Patna High Court
Ahmad Ali Ansari And Ors. vs Shree Chaudhary Sia Saran Sinha And Ors. on 16 February, 1961
Equivalent citations: AIR1961PAT342, AIR 1961 PATNA 342, (1962) 1 LABLJ 99, 1961 BLJR 689, (1961 - 62) 21 FJR 190
Author: V. Ramaswami
Bench: V. Ramaswami
JUDGMENT Choudhary, J.
1. The facts leading to the presentation of this application under Article 226 of the Constitution are these :
2. The Darbhanga-Laheriasarai Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. is a public utility set-vice and it supplies power and light to the public at Darbhanga and Laheriasarai. Its management (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Management") is respondent No. 3 in this case. In November, 1957, a pamphlet was published and distributed wherein defamatory and scandalous statements were made against the Management. It is alleged that the pamphlet was published for and on behalf of the workers of the said Corporation.
The Management took objection to the various allegations made against it in that pamphlet, and a copy of the pamphlet was given to each of its workers and they were asked to state in writing whether that pamphlet had been printed and published with their consent. At that time, there were 108 workmen working in that Corporation. Out of them, 35 workmen replied that the said pamphlet had been printed and published with their consent. The rest of the workmen, however, denied to have had any concern with the printing and publication of that pamphlet.
These 35 workmen were, therefore, asked by the Management to give their explanations, about the printing and publication of the pamphlet. After receipt of their explanations, enquiries were held by the officers of the Management in presence of the workmen concerned. One of the 35 employees offered apology and was pardoned by the Management. The remaining 34 employees, however, took a defiant attitude, which, according to the Management, was highly subversive of discipline, and, therefore, these 34 employees were charge-sheeted and ultimately discharged on the 7th of December, 1957 from their services on charges of misconduct, insubordination and acts subversive of discipline.
Admittedly, the employees of this Management had formed a trade union known as Dar-bhanga Laheriasarai Electric Supply Workers Union (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Union"). The General Secretary of this Union is one Sri Hari Prasad Singh and its President is Sri Anirudh Prasad Singh. This Union, however, does not appear to have taken up the cause of these discharged workmen.
By Notification No. III/DI-3018/58L-10162; dated the 13th June, 1958, the Government of Bihar in the Labour Department, however, referred the disputes for adjudication to the Labour Court, North Bihar, Muzaffarpur, under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act", between the Management and its 34 discharged workmen on the point as to whether the discharge of the said 34 workmen was justified, and, if not, whether they were entitled to reinstatement or any other relief.
3. Notices of the reference were served on the parties, who filed written statements on the 9th of July, 1958. The case of the Management, as disclosed in its written statement, was that the reference was without jurisdiction inasmuch as the question referred for adjudication was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, and that neither the Labour Union of the under taking nor any body or any group of workmen working under the undertaking had at any time taken up the cause of these workmen, and, as such, any dispute in regard to their discharge was only an individual dispute.
The Management also pleaded justification for the action taken by it against these workmen. Along with the written statement, the Management filed another application requesting the Labour Court to decide the question of jurisdiction before taking up the case on merits. Accordingly, the jurisdictional point was taken up for hearing on the 12th of August, 1958. The 34 discharged workmen desired to be represented at the hearing by one Sri Suraj Narain Singh, who claimed to be the President of the Darbhanga Laheriasarai Electric Supply Workers Union.
The Management objected to the workmen being represented by the said Suraj Narain Singh on the ground that he was not the President of the Union. On hearing both parties on this point, the Labour Court held by its order dated the 15th of September, 1958 against the workmen being represented by the said Sri Suraj Narain Singh on the ground that his election, if any as the President of the Union was illegal and unconstitutional.
Against this order, the workmen moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 736 of 1958, but the said miscellaneous judicial case was dismissed by this Court by its order dated the 16th ot October, 1958. The Labour Court, thereafter, fixed the 13th of November, 1958 for hearing the jurisdictional point. On that date, it appears that one of these 34 workmen, namely, Shree Narain Bhagat, appeared and filed a petition containing written arguments and submitted on behalf of all the 34 discharged workmen that they had nothing further to say on the jurisdictional point beyond what was contained in that application.
Thereafter, on that date, witness No. 1 for the Management, namely, Sri K.K. Bairoliya, was examined, but his cross-examination was declined by the said Shree Narain Bhagat. Other witnesses on behalf of the Management were examined on the next day, that is, on the 14th of November, 1958, to which date this case was adjourned for further hearing, but neither the said Shree Narain Bhagat nor any other person on behalf of the workmen appeared before the Labour Court on that date, and ultimately the further hearing of the jurisdictional matter was concluded in the absence of the workmen.
