Allahabad High Court
Ramsukh And Another vs State Of U.P. And 20 Others on 9 January, 2020
Author: Ajay Bhanot
Bench: Ajay Bhanot
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Court No. - 83 Case :- WRIT - C No. - 619 of 2020 Petitioner :- Ramsukh And Another Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 20 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Rakesh Prasad Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Diwakar Singh Hon'ble Ajay Bhanot,J.
1. The petitioner instituted a proceeding under Section 24 of The Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad in the year 2009 which was registered as Case no. 269 of 2009-10 (Ram Sukh Vs Gram Sabha and others). The dispute pertains to demarcation of the boundaries of the disputed plots.
2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the failure of the statutory authority to decide the aforesaid proceeding, more than 10 years after institution of the case.
3. The only prayer made by Sri Rakesh Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioners is for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the learned trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad before whom the matter is pending, to decide the case within a stipulated period of time.
4. Sri Rakesh Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioners calls attention to the ordersheet to contend that the final decision in the matter is being inordinately delayed for no good reasons or valid basis in law. He also relies on Section 24 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 to contend that the learned trial court is under an obligation of law to conclude the proceedings under the aforesaid section within a period of three months as far as possible. The learned trial court has flouted its statutory mandate, by failing to perform its statutory duty.
5. Heard Sri Rakesh Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Diwakar Singh, learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha and learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents.
6. A perusal of the ordersheet discloses that the suit instituted in the year 2009 came up for hearing for the first time on 03.11.2010 for the first time. The learned trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad issued notices to the defendants in the suit on 03.11.2010. Thereafter the suit saw the light of day on 21.1.2011 wherein the matter was fixed for 29.01.2011 by providing a "general date". Similar cryptic one line orders fixing various dates for hearing were passed on 21.01.2011, 29.01.2011, 28.02.2011, 08.03.2011, 16.03.2011, 31.03.2011, 04.04.2011, 12/13.04.2011. Such orders were also passed on 12.05.2011, 23.05.2011, 08.06.2011, 22.10.2016. No order is in the record of the ordersheet from 08.06.2011 till 22.10.2016.
7. On 22.10.2016 matter was posted for 12.01.2017. The case was adjourned on 12.01.2017 as the Presiding Officer was unavailable. Similarly the case was adjourned on 18.12.2017, 26.04.2017 and on 26.04.2017, due to non availability of the Presiding Officer for various reasons. On 27.06.2017 once again a general order fixing the matter on 27.07.2017 was passed. The ordersheet then reflects that the matter could not be heard on 29.08.2017, 08.11.2017, 20.12.2017, 15.03.2018, 26.03.2018, 25.04.2018, 04.06.2018 because the Presiding Officer was not available due to his engagement in election related duties, administrative work and other meetings.
8. The matter was not heard on a number of days due to strike of counsels. The dates which record absence of counsels due to lawyers' strikes were 25.04.2011, 14.06.2017, 8.08.2017, 29.08.2017, 05.04.2018, 28.04.2018, 10.05.2018, 22.05.2018, 25.06.2018, 24.07.2018, 13.08.2018, 28.12.2018, 08.03.2019, 14.06.2019, 16.08.2019. The defendants appeared before the trial court on 27.07.2017, when time was granted for filing their pleadings/responses.
9. It is evident from the ordersheet that for the past 11 years no effective hearing has taken place in the matter except on one occasion when the defendants were granted time to file their response.
10. The ordersheet has already been extracted almost fully in the preceding part of the judgment. A perusal thereof shows that dates of hearing have been fixed initially as a matter of course. The orders are cryptic and demonstrate that the proceeding is being adjourned for no reasons at all. The second categories of dates are when the matter was not be heard due to no availability of the Presiding Officer for various reasons. The third category of the orders granting adjournments are on account of strike of counsels.
11. The tenor of the ordersheet is sufficient to defeat the mandate of the statute in this case. Serious efforts to decide the appeal with expedition are clearly lacking in this case. It is a shocking state of affairs that even eleven years after the institution of the proceeding effective hearings have not happened and the proceeding has not been concluded. On all dates of hearing adjournments are granted or the hearing was postponed by one line orders. The reasons for postponement of hearing which are described in the earlier part of the judgment are specious and unsustainable in law. Judicial proceedings cannot be stalled for the reasons recited in the ordersheet.
