Punjab-Haryana High Court
Kaila Devi vs State Of Haryana on 17 December, 1998
Equivalent citations: (1999)122PLR628
Author: Swatanter Kumar
Bench: Swatanter Kumar
JUDGMENT Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. This application under Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code has been filed by the applicant with a prayer that they be awarded a sum of Rs. 60,000/- per acre for the acquisition of their land in terms of order dated 24.5.1990. passed in RFA No. 1186 of 1988 Arjan and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors.
2. Notice of this application was issued to the respondent, who filed a detailed reply to the application. On merits of the case, they raised objection to the very maintainability of the application in the present form.
3. The applicants contended that in the interest of justice and to award equal compensation to the applicants, as has been granted to the other claimants, whose land was acquired by the same notification, compensation prayed for should be granted to them. On the other hand, it is contended by the respondent that the application is an abuse of process of law and if any remedy was available to the applicants in the present case, it was by filing a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of the Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court.
4. In order to critically examine the rival contentions, references to basic facts would be necessary.
5. The land of the applicant along with other land-owners of Village Rattan Pura was acquired by the State of Haryana for the construction of Yamuna Nagar Thermal Power Project Colony vide notification dated 16.3.1985 published on 21.3.1985 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. After following due process under the provisions of the said Act, the Land Acquisition Collector had awarded compensation, which was enhanced by the learned Additional District Judge to Rs. 45,000/- per acre vide judgment dated 21.11.1987. Aggrieved by the award of the learned Additional District Judge, the applicants-claimants filed First Regular Appeal No. 459 of 1988 in this court, which was dismissed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.C. Jain, vide detailed judgment dated 27.7.1989 and the relevant portion of the judgment reads as under: -
"In the light of the observations made above, the appeals are meritless and they are consequently ordered to be dismissed with no order as to costs."
6. Learned Judge did not consider it proper to enhance the amount already awarded by the learned Additional District Judge and maintained the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Additional District Judge, though the claimants had asked for compensation at the rate of Rs. 80,000/- per acre. However, in another Regular First Appeal, being RFA No. 1186 of 1988, the compensation was enhanced by the High Court to Rs. 60,000/- per acre. In view of the order passed in RFA No. 1186 of 1988, the present applicants filed an application being Civil Misc. No. 1619-CI of 1990 in this Regular First Appeal praying that they be awarded compensation at the same rate i.e. Rs. 60,000/- per acre. The basic plea was that for the identical land acquired by the same notification said compensation has been awarded, so the applicants were entitled to Rs. 60,000/- per acre.
7. This application was filed by the applicants on 16.8.1990 and was dismissed by the Court by its order dated 12.7.1993. The said order reads as under:-
"This order of mine would dispose of the civil misc. application. A prayer for the grant of compensation in the amount of Rs. 60,000/- per acre to bring it in conformity with the Award given by me in RFA No. 1186 of 1988-Arjan and Anr. v. The State of Haryana decided on May 14, 1990 has been made after hearing the counsel for the parties vide my judgment dated July 27, 1989 (Ved Parkash v. State of Haryana, RFA No. 507 of 1988) dismissed the appeals of the claimants upholding the award of the Land Acquisition Court. Any order to be passed by me would amount to reviewing my Award in Ved Parkash's case (supra). The applicant could well file an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench. Even the present application was filed after more than a year. In view thereof no case for interference under Section 151 CPC is made out. The application is accordingly declined."
Again on 4.9.1993, the present application was filed with the same relief. It is in this background, this Court has to consider the merits and maintainability of this application.
8. It is contended by the learned counsel for the applicants that this court has inherent powers and it must do justice to the parties by awarding the same compensation as has been awarded alongwith the applicants by the same notification. According to the learned counsel for the applicants, the inherent powers of the Court, as contemplated under Section 151 of the Code, would justify passing of such order. For this purpose, he relied upon a Division Bench Judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Ram Mehar v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 Delhi 130.
9. It is true that normally similar amount of compensation would be payable to the identical situated landowner and specially when such lands are acquired by the same notification. This principle of law has to be made applicable within four corners of law and cannot be achieved by a power which otherwise is not vested in the Court.
10. The inherent powers vested in the Court under Section 151 of the Code could be invoked to do justice but without infringing and overreaching the specific provisions of law or provisions of the Code. If exercise of such powers is likely to contravene the manner and the method for which specific provisions have been enacted in the Code, the Court would have to refrain from passing such order in exercise of its inherent powers. In other words, expressed provisions of law in the statute would by necessary implication exclude the exercise of inherent powers in regard to that particular Act where specific remedy is available to the party in accordance with codified law. Passing orders under inherent power in variation of such definite remedy is normally not permissible in law and that has been consistent view held by the Courts including the highest court of the land. So the inherent powers cannot be permitted to be substituted for appellate Court powers to judge the merits and correctness of the judgment pronounced.
11. At the very outset, it will be appropriate to refer to the judgment rendered in the case of Manilal Mohan Lal Shah and Ors. v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahmad and Anr., A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 349. Commencing upon the scope of inherent powers, excisable by the Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
"(12) It was urged before us that the Court could allow a set-off in execution proceedings under its inherent powers apart from the provisions of Order 21 Rule 19 of the Civil Procedure Code. We do not think that the inherent powers of the Court could be invoked to circumvent the mandatory provisions of the Code and relieve the purchasers of their obligation to make the deposit."
Further in the case of Cotton Corporation of India Limited v. United Industrial Bank Limited and Ors., A.I.R. 1983, Supreme Court 1272, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
"The Court can in appropriate cases grant temporary injunction in exercise of its inherent power in cases not covered by Order 39 CPC. But while exercising this inherent power, the Court should not overlook the statutory provision which clearly indicates that injunction to retrain initiation of proceeding cannot be granted. Section 41(b) is one such provision. And it must be remembered that inherent power of the court cannot be invoked to nullify or stultify a statutory provision.
