Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Omer Bin Salam Askari vs Dr. Yousuf on 13 December, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1998(2)ALD258, 1998(2)ALT486
ORDER
1. The petitioner before this Court is a tenant of mulgies bearing Nos.22-2-541/1/1 and 2, Dabeerpura, Hyderabad, and the respondent is the landlord thereof The rent in respect of the said premises was fixed at Rs.160/- per month excluding electricity charges and the same was required to be paid in advance on the 1st day of every month. However, according to the respondent-landlord, the petitioner-tenant failed to pay rent for as long a period as three years covering 1-4-1983 to 31-3-1986 and committed wilful default in payment of rent which made him liable to be evicted from the demised premises. The ground of personal requirement is also urged by the landlord for securing eviction of the tenant.
2. The Rent Controller dismissed the suit for evictioa The matter was earned in appeal by the landlord before the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, in RA No.362ofl991. The learned Chief Judge of the appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in favour of the landlord both on the ground of wilful default and on the ground of bow fide personal requirement. Aggrieved by the said order, the tenant has filed Ihe present Civil Revision Petition.
3. On the question of wilful default, the appellate Court observed that the respondent (tenant) paid Rs.960/- on 24-10-1986 towards six months rent after institution of the proceedings. The appellate Court further observed that every month the tenant had to pay rent for the current month on or before 25th of that month or else he would be a defaulter. In the RC which was filed on 19-3-1986, it was not clarified when the rent of March, 1986 was paid. The rent for April, 1986 would not have been received by the landlord because he had already filed the RC- When the rent for April, 1986 was paid was not slated by the tenant. The rent for May, 1986 had to be paid on or before 25-05-1986, but the same was remitted by money order only in June, 1986. The respondent (tenant) who sent Ex.R6 money order afler entering his appearance in the RC did not even mention when he paid the rent for March and April, 1986. The appellate Court further observed that the docket of the trial Court showed that on 24-10-1986 the Counsel for the tenant paid Rs.960/- to the Counsel for appellant-landlord which would mean that six months' rent was paid only on 24-10-1986 by the tenant inspite of the fact that he was fully aware that the appellant had filed RC against him inter alia alleging wilful default in payment of rent on his part which itself according to the learned appellate Court, was sufficient to establish wilful default on part of the tenant The appellate Court further took note of the specific case of the tenant that he was paying rent to the father of the landlord and that after the father of the landlord fell sick in 1984 he was paying rent to the mother of the landlord regularly till April, 1986, thatin chief examination as RW1 also he stated so and that during the cross-examination he stated that he is maintaining accounts for his business and that he did not mention the payment of rents in his accounts and that he had no documentary proof to show that he paid rent from April, 1983 to April, 1986, and held that the trial Court without considering the above evidence of RW1 was in error in drawing an inference against Ihe landlord for non-production of his income tax returns. PW1 clearly stated that he did not show the arrears of rent in his income tax returns. If the respondent (tenant) was sure that the income tax return of the landlord disclosed the payment of rent by him, he could have obtained certified copies thereof and filed before the Court to substantiate his contention. Further, according to the learned appellate Judge, merely because PW1 stated that they used to issue printed receipts earlier and that they were not issuing printed receipts from 1970 did not mean that he was not in the habit of issuing receipts. RW1 admitted that his account books did not disclose payment of rents to the landlord. RW3 to whom the tenant was said to have paid the rents on behalf of the landlord did not support tiie case of the tenant. She clearly stated that she never collected rent from the tenant and that she did not know him. The appellate Court further observed that RW3's statement that her husband used to collect rents earlier was of no consequence because even according to the tenant, the father of the landlord collected rent till 1984 and fell sick and from that time onwards he was paying rent to RW3. Non payment of rent for a period from 1-4-1983 to 31-3-1986 very much amounted to committing wilful default in payment of rent and, therefore, according to the appellate Court, the tenant not only committed wilful default in payment of rent from 1-4-1983 to 31-3-1986 but also failed to pay subsequent to the filing of the RC.