12. The statutory authority has failed to discharge his duties is under the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006. Abstention from work by the counsels is obstructing the implementation of the statutory mandate. It is not a ground to halt the judicial process.
13. The reasons of the statutory authority/trial court for adjourning the matter on account of engagement in administrative duties is no defence against the failure to perform statutory functions. The cases have to be transferred to another Presiding Officer who is holding the Court in case any one Presiding Officer is not available.
14. In light of the preceding discussion this Court finds that the provisions of Section 24(3) of The Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006, have been flouted by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad as well as the counsels for the parties. The authority has a statutory duty to perform its obligation under law to decide the matter as far as possible within three months. The counsels being officers of the court are expect to cooperate and assist in a final conclusion of the matter.
15. The failure to implement the statutory mandate can be determined once the nature of the statutory mandate is understood. Understanding the nature of the statutory mandate is essentially an exercise in interpretation of the statute.
16. The words of a statute are the best guide to legislative intent. The settled canons of interpretation of statutes are the best tools to ascertain the scope of the statutory duties.
17. Section 24 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 lays down a procedure and a time frame for concluding the proceedings. The provision is extracted herein under for ease of reference:
"24. Disputes regarding boundaries.- (1) The Sub-Divisional Officer may, on his own motion or on an application made in this behalf by a person interested decide, by summary inquiry, any dispute regarding boundaries on the basis of existing survey map or, where the same is not possible in accordance with the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holding Act, 1953, on the basis of such map.
(2) If in the course of an inquiry into a dispute under sub- section (1), the Sub-Divisional Officer is unable to satisfy himself as to which party is in possession or if it is shown that possession has been obtained by wrongful dispossession of the lawful occupant, the Sub-Divisional Officer shall -
(a) in the first case, ascertain by summary inquiry who is the person best entitled to the property, and shall put such person in possession;
(b) in the second case, put the person so dispossessed in possession, and for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary and shall then fix the boundary accordingly.
(3) Every proceeding under this section shall, as far as possible, be concluded by the Sub-Divisional Officer within [three months] from the date of the application.
(4) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer may prefer an appeal before the Commissioner within 30 days of the such order. The order of the Commissioner shall, subject to the provisions of Section 210, be final."
18. A perusal of the scheme of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006, particularly Section 24 shows that the intent of the legislature is clearly to ensure an expeditious disposal of the case by the learned trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer. The legislature was clearly aware of the realities of governance and the limitations of revenue courts. In such circumstances, the legislature was conscious that it may not be possible to adhere to the letter of a strict time frame. But it was within the reach of the learned trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad to comply with the spirit of deciding the case with dispatch and expedition. The intendment of the legislature is revealed by the words employed in the provisions.
19. The legislature has taken a practical view. In the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 the legislature has set pragmatic standards which are achievable and not created idealistic goals which are beyond reach. The realities of administration of justice in revenue courts have been balanced with the ideals of speedy justice.
20. The legislative mandate to the learned trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad is that "Every proceeding under this section shall, as far as possible, be concluded by the Sub-Divisional Officer within [three months] from the date of the application.". The word "shall" is indicative of the mandatory nature of the provision, but it is not conclusive. The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the import and consequences of the word "shall" used by the legislature in different statutes.
21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Raghubir Dayal, reported at (1995) 1 SCC 133, undertook this exercise and held thus:
"5. The use of the word 'shall' is ordinarily mandatory but it is sometimes not so interpreted if the scope of the enactment, on consequences to flow from such construction would not so demand. Normally, the word 'shall' prima facie ought to be considered mandatory but it is the function of the Court to ascertain the real intention of the legislature by a careful examination of the whole scope of the statute, the purpose it seeks to serve and the consequences that would flow from the construction to be placed thereon. The word 'shall', therefore, ought to be construed not according to the language with which it is clothed but in the context in which it is used and the purpose it seeks to serve. The meaning has to be ascribed to the word 'shall' as mandatory or as directory, accordingly/Equally, it is settled law that when a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling the doing of something and prescribes the formalities which are to be attended for the purpose, those prescribed formalities which are formalities which are essential to the validity of such thing, would be mandatory. However, if by holding them to be mandatory, serious general inconvenience is caused to innocent persons or general public, without very much furthering the object of the Act, the same would be construed as directory."