12. In the case of Ram Chand & Sons Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Kanhayalal Bhargav, A.I.R. 1966 S.C.C. 1899, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while specifically indicating that inherent powers of a Court is in addition to complementary to the powers expressly conferred under the Code emphasised the need that such power will not be exercised, if its exercise is inconsistent with, or comes into conflict with, any of the powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the other provisions of the Code, exhaustively to deal with a particular topic provided in the Code, it gives rise to the necessary implication that no power shall be exercised in respect of the said topic otherwise than in the manner prescribed in the said provisions.
13. Normally inherent powers would come into play where the Code does not provide a specific provision to deal with the situation. Where a party fails to recourse to a specific remedy prescribed under the Code, normally the Court would not permit exercise of inherent powers to rescue or remedy the grievance of that party in exercise of its inherent powers, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 997 Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee and Ors.
14. Restrictions on exercise of inherent powers by the Court was illustrated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Rangila Ram (dead) by LRs., A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 206, where the Court held that once the award becomes final, inherent powers could not be exercised to enhance solatium and statutory benefits given under the. award. Similar view was expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Bai Shakrihen (dead) by Natwar Melsingh and Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Anr., A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 3323, that where a decree has become final executing Court cannot amend the decree by exercising inherent powers.
15. At this stage, it will be appropriate to refer to the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court made in the case of Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills Private Ltd., (supra):
"The inherent power of a Court is in addition to and complementary to the powers expressly conferred under the Civil Procedure Code. But that power will not be exercised if its exercise is inconsistent with, or comes into conflict with, any of the powers expressly or by necessary implication, conferred by the other provisions of the Code. It there are express provisions exhaustively covering a particular topic, they give rise to a necessary implication that no power shall be exercised in respect of the said topic otherwise than in the manner prescribed by the said provisions. Whatever, limitations are imposed by construction on the provisions of Section 151 of the Code they do not control the undoubted power of the Court conferred under Section 151 of the Code to make a suitable order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court."
16. Montage picture that emerges from the principle enunciated by the highest court of the land is that recourse to inherent powers in face of or in conflict with the specific provisions of the statute would not be permissible. Inherent powers cannot be used as an instrument to intrude the powers of the Court in regard to a procedure or a remedy, if specifically provided in other provisions of the Code. No code or law could be codified so as to provide for each and every situation, at every stage of the proceedings arising from the vacuum left in the enactment, Such situations are to be supplied by the Court by recourse to inherent powers to create a bridge over such situation for meeting the ends of justice or prevent abuse of process of law. To do justice is the primary duty of the Court but duty imposed should be discharged in consonance with the provisions of the Code and within four comers of well enunciated principle. Inherent powers being adjunct to the specifically provided powers of the Code as codified in the code. Thus they could not be used for disturbing the procedure provided under the Code because its ramification could prove retrogative to the administration of justice by civil court. Entertainment of such application would have the effect of infringing the concept of finality doctrine of civil jurisprudence.
17. The decision of the Court dated 27.7,1989 had given finality to the merits of the case in Regular First Appeal, referred to above. The judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court should be serutinised on merit only by the Letter Patent Bench under Section 10 of the Letter Patent Appeal Act. In any case, if there was some scope for review of the said judgment the same stood exhausted by the applicants by filing Civil Misc. No. 1619-CI of 1990 dismissed on 12.7.1993. Thus, the order of 1993 attained finality. In case the judgment of this Court passed in Regular First Appeal is permitted to be re-opened, it would apparently be in conflict with the spirit and substance of the statutory provisions prescribed under clause 10 of the Letter Patent Act and Order 43 of the CPC.
For the reasons aforestated but with great respect I am not able to reconcile myself to follow the view elucidated in Ram Mehar case (supra).
18. Another factor which must be noticed that even in Ram Mehar's case, the High Court held that review was not permissible on that ground under the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In other words, the application of the applicants did not satisfy the basic ingredients provided under Order 41 Rule 1 of the code and a review could be filed only if such ingredients were satisfied. If no review was maintainable, then only other alternative remedy was to prefer a regular appeal for which a detailed self-contained procedure has been provided in law. Recourse to inherent powers as alternative to statutory remedy in my humble opinion would not be permissible.
19. Furthermore, a distinguishing feature of the judgment-cited by the learned counsel for the applicants is that in that case compensation had been awarded under the Regular First Appeal by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court and the same was enhanced under Section 151 CPC. While in the present case, the Regular First Appeal itself was dismissed on merits at the initial stage. Thus, that judgment, in any case, is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
20. The present application would be liable to be rejected even on the ground that it is hit by the principle of res judicata. As already noticed, earlier application being Civil Misc. No. 1619-CI of 1990 for identical relief was filed, which was dismissed by the order dated 12.7.1993. The said order was again not assailed in appeal and had attained finality. The present application is replica of that application except mentioning of a Division Bench judgment of Delhi High Court, in the case of Ram Mehar's case (supra) as such, the second application raising substantially and materially the same controversy, as raised in the previous application, which has already been decided on merits, would be hit by the principle of res judicata. A party cannot be permitted to agitate and re-agitate one and the same issue by filing application after application for the same relief. To say the least, this is an abuse of the process of Court. By no stretch of imagination one can accept that, this application is for achieving the ends of justice.
In view of the detailed order dated 12.7.1993, I do not see any necessity to discuss the merits of this application any further.
For the aforesaid reason, I find that the present application is not maintainable and is even otherwise liable to be dismissed on merits. Ordered accordingly.