4. The learned Rent Controller seems to have been swayed away by the fact that the landlord before him kept quiet for as many as three years regarding the non receipt of rent from the tenant. He also took into consideration the fact that the rent account was not produced before the Court inspite of PW1 admitting that he was maintaining the rent account. No notice was sent to the tenant for the alleged arrears of rent from April, 1983 to March, 1986. PW1 also admitted that the factum of arrears of rent was not shown in his Income Tax Returns. The learned Rent Controller further observed that the admission made by the landlord that no receipts were passed since 1970 lent an air of credibility to the tenant's version that rent receipts were not issued to him inspite of the rent having been paid to the landlord.
5. The learned Rent Controller (hereafter referred to the decision of this High Court in Fatima Bi v. Akber Hussain, 1975 (I) APLJ 51 in which it is held that even if one month's default is not explained, it could be treated as wilful and in Pattan Khan v, Syed Pasha, 1975 (2) APLJ 318, where it is held that irregular payment of rent by the tenant amounted to wilful default though the landlord received the rent without protest The trial Court also referred to the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Narsimha Rao v. Radhakrishnama Charyulu, 1978 (1) APLJ 308 where it is held that the failure of the tenant to pay the rent within 15 days after expiry of time fixed under the agreement or if there was no such agreement he failed to pay the rent before the last day of the following month, the Controller had no option but to direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building unless the matter was one which fell within the proviso. However, according to the learned Rent Controller, in the case before him, it was held that the version of the landlord that the rents were not paid from April, 1983 to March, 1986 could not be accepted and, therefore, the authorities cited above did not apply to the facts of the case. On this ground the learned Rent Controller dismissed the landlord's plea that the tenant was liable to be evicted on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent.
6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in'the case of Dakaya alias Dakaiah v. Anjani, , in which it is held that in view of the fact that the tenant sent the bank draft covering the entire default, there was no occasion for the Rent Controller to direct the deposit of arrears within the stipulated period. The Rent Controller, the first appellate Court and the High Court failed to appreciate, as observed by (he Supreme Court, the incidence of tendering the entire amount under default before the institution of the suit. As a result the Courts below erroneously proceeded on the footing that there had been a wilful default for which the landlady was entitled to a decree for eviction.
7. In the case ofNeki s/o Bakhatawar v. Satnarain, 1997 (2) APLJ 50 (SC), the Supreme Court was confronted with a question whether the default in payment of rent for the year 1978 warranted the eviction of tenant from the demised property. The Supreme Court observed that the appellant-tenant never committed default in the payment of share of the crop and it was unlikely that he would commit default in the payment of rent for 1978. The normal probable human conduct would show that he must have paid the amount to the agent of the principal landlord. It was also admitted that subsequent to the filing of the application for three years he had already paid the rent to the respondent's GPA and under these circumstances, the Supreme Court observed that on a conspectus of the relevant provisions and the probable human conduct, the finding recorded by the Commissioner was not sustainable. Generally, tenant was not expected to demand from the landlord issue of a rent receipt for payment of the amount. After all, it was a relationship of confidence between Ihe. landlord and the tenant, unless there was a special contract in that behalf. After taking note of all the circumstances, the Supreme Court expressed a view that the finding that the appellant had committed wilful default in payment of rent for the year 1978 due to failure of crop and had paid the same in the later year was not correct and he was not liable to ejection.
8. The learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord pressed into service the decision of a learned single Judge of this High Court in D.L. Satyanarayana v. K. Radha Krishnalah, . The learned single Judge of this High Court held that the default committed by the tenant during the pendency of the proceedings amounted to wilful default and eviction could be ordered on the basis of such wilful default.
9. The learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord also relied on the decision of this High Court in N. Ananda Rao v. P. Naga Anjeswam Rao, in which it is held that the Court cannot embark upon independent reassessment of evidence and interfere with the concurrent findings of fact and reach a different conclusion of its own when Courts below had applied correct law to the evidence on record. It is further held that the default in payment of rent subsequent to filing of eviction petition could also be made a ground for eviction and the order of eviction was confirmed.
