula emerges:
The value of the land acquired - Rs.1,744.00 per cent (-) 53% deduction towards development charges and other sub-heads referred to supra - Rs. 924.32 per cent
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The net value of the land for awarding compensation- Rs. 819.68 per cent
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31. Accordingly, the net value of the land for awarding compensation after deducting 53% towards development charges, is arrived at Rs.819.68/- per cent which could be rounded to Rs.820/- per cent (Rupees Eighty Hundred and Twenty only). Accordingly, if worked out, the net value of the land per acre would come to Rs.82,000/- (Rupees Eighty Two Thousand only).
32. The claimants are also entitled to statutory entitlements over which there is no dispute. For the enhanced amount in the award, the claimants are entitled to get solatium as well as interest on the additional amount.
33. The learned Counsel for the claimants cited the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Sub Collector, Padmanabhapuram v. R.S.Raveendran reported in 2006-2-L.W.102 and an excerpt from it, would run thus:
"10.It is also relevant to note that Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 makes it clear that the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are applicable to all proceedings initiated under the said Act (Land Acquisition Act). In view of the same, it is not in dispute that Order 41, Rule 33 C.P.C. is applicable to the land acquisition proceedings. Inasmuch as the appeal is also continuation of the original proceedings, the said provisions are applicable to the appeals also and in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court in Sunder v. Union of India, interest is payable for the solatium amount, and in order to render substantial justice, we accept the request of the counsel for respondents/claimants and hold that the solatium amount also carries interest at the same rate as applicable to the enhanced compensation and additional amount."
34. As such, adhering to the aforesaid decision, the claimants are entitled to appropriate interest on the solatium as well as the additional amount awarded.
35. Here, the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Thanjavur, adhered to the earlier decision of this Court in The Special Tahsildhar v Thaineesraj & 7 others reported in 2008-1-L.W.1029, relating to the similar matters, which arose out of the land acquisition proceedings in the same vicinity, where the present lands have been acquired and hence, I am of the view that the judgment of the lower Court cannot be found fault with.
36. Accordingly, all the appeals are dismissed by this common judgment. The Government shall deposit the amount awarded by the lower Court in the interest of both sides within a period of one month from this date, if not already deposited. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.
rsb To
1.The Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Thanjavur.