Karnataka High Court
Sri.Vishweshwara M R vs Sri. M.S.K. Naveen on 31 July, 2025
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NC: 2025:KHC:29639
WP No. 7750 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 31ST DAY OF JULY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI
WRIT PETITION NO. 7750 OF 2025 (GM-CPC)
BETWEEN:
SRI. VISHWESHWARA M. R.
S/O LATE REVANNASIDDAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
R/A MULENAHALLYI VILLAGE,
MADIHALLI HOBLI, BELUR TALUK,
HAGARE POST,
HASSAN DISTRICT - 573 216.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. CHANDRAKANTH R GOULAY.,ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SRI. M.S.K. NAVEEN,
S/O KALYAN KUMAR,
Digitally AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
signed by K G
RENUKAMBA
2. SRI. TILAK M.K.
Location:
HIGH COURT S/O KALYAN KUMAR,
OF AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
KARNATAKA
R1 AND R2 ARE
RESIDING AT SULEDEVARHALLY VILLAGE,
HAGARE POST,
MADIHALLI HOBLI, BELUR TALUK,
HASSAN DISTRICT - 573 216.
3. SRI. KALYAN KUMAR,
S/O LATE SIDDEGOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
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NC: 2025:KHC:29639
WP No. 7750 of 2025
HC-KAR
R/O MOOLENAHALLI VILLAGE,
MADIHALLI HOBLI,
BELUR, HASSAN DIST - 573 216.
4. NANJESHWARI,
D/O LATE REVANNA SIDDAIAH,
AGED ABOUT - NOT KNOW TO PETITIONER.
5. LEELAVATHI,
D/O LATE REVANNA SIDDAIAH,
AGED ABOUT - NOT KNOW TO PETITIONER.
R3 TO R5
RESIDING AT,
SULEDEVARHALLY VILLAGE,
MADIHALLI HOBLI,
BELUR TALUK - 573 216.
6. JAYAPRAKASH,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
S/O LATE REVANNASIDDAIAH,
RESIDING AT,
SULEDEVARHALLY VILLAGE,
MADIHALLI HOBLI,
BELUR TALUK - 573 216.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.GURUDATH.V.R., ADVOCATE FOR C/R1)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUION OF INDIA PRAYING TO SET
ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 08.01.2025 PASSED ON IA NO.8 IN
O.S.NO.102/2019 BY THE CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC BELURU, AS
PER ANNEXURE-L AND ETC.
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NC: 2025:KHC:29639
WP No. 7750 of 2025
HC-KAR
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI
ORAL ORDER
This petition has been filed for setting aside an order dated 08.01.2025 passed on I.A.No.8 moved in O.S.No.102/2019 by the Civil Judge and JMFC, Belur. By means of the impugned order, the Trial Court has observed that the Court can exercise its inherent powers for enforcement of the status quo order passed by the Appellate Court by giving police aid and ordering police protection to the plaintiffs-respondents and the suit properties.
2. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that initially the suit was filed seeking a permanent injunction qua the suit property. It is stated that an order of status quo was granted in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents. Thereafter, the plaintiffs moved an application for amendment of the plaint, which came to be -4- NC: 2025:KHC:29639 WP No. 7750 of 2025 HC-KAR allowed by an order of the Court dated 23.11.2023. By means of that amendment, inter alia, the relief claimed in the suit was changed. The relief of permanent injunction was deleted and relief for declarations in respect of share in the suit property, separate possession and voidance of the registered Release Deed were substituted. Apart from the aforesaid declarations sought, no other relief was sought. The contention is that by means of the I.A.No.8 direction was sought from the Trial Court for police protection of the possession of the plaintiffs over the suit properties on the ground that the defendants-petitioners were preventing the plaintiffs-respondents from entering the suit properties.
3. An objection has been filed by the defendant- petitioner. It is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that despite the remedy available to the petitioner to move an application under Rule 2-A of Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'CPC' for short), this plea seeking police -5- NC: 2025:KHC:29639 WP No. 7750 of 2025 HC-KAR protection was resorted to by moving the IA, which could not have been granted. It is stated that the order was one of status quo in respect of the suit schedule properties and the order of status quo could only be interpreted by the Competent Court itself to ascertain whether any violation of the injunction had taken place.