22. Clearly the consequences of using the word "shall" can vary and are not uniform. The mandatory effect of the word "shall" can be diluted depending upon the context in which the word "shall" is employed and the statutory scheme in which it is placed. In the context the word "shall" is also qualified by the words "as far as possible". The latter words limit the mandatory effect of the word "shall".
23. The phrase "as far as practicable" was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N.K. Chauhan Vs. State of Gujarat and others, reported at (1977) 1 SCC 308, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:
"26. What does 'as far as practicable' or like expression mean, in simple anglo-saxon ? Practicable, feasible, possi- ble, performable, are more or less interchangeable. A skiagraph of the 1959 Resolution reveals that the revival of the direct recruitment, method was motivated by 'the inter- est of administration'--an overriding object which must cast the benefit of doubt if two meanings with equal persuasive- ness contend. Secondly, going by the text, 50% of the substantive vacancies occurring in the cadre should be filled in by selection in accordance With appended Rules. 'As far as practicable' finds a place in the Resolution and the Rule. In the context what does it qualify ? As far as possible 50% ? That is to say, if 50% is not readily forth- coming, then less ? Within what period should be imprac- ticabilitv to felt ? What is the content of impracticabi- litv' in the given administrative 'setting ? Contrariwise, can you not contend that impracticability is not a license to deviate, a discretion to disobey or a liberty with the ratio ? Administrative tone is too impor- tant to be neglected but if sufficient numbers to fill the direct recruits' quota are not readily available, substan- tive vacancies may be left intact to be filled up when direct recruits are available. Since the exigencies of administration cannot wait, expediency has a limited role through the use of the words 'as far as practicable'. Thereby Government is authorised to make ad hoc appointments by promotion or by creation of ex cadre posts to be filled up by promotees, to be absorbed in the 50% portion falling to the promotional category in later years. In short 'as far as practicable means, not interfering with the ratio which fulfils the interest of administration, but flexible provision clothing government with powers to meet special situations where the normal process of the government Reso- lution cannot flow smooth. It is a matter of accent and import which affords the final test in the choice between the two parallel interpretations.
27. We have given close thought to the competing contentions and are inclined to the view that the former is the better. Certainly, Shri Garg is right that the primary purpose of the quota system is to improve administrative efficiency. After all, the Indian administration is run for the service of the people and not for opportunities for promotion to a few persons. But theories of public administration and experiments in achieving efficiency are matters of governmental policy and business management. Apparently, the State, having given due consideration to these factors, thought that a blended brew would serve best. Even so, it could not have been the intention of government to create artificial situations, import legal fictions and complicate the composition of the cadre by deviating from the natural course. The State probably intended to bring in fresh talent to the extent reasonably available but not at the sacrifice of sufficiency of hands at a given time nor at the cost of creating a vacuum by keeping substantive vacancies unfilled for long. The straightforward answer seems to us to be that the State, in tune with the mandate of the rule, must make serious effort to secure hands to fill half the number of vacancies from the open market. If it does not succeed, despite honest and serious effort, it qualifies for departure from the rule. If it has become non-feasible impracticable and procrastinatory to get the requisite quota of direct recruits, having done all that it could, it was free to fill the posts by promotion of suitable hands if the filling up of the vacancies was administratively necessary and could not wait. 'Impracticable' cannot be equated with 'impossible'--nor with 'unpalatable'--and we cannot agree with the learned judges of the High Court in construing it as colossally incapable of compliance. The short test, therefore, is to find out whether the government, in the present case, has made effective efforts, doing all that it reasonably can, to recruit from the open market necessary numbers of qualified hands. We do not agree that the compulsion of the rule goes to the extreme extent of making government keep the vacancies in the quota of the direct recruits open and to meet the urgent needs of administration by creating ex cadre posts or making ad hoc appointments or resorting to other out-of-the-way expedients. The sense of the rule is that as far as possible the quota system must be kept up and if not 'practicable', promotees in the place of direct recruits or direct recruits in the place of promotees may be inducted applying the regular procedures, without suffering the seats to lie indefinitely vacant."