10. In the case before us, however, the main thrust is on the proposition of fact that the tenant was in arrears of rent for more than three years prior to the date of filing the RC. As far as the subsequent period is concerned, an allegation is indeed made against the tenant that he was irregular in depositing rents in the Court but the same was not substantiated to the satisfaction of the Court. Prior to the initiation of the proceedings, I am unable to agree with the views expressed by the appellate Court as against the finding of the learned Rent Controller that the landlord had established beyond all reasonable doubts that the tenant had committed wilful default in payment of rent. The allegations made by the tenant that the rent was paid but the rent receipts were not issued and that the arrears of rent were also remitted by money order and that notice prior to filing of suit for eviction was not served upon the tenant and also that the landlord was frequently visiting Gulf countries which made it difficult for the tenant to pay rent to him in the absence of anyone else to accept rent on his behalf etc. are not devoid of merits and do give us a reason not to believe that the tenant committed any wilful default and I do not find any cause to disagree with the views expressed by the learned Rent Controller that the landlord had failed to establish that the tenant committed wilful default in payment of rents. The 1st appellate Court had no reason to disagree with the views expressed by the Rent Controller on the issue of wilful default.
11. Dr. Yousuf, the landlord made certain admissions in his cross-examination which tend to demolish the myth of 'wilful default'. Some of the admissions made by him are as follows:
"(1) It is true that I purchased the suit properly in an auction in the year 1965. My date of birth is 25-8-1945 I am leaving India on 12-4-1988 and I am going to Iran. I have already obtained visa and also purchased the tickets. Originally the property was purchased by my mother in the year 1965. Myself and my father both managed the suit property. My father was President of the Congress Committee. My father is bed-ridden since 1984. He is bed-ridden and he is unable to move since then, I was at Iran for two years from 1981 to 1983 previously.
(2) I have stated in my petition that I collected the rents till end of March 1983 and we used to pass the rent receipts as and when we received tie rents. Previously we are having counterfoils of the rent receipts. We are not having the counterfoil of the rents receipts for the year 1982 and 1983.
(3) I appointed my younger brother as my GPA when I was away. I did not give any notice to the respondent asking him to pay the rent to my GPA in my absence.
(4) The respondent sent the rent of May 1986 and I refused the same as the amount was not sufficient. We did not issue any notice to the respondent stating that he was due rent. The respondent originally was the tenant of all the three mulgies. Ex.Rl to R4 are the rent receipts issued by us. (Ex.Rl to R4 marked subject to the payment of stamp duty penalty) Ex.RI to R4 were in the handwriting of my father but I signed the same. It is true that I used to pass the printed rent receipts previously. Since 1970 we were not issuing the printed rent receipts.
(5) It is true that I refused to receive the M.Os. sent Ex.RS and R6 (witness adds the amount was not sufficient and as such I refused). It is true that the respondent paid a sum of Rs.960/- on the first date of hearing of this case and since then respondent continuously paying the rents.
(6) It is true in the rental deeds it is mentioned that I have to issue notice to the respondent asking him to vacate the premises. I did not issue any notice to the respondent before filing of this petitioa"
The above admissions restrain the Court from recording an unimpeachable finding that there was any deliberate attempt on part of the tenant to desist from discharging his liability of paying rent These admissions made by the landlord defeat his case that the rent receipts were regularly issued, so that the Court could give a definite finding on the basis of the counterfoils regarding the arrears of rent, if any, and that any default was committed by the tenant in payment of rents prior to the initiation of Court proceedings by the landlord. It also becomes quite evident from these admissions that the landlord used to be frequently out of India and he had.not given any notice to the respondent asking him to pay rent to his GPA during his absence and, therefore no fault could be found with the tenant if the rent remained unpaid on account of the fact that there was none to receive the rent within the knowledge of the tenant.
12. The admissions made by the landlord that the tenant paid a sum of Rs.960/- on the first date of hearing of the case and that since then the tenant-respondent was continuously paying rent clinches the whole issue. Under Section 10(2)(i) of the Act, it was necessary for the landlord to show that the tenant did not pay or tender the rent due within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy, or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent was payable. This verification could have been made possible if the landlord had served upon the tenant a notice prior to initiating the Court proceedings demanding payment of the arrears of rent, but admittedly no such notice was given. Under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act, the Rent Controller was required to record a satisfaction whether the tenant's default to pay or tender was not wilful, so that time not exceeding fifteen days could be given to pay or tender the rent due by the tenant to the landlord upto the date of such payment. This statutory satisfaction is not rendered to the Rent Controller thereby disabling the Rent Controller to hold that the tenant committed a wilful default. Other admissions made by the landlord speak for themselves and the same need not be specifically dealt with.