4. Learned counsel for the caveator (plaintiff- respondent) on the other hand, has relied upon a judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court passed in the matter of Smt. Karisiddamma and Others Vs. Smt. Sarma Kenchamma, reported in 2010 (1) AIR Karnataka 271. He contends that the Court held in the aforesaid judgment of Karisidamma that for enforcement of injunction order, police protection can be ordered.
5. From the record it appears that there is a history of dispute between the parties. The petitioner claims to be the owner of property bearing Sy.No.58/2 to the extent of 24 guntas and Sy.No.65/3 to the extent of -6- NC: 2025:KHC:29639 WP No. 7750 of 2025 HC-KAR 15 guntas both situated in Belur Taluk. He claims to be the successor in interest, along with his brother, Sri. Jayaprakash, in respect of these properties, from their father. It is stated that the claim of the respondent Nos. 6 to 9 is that their father along with the father of the petitioner acquired the property and therefore they are equally entitled to the share of the said property. Therefore, the respondent Nos. 7 and 8 filed OS No.102/2019 against the father of the petitioner, the petitioner himself and his brother seeking a decree of permanent injunction in respect of the suit schedule property. An interim order was passed on 25.09.2019 directing both parties to maintain status quo in respect of the suit schedule property till disposal of IA No.2.
6. It is stated that the name of the petitioner is recorded in the record of rights and at no point of time have the private respondents been in possession of the suit property nor have they any right, title or interest over the same, but they have been obstructing the peaceful -7- NC: 2025:KHC:29639 WP No. 7750 of 2025 HC-KAR possession and enjoyment of the properties by the petitioner. Therefore, the father of the petitioner and the petitioner filed OS No.10/2021 seeking permanent injunction in respect of the very same suit property as in OS No.102/2019. However, since the trial Court dismissed IA No.2 in OS No.10/2021 (by which temporary injunction was sought) by its order dated 06.09.2021, MA No.13 of 2021 was filed before the appellate Court. By an order dated 20.01.2022 the appellate Court, while disposing of the appeal, directed the parties of OS No.10/2021 to maintain status quo in respect of the subject matter of the suit as that of OS No.102/2019 and the trial Court was directed to consolidate the two suits and try them together. The petitioner has also given references of several disputes between the parties including details of criminal cases arising out of disputes in respect of the suit properties.
7. The respondent Nos. 6 to 9 instituted WP No.22015/2022, without impleading the petitioner, against -8- NC: 2025:KHC:29639 WP No. 7750 of 2025 HC-KAR State respondents including police officials for directing them not to interfere in the civil dispute with respect of the aforesaid suit properties. In that petition the Court directed the police not to interfere with the affairs of the petitioners therein except in accordance with law. Reference has also been made regarding WP No.22197/2023 filed by the petitioner seeking police protection in respect of their possession, cultivation and removing of areca nut crop raised over the suit properties. While referring to a circular dated 14.11.2018, this Court disposed of WP No.22197/2023 directing the police to accord police protection only if it finds that there is a threat to the petitioners life and limb in real time and not create further problems contrary to the order passed by this Court (in WP No. 22015/2022 aforesaid).
8. In the parawise reply of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, concealment and misrepresentation have been alleged and the allegations made in the writ petition are denied.
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NC: 2025:KHC:29639 WP No. 7750 of 2025 HC-KAR
9. What is important to consider in the instant case is that OS No.102/2019 was converted from one seeking permanent injunction to a suit seeking declaration of partition and for separate possession of their share therein, as well as for declaration that an instrument which was a release deed dated 06.02.2007 said to be executed in favour of the father of the petitioner was a fraudulent document. When the impugned order was passed, admittedly there was no relief existing in the plaint seeking permanent injunction.
10. As far as the order of status quo in OS No.102/2019 is concerned, the same has been filed as Annexure-B to this petition. By means of that order, the parties were directed to maintain the status quo in respect of the subject matter of the suit. Also in MA No.13/2021, that arose out of an order dismissing the petitioner's application for temporary injunction in OS No.10/2021, an order of status quo was granted. Thereafter, both the contesting parties have approached this Court in WP No.