24. In the case of P.T. Rajan Vs. T.P.M. Sahir and others, reported at (2003) 8 SCC 498 while considering similar provision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:
"48. Furthermore even if the statute specifies a time for publication of the electoral roll, the same by itself could not have been held to be mandatory. Such a provision would be directory in nature. It is well-settled pinciple of law that where a statutory functionary is asked to perform a statutory duty within the time prescribed therefor, the same would be directory and not mandatory."
25. A mandatory provision is required to be complied with strictly on pain of invalidation. But merely because a provision is held to be directory, it does not provide an option of non-compliance to the authorities. The law has to be complied with in all circumstances. This is the essence of the rule of law. However, the rigors of compliance may vary depending upon the statutory provision. In case of a directory provision, a substantial compliance of the same would suffice to meet the ends of law.
26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has often dealt with the distinction between a mandatory provision and a directory provision, and the issue of compliance of directory provisions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharif-Ud-Din Vs. Abdul Gani Lone, reported (1980) 1 SCC 403 held thus:
"9. The difference between a mandatory rule and a directory rule is that while the former must be strictly observed, in the case of the latter, substantial compliance may be sufficient to achieve the object regarding which the rule is enacted (emphasize added). Certain broad propositions which can be deduced from several decisions of courts regarding the rules of construction that should be followed in determining whether a provision of law is directory or mandatory may be summarized thus: The fact that the statute uses the word 'shall' while laying down a duty is not conclusive on the question whether it is a mandatory or directory provision. In order to find out the true character of the legislation, the Court has to ascertain the object which the provision of law in question is to sub-serve and its design and the context in which it is enacted. If the object of a law is to be defeated by non-compliance with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory. But when a provision of law relates to the performance of any public duty and the invalidation of any act done in disregard of that provision causes serious prejudice to those for whose benefit it is enacted and at the same time who have no control over the performance of the duty, such provision should be treated as a directory one. Where however, a provision of law prescribes that a certain act has to be done in a particular manner by a person in order to acquire a right and it is coupled with another provision which confers an immunity on another when such act is not done in that manner, the former has to be regarded as a mandatory one. A procedural rule ordinarily should not be construed as mandatory if the defect in the act done in pursuance of it can be cured by permitting appropriate rectification to be carried out at a subsequent stage unless by according such permission to rectify the error later on, another rule would be contravened. Whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow."
27. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Vikas Trivedi Vs. State of U.P. and others, reported at (2013) 2 UPLBEC 1193 held as under:
"15. Maxwell On the Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition) in Chapter 13,while discussing "Imperative And Directory Enactments" said following:
'The first such question is: when a statute requires that something shall be done, or done in a particular manner or form, without expressly declaring what shall be the consequence of non-compliance, is the requirement to be regarded as imperative (or mandatory) or merely as directory (or permissive)? In some cases the conditions or forms prescribed by the Statute have been regarded as essential to the act or thing regulated by it, and their omission has been held fatal to its validity. In others, such prescriptions have been considered as merely directory, the neglect of them involving nothing more than liability to a penalty, if any were imposed, for breach of the enactment. An absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially.' It is impossible to lay down any general rule for determining whether a provision is imperative or directory. 'No universal rule', said Lord Campbell, L.C., 'can be laid down for the construction of statutes, as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of Courts of Justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed.' And Lord Penzance said: 'I believe as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safely go further than that in each case you must look to the subject matter; consider the importance of the provisions that has been disregarded, and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act; and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the matter is what is called imperative or only directory."