13. The term 'wilful' connotes something which is done without lawful excuse and which is intentional. The expression 'wilful' can be understood in the context of mental element of a man who refused to make the payment deliberately. 'Wilful default' may mean default in payment of rent at the stipulated time without valid reasons. The default can be regarded as wilful where the conduct of the tenant is such as to lead to the conclusion that his omission was a conscious act of breach of obligation to pay the rent or reckless indifference. If a man permits a thing to be done, it means that he gives permission for it to be done and if a man gives permission for a thing to be done, he knows what is to be done or is being done, and if he knows that, it follows that it is not wilful.
14. In the instant case, the undisputed fact that the rent tendered by money order was not accepted by the landlord and further admission by the landlord that the tenant deposited a sum of Rs.960/- on the first date of hearing and thereafter continued to pay rent in the Court, absolves the tenant from the mischief of the term 'wilful default'. In Ihe Rent Control Act the word 'wilful' is not used in the narrow and primary sense. It implies not doing something lhat is reasonable or necessary which is required to be done. When it is coupled with the word 'wilful', the phrase is intended to signify something more than a mere omission or default If the alleged inaction on part of the tenant was wilful, he would not have tendered the rent on the first date of hearing and would^not have paid the subsequent rent in Ihe Court. The ground taken by the landlord that the money order was not accepted because it is did not cover the entire arrears of rent does not stand substantiated from the evidence which has come on record on behalf of the landlord. The landlord made two admissions in his cross-examination which go to the root of the case, firstly, that he was spending more of his time abroad, and secondly, that he had not informed the tenant about the appointment of his GPA who was empowered to receive the rents. No fault could, therefore, be found with the tenant if he is not informed by the landlord as to whom the rent should be paid in his absence. Not issuing the receipts for rent paid by the tenant is a serious lacuna on part of the landlord. With regard to the amount which was in arrears, a mere word of mouth in such circumstances cannot be accepted as the proof of the allegation made by the landlord that the rent was in arrears for as many as three years prior to the institution of the Court proceedings. The appellate Court has held that the tenant was a wilful defaulter mainly on the ground that the payment of rent from 1-4-1983 to 31-3-1986 was in arrears and that the tenant failed to explain the arrears and failed to pay the same, hi my opinion, mis is erroneous. The appellate Court seems to be carrying an impression that it was for the tenant to explain and establish that the rent was not in arrears as alleged by the landlord. In fact it was the duty of the landlord to satisfy the Court unflinchingly regarding the period for which the rent was in arrears. But the landlord has failed to discharge this burden which lay heavily on him. The alleged omission on part of the tenant to pay rent for a period as many as three years could have fatally affected the tenant's case that he was not a wilful defaulter and the onus would have shifted to the tenant that the default was not wilful only if the landlord had specifically come out with a cogent and convincing evidence that the tenant was in arrears for a period as long as three years. In the absence of such evidence and in the absence of any notice to the tenant prior to the initiation of Court proceedings regarding the period for which the rent was in arrears, it cannot be held that the tenant committed wilful default in payment of rent. This lacuna destroys the landlord's case and disentitles the landlord to call upon the Court for a decree of eviction against the tenant.
15. Therefore, I do not agree with the observations and findings of the appellate Court on the issue of wilful default and I am convinced that nothing has pre-dominantly emerged from the discussion made by the appellate Court in its judgment which could justify the displacement of the findings of Rent Controller and, therefore, atleast on the ground that the tenant committed wilful default in payment of rent, no eviction could be ordered.
16. Let us, however, now examine the proposition whether the eviction could be ordered on the ground that the landlord had bonafide personal requirement to oust the tenant from tie demised premises. The "damage" allegedly caused to the demised premises was also taken as a ground for eviction, but it was not pressed at the hearing.