4. The Labour Court agreed with the contention raised on behalf of the Management that the dispute which had been referred for its adjudication was not an industrial dispute, and, therefore, the reference was without jurisdiction. It gave an award accordingly holding the reference to be without jurisdiction. Being thus aggrieved, only 10 out of the said 34 discharged workmen have presented this application under Article 226 of the Constitution, and they seek to have the award quashed and the reference to be heard on merits.
5. Respondent No. 1 is the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, and respondent No. 2 is the State of Bihar through the Department of Labour Government of Bihar. Respondent No. 3, as alredy observed, is the Management of the Darbhanga Laheriasarai Electric Supply Corporation Ltd.
6. On behalf of the petitioners, one of the objections raised to the preliminary hearing of the jurisdictional point taken before the Labour Court was that that Court was not competent to determine the competency or otherwise of the Government to make the reference. The Labour Court overruled this objection, and held that it was competent to determine whether what was referred to it by the Government was an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act or not.
The correctness of its decision on this point has not been challenged by Counsel for the petitioners, and the same is borne out by various decisions. If any authority is needed, reference may be made to two decisions of the Supreme Court in the State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy, AIR 1953 SC 53 and Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal U. P., (S) AIR 1957 SC 532. It was pointed out in those cases that it was open to a party to show that what was referred for adjudication was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, and, therefore, the Tribunal or the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to make an award on such a dispute.
7. The real contest between the parties in this case is with regard be the question whether the dispute referred in this case by the Government of Bihar is an industrial dispute or not within the meaning of the Act so as to give jurisdiction to the Labour Court to give its award on that question. According to the petitioners, the dispute was between the Management, on the one hand and a number of workmen, on the other, with regard to the question of dismissal of those workmen by the Management, and, therefore, the dispute referred was an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act.
On behalf of the respondents, however, it is contended that, though in this case the dispute is between the 34 discharged employees and the Management, yet the cause of these discharged employees not having been taken up by any trade union or by the rest of the employees, the dispute referred is an individual dispute of the 34 dismissed employees, and not a collective dispute of the employees in general or a class of employees so as to make it an industrial dispute within meaning of the Act.
It has, therefore, been contended on behalt of the respondents that the award of the Labour Court holding that the reference was without jurisdiction- is perfectly correct and ought to be maintained. The expression "industrial dispute" has been defined in Section 2 (k) of the Act as meaning "any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and work-men, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person".
This definition, undoubtedly, is wide enough to cover a dispute between the employer, on the one hand, and its, individual employees, on the other. But the above definition considered in the light of the object for which the Act was enacted, as will be presently shown, leaves no room for doubt that an individual dispute of one or more of the employees simpliciter was not intended to be covered by the expression "industrial dispute", as defined in the above section, of the Act.
8. As has been pointed out in Shamsuddin v. State of Kerala, 1960-1 Lab LJ 623 : (AIR 1960 Kerala 361), the object of the Act is to prevent industrial strife and unrest, and to promote measures for securing and preserving good relations between employers and employees, and is not to substitute a new procedure, or to supplant the established or ordinary tribunal in the land, for the enforcement of rights, contractual Or otherwise, of individual workman.
A Bench of this Court, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad, AIR 1953 Pat 321, pointed out that the expression "industrial dispute'' cannot be construed in a grammatical sense so as to mean any dispute relating to an industrial establishment, and that the conception of industrial dispute is a conception in the realm of economics. It connotes a dispute between capital and labour organised in a collective sense, and the object of an industrial dispute in this sense is to obtain new industrial conditions for the body of employees and not merely to ventilate the grievance of any specific individual employee at a particular moment in an industrial establishment.
The Supreme Court, in (S) AIR 1957 SC 532, while considering somewhat similar provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (28 -of 1947), observed that the object of the Act was to maintain industrial peace so as to prevent interference with the public safety or public order or with the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community or of employment.
9. Keeping the object of the Act in view, it has to be seen as to what the exact meaning of the expression "industrial dispute", as defined in Section 2 (k) of the Act, is. In an individual dispute of one or more of the workmen, with which the rest of the workmen or a substantial number of them are not at all concerned and interested, and the cause has not been taken up by the trade union concerned, there is no possibility of any industrial strife or unrest, nor is there any possibility of good relations between employers and employees becoming insecure.