"76. At this juncture a note of caution is required to be given. All provisions of the statute are required to be complied with. It is useful to quote paragraph 5-052 of De-Smith Judicial Review 6th Edition in which while dealing with mandatory and directory statutes, following was observed:-
"5-052. A second reason for the tangle in this area is the use of the terms "mandatory" and "directory"; the latter term is especially misleading. All statutory requirements are prima facie mandatory. However, in some situations the violation of a provision will, in the context of the statute as a whole and the circumstances of the particular decision, not violate the objects and purpose of the statute. Condoning such a breach does not, however, render the statutory provision directory or discretionary. The breach of the particular provision is treated in the circumstances as not involving a breach of the statute taken as a whole. Furthermore, logically, a provision cannot be mandatory if a court has discretion not to enforce it."
28. In the case of Karnal Improvement Trust, Karnal Vs. Smt. Parkash Wanti (Dead) and another, reported at (1995) 5 SCC 159, the Hon'ble Apex Court laid down the law in the following terms:
"11. There is distinction between ministerial acts and statutory or quasi-judicial functions under the statute. When the statute requires that something should be done or done in a particular manner or form, without expressly declaring what shall be the consequence of non-compliance, the question often arise: What intention is to be attributed by inference to the legislature? It has been repeatedly said that no particular rule can be laid down in determining whether the command is to be considered as a mere direction or mandatory involving invalidating consequences in its disregard. It is fundamental that it depends on the scope and object of the enactment. Nullification is the natural and usual consequence of disobedience, if the intention is of an imperative character. The question in the main is governed by considerations of the object and purpose of the Act; convenience and justice and the result that would ensure. General inconvenience or injustice to innocent persons or advantage to those guilty of the neglect, without promoting the real aim and object of the enactment would be kept at the back of the mind. The scope and purpose of the statute under consideration must be regarded as an integral scheme. The general rule is that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially. When a public duty, as held before, is imposed and statute requires that is shall be performed in a certain manner or within a certain time or under other specified conditions, such prescriptions may well be regarded as intended to be directory only in cases when injustice or inconvenience to others who have no control over those exercising the duty would result if such requirements are not essential and imperative."
29. Good authority thus holds that statutes fixing time-lines to accomplish an action are directory in nature. In various cases the legislative intent was sought to be defeated by a highly delayed compliance on the pretext of the provision being directory in nature. Such action of the authorities was on a misconception of law. This action of the authorities was invalidated and such interpretation was negatived by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Inordinate delay does not satisfy the requirement of substantial compliance of a directory provision.
30. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. P.C. Wadhwa, IPS, Inspector General of Police and another, reported at (1987) 2 SCC 602, while laying down the law, dispelled all such doubts. The relevant parts of the judgement are being extracted for ease of reference:
"14. The whole object of the making and communication of adverse remarks is to give to the officer concerned an opportunity to improve his performance, conduct or character, as the case may. The adverse remarks should not be understood in terms of punishment, but really it should be taken as an advice to the officer concerned, so that he can act in accordance with the advice and improve his service career. The whole object of the making of adverse remarks would be lost if they are communicated to the officer concerned after an inordinate delay. In the instant case, it was communicated to the respondent after twenty seven months. It is true that the provisions of Rules 6, 6A and 7 are directory and not mandatory, but that does not mean that the directory provisions need not be complied with even substantially. Such provisions may not be complied with strictly, and substantial compliance will be sufficient. But, where compliance after an inordinate delay would be against the spirit and object of the directory provision, such compliance would not be substantial compliance. In the instant case, while the provisions of Rules 6, 6A and 7 require that everything including the communication of the adverse remarks should be completed within a period of seven months, this period cannot be stretched to twenty seven months, simply because these Rules are directory, without serving any purpose consistent with the spirit and objectives of these Rules. We need not, however, dilate upon the question any more and consider whether on the ground of inordinate and unreasonable delay, the adverse remarks against the respondent should be struck down or not, and suffice it to say that we do not approve of the inordinate delay made in communicating the adverse remarks to the respondent."