17. On the aspect of personal requirement, the petitioner's case is that his wife is an educated lady and his family is residing on the first floor of the suit premises. She wanted to start general and provisional store in super bazaar style in the suit premises and, therefore, the landlord was in need of the demised premises for bonafide personal requirement. The tenant, on the other hand, resisted this proposition by pointing out that there was no parking place in front of the suit premises and that the alleged requirement was got up with a mala fide intention of evicting the tenant. Further according to the tenant, the suit premises is situated in the old city and the business in the suit premises is the only source of livelihood for him (tenant). The trial Court has recorded an admission on part of the landlord that his wife was not trained in any business and that she was only ahouse-wife. PW2 (the wife herself) also admitted that she has no experience of handling general stores. However, according to the landlord, his requirement of the premises could not be rejected merely on the ground that his wife had no previous experience.
18. Section 10(3)(a) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short 'the Act') lays down that a landlord may subject to the provisions of Clause (iii), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise (a) for (he purpose of a business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application, (b) for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the Controller, the landlord bonafide proposes to commence.
19. Nothing has come on record to satisfy the Court that the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city concerned which may be his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under the Act or otherwise for the purpose of business which he is carrying on. The landlord bonafide proposing to commence business is the only factor which could be looked into by the Court for deciding whether the tenant could be evicted from the premises on this ground. The learned Rent Controller in his judgment referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Baga Begum v. Abdul AhadKhan, AIR 1979 SC 272, in which it is laid down that there should be an element of need as opposed to mere desire or wish. The landlord must satisfy the Rent Controller that his proposal to commence business is bom fide. The Rent Controller also referred to the decision of this High Court in Ch. Ramanajanulu v. Nagara Hamma, 1988 (2) APLJ 72 (SN), in which it is held that the Rent Controller should taken into consideration the relative hardship and the advantage likely to be caused to the tenant while considering the case under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act.
20. hi the case before us, there is no dispute that P W2 has no experience in running the business which is proposed to be commenced from the demised premises and that she is only a house-wife. Her husband is working as a Doctor and he is on deputation to Iran. According to PW1, they have sufficient funds to start the new business from the demised premises. With these facts in view it need hardly be stated that Ihe balance of convenience is in favour of the tenant inasmuch as the tenant who is not shown to be having in possession any other premises for running his business would be exposed to untold hardships if he is subjected to vacate the premises and he would be totally deprived of his livelihood; whereas the landlord who is infact a Doctor and who is not shown to be a person of scanty means is not in dire need of the premises for starting a new business and that too under such exigency that the administration and supervision thereof may have to be entrusted to his wife. There is nothing to show that they would be exposed to any hardship if the possession of the demised premises is not given to them by evicting the tenant for the purpose of commencing new business for which there is neither any inevitability nor any know how or experience. I am, therefore, firmly of the opinion that there are absolutely no bona fides in the landlord's claim to secure the vacant possession of the demised premises on the ground of commencing a new business from there. The entire proposal looks like a fabricated proposal on the very face of it and got up only whh a view to creating an additional ground for securing the eviction of the tenant.
21. The learned Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, in his impugned judgment has not examined these facts at all. He has only taken into consideration that there was no Super Bazaar in that locality and lhat absence of sufficient parking place in front of the suit premises could not be treated as causing any infirmity to the landlord's claim of the demised premises for bona fide personal requirement. This entire approach is erroneous. -In sub-clause (b) of Clause (iii) of Section 10(3)(a) of the Act emphasis is laid on the fact that the landlord 'bona fide' proposes to commence business. The meaning in which the term 'bona fide' is used in this provision could be effectively applied only if the landlord is likely to be exposed to any hardship if he is prevented from commencing a new business from the demised premises. If there is no hardship, the requirement certainly is not bona fide. Even if any hardship is going to be caused, greater hardship is likely to be caused to the tenant because he has no other means of livelihood. The landlord who is a Doctor by profession is not shown to be a person of any scanty means. In that view of the matter, therefore, there can be no constraint on recording a finding that the landlord cannot be held to be bona fide proposing to commence new business from the demised premises and, therefore, on that ground also the landlord fails in establishing his case to secure the eviction of the tenant from the demised premises.
22. The Full Bench of this High Court in Vidyavathi Bat v. Shankerlal, 1987 (2) ALT 550 held lhat the landlord in occupation of a non-residential building as owner is not entitled to eviction of a tenant in occupation of another non-residential building of landlord. The Full Bench further observed that suitability, convenience and sufficiency of the non-residential building already in occupation of the landlord for carrying on the business of the applicant (landlord) or to meet the bona fide need of any other member of the family of the applicant (landlord), independent of and over above The need of the applicant (landlord), are all irrelevant considerations in the context of construing the provisions in Section 10(3XaXiii) of the Act, which in dear terms, interdicted the landlord in absolute terms from seeking recovery of the non-residential building belonging to him in the occupation of the tenant.