Such a dispute, therefore, is not an industrial dispute. But, where the dispute relates with regard to the workmen in general or as a class, or at any rate, with regard to a substantial number of them, or even if it is an individual dispute of one or more workmen, but the cause has been taken up by the rest of the workmen, or a substantial number of them, or by the trade union concerned, then the workmen as a class are concerned with and interested in the dispute, and if the same is not resolved, there is every possibility of an industrial strife or unrest or of non-preservation of good relations between the employers and the employees.
In that case, the dispute is undoubtedly an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act.
In other words, the expression "industrial dispute", as defined in the Act, means a dispute in regard to the matters enumerated therein between the employer and his workmen in general or as a class Or a substantial number of them being represented by the workmen as a class, or by the trade union of which they are members.
That obviously means that there must be a collective dispute on behalf of the employees as a class, either being represented by all or a substantial number of them or by the trade union concerned, so as to necessitate the resolving of the same in order to prevent industrial strife and unrest and to promote measures for securing and preserving good relations between employers and employees. So for as an individual dispute of any of the workmen is concerned, he has got his remedy by a suit under the common law right, and not under the Act, as it is not an industrial dispute.
10. The interpretation of the expression "industrial dispute" has been the subject-matter of various decisions, and the view taken in all of them is the same as given above. In Kandan Textile Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal (1) Madras, AIR 1951 Mad 616, Mack, J., in his concurring judgment, clearly observed that a dismissed workman cannot, by making a demand for reinstatement, create an industrial dispute, but, if a workers' union or a substantial body of workmen, who continue in employment, espouse his cause, then an industrial dispute may arise.
Rajamannar, C. J., who gave the leading judgment, however, did not express his final opinion on this point. But, as has been pointed out by this Court in the case of AIR 1953 Pat 321, referred to above, Rajamannar, C. J., in a subsequent case, in Manager, United Commercial Bank Ltd., Mathurai v. Commissioner of Labour, Madras, AIR 1951 Mad 141, where certain provisions of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act (36 of 1947) were being considered, expressed the view that if Section 2, (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act was to apply, there must be a dispute between a body of employees in the collective sense and the management, and that a dispute between a solitary employee and the management would not by itself constitute an industrial dispute within the meaning of that expression in the Act.
The same view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in the matter of J. Chowdhury v. M.C. Banerjee, 55 Cal WN 256. In that case, it was held that the approach to a proper construction of the definition of "industrial dispute" should be founded not only upon the language of the relevant section but also upon the scheme of the several other provisions of the Act, and that, on a true construction of Section 2 (k) of the Act, a dispute which is between the employer, on the one side, and an individual employee, on the other, cannot come within the definition of an industrial dispute; but a dispute which in origin is between the employer and an individual employee may develop into an industrial dispute if the rest of the employees or the majority of them take up the cause of the employee concerned.
In Standard Vacuum Oil Co. Ernakulam v. Industrial Tribunal, Ernakulam, AIR 1952 Tniv-Co. 249 also it has been held that, though the term "industrial dispute", as defined in section 21 (k) of the Act, is wide enough to include a dispute between the employer and one or a few only of the workmen, the definition has to be understood and interpreted with reference to the context, that regard being had to the scheme of the Act, it is clear that such a wide interpretation cannot be justified, and that the true meaning of an industrial dispute is that it should be a collective dispute.
It was further pointed out in that case that a dispute pertaining to an individual workman-may, if taken up by all the others or a sufficient number of them or by a labour union, become collective and, therefore, an industrial dispute; but a dispute which at the inception is an individual one and continues to be such cannot be regarded as an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act.
11. The view of this Court also on this point is exactly the same. In AIR 1953 Pat 321, to which a reference has already been made, it has been held that an industrial dispute must be construed to mean not a dispute between an individual workman and the management, but a dispute which, though it may originate in an action with regard to an individual workman has developed into a dispute in which the majority of the workmen in the establishment are interested; and that view has been re-affirmed in subsequent decisions of this Court, namely, K.H. Gandhi v. R.N.P. Sinha, AIR 1956 Pat 320 and South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd., Bista v. State o£ Bihar, AIR 1956 Pat 274. In a recent decision of this Court in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad, 1959 BLJR 172, the law on the subject has been pointed out as follows:
"It is now well settled that a dispute between an employer and individual employees cannot per se be an industrial dispute. It is only an individual dispute not within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act, The dispute to be an industrial dispute should be of such a nature as is not confined to one or two individuals but their cases are taken up by the Trade Union of which they are members or there is a concerted demand by the employees on their behalf. It is equally well settled that a dispute between an employer and a single employee also may develop into an industrial dispute, if it is taken up by the Union or a number of workmen".