31. The statutes which do not provide for specific time frame to do an act, do not provide a clear guidance to the authorities regarding the time period in which the act has to be done. In such cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court ironed out such creases in law in the case of Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Vs. K.T. Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd. reported at (1995) 1 SCC 181 and held:
"4. There can be no dispute in law that when a power is conferred by statute without mentioning the period within which it could be invoked, the same has to be done within reasonable period, as all powers must be exercised reasonably, and exercise of the same within reasonable period would be a facet of reasonableness. When this appeal was heard by us on 7-9-1994 and when this aspect of the matter came to our notice, we desired an affidavit from the Commissioner to put on record regarding the point of time when he came to know about the default and to explain the cause of delay. Pursuant to that order, the Commissioner filed his affidavit on 10-11-1994, according to which the power of levying damages came to be delegated to the Commissioner by an order dated 17-10-1973. As, however, large number of establishments were in existence in the State of Maharashtra -- the number of which in 1985 was 22,189 -- and there was only one Regional Provident Fund Commissioner having power to levy damages, delay was caused in detection of the cases of belated payment. According to the affidavit, the default at hand was located on 19-4-1985 and the damages came to be levied by order dated 5-11-1986."
32. In case, the proceeding is decided within three months, the letter and spirit of the statute is implemented. However, mere failure to decide the case within three months does not violate the statutory mandate. In the latter case, the statutory obligation will be defined by the quality of the efforts made to decide the suit/proceeding with promptitude and dispatch. The statutory obligation will be discharged if the case is decided within a reasonable time, after the expiry of three months from the date of its institution.
33. Statutes of limitation are statutes of repose. Statutes with time lines for decision making are statutes of endeavour. Statutory duty is discharged not only when the act is done but also when effort is made. However, the leeway to the authority is not unlimited and the time to accomplish the act is not indefinite.
34. The statutory duty of the trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad, in the event the case is not decided within three months is to be seen. The trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad in discharge of its statutory duties has to make earnest efforts to decide the case expeditiously in a reasonable time after the expiry of three months from the institution of the suit. While the statutory duty of the trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad is to make earnest efforts to decide expeditiously, the proof of its performance is in the order-sheet of the court. The order-sheet of the trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad is the most reliable evidence of the sincerity or earnestness of the efforts made by the appellate authority. The order-sheet of the trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad is true testimony to the accomplishment of the statutory duty or the failure of the authority to perform its statutory duty. In the latter case the authority is liable to be mandamused.
35. In the light of the legal position stated above, the facts of the case will be analyzed.
36. The ordersheet has been analysed at length in the earlier part of the judgment. A perusal of the order-sheet discloses that the matter is being adjourned repeatedly without any good reason and that virtually no effective hearing has taken place since the institution of the proceedings in the year 2009. This discloses a clear failure of the authority below to perform its statutory functions prescribed by law.
37. No lis can remain pending indefinitely before a court of law. Indefinite pendency of a lis goes to the root of administration of justice. Such delay is not permitted by law and cannot be countenanced by the court.
38. In light of the preceding discussion, a writ in the nature of mandamus is issued commanding the respondent no. 2, trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad, before whom the Case No. 269 of 2009-10 (Ram Sukh Vs Gram Sabha and others) is pending to execute the following directions:
I. The respondent no. 2, trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad, shall decide the Case No. 269 of 2009-10 (Ram Sukh Vs Gram Sabha and others), after giving an opportunity of hearing to all the parties to the proceedings within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
II. The respondent no. 2, trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad, shall not grant any unnecessary adjournment to the parties.
III. In case any adjournment is granted in the paramount interest of justice, the respondent no. 2, trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad, shall impose costs not below Rs. 10,000/- for each adjournment, upon the party seeking adjournment.
IV. In case the counsel for any party does not appear before the respondent no. 2, trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad, on any date on the ground of strike of advocates, the respondent no. 2, trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad, shall not permit such counsel (of either party) to appear in this case on future dates.
V. The respondent no. 2, trial court/Sub-Divisional Officer, Phulpur, District Allahabad, shall proceed with the case on a day to day basis, if required, to adhere to the above stipulated time line of six months. In case the court is vacant the Commissioner, Prayagraj Division, Prayagraj, shall nominate another court which is sitting to ensure that the above stipulated time period of six months to decide the case, is strictly adhered to.
39. With the aforesaid direction, the writ petition is disposed of finally.
Order Date :- 9.1.2020 Pravin