23. The Supreme Court expressed the same view in D.Dvaji v. K. Sudershana Rao, 1994(1)APLJ5(SC).
24. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord invited my attention to the decision of this High Court in Kosuri Satti Babu v. Vadaboyina Simhachalam, , in which it is observed in paragraph 13 that as regards the bona fide requirement of the respondents and as regards the relative hardship, as Ihey are based on the facts and circumstances of the case and well supported by evidence on record, ihe Court did not find any basis for interfering with the same. It is further observed that in exercise of the revisional power under Section 22 of the Act, the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence as laid down by the Supreme Court in Rukmini Amma v. Kallyani Sulochand, and K.A. Anthappai v. C.Ahammed, . while dealing with the similar provision - Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965.
25. From the discussions made in this judgment on one of the grounds for eviction based on bonafide personal requirements, it could not be said that this Court has indulged into reappreciation of the evidence. We have only endeavoured to elucidate the meaning of the term 'bona fide' as used in Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act and we have come to a conclusion that on the principle of hardship, the landlord's alleged requirement could not be treated as falling within the meaning of the term 'bonafide' used in the said section. In light of this situation, I am afraid the conclusions arrived at in the Sathibabu 's case (supra) cannot be applied to (he facts of the present case.
26. On the same ground, the decision of this High Court in the case of Vijayalaxtni Printing Press v. N. Shanker, , cannot be applied to the facts of the case having regard to the fact that the High Court was not examining the meaning and scope of the term 'bona fide" used in Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of Ihe Act, but the Court was concerned with a situation in which the landlord was carrying on business in a rented shop and they purchased the petition schedule premises for the purpose of starling new business. The respondent did not own any other non-residential building in the town and the portion which was in their occupation was not suitable for carrying on business i.e., for establishing a cloth shop as it opened into a lane and had no entrance to the main road. There could, therefore, be no doubt about the fact that the ratio emerging from the decision in Vijayalaxmi Printing Press's case (supra) cannot be applied to the facts of the present case.
27. In yet another decision of this High Court in V.V.Krishna Vara Prasad v. S. SuryaRao, it is observed that the appellate Court erred in disturbing the finding of the Rent Controller on the mere ground that the subsequent death of the landlord disentitled the son to seek eviction on the ground of bona fide personal requirement It is further observed that the other reasoning given by the appellate Court that there was insufficient evidence as to whether the requirement was residential or non-residential was not correct since no such plea was raised in the counter to the eviction petition and it was finally held that the landlord was entitled to seek eviction on both the grounds namely, wilful default and bona fide personal requirement.
28. However, in the instant case, we are not confronted with any change in the fact situation during the pendency of the proceedings whereas in the above case the eviction petition was originally filed on the ground that the land-o\vner required the premises for business purposes. After his death during the pendency of the appeal, ihe son came on record but the petition was not amended nor the son gave any evidence in the appeal. The deceased landlord stated in his evidence that the premises was required for business to be carried on by his son and, therefore, the reasoning of the appellate Court that the details of the business were not given was not tenable. By not stating the nature of business and the particulars thereof, it could not be said that any prejudice would be caused to the tenant and that it was not necessary to state the nature and particulars of business in the petition. The facts before us are quite different, it would not be in order to apply tiie ratio emerging from the above case to the facls of the present case.
29. It would thus appear that on both the grounds namely, the ground of wilful default in payment of rent and bonafide personal requirement, Ihe landlord does not succeed and the appellate Court erred in rejecting the conclusions arrived at by the Rent Controller for dismissing the landlord's petition for evicting the tenant from the demised premises. Hence, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the impugned judgment of the appellate Court in RANo.362 of 1991 dated 6-12-1995 is hereby quashed and set-aside. The judgment and decree passed by the Rent Controller in RC.No.255 of 1986 dated 4-9-1991 dismissing ihe eviction petition is upheld and revived. No costs.