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NC: 2025:KHC:29639 WP No. 7750 of 2025 HC-KAR 22015/2022 and in WP No.22197/2023 in which petitions this Court was please to pass orders in respect of their prayers for non-interference by police and for according police protection, respectively. In the meanwhile under order of the Court dated 23.11.2023 (as evident from Annexure A to the writ petition) the relief in OS No.102/2019 was amended from seeking a decree of permanent injunction to a suit for declaration.
11. Subsequently, IA No.8 was filed in OS No.102/2019 seeking police protection on which IA the order impugned dated 08.01.2025 was passed. By the impugned order the trial Court has directed the Belur police to give police aid for implementing the status quo order passed by the Appellate Court in MA No.13/2021.
12. A perusal of the impugned order leaves little room for doubt that the trial Court has come to a conclusion in favour of the private respondents for granting police aid on the basis of misreading of the order
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NC: 2025:KHC:29639 WP No. 7750 of 2025 HC-KAR passed in MA No.13/2021. Pertinently, IA No.8 was moved in OS No.102/2019 in which an order of status quo was passed. Be that as it may, ordering police aid to protect suit property and prevent alleged interference by the defendants of OS No.102/2019 (petitioner in the instant petition) in the possession of the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) would amount to granting an interim mandatory injunction.
13. Moreover, an order of status quo with regard to suit property without indicating what the status quo was, would require interpretation by the Court which passed the order of status quo. Thereafter, the violation, if any, has to be determined, prima facie, after taking into account various facts and evidence like the details of the suit property, the extent of violation, if any, and various other incidental factors. The trial Court in paragraph No.11 of the impugned order, unfortunately, comes to a conclusion in favour of the private respondents while purportedly relying upon the order of the appellate Court (in MA
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NC: 2025:KHC:29639 WP No. 7750 of 2025 HC-KAR No.13/2021), whereas the prima facie conclusion of the appellate Court tilted in favour of the petitioner herein based on the current revenue records showing the possession of the suit properties of the petitioner and Sri. Jayaprakash. The inexplicable conclusion of the trial Court is, "Therefore, the contention of the defendants that the plaintiffs are not in possession and enjoyment over the suit properties holds no water."
14. The Supreme Court, in Kishore Kumar Khaitan v. Praveen Kumar Singh1, observes:-
"5. It is necessary to notice at this stage that in an original suit of this nature, it was not appropriate for the Additional District Judge to pass an order directing the parties to maintain status quo, without indicating what the status quo was. If he was satisfied that the appellant before him had made out a prima facie case for an ad interim ex parte injunction and the balance of convenience justified the grant of such an injunction, it was for him to have passed such an order of injunction. But simply directing the parties to maintain status quo without indicating what the status quo was, is not an order that should be passed at the initial stage of a litigation, especially when one court had found no reason to grant an ex parte order of injunction and the appellate court was dealing with only the limited question whether 1 (2006) 3 SCC 312
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NC: 2025:KHC:29639 WP No. 7750 of 2025 HC-KAR an ad interim order of injunction should or should not have been granted by the trial court, since the appeal was only against the refusal of an ad interim ex parte order of injunction and the main application for injunction pending suit, was still pending before the trial court itself. Therefore, we are prima facie of the view that the Additional District Judge ought not to have passed an equivocal order like the one passed in the circumstances of the case. But of course, that aspect has relevance only to the extent that before ordering an interim mandatory injunction or refusing it, the court has first to consider whether the plaintiff has proved that he was in possession on the date of suit and on the date of the order and he had been dispossessed the next day. Unless a clear prima facie finding that the plaintiff was in possession on those dates is entered, an order for interim mandatory injunction could not have been passed and any such order passed would be one without jurisdiction."
(emphasis supplied)
15. The violation, if any, of such an order of status quo as above, can only be ascertained by the Court after interpreting such order. While recording a prima facie conclusion on an application under section 151 CPC, material facts and evidence have to be duly considered by the Court. Where the facts and available evidence are nebulous, the Court ought not to 'hive off' its duty to an external investigating/law enforcement agency, as that
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NC: 2025:KHC:29639 WP No. 7750 of 2025 HC-KAR would have the effect of clothing such authority with a jurisdiction it does not possess.