12. The above view gains ample support from decisions of the Supreme Court. In D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee, AlR 1953 SC 158, while dealing with the meaning of the expression "industrial dispute", their Lordships observed as follows :
"The words 'industrial dispute' convey the meaning to the ordinary mind that the dispute must be such as would affect large groups ot workmen and employers ranged on Opposite sides on some general questions on which each group is bound together by a community of interests--such as wages, bonuses, allowances, pensions, provident fund, number of working hours per week, holidays and so on. Even with reference to a business that is carried on, we would hardly think of saying that there is an industrial dispute where the employee is dismissed by his employer and the dismissal is questioned as wrongful. But at the same time, having regard to the modern conditions of society where capital and labour have organised themselves into groups for the purpose of fighting their disputes and settling them on the basis of the theory that in union is strength, and collective bargaining has come to stay, a single employee's case might develop into an industrial dispute, when, as often happens, it is taken up by the trade union of which he is a member, and there is a concerted demand by the employees for redress".
In Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd., Nagpur v. Raghunath Gopal, (S) AIR 1957 SC 104, their Lordships were considering the provisions of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act (23 of 1947). In that connection, their Ltrdships had to consider the question whether a dispute by an individual workman would be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, and, after considering various decisions of the different High Courts and the Industrial Tribunals, their Lordships preferred to accept the view that a dispute between an employer and a single employee cannot per se be an industrial dispute, but it may become one if it is taken up by the Union Or a number of workmen.
Their Lordships pointed out that, though the language of Section 2 (k) of the Act is wide enough to cover a dispute between an employer and a single employee, the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act does appear to contemplate that the machinery provided therein should be set in motion to settle only disputes which involve the rights of workmen as a class and that a dispute touching the individual rights of a workman was not intended to be the subject or an adjudication under the Act, when the same had not been taken up by the Union or a number of workmen.
In (S) AIR 1957 SO 532, their Lordships were considering the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act (28 of 1947), and their Lordships pointed out that, in order to get the true import of the Act, it is necessary to view the enactment in retrospect, the reasons for enacting it, the evils it was to end and the objects it was to subserve, and, therefore, the Act has to be viewed as a whole and its intention determined by construing all the constituent parts of the Act together and not by taking detached section or to take one word here and another there; and, by so construing, their Lordships interpreted the expression "Industrial Dispute", as defined in Sec-tion 2 of that Act, as having the same meaning assigned to it as in Section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and held that the intention or the Act was to make it applicable to collective disputes, and not to individual ones.
13. Reliance has, however, been placed on behalf of the petitioners on the decision of the Supreme Court in Associated Cement Companies Ltd., Porbandar v. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 777. In that case, the question raised was whether a registered trade union, representing a minority of workmen, governed by an award, could give notice to the employer intimating its intention to terminate the award under Section 19(6) of the Act.
Section 19 (6) of the Act provides that notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operation under Sub-section (3), the award shall continue to be binding on the parties until a period of two months hag elapsed from the date on which notice is given by any party bound by the award to the other party or parties intimating its intention to terminate the award. While considering this provision of law, their Lordships observed that, though the expression "any party bound by the award" in this section refers to all workmen bound by the award, notice to terminate the said award can be given not by a group of workmen acting collectively either through their union or otherwise, and it is not necessary that such a group or the union through which it acts should represent the majority of workmen bound by the award.
Their Lordships further observed that it is open even to a minority of workmen or a minority union to terminate the award by widen they, along with other employees, are bound just as much as it is open to them to raise an industrial dispute under the Act. On the authority of this decision, counsel for the petitioners has urged that the 34 dismissed employees in the present case, though they were in minority, could raise an industrial dispute in regard to the question of their dismissal which, according to them, was illegal and unjustified.
In my opinion, this decision is of no assistance to the petitioners because, even according to this decision, the dispute must be raised by a group of workmen, though in minority, acting collectively, either through their Union or otherwise. But, if the dispute is not raised collectively, and is only an individual dispute, it cannot come within the purview of the Act.
14. Applying, therefore, the true import of the expression "industrial dispute'', as defined in the Act, to the instant case, it appears that, on the finding of the Labour Court, the dispute re-ferred by the Government of Bihar is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act. (His Lordship then agreed with the Labour Court in its conclusion that the cause of any of the discharged workmen was never taken up or espoused either by the Union or by a majority of the workmen or a substantial number of them and that no opportunity was given to the management in the instant case even to know as to what demand, if any, of the workmen it was to- comply with or to meet till the reference was made).
15. The result, therefore, is that the application fails, and is dismissed; but, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
Ramaswami, C.J.
16. I agree.