16. This however, is not to say that power to pass an injunction in the form of restoration of possession on an application under section 151 of the CPC is not available. This aspect is recognised by the Supreme Court2. In that judgment of the Supreme Court it is iterated that in the event of violation of an injunction order, a party forcibly dispossesses the other, the Court can order restoration of possession to the party wronged. In the same vein it has been stated that the inherent power under Section 151 of the CPC must be exercised only in exceptional circumstances for which the Code lays down no procedure. The Supreme Court held:-
"24. Now, the question before us relates to the issue to be decided as to who was in possession of the suit property at the time when Suit No. 199 of 2002 was filed. As per the findings of the trial court, it appears that Respondent 1 was in possession of the suit property and that he was unlawfully dispossessed from the suit property by Respondent 2 after relying on certain documents produced by him and the court 2 Meera Chauhan v. Harsh Bishnoi - (2007) 12 SCC 201
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NC: 2025:KHC:29639 WP No. 7750 of 2025 HC-KAR directed restoration of possession to Respondent 1. In order to find who was in possession of the suit property Respondent 1 relied on the report of change of electricity meter dated 9-4- 2002 and photocopy of bail bond dated 14-1-2005. Certain other electricity bills of the year 2003 were also filed to show that Respondent 1 was the consumer of the electricity in the suit property. Some other documents to show that address of Respondent 1 was the suit property were also filed. In order to show that Respondent 2 was in possession of the suit property at the time of filing of the suit and such possession was delivered to the appellant, reliance was placed on the rejection of the prayer of Respondent 1 to record his name being in possession of the same. It also appears that it was the case of the appellant that possession of the suit property was amicably handed over to Respondent 2 by Respondent 1. In order to come to a proper finding of fact that who was in actual possession, the parties ought to have produced oral evidence along with documentary evidence. In our view, the documents on which reliance was placed by Respondent 1 cannot conclusively prove that he was in actual possession of the suit property at the time of dispossession. For this purpose not only documentary evidence would be required to be produced but at the same time oral evidence should also be adduced by the parties, particularly when the parties dispute the question of possession at the appropriate time and also one party made out a case that possession of the suit property was amicably handed over to the other party. In this view of the matter, although for deciding an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it would not be proper to permit the parties to adduce oral evidence but in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case we are of the view that the trial court ought to have directed the parties to adduce oral evidence along with documentary evidences and also considered the fact of pendency of the suits as noted hereinearlier. The suit filed by Respondent 1 is not a suit for decree for permanent injunction restraining Respondent 2 from interfering with possession of the suit property. There is another aspect of this matter. We have already noted hereinearlier that at the time of allowing the application for impleadment filed by the appellant before the trial court, the trial court had come to a finding that neither the pendency of
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NC: 2025:KHC:29639 WP No. 7750 of 2025 HC-KAR the suit nor the ex parte order of injunction was within the knowledge of the appellant. Therefore, we are of the view that the appellant was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Be that as it may, this question may not be very germane in the facts of this case."
(emphasis supplied)
17. In the judgment that has been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Judge has referred to inter alia, a judgment of the Kerala High Court wherein a temporary injunction order was made absolute after hearing both the sides. The facts of the instant case are starkly different.
18. If the provision of Rule 2-A of Or.39 CPC is looked at, the disobedience or otherwise of any injunction granted or other order made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order XXIX of CPC or breach of any of the terms of injunction granted or order made, has to be first determined by the Court itself. And after being satisfied of the existence such breach or disobedience, the person who is guilty of such disobedience or breach would be liable to
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NC: 2025:KHC:29639 WP No. 7750 of 2025 HC-KAR be proceeded against by attachment of his property or by being detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months. Section 134 CPC recognises arrest other than in execution of decree. However, as stated above, the instant matter involves the interpretation by the Court of the order of status quo itself and considering facts and evidence before granting an interim mandatory injunction on an application under section 151 CPC.
19. Under the circumstances, the order impugned dated 08.01.2025 cannot be sustained and is therefore set aside.
20. Leaving it open for the plaintiff/respondents to avail of such lawful procedures and remedies that may be available to them, this petition is allowed.
Sd/-
(JAYANT BANERJI) JUDGE AMA, BVK List No.: 1 Sl No